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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the governance of climate change policy in English and German 
cities. Based on fieldwork research in the comparable 'twin towns' of Newcastle and 
Gelsenkirchen, it focuses on how local authorities in these cities have worked with other 
actors to increase their capacity to achieve policy objectives. The study analyses these 
governance arrangements in the context of climate change strategies, planning policy and 
how the municipalities use resources in their everyday corporate activities. 
 
Drawing on theories and typologies of multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003), 
policy styles (Richardson 1982), urban governance (Stone 1989) and dependencies in inter-
governmental relations (Rhodes 1981), it introduces a new model for mapping power 
relationships between governing actors. By applying this model to the empirical cases, the 
thesis identifies how central-local relations in England are looser than those in Germany, and 
how this results in weaker municipal institutions. This means that Newcastle has had to rely 
more on local stakeholders to achieve its objectives when compared to Gelsenkirchen. The 
English council is also less able to exert hierarchical authority over other bodies.  
 
Although the study found that the two cities’ approaches are converging in some areas, they 
are diverging in others. Indeed, they have developed their own distinct coping strategies to 
achieve policy objectives in the face of similar endogenous and exogenous pressures. These 
coping strategies are shaped by the institutional framework and power dependent 
relationships that apply to each city, which challenges the idea that policy problems 
determine the way in which the political system operates (see Lowi 1964). Such findings 
have implications for other municipalities in both England and Germany, as well as cities 
elsewhere in Europe that are seeking to address climate change or other ‘wicked’ public 
policy issues. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
Atmospheric concentrations of ‘greenhouse gases’ (GHGs), which trap heat in the 
earth’s atmosphere and therefore result in higher global temperatures, have risen 
significantly over the last two centuries. In 1800, carbon dioxide (CO2), the main 
GHG, constituted around 280 parts per million (ppm) of the earth’s atmosphere – a 
figure that had crept up to 305 ppm by 1945, due to the industrialisation of many 
Western countries and an increasing reliance on fossil fuels for energy production 
(Dryzek, 2014). By early 2015, however, it had risen to over 400 ppm, and was still 
increasing by around 2 ppm every year (ESRL, 2015). This is despite increasingly 
stark warnings from the vast majority of the world’s most eminent scientists about the 
consequences of rising global temperatures and the fact that these increases are 
largely caused by human activity (IPCC, 2007, IPCC, 2014), as well as various 
attempts to tackle the problem within the international arena. Indeed, the decade 
2001-2010 was the warmest since reliable records began in 1850, and countries 
around the world experienced an increase in flooding, droughts, heavy rainfall and 
heatwaves during this period (WMO, 2013). Scientists estimate that the world’s 
average temperature could rise by as much as 4°C between 1986 and 2100 if 
humanity is unable to address the issue effectively (IPCC, 2014). Such an increase 
could trigger an even faster acceleration in global warming, which may be 
‘irreversible’ and impossible for humanity to control (Stern, 2008). 
 
These developments show how policy-makers have struggled to address the issue 
effectively, despite the huge threat that climate change poses to natural and human 
systems. A key reason for this lack of progress is that the issue requires a co-ordinated 
response from state and non-state actors at all levels across the globe. These actors 
include cities, which various studies have identified as being particularly at risk from 
climate-related events such as flash-flooding, heavy storms and coastal erosion 
(Nicholls et al., 2008, World Bank, 2010, IPCC, 2014) and in which the majority of 
the world’s population now lives (UN, 2014). Given the fact that some municipal 
governments have been seeking to address climate change since the 1990s (Bulkeley 
and Betsill, 2003), it is surprising that political science scholars have not focused 
more on how local political actors are dealing with the issue. Indeed, as chapter 2 will 
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highlight, most of the academic studies into local climate governance have come from 
a geographical perspective. 
 
This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by investigating climate change policy 
in English and German cities, focusing specifically on the comparable 'twin towns' of 
Newcastle upon Tyne and Gelsenkirchen. It is particularly interested in how the 
municipalities in each city work with other actors in order to try and achieve their 
policy objectives, and the extent to which these external organisations shape decision-
making processes. In order to identify which actors are influential in driving the 
policies of local councils, it analyses the nature of each municipality’s vertical 
relationships with other tiers of government, as well as how they work with horizontal 
local stakeholders. The study analyses these governance arrangements in the context 
of climate change strategies, planning policy and how the municipalities use resources 
in their everyday corporate activities. 
 
This introductory chapter begins by placing the investigation in the context of wider 
debates about the changing role of the state and how governing actors (including 
cities) have responded to the issue of climate change. Building on this background, it 
then draws out the key aims and objectives of the thesis, and how they have 
determined the methodology, case selection and approach to data collection. It then 
provides a brief overview of the remaining chapters and discusses how they relate to 
the key research questions – namely: how are the municipalities in Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle addressing the issue of climate change, and to what extent are their 
governance approaches converging towards a hybrid model?  
 
1.1 Background and context  
 
1.1.1 The changing role of the state in developed countries 
 
Since the 1970s, a myriad of influences have changed the way in which governments 
in developed countries seek to achieve their objectives, and they have been of 
considerable interest to political scientists. Around this time, various academics began 
to express concerns that Western states had tried to undertake too many tasks and 
were becoming ‘overloaded’ (King, 1975, Hanf, 1978, Kooiman, 2003) as a result: 
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some even argued that their inability to deliver policy goals was making societies 
‘ungovernable’ (Crozier et al., 1975, Grunow, 2003). In response, governments 
attempted to reduce the scope of their activity, or work more closely with non-state 
actors to achieve political objectives, in order to try and maintain the legitimacy of 
state institutions. Notably, this trend was particularly apparent at the local level: 
indeed, municipalities in various developed countries were at the forefront of attempts 
to implement ‘New Public Management’ (NPM, see Hood, 1991) techniques, 
including outsourcing, privatisation or public-private partnerships (John, 2001).  
 
In addition, more recent pressures (such as the growing influence of supranational 
actors like the European Union, rapid developments in technology, increasingly 
powerful global corporations and the 2007/8 financial crisis) have also shaped the 
ways in which democracies seek to address policy issues. These factors have 
challenged traditional approaches to policy-making, such as the UK’s ‘Westminster 
model’ and Germany’s Rechtsstaat, which many academics argued were becoming 
increasingly unfit for purpose (Hesse and Benz, 1990, Rhodes, 1997, Mayntz, 2009, 
2010). In particular, they led various scholars to ponder whether political institutions 
and policies in different jurisdictions may be converging, as they seek to address 
comparable pressures in similar ways (Guillén, 2001, Jörgens et al., 2014) 
 
At the same time, the nature of policy problems that Western states seek to address 
has changed markedly, as governments have been confronted with an increasing 
number of ‘wicked issues’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) – including obesity, social 
exclusion, drug trafficking, migration and environmental degradation. These issues 
encompass a range of stakeholders and require decision-makers to integrate policy 
objectives across different policy sectors, as well as engage more widely with non-
state actors. Furthermore, policy-makers often have to take decisions based on 
incomplete or contradictory knowledge, which makes it very difficult to agree a 
common way forward. Indeed, some stakeholders may even disagree about the nature 
or extent of the problem – yet they often need to change their behaviour to address the 
issue effectively and therefore have to be involved in finding a solution.  
 
Building on this, several scholars have described global climate change as a ‘super 
wicked problem’ or even a ‘policy tragedy’, because ‘time is running out; those who 
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cause the problem also seek to provide a solution; the central authority needed to 
address it is weak or non-existent; and… policy responses discount the future 
irrationally’ (Levin et al., 2012, p. 123). This suggests that it is likely to disrupt 
traditional governance processes even more than ‘normal’ wicked issues, and 
therefore policy-makers must adopt new approaches if they are to have any hope of 
addressing the problem effectively.  
 
Writing before Rittel and Webber published their seminal article, Lowi (1964) argued 
that the nature of policy problems determines how the political system will seek to 
address them. Since then, wicked issues have presented policy-makers with new and 
increasingly complex challenges, because functional and sectoral Western states were 
not designed to embrace a range of potential actors in decision-making processes. 
Indeed, we might expect contemporary governing actors to be constrained by the 
traditional institutions within which they operate, and therefore find it difficult to seek 
out new and more effective ways of addressing complex policy problems. 
Alternatively, they may be able to break free from their historical legacy and adopt 
more appropriate responses to wicked issues, regardless of pre-ordained views or 
structures that might favour a particular technique. This potential tension between 
institutionalised structures and the most appropriate political response to complex 
policy problems lies at the heart of this thesis. 
 
As this discussion has indicated, various factors are disrupting the traditional 
processes that governments in developed countries have adopted to address policy 
problems. These include reforms to governance structures in Western countries 
(particularly at the municipal level), exogenous pressures such as globalisation and 
the financial crisis, and the complex nature of ‘wicked’ issues such as climate change. 
Moreover, this thesis focuses on two cities that have experienced significant economic 
upheaval and financial problems in recent decades (see section 1.3.2 and chapters 3 
and 4). As a result, we might expect their councils to be facing demands and pressures 
that are not present in wealthier municipal areas. Overall, therefore, climate change in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle represents a particularly potent challenge to prevailing 
institutional structures for policy-making. Indeed, it is perhaps more likely than other 
policy sectors to be challenging traditional governance approaches, which makes it a 
particularly interesting subject for academic analysis.  
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1.1.2  Cities and climate change 
 
As chapter 2 will highlight in greater detail, there is an extensive literature on the 
evolving international regime for climate change and how governments have sought 
to address the issue through organisations such as the United Nations. More recently, 
geographers such as Harriet Bulkeley and her colleagues have stressed the important 
role that sub-national tiers of governance need to play in climate protection, 
emphasising how the issue cannot be addressed solely at the global level (Bulkeley 
and Betsill, 2003, Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005, Bulkeley and Kern, 2006, Bulkeley and 
Casta´n Broto, 2011). Organisations such as the World Bank (2010) have echoed 
these concerns. Indeed, Agenda 21, which refers explicitly to local government’s role 
in reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, was agreed at the 1992 Earth Summit in 
Rio, thereby illustrating how policy-makers recognised the important part that the 
municipal level would need to play in dealing with the problem over two decades ago. 
Such a view also chimes with other academic perspectives, which point out that sub-
national institutions play a crucial role in delivering a range of public goods and 
services (Ostrom, 1990, Putnam et al., 1993, Savitch and Kantor).  
 
However, there is remarkably little analysis from a political science perspective about 
how municipalities are seeking to address climate change, and what their approaches 
might say about the nature of local democracy in Western countries. This is 
particularly important, given that local authorities tend to work more with external 
actors than central government and are therefore perhaps even more vulnerable to the 
changes in the institutional environment detailed in section 1.1.1. This thesis will fill 
some of this gap by focusing on two comparable municipalities in Germany and 
England.  
 
1.2  Aims and objectives of the thesis 
 
The above discussion has highlighted how various factors could be changing the ways 
in which Western cities seek to address policy problems. With these observations in 
mind, it is crucial to note that this thesis will examine the governance approaches of 
each case study city (in other words, the processes involved in making and 
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implementing policy) - not the outcomes of these processes. Therefore, it will not 
attempt to assess the level of ambition or perceived ‘effectiveness’ of particular 
solutions, but rather focus on which actors influence these policies and – by extension 
– the power dynamics within these stakeholder relationships. 
 
Chapter 2 will discuss the trend away from individual state organisations being solely 
or largely responsible for public policy and the increasing degree of interdependence 
between governance actors. These developments raise important democratic concerns, 
because they make it more difficult to identify which stakeholders are exerting most 
influence over decision-making. Furthermore, the potential involvement of private 
actors in policy-making (from lobbying right through to the delivery of public 
services) can reduce the level of accountability. This has led critics to point out that 
such ‘new’ modes of governance tend to be ‘exclusive’ rather than democratic, and 
argue that they need to operate under the shadow of elected political institutions in 
order to be legitimate (Bellamy et al., 2011).  
 
At the same time, however, this trend can increase the state’s capacity to implement 
policy – particularly in wicked sectors such as climate change, where a range of 
stakeholders need to act in order to achieve policy goals. This has led some to argue 
that there is a ‘trade-off’ between the ‘representativeness’ and ‘influence’ of elected 
bodies (Shepsle, 1988), and that policy-makers need to get this balance right in order 
to address problems effectively whilst remaining accountable to voters. In short, 
therefore, any changes to governance approaches would alter how public policies are 
made and power is distributed (Capano et al., 2012), which raises important concerns 
about democratic oversight and accountability. 
 
Crucially, however, this thesis will not address such normative issues directly, or try 
to construct arguments about the value of ‘trading off’ democracy in return for 
increasing the state’s ability to deliver public goods. Such deliberations sit in the 
realm of applied political theory and are therefore outside the scope of this empirical 
investigation. Nonetheless, this study’s research findings are likely to raise such 
concerns, because the pressures outlined in section 1.1.1 are challenging the tradition 
of hierarchical government in Western European cities and leading to greater 
interdependence between policy-making actors. Instead, this thesis will concentrate 
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on the (changing) nature of governance in two comparable cities, and focus 
particularly on how their respective councils are responding to these challenges. Since 
the project concentrates on the municipal level, it will examine both vertical and 
horizontal relationships (in other words, how each city council works with ‘higher’ 
tiers of government and with other local actors), and the changing nature of these 
arrangements as decision-makers try to identify the most effective way of addressing 
climate change.  
 
As chapter 2 will demonstrate, scholars such as Herrschel and Newman (2002) have 
used Hooghe and Marks’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2003) typology of multi-level 
governance to characterise Germany and England as having contrasting structures for 
sub-national government. Indeed, Germany’s federal structure has been embedded in 
the country’s constitutional system for some time, whereas England is a unitary state 
in which central government has historically restricted the activities of local 
authorities. Similarly, Jordan and Richardson (1982), Dyson (1982), Knill and 
Lenschow (1998) and Wurzel (2002) have highlighted how Germany and England 
differ in terms of policy style, in that the former has tended to operate more 
hierarchically and legalistically than the latter, as well as opt for more ambitious 
policy solutions. These contrasting characteristics formed the initial basis for the 
empirical fieldwork, which sought to identify the extent to which governing 
arrangements in each case study city resembled these typical models, and whether 
they might be changing and/or converging towards a ‘hybrid’ arrangement due to the 
adoption of previously ‘foreign’ techniques or approaches. 
  
Whilst the thesis does still undertake this mapping exercise, it soon became apparent 
that these typical characterisations do not provide the tools to analyse relationships 
between key stakeholders in each city. As such, they did not help to identify which 
actors are most influential in decision-making processes – something that is core to 
the discipline of political science. To address this problem, chapter 2 develops a new 
framework for examining power dependencies between governing actors, which does 
achieve this goal and also highlights the differences between Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle in a more analytical way. As such, chapter 3, which traces the 
establishment and development of local government in Germany and England, 
maintains a constant focus on the nature of vertical and horizontal power 
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dependencies in both countries throughout this period. Following on from this, the 
empirical part of the thesis (chapters 4, 5 and 6) adopts the concept of power 
dependence to identify the nature of decision-making in the case study cities. Each of 
these chapters addresses a separate policy sector: climate change strategy, planning, 
and the corporate policies adopted by the case study municipalities. 
 
Overall, this thesis aims to investigate the nature of climate governance in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle and identify whether it is changing in any way. 
Therefore, this encompasses both the ‘mapping’ of empirically-observed governance 
arrangements in the case study cities against the ‘ideal’ models suggested in academic 
literature, and also the analysis of vertical and horizontal power dependencies. For the 
purposes of clarification, these research questions, along with details of how chapters 
3-6 will address each of them, are outlined in figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Research questions at the core of this thesis and how they will be 
addressed 
 
1.3  Epistemological and methodological considerations 
 
This subsection sets out my ontological and epistemological position and how this 
determined the methods I adopted for data collection and examination. As such, it 
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highlights how the research questions detailed above necessitate a reliance on 
qualitative techniques, particularly interviews with key stakeholders, and the potential 
limitations of this approach. 
 
1.3.1.   The relevance and limitations of qualitative methodologies 
 
Crucially, because this project is concerned with analysing actor motivations, power 
relationships and decision-making processes, it needs to rely on qualitative methods 
of data collection and analysis. Quantitative approaches would do insufficient justice 
to these complex issues, since such interactions cannot be condensed into statistical 
datasets – and even if these data were available, they probably would not be relevant. 
Instead, these phenomena can only be identified through approaches such as 
interviews, focus groups or participant observation. Notably, however, that means that 
the findings from this thesis are not necessarily replicable or applicable in other 
contexts, since they cannot represent a ‘universal truth’ in the positivist tradition 
(Devine, 2002).  
 
Upon consideration of the various qualitative approaches available, it becomes clear 
that neither participant observation nor focus groups are likely to provide the data that 
is required for a rigorous examination of climate governance. Both of these 
techniques have significant disadvantages: the former can be extremely time-
consuming (Bogner et al., 2009), whereas the latter may result in some participants 
dominating proceedings or becoming ‘conditioned’ or ‘contaminated’ by their 
involvement (Stopher, 2012). They also require the consent and co-ordination of 
significantly more people than interviews, which can be arranged at a time that need 
only be convenient for two or three individuals.  
 
Indeed, anonymised interviews are the best method to adopt when trying to identify 
connections and relationships between actors, because their complex and nuanced 
nature is not expressed (and indeed cannot be captured) in other ways (Kvale, 1996). 
Interviews are necessary to understand the nature of these constructs (Marsh and 
Furlong, 2002) and therefore answer the research questions that are central to this 
thesis. In this way, they can provide meaning and experience to events that suggest 
causality, even though they cannot ‘prove’ that a single independent variable results 
10 
 
in a particular outcome (King and Horrocks, 2010). Furthermore, because the 
interviewees for this project are primarily ‘elites’ (Woods, 1998) or ‘experts’ 
(Pfadenhauer, 2009) in the field of study, this is likely to improve the quality of data 
that they provide (Bogner et al., 2009). 
 
Nonetheless, various scholars have identified other potential drawbacks of relying on 
interviews for research purposes. These include a lack of reflexivity on behalf of the 
researcher (Reed, 2012), possible bias in the answers of participants (Kezar, 2003), 
and the probability that semi-structured discussions will not follow a consistent 
format and could therefore mean that some data are misleading or taken out of context 
(Kvale, 1996). Many of these issues are unavoidable when relying on qualitative 
techniques, and they raise questions about whether the thesis will be able to obtain 
data of sufficient quality. Furthermore, the fieldwork for this thesis relied heavily on a 
snowball technique to identify interview subjects, which meant that some 
interviewees may have been able to shape the nature of my research by acting as 
gatekeepers, blocking access to certain individuals, wanting to know the content of 
interview discussions, or presenting a version of events that casts them in a good light 
(Atkinson and Flint, 2001). 
 
‘Triangulation’ techniques are one way of responding to these issues, and, as section 
1.3.3 will discuss in further detail, I relied heavily on this approach. However, since I 
conducted the research in collaboration with Newcastle City Council, there was also a 
risk that I could become too embedded in one of the organisations under investigation 
to draw reliable conclusions. I addressed this by keeping some distance away from the 
authority (for example, I only entered council buildings to undertake fieldwork 
interviews) and making a conscious effort to remain objective during data collection 
and analysis. 
 
1.3.2  Case selection  
 
Although I did consider examining cities in three different countries at the outset of 
the project, I decided to focus on two in order to ensure that they could be 
investigated in sufficient depth. There were also practical reasons for this choice: it 
makes it easier to identify and explain contrasting approaches to governance and also 
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increases the chances that the thesis will focus on each city to a similar extent. I 
selected Germany and England for various reasons, many of which are outlined in 
further detail in chapter 3. In particular, there are significant differences in the genesis 
and development of local government in these countries, which may have led German 
and English municipalities to address climate change in contrasting ways. For 
example, until a ‘general power of competence’ came into force through the Localism 
Act 2011, English councils could only do what was expressly permitted in statute – 
otherwise they would be acting ultra vires and could be prosecuted. This contrasts 
with a long-standing constitutional guarantee of lokale Selbstverwaltung (local self-
administration) in Germany. Such contrasts are also evident in each country’s multi-
level governance arrangements, as well as their preferred policy styles (see section 
1.2). At the same time, both countries have highly-developed economies, are 
members of the European Union and have professed their willingness to reduce CO2 
emissions. As such, we might expect them to follow similar policy paths in order to 
mitigate climate change.  
 
Furthermore, the study took great care to select comparable cities at the outset of the 
project. Indeed, Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle share many common features and 
therefore a study that compares them as ‘most similar systems design’ (Przeworski 
and Teune, 1970, Keman, 2011) is able to control for a large number of other 
variables and focus on the critical institutional variables that differ. Firstly, they are 
very similar in size: Newcastle has a population of 270,000 and Gelsenkirchen has 
260,000 inhabitants, and both are situated within larger conurbations – the Tyne and 
Wear region and Ruhrgebiet area of north-western Germany respectively. Secondly, 
they were both strongly associated with heavy industry between the eighteenth and 
mid-twentieth centuries – coal mining was a major employer in both cities, 
Gelsenkirchen had a large steel sector and Newcastle was a big shipbuilding centre 
during this period. Thirdly, this shared history has left a common legacy of 
deindustrialisation and economic decline since the late 1960s, which both cities have 
sought to address by re-branding themselves as forward-looking, sustainable locations 
to attract investment from the low-carbon sector (see also chapters 4 and 6). Indeed, 
the fact that both cities have also been suffering from economic decline in recent 
decades could mean that their governance arrangements are even more dynamic than 
those of wealthier areas elsewhere in Germany and England. This is because they are 
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more likely to have changed to reflect new political priorities – particularly given the 
relatively recent arrival of climate change on the political agenda. Finally, both 
countries are members of the European Union, and are therefore subject to the same 
supranational agreements for mitigating climate change. Considering the similarity 
between the two cities, it is unsurprising that they agreed a ‘twinning’ arrangement in 
1947 – in spite of the fact that the experiences of the World War II were still raw at 
this point. 
 
Bulkeley & Betsill (2005) highlight another potential drawback of comparing how 
local authorities in different countries attempt to address policy problems. In 
particular, they stress how privatisation and outsourcing have reduced the ability of 
English municipalities to shape their local areas – both in the way services are 
delivered and how people in the community pursue everyday activities (see also 
Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). Indeed, Collier (1997) cautions that direct comparisons 
between local authorities in different countries should take account of the fact that 
they may have significantly different responsibilities, and therefore some will have 
more power to effect change than others. As such, I selected three sectors (namely 
climate change strategy, planning and corporate policy), for which the case study 
municipalities have comparable responsibilities. In addition, because each of these 
sectors is likely to require the involvement of external actors to varying degrees, we 
might expect the municipalities to adopt different policy-making approaches for each 
one. Therefore, by examining areas where we might expect to find both ‘horizontal’ 
and ‘hierarchical’ modes of governance, the thesis should provide a more rounded 
view on the way in which the case study councils address climate change.  
 
For example, chapter 4 analyses climate change strategy in the two cities: an issue 
over which municipalities have only limited control, since they are largely unable to 
direct the activities of other actors within the locality. As a result, we might expect 
both cities to engage more with external stakeholders to develop and implement their 
policy objectives in this sector. Chapter 5 examines planning policy, one of the few 
areas that have an impact on climate change over which councils in both countries 
maintain significant control (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003), and – notably – a sector in 
which German and English local authorities have comparable nominal powers. 
Therefore, the empirical research into this policy area may find that Gelsenkirchen 
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and Newcastle councils are exerting a greater degree of hierarchical influence over 
other local actors in governance arrangements. Finally, chapter 6 investigates the 
corporate policies of the case study municipalities, such as their energy and water 
consumption, and their approaches to procurement and corporate transport. This is 
something over which individual authorities have very significant control, which 
suggests that they would be in a position to adopt hierarchical modes of governance if 
they so wished.  
 
By examining different policy sectors in two comparable municipalities in this way, it 
should be possible to address the research question at the centre of this thesis, namely 
whether governance structures in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle are different and/or 
changing, and what might be causing these differences. Indeed, if climate change does 
result in contrasting governing solutions at the local level, then this suggests that 
policy-making processes are institutionalised to some extent – and this can then 
trigger further investigation into why they vary between the two cities. In addition, if 
there has been little or no change in decision-making styles or institutional structures 
in a sector where this is perhaps most likely, then this suggests that local policy-
making has not been as affected by globalisation or Europeanisation to the degree that 
some scholars claim.  
 
1.3.3  Methodology for this thesis 
 
Overall, the study involved 34 semi-structured interviews with a total of 37 people. 
Fifteen of the discussions, which covered 19 individuals, were in Gelsenkirchen and 
the surrounding area, and the remaining 19 interviews involved 18 different people in 
Newcastle. Alongside searching each council’s website to find the names and contact 
details of relevant individuals, I also adopted a snowball technique to identify 
potential interviewees. With one exception, every person I asked to participate did 
agree to participate and respond to my questions – and this single individual 
suggested that I speak to a colleague instead, who was happy to oblige. The 
interviewees worked in a range of council departments, including environment, 
planning, economic development, corporate procurement and policy, and included 
some very senior managers in both municipalities. I also spoke to staff in a number of 
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other public bodies, as well as representatives from the local voluntary sector in each 
city.  
 
In order to ensure that interviewees responded in an unbiased manner, the 
conversations relied on neutral, restrained and open questions (Kvale, 1996), and their 
answers were never taken out of context. Furthermore, on several occasions I 
contacted participants after the interview in order to clarify their comments or follow-
up some responses with additional questions. All participants were guaranteed 
anonymity, in order to ensure that their individual interests were secured and to 
encourage more honest and open discussions. A list of interviews, dated and 
numbered in chronological order, is provided in the appendix. 
 
The Newcastle fieldwork was conducted in English between January 2012 and May 
2015, and the Gelsenkirchen interviews were held in German between June and 
September 2013.1 Twenty-seven of the 34 conversations were recorded: in each of 
these cases I noted down some points that related to key themes of my research during 
the interview itself and then transcribed more detailed passages later whilst listening 
to the audio file. Three of the individuals with whom I spoke face-to-face did not want 
our conversations to be recorded, and in these instances I took detailed notes during 
the course of the discussion. I also adopted this approach when speaking to two 
Gelsenkirchen interviewees on the telephone. Finally, I conducted one interview in 
each case study city by email, which ensured that I captured these data electronically 
at source.  
 
Although software programs such as NVivo and Atlas have been developed to help 
with qualitative data analysis, I decided not to use them for two main reasons. Firstly, 
these programs were originally designed for scholars who employ grounded theory to 
explain their findings (Welsh, 2002). I already had a clear idea of my theoretical 
approach and research question before conducting the interviews, which meant that 
such software programs may have been less useful for my project than they might be 
for others. More importantly, however, I did not want to distance myself from the data 
                                                 
1 All translations from these German discussions into English are my own, as indeed are translations 
from the German-language literature. 
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and rely on software to undertake this important task, in case the technology would 
not analyse the text rigorously enough or code it appropriately. As Seidel (1991) 
argued, this would carry a risk that the software determines the focus of analysis, 
instead of acting merely as a support tool. Indeed, Brown et al. (2008) found that 
software programs sometimes fail to identify where interviewees may have used 
different words to describe similar phenomena, which could have a significant impact 
on how the data are coded and – ultimately – analysed.  
 
Instead of relying on software, and in order to retain personal control over this crucial 
part of the project, I created separate files for each individual interview and coded the 
interview data according to the specific themes and sub-themes of my research 
question that they addressed. For example, if an interviewee mentioned the role of 
other vertical actors in shaping Newcastle Council’s planning policy, then I coded 
their response accordingly and copied and pasted the relevant text into subsection 
5.2.2.1, the part of the corresponding chapter that covers multi-level governance. 
Similarly, if an individual from Gelsenkirchen talked about how the council sought to 
invest in high-end sustainability features in its office buildings, then I incorporated 
this into my analysis of the German municipality’s preference for ‘state of the art’ 
solutions in its corporate policies (section 6.3.1.2). I then analysed each dataset 
individually to ascertain the extent to which they suggested each council was adopting 
a typically ‘German’ or ‘English’ approach to policy-making (and the extent to which 
their position had changed in recent years) and plotted them on illustrative diagrams 
accordingly. I adopted a similar approach to my analysis of power dependencies in 
terms of each municipality’s vertical and horizontal relationships.2  
 
Furthermore, as section 1.3.1 outlined, interviewing as a research methodology has its 
own potential drawbacks. To mitigate against these risks, I also sought out a range of 
other sources, including academic analyses, statistics on carbon emissions and 
building standards, ‘grey’ literature such as audit or think tank reports, minutes from 
meetings, policy documents, legislation, and interviewees outside the municipalities 
                                                 
2 See figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5 for examples of these illustrative diagrams, and chapter 2 more 
generally for a more detailed explanation of how they relate to the research question under 
investigation.  
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of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. In addition, the collaborative nature of my PhD 
studentship with Newcastle City Council meant that I had access to some 
documentation concerning the English case study that was not available to the wider 
public. ‘Triangulating’ various perspectives in this way can result in a more reliable 
version of events (Webb et al., 1966) and therefore enable the researcher to draw 
more satisfactory conclusions. Indeed, taking all of the above discussion into account, 
I am confident that the empirical analysis in chapters 4, 5 and 6 represents an accurate 
account of climate governance approaches in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. 
 
1.4  Overview of the following chapters 
 
The previous sections of this introductory chapter have explained the context for the 
rest of the thesis and the methods that it will adopt to address the research questions. 
All that now remains is to set out how each of the remaining chapters will contribute 
towards responding to these questions. This is represented diagrammatically in figure 
1.2, and explained in further detail below. 
 
Chapter 2 draws on various academic literatures to develop two complementary 
theoretical frameworks that shape the empirical analysis later in the thesis. The first of 
these frameworks utilises perspectives of multi-level governance and policy styles, 
and it sets out two dimensions of typically ‘German’ and ‘English’ local governance 
accordingly, based on the approaches that we might expect to find in each country. In 
keeping with the title of the thesis, this framework hypothesises that governance 
approaches are converging towards a hybrid model, in response to the exogenous and 
endogenous pressures discussed in section 1.1.1. The second framework allows for a 
more in-depth investigation into power relationships and decision-making within 
municipalities, by characterising them as broadly independent of, interdependent 
with, or dependent on other governing actors – along both vertical and horizontal 
dimensions.  
 
Chapter 3 traces the evolution of local authorities in Germany and England and uses 
the power dependency framework to analyse the changing nature of central-local 
government relations during this period. In particular, it highlights the contrasting 
genesis of modern local authorities in both countries, and how this legacy is still 
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relevant today, with the result that most German councils have significantly more 
autonomy and capacity than their English counterparts. In this way, the chapter sets 
out a ‘baseline’ scenario that we might expect to find from empirical research in the 
case study cities. 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 set out the empirical findings of the study into Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle councils. Chapter 4 focuses on the governance arrangements for climate 
change strategies, chapter 5 covers planning and chapter 6 concentrates on the 
municipalities’ corporate policies. Each of these chapters maps the councils’ policy-
making approaches against the characteristically ‘German’ and ‘English’ models and 
also analyses their relations with other stakeholders using the power dependency 
framework.  
 
Figure 1.2: Overview of chapters 2-7 and how they address the research question 
 
Overall, these chapters find that governance approaches in the two cities differ, and 
are also changing along the dimensions of multi-level governance and policy styles. 
This is primarily due to the case study municipalities adopting coping strategies in 
which they seek out sources of additional capacity in order to achieve their policy 
objectives. However, their approaches are not always converging – and in many cases 
they are actually diverging in terms of the multi-level governance typology. In other 
words, these chapters do not support the hypothesis that both cities are moving 
towards a hybrid model of local governance that incorporates a combination of 
‘English’ and ‘German’ approaches. 
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The empirically-based analysis of power dependencies in the case study cities is more 
illuminating. In particular, chapters 4, 5 and 6 identify the key role that vertical 
relationships play in determining municipal capacity, and how greater 
interdependence along this dimension in Germany has meant that Gelsenkirchen 
Council is able to act more independently vis à vis other horizontal actors. In contrast, 
Newcastle Council’s greater independence from central government means it has less 
internal capacity and is more dependent on other organisations in the area to 
implement policy. Crucially, therefore, these vertical power dependencies shaped the 
nature of councils’ horizontal relationships, which then influenced the governance 
arrangements within each city. As a result, the empirical chapters are able to identify 
the most influential actors in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle across each policy sector, 
and thereby highlight the key contrasts between the case study cities in a manner that 
multi-level governance and policy styles cannot. 
 
Following on from the empirical analysis, chapter 7 concludes the thesis with an 
overview of its key arguments. As such, it reiterates the contrasting nature of local 
climate governance in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle, and how vertical relationships 
have shaped each council’s capacity to act independently of other horizontal actors in 
the locality. The chapter also explains how these findings raise a number of normative 
questions associated with democratic accountability, sets out various avenues for 
future research and draws attention to how the power dependency framework could be 
applied in a range of other empirical contexts. Indeed, this framework represents the 
central theoretical contribution of this thesis and could prove to be a useful tool for 
other scholars of sub-national government. After reviewing a range of other relevant 
literatures, the next chapter will set out the framework and discuss its applicability for 
analysing local climate governance arrangements.  
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Chapter 2: A new framework for analysing local climate governance 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
As chapter 1 clarified, this thesis focuses on governance approaches in the two cities 
of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle, as illustrated by how each municipality seeks to 
address the problem of climate change. Therefore, the theoretical perspectives that 
might support this analysis are not solely concerned with examining environmental 
policy – instead, they seek to explain broader dynamics associated with public policy, 
governance and power relations. Nonetheless, climate change interpretations are 
useful, because they help to frame the research question and highlight the link 
between purely environmental perspectives and broader theoretical approaches to 
public policy.  
 
With that in mind, this chapter introduces a variety of relevant literatures and analyses 
how each of them relate to the research questions set out in chapter 1. As such, it will 
cover the following academic perspectives in turn: international attempts to address 
climate change; governance; multi-level governance; policy implementation; policy 
networks; new public management; organisational capacity; environmental policy 
integration; policy styles; and urban governance. As will become apparent, each 
individual perspective by itself is insufficient to help explain all of the phenomena 
associated with local climate policy-making. Instead, a combination of various 
approaches is necessary to understand governance arrangements in English and 
German cities, particularly considering the wicked nature of the sector. Therefore, the 
chapter pulls these perspectives together to develop an integrated hypothesis that 
frames the empirical analysis in chapters 4, 5 and 6. This relies largely on multi-level 
governance typologies and ‘policy style’ perspectives, and therefore draws in 
particular on the work of Hooghe and Marks (2003), Richardson et al. (1982), Wurzel 
(2002), and Knill and Lenschow (1998).  
 
As will become clear however, this hypothesis will not provide a sufficient theoretical 
basis for explaining the reasons why each city takes a particular approach to climate 
governance, or indeed why it might be changing. To fill this gap and provide more 
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support for the empirical analysis, the chapter will build on Rhodes’ (1981) theory of 
power dependence in central-local relations. In particular, it will show how Rhodes’ 
concepts can help to understand the root causes behind the development of local 
climate governance approaches in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. Moreover, it will set 
out how Rhodes’ theory can be integrated with multi-level governance perspectives to 
illustrate the extent to which municipalities are independent of, interdependent with or 
dependent on other governance actors – and how the nature of these relationships may 
be shaping policy styles. Crucially, this model can be applied to both the vertical and 
horizontal context within with local authorities operate – in other words, the 
relationships between central and local government on the one hand, and 
municipalities and other local actors on the other. In this way, it is able to identify the 
most powerful decision-makers within local governance arrangements, and therefore 
which actors are shaping and/or changing existing approaches to climate change in 
each case study city.  
 
2.2  Relevant theoretical perspectives on local climate governance 
 
This section discusses a range of literatures that are relevant for analysing climate 
change policy in Western European cities. It begins with a discussion on international 
relations perspectives, since the global nature of climate change means that 
governments from across the world need to work together to address the issue. It then 
goes on to highlight how international relations theories are related to the idea of 
‘governance’, and its importance for understanding public policy at the domestic and 
sub-national level. As such, the discussion then segues into an overview of multi-level 
governance, before addressing policy implementation, policy networks, new public 
management, organisational capacity, environmental policy integration, policy styles 
and urban governance in turn. The review illustrates how each theory intersects with 
another in some of its interpretations. At the same time, it highlights the shortcomings 
of each perspective, and how the subsequent literature can to help to fill in the gaps 
that remain.  
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2.2.1   International relations perspectives 
 
A substantial body of literature focuses on the global nature of climate change, and 
how states have tried to respond to the challenge through international initiatives such 
as the Kyoto Protocol (see Bodansky, 2006 for an overview of what he refers to as 
'the international climate change regime'). This research tends to use the traditional 
tools of international relations (IR) scholars and theories such as neo-realism to 
analyse decision-making processes. For example, they identify how states with similar 
concerns often coalesce into groups and negotiate agreements based on their 
enlightened self-interest (Grubb and Brack, 1999, Luterbacher and Sprinz, 2001), 
highlight how domestic interest groups shape governments’ bargaining positions 
(Böhmelt, 2013), or seek to identify a workable solution to the apparent impasse (R. 
Eckersley, 2012). This research is of course extremely valuable from a normative 
perspective, because co-ordinated international action is essential to prevent global 
temperatures from rising to a level where ‘runaway’ climate change becomes a 
reality. Indeed, it highlights how various global agreements have set targets to reduce 
anthropocentric greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and EU member state also pledged 
to cut them by 20% by 2020 against the 1990 baseline. Such initiatives provide a 
useful background reference point for the thesis, because they stress the fact that there 
is broad agreement globally about the urgency of the issue, and that co-ordinated 
action is necessary to deal with the problem.  
 
However, global agreements have failed to curb the volume of GHGs released into the 
atmosphere, because world leaders have not been able to change the behaviour of 
businesses, other organisations and private individuals (Auer, 2000). Indeed, the UK 
and Germany – the two countries that this thesis will investigate at the local level – 
are the only two Western European states to have made significant progress on 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions since 1990. In both cases there are specific 
reasons for this – there has been a ‘dash for gas’ as a fuel source in Britain following 
the closure of many coal mines, whereas the de-industrialisation of the former GDR 
resulted in a large drop in the use of fossil fuels across post-unification Germany 
(Wurzel, 2002, Collier, 2002). Thus, although IR perspectives may help to understand 
decision-making processes at the global level, they do not assist with interpreting 
policy outcomes within individual countries or cities. International relations scholars 
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would probably contend that examining approaches to policy implementation requires 
a completely different set of tools. Indeed, by only dealing with agreements at the 
‘highest level’, they neglect a range of influences ‘lower down’ the policy chain that 
prevent objectives from being achieved (Auer, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, and as chapter 1 highlighted, many environmental problems tend to be 
classic ‘wicked’ issues (Rittel and Webber, 1973, Nilsson et al., 2009a): they defy 
resolution ‘because of the enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, 
and conflicting stakeholders implicated by any effort to develop a solution’ (Lazarus, 
2009, p. 1157). They are difficult to describe and address easily and there is no agreed 
view on the ‘public good’. In some cases, ‘green’ interest groups might even disagree 
with each other about whether a potential solution would benefit the environment – 
such as constructing wind turbines or hydroelectric power stations in areas of natural 
beauty. Thus, important stakeholders can often have significantly different 
perspectives on how to solve specific problems, or what the key concern may be, or 
even whether addressing it would be desirable. Yet they must be incorporated into the 
process if the policy is to have any degree of success. Any attempt to reduce 
pollution, for example, requires polluters to change their behaviour – by choice or 
compulsion.  
 
Levin et al. (2012) highlight how climate change is even more complex and 
challenging than other wicked issues, and therefore describe it as a ‘super wicked’ 
problem, or ‘policy tragedy’. Indeed, as Bodansky (2006) points out, its direct 
relevance to the vast majority of human activities means that it encompasses a range 
of other social, economic and development issues. This means that individuals across 
the world have become subjects as well as objects in public policy, because their 
everyday actions have implications for the rest of humanity (Grunow, 2003). 
However, because key stakeholders often disagree about the best way to reduce fossil 
fuel consumption, the governing system is unable to develop effective strategies to 
mitigate climate change – with the result that GHG emissions increase unabated. 
 
As this suggests, any attempt to understand climate change policy needs to study the 
behaviour of a plethora of governing actors. These stakeholders include interest 
groups and private citizens, as well as national and sub-national governments, which 
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can result in extremely complex policy-making processes. In order to make sense of 
these arrangements, we need to adopt theoretical perspectives that can disentangle 
decision-making processes at all levels of governing. Moreover, since this thesis focus 
on cities as the unit of analysis, it should use theories that are particularly applicable 
to municipal government – and therefore IR perspectives are not very applicable to 
the study. 
 
2.2.2  Governance  
 
Nonetheless, the IR concept of ‘governance’ – the idea that states require input and 
support from a range of other actors in order to achieve their policy objectives 
(Rosenau, 1992) – is very relevant for analysing environmental policy in general 
(Biermann et al., 2009, Wurzel et al., 2013) and local responses to climate concerns 
in particular (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). As Rosenau argued, governments no longer 
govern alone (if indeed they ever did). Instead, various state and non-state actors co-
operate to try and control events in the international arena. Countless scholars have 
since identified its importance at national and (particularly) sub-national levels, 
especially since wicked issues became more prevalent. For example, Rhodes (1997) 
explains how these phenomena are clearly apparent in the UK, and how various 
pressures are eroding the traditional ‘Westminster model’ (see also Weale, 1997, 
Miller et al., 2000, John, 2001, Stoker, 2003, Pierre and Peters, 2012). Instead of 
hierarchical government, public bodies now work together with non-state actors to 
shape and implement policy together in governance arrangements, and the dynamics 
of their relationships often play a crucial role in determining policy outcomes.  
 
For some, ‘the involvement of society in the process of governing’ (Hill and Hupe, 
2002, p. 14) is what characterises the idea of governance. Although there is some 
debate about when private actors became more influential in decision-making, 
Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2011) argue that the shift towards these arrangements was a 
logical consequence of the process of ‘state retreat’ that has occurred across the 
developed world since the 1970s (see also Mayntz, 2009, and section 1.1.1 of this 
thesis). This view holds that politicians have actively sought to involve other 
stakeholders in decision-making processes – partly because they felt that the state was 
unable to continue delivering a wide range of high quality public goods and services, 
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and partly because they recognised the crucial role that non-state actors need to play 
in addressing wicked issues.  
 
Indeed, the idea of ‘governance’ has been widely accepted within academia, and 
many scholars have since identified similar trends within other countries through 
comparative studies (for example John and Cole, 1999, Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005, 
Bull and Jones, 2006). In the specific area of climate change, Bulkeley and Betsill 
(2003) have pointed out that ‘authority for making decisions related to the mitigation 
of greenhouse gas emissions has been redistributed upwards, to international 
organizations and transnational networks, downwards to cities and regions, and 
outwards to non-state actors’ (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003, p. 189). Similarly, Auer 
(2000) has stressed the importance of a range of state and non-state actors to any 
study of problems that are both global and local, with climate change as a prime 
example.  
 
Therefore, this research project assumes that all state and non-state actors that are 
involved in climate change policy have some influence over how that policy is 
developed and delivered. However, the sheer number of actors makes identifying 
independent variables and causal links extremely difficult (Benz et al., 2007): in other 
words, governance perspectives make it more difficult to focus on what is being done 
where, at which level, and by whom (Hill and Hupe, 2002). This poses problems for 
scholars who wish to study policy-making; it also raises issues about the nature of 
democratic accountability, since it becomes increasingly difficult to identify decision-
makers and citizens often have no direct recourse to potentially influential actors from 
the private sector.  
 
With this in mind, the explosion in ‘governance’ literature has led many scholars to 
differentiate between three different types of democratic legitimacy: a traditional type 
that focuses on citizen ‘inputs’ through the ballot box; one that corresponds to 
‘throughputs (which relates to decision-making processes); and a third that relates to 
the idea of ‘outputs’ and the effectiveness of the policy-making process (Scharpf, 
1999, Risse and Kleine, 2007, van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004). Indeed, 
although some have argued that the participation of different societal actors in 
governance arrangements means they are potentially more democratic and legitimate 
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(Héritier and Rhodes, 2011), critics of the exclusive and elitist nature of pluralism 
(Schattschneider, 1960, Lehman Schlozman et al., 2012) would challenge this 
perspective. Such normative questions are not central to the empirical nature of this 
project. However, the thesis will revisit them at regular intervals to highlight how 
changes in the way that state actors seek to address policy problems can have 
significant implications for traditional democratic processes.  
 
Some scholars argue that the state only needs to exert hierarchical authority if societal 
actors are reluctant to get involved in policy-making (Biermann, 2007). In contrast, 
others hold that the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ ensures that private companies and 
individuals will co-operate to avoid being subjected to binding regulations and/or 
direct state control (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2011). Indeed, although the participation 
by private actors in governance arrangements is by definition voluntary, the costs of 
not being involved can be very high. Similarly,  the agreements that ensue ‘are very 
often the second-best option for everybody’ (Bartolini, 2011, p. 9), but many 
academics accept that governance approaches offer the most workable solution. This 
is because actors are more likely to implement policies if they consent to them during 
the decision-making process (Heinelt, 2002).  
 
2.2.3  Multi-level governance 
 
Implicit in the above discussion is the idea of ‘multi-level’ or ‘multi-tiered’ 
governance – the notion that governance ‘happens’ within local, regional, national 
and international jurisdictions. This term was first coined by Gary Marks (1993) to 
describe the workings of the European Union (EU) and its member states, before 
gaining wider currency as other scholars began to emphasise how different tiers of 
government shape and implement policy, often in collaboration with societal actors 
(Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). Indeed, the emergence of supranational institutions 
such as the EU, the decentralisation of power within nation-states and structural 
reforms associated with New Public Management (NPM, see section 2.2.6) have 
made the term increasingly relevant to Western democracies (Peters and Pierre, 
2001). Crucially, not only does it assume that governance is an important horizontal 
factor across each of these levels, but it also takes account of vertical arrangements 
that result in policy priorities being shaped and delivered both ‘downwards’ (e.g., 
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from central to local government) and ‘upwards’ (in the opposite direction). In other 
words, multi-level governance arrangements reject traditional ‘top-down’ hierarchies 
by recognising that policy-making processes are complex and involve a range of 
different stakeholders. 
 
Due to the numerous state and non-state actors involved in environmental policy, and 
the ‘wicked’ nature of the issue, many scholars have sought to use multi-level 
governance perspectives to understand this sector (see for example Lenschow, 1999, 
Auer, 2000, Bulkeley, 2005, Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005, Schreurs, 2008). Indeed, the 
multi-level perspective can help to provide a more holistic analysis of policy 
processes and implementation strategies in a variety of scenarios. For example, the 
EU (through the regional development funds), or central or state/Land governments 
might impose specific targets on municipalities, or attach strings to funding grants to 
try and ensure that policy objectives are achieved. Alternatively, they may provide 
additional capacity and resources to help local authorities to achieve their objectives 
fairly autonomously of other horizontal actors. For their part, private actors could 
exercise significant influence over decision-making, with the result that policies do 
not reflect the ambitions of public officials. 
 
Together with Lisbet Hooghe, Marks developed the initial idea further by 
characterising two different types of multi-level governance: Type I, which consists of 
relatively static, multi-purpose jurisdictions where a single public body has direct 
responsibility for a range of services; and Type II, where more ad hoc, specific 
governance arrangements are more common (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Table 2.1 
summarises these differences.  
 
Hooghe and Marks (2003) acknowledge that the two theoretical types are ideal 
models and normally overlap in the real world, and that neither is demonstrably more 
effective than the other. Moreover, they stress that most (if not all) countries are 
positioned somewhere along a spectrum between the two models and do not conform 
to either ‘ideal’ type. Nonetheless, they provide a useful distinction for the purposes 
of comparative politics. In particular, Germany is a federal country that allocates 
specific responsibilities to the multi-functional Länder (states) and local authorities. 
Since these institutions are also anchored into a rigid constitutional framework, it 
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resembles a Type I environment. In contrast, England (though not necessarily the 
other constituent parts of the United Kingdom following devolution to Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland) has much more of a Type II unitary structure, because 
institutional arrangements are flexible and dynamic, and sub-national government is 
much weaker than the centre. In addition, the state is fragmented because a range of 
other functional agencies, such as quasi-autonomous non-government organisations 
(quangos), play important roles in various policy sectors (Alexander, 1991, 
Goldsmith, 2012). This contrast has led Herrschel and Newman (2002) to characterise 
Britain and Germany as representing two extremes in terms of state structures – and 
this has been the case especially since the 1980s, when local government in England 
underwent significant horizontal fragmentation (Miller et al., 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Type I and Type II multi-level governance (source: Hooghe and Marks 
(2003) 
 
Building on the ideas of Hooghe and Marks, this thesis is particularly interested in the 
contrasts between Type I and Type II multi-level governance in terms of vertical and 
horizontal relationships with other policy-making actors. However, the empirical 
research found three ways in which this typology needed to be refined. Firstly, it 
revealed a key contradiction in table 2.1 – between row 2 on the one hand, and rows 3 
and 4 on the other. Crucially, it found that the greater the degree of vertical interaction 
between tiers of governance, the more structured and fixed these structures became. 
Indeed, as chapters 4, 5 and 6 will demonstrate, the mutually-supportive nature of 
interdependent vertical relationships in Germany actually reinforced the system-wide 
architecture, since all tiers of government recognised that collaboration could increase 
their capacity to achieve policy objectives. In other words, Gelsenkirchen is involved 
in intersecting vertical relationships (a Type II characteristic), yet these strengthened 
Row Type I Type II 
1 general-purpose jurisdictions  task-specific jurisdictions 
2 non-intersecting memberships  Intersecting memberships 
3 jurisdictions organized in a 
limited number of levels 
no limit to the number of 
jurisdictional levels 
4 system-wide architecture flexible design 
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the existing structures and fixed number of jurisdictions within which the council 
operates (attributes that would normally be associated with Type I multi-level 
governance). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Vertical and horizontal dimensions of Types I and II multi-level 
governance arrangements (adapted from Hooghe and Marks, 2003) 
 
To address this issue, the thesis condensed the Type I and Type II characterisations 
into two sub-dimensions: the extent to which municipalities exist within a structured 
vertical framework; and the degree to which the local state has been fragmented and 
other horizontal actors undertake public functions. Figure 2.1 provides an overview 
of these sub-dimensions of multi-level governance, whilst emphasising the fact that 
they exist on a spectrum and jurisdictions may exhibit characteristics associated with 
one type horizontally but the other along the vertical sub-dimension. This diagram 
will act as a template for illustrating the different structural arrangements that operate 
in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle (see chapters 4, 5 and 6). As it suggests, a 
municipality in a characteristically Type I jurisdiction would be located in the bottom 
left quadrant. This is because it operates within highly-structured vertical 
arrangements and responsibility for a wide range of local functions is concentrated 
within the council, in what Hooghe and Marks call a ‘multi-purpose’ authority. In 
contrast, Type II arrangements in the top-right quadrant are loose and flexible along 
the vertical sub-dimension, and the local state is fragmented horizontally. As section 
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2.3 will explain, these two contrasts form a key part of the central hypothesis in this 
thesis. 
 
A second problem with Hooghe and Marks’ typology relates to their descriptions of 
governance actors. Although the very term ‘governance’ implies that private firms 
and voluntary bodies have a role to play in decision-making, Hooghe and Marks 
suggest that their typology only extends to those organisations that help to provide 
public services within the jurisdiction under investigation. For example, their 
description of a Type II arrangement, in which the local state is fragmented into 
various task-specific organisations, only appears to cover those bodies that have 
responsibility for delivering or deciding on public services. Such a characterisation 
ignores the crucial role that private actors need to play in climate change mitigation 
and illustrates how the typology has limited applicability in wicked policy sectors, 
particularly along the horizontal dimension. Indeed, since any jurisdiction’s 
governance approach to climate change could theoretically encompass every 
organisation and private citizen within its boundaries, it might be argued that Type II 
arrangements must apply because the actors involved in addressing it must by 
definition be fragmented. To overcome this second problem, the thesis only 
considered those actors that the municipalities in Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen have 
actively sought to involve in their governing arrangements. Although this may 
simplify the analysis to a certain extent, it ensures that the investigation is manageable 
from a practical perspective. 
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, although the typology might help to illustrate how 
different jurisdictions have adopted contrasting governance arrangements, it does not 
explain the reasons for these differences or provide theoretical tools that could predict 
the ways in which they may change. Indeed, the overall idea of ‘(multi-level) 
governance’ is more descriptive than analytical: it highlights the fact that numerous 
stakeholders are involved in making and implementing policy, but does not act as a 
tool to help understand why things turned out the way they did (see Smith, 2003, Zito, 
2013 for more comprehensive critiques). As such, it is a useful reference point when 
discussing the fact that different actors are involved in decision-making, but it is not 
an explanatory tool, and certainly not a comprehensive theoretical framework. 
Crucially, the typology does incorporate tools to analyse the nature of power relations 
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between tiers of government, and therefore it cannot help to identify which actors are 
most influential in governance arrangements. As a result, this thesis also draws on 
Rod Rhodes’ theory of power dependency (Rhodes, 1981) in order to provide the 
necessary theoretical support to explain how climate change policy is made and 
implemented in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. Section 2.4 will show how this theory 
is applicable to the case study cities, and also expand on Rhodes’ original model to 
provide even greater insight into policy-making processes. 
  
2.2.4  Policy implementation 
 
One consequence of the shift towards governance interpretations is that scholars need 
to focus more on management and policy ‘delivery’ in order to analyse decision-
making processes (Hill and Hupe, 2002). Although this increases the number of 
potential variables that require examination, it is undoubtedly the case that policy is 
influenced (and therefore ‘made’) at all stages of its development – from the initial 
idea or proposal to its practical implementation. As a result, theoretical perspectives 
on implementation are also of relevance to any analysis of public policy, including 
this thesis. 
 
There is a wealth of literature discussing the concept of policy implementation or 
delivery, and the extent to which it can be divorced from policy-making or 
formulation. Policy implementation emerged as a separate, though related, field from 
the 1960s onwards, primarily as a result of Pressman and Wildavsky’s seminal work 
on How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; or why it's amazing 
that federal programs work at all (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Their study, 
which looks at policy from a classical ‘top-down’ perspective, aimed to track the 
extent to which federal policy objectives were implemented at the local level. They 
highlight the myriad of agencies and other governmental institutions that can block 
the path between Congress and citizens, and express amazement at the fact that some 
priorities survive this journey to take effect ‘on the ground’. 
 
Pressman and Wildavsky’s work led to numerous other commentators offering their 
own perspectives. Some broadly agreed with their overall analysis (van Meter and van 
Horn, 1975), whilst others argued that a top-down approach is too simplistic to 
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explain complex policy areas with multiple stakeholders (for a comprehensive 
overview of the literature see Hill and Hupe, 2002). In particular, critics stressed that 
top-down perspectives failed to account sufficiently for policy failure, which had 
become a major issue within many Western democracies during the post-war period. 
This referred to a general frustration that the outcomes of policy were not what 
governments had hoped for or expected, and one reason for this was the poor 
performance or effectiveness of public bodies – an argument that has echoes of the 
‘overloaded state’ perspective (King, 1975, Birch, 1984, see also chapter 1 of this 
thesis). As a result, many academics and practitioners recognised that other tools and 
theories would be necessary to help explain why some policies did not deliver what 
their architects wanted.  
 
With these considerations in mind, Michael Lipsky turned Pressman and Wildavsky’s 
approach on its head by emphasising the role of ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 
1971) in the policy process. These ‘front-line’ workers often have to use their 
professional judgement to decide how to deliver political objectives, due to the high-
pressure situations they find themselves in and the fact that many directives may not 
be relevant to specific contexts. As a result, they are often responsible not only for 
implementing policy, but also for making it. Indeed, their experiences are sometimes 
channelled back ‘up’ the chain to politicians and incorporated into thinking about how 
future policy could be more effective in delivering desired outcomes. Given the range 
of stakeholders involved throughout the ‘policy chain’, Lipsky’s arguments are 
particularly relevant for wicked issues such as climate change.  
 
Overall, however, some kind of balance between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives is likely to be necessary when analysing local climate governance. Purely 
‘top-down’ perspectives appear too simplistic, given the plethora of actors who have 
an interest in wicked policy sectors – whereas ‘bottom-up’ explanations are unlikely 
to reflect the fact that climate protection is a widely-held goal at all levels of 
government, or take sufficient account of dependency relationships between actors. 
For example, central governments might introduce targets for municipalities to reduce 
CO2 emissions and perhaps ‘reward’ them with financial incentives if these objectives 
are achieved. In this scenario, there is less likely to be ‘dilution’ of overall policy 
goals throughout the chain.  
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Indeed, a number of commentators have sought to find common ground between both 
ends of this spectrum. For example, Barrett and Fudge (1981) found that negotiation 
and compromise occur throughout the policy process, as various actors seek to 
implement ideas in the most effective manner. In other words, there is rarely (if ever) 
‘perfect implementation’ of a policy that has been designed at the ‘top’. Similarly, 
Ripley and Franklin (1982) stressed that any judgement of policy effectiveness should 
take account of the extent to which it has the ‘desired performance and impacts’, 
rather than the degree to which it complies with the original policy aims. Therefore, 
this perspective also recognises that there is a degree of flexibility within the policy 
chain, which allows ‘street level bureaucrats’ to exercise discretion – provided their 
activities will deliver the type of result that elected politicians are seeking.  
 
Similarly, Sabatier (1986) also sought to balance ‘bottom-up’ with ‘top-down 
interpretations in his idea of ‘advocacy coalitions’. He argued that these coalitions 
comprise key stakeholders (including elected representatives, public officials, interest 
groups and other influential figures), who are located at all points in the policy chain. 
These actors held together by ‘core beliefs’ and seek to ensure that initial objectives 
remain pre-eminent from formulation to implementation. According to the theory, 
they compete with other coalitions to try and influence policy in line with their core 
beliefs, and this process generates policy learning. Generally speaking, dominant 
coalitions benefit from stable institutional arrangements and the way in which 
resources are distributed, but they may come under pressure from volatile external 
factors, such as changes in socio-economic conditions or the governing majority (see 
also Sabatier, 1998). Hajer (1995) echoed much of Sabatier’s thinking, but argued that 
coalition members need not always share the same ‘core beliefs’, provided they have 
a common understanding of the policy issue and ways in which it can be addressed. 
His idea of the ‘discourse coalition’ was subsequently used by Bulkeley (2000) to 
illustrate how various groups in Australia may have conflicting interests, but 
nonetheless agree on how policy objectives can be achieved. 
 
One advantage of Sabatier’s framework is that its holistic perspective allows for 
analysis of the input and role of various actors throughout the process. Indeed, since 
action to mitigate climate change is generally supported across different tiers of 
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government in both Germany and the UK, it could provide a useful perspective on 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle’s policy-making approaches in this sector. However, 
neither advocacy nor discourse coalition approaches provide sufficient tools to 
disaggregate the institutional roles of various stakeholders involved in decision-
making. In particular, the policy subsector specific theory is not really designed to 
support the analysis of multi-level governance processes involving complex 
institutional layering and interactions – something that is a key focus of this thesis. 
Instead, as section 2.3 will show, other perspectives are more helpful in identifying 
power relations between governance actors, and therefore the extent to which 
different stakeholders may be influencing policy-making processes.  
 
Nonetheless, the overall implementation literature does make a convincing case that 
‘top-down’ policy-making interpretations tend to be too simplistic, especially in the 
era of wicked issues. In particular, although policies may be communicated initially in 
a ‘top-down’ manner, actors at the ‘bottom’ may develop their own implementation 
strategies to achieve broadly similar objectives – but perhaps in a different way than 
was originally intended. This could be particularly likely in situations when those at 
the ‘top’ set out the policy goals but do not provide the means for those at the bottom 
to achieve them. Notably, Capano (2011) distinguished between situations where 
actors at the top establish both the policy objectives and the means of achieving them, 
and scenarios where they determine only one or neither of these factors. Indeed, as the 
empirical chapters of this thesis will demonstrate, the extent to which central or state 
governments support municipalities in the delivery of political objectives plays a key 
role in shaping governance arrangements.  
 
2.2.5  Policy networks 
 
As Smith (2000) has pointed out, the idea of ‘policy networks’ is reminiscent of 
Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework: both perspectives argue that groups of 
similarly-minded actors play a vital role in agreeing on and implementing policy. 
Indeed, various scholars have investigated their role in policy-making at the national 
and EU levels, and in the environmental sector (Weale, 1996, Lees, 2005). The idea 
fits comfortably into a governance perspective, because it recognises that a variety of 
state and non-state actors are now responsible for governing Western countries, and 
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priorities are developed, refined and implemented throughout the policy chain. This is 
particularly the case for ‘Type II’ multi-level governance interpretations, as these 
jurisdictions have less hierarchical and more flexible structures, and tend to be more 
open to interest group participation (Rhodes, 1997).  
 
After the concept became popular during the 1980s and 1990s, Tanja Börzel (1998) 
argued that this was creating a ‘Babylonian’ effect, because the ambiguity inherent in 
the term meant that it was often used in different ways. In particular, Börzel 
contrasted the ‘governance’ interpretation of policy networks, which was primarily 
associated with German scholars, with that of the ‘interest intermediation’ school, 
which was much more prominent in the Anglo-American literature. She argued that 
scholars in the Anglo-American school used ‘policy network’ to describe any kind of 
relationship between the state and private actors, which strips the term of its 
usefulness, as it is no more valuable than previous characterisations of corporatism or 
pluralism.  
 
This is somewhat simplistic, as various scholars did recognise that there are different 
types of network, and several have sought to categorise them by their degree of 
integration (see for example Atkinson and Coleman, 1992, Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, 
Jordan and Schubert, 1992). Depending on where they sit on this continuum, 
networks may also be operating at different levels and across sectors. For the purposes 
of this thesis, however, it is very unlikely that the multitude of stakeholders that are 
involved in climate change could form a cohesive network, considering that they 
would have potentially conflicting and complex objectives and cross over multiple 
traditional policy sectors (see Schout and Jordan, 2005). More pertinently, by 
categorising networks based on their degree of integration, the focus of this school is 
primarily on the type of relationship between state and non-state actors, rather than 
how this may influence policy-making. As such, this ‘Anglo-American’ interpretation 
of ‘policy networks’ is not particularly helpful as an analytical tool: like ‘multi-level 
governance’, it is more of a descriptive term. Indeed, it suggests that almost any 
relationship between policy-making actors could be described as a ‘network’ 
arrangement, without providing any kind of insight into how that might affect public 
policy.  
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Börzel’s (1998) insights comes into their own at this point, since she characterises 
policy networks as a ‘mode of governance’ that is distinct from hierarchy and the 
market. As such, this helps to focus analysis on processes and activities, rather than 
just trying to identify which actors are involved in decision-making (see also Scharpf, 
1991, Mayntz, 1993). In other words, it stresses the importance of understanding the 
power relationships and structures that operate within networks, and therefore the key 
drivers involved in policy-making processes – not the members of the network and 
how closely they work together (Kenis and Schneider, 1991, Kooiman, 1993). For 
example, Grote (2007) stresses how the influence of hierarchical or civil societal 
norms will vary according to the network and sector, often depending on the strength 
of state actors in negotiating processes.  
 
Therefore, as with multi-level governance, network characterisations need to be 
complemented with a theory of power in order to identify which actors are 
influencing decision-making and why policies develop in a particular way. Indeed, as 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) acknowledge, policy networks interpretations cannot 
explain or predict policy decisions, because these will depend on power relationships 
and how resources are distributed within the network. As such, although Börzel’s 
characterisation of networks as a mode of governance helps to pinpoint the key focus 
of analysis for this thesis, these perspective do not provide all of the theoretical tools 
that are necessary to analyse decision-making in the case study cities. 
 
2.2.6  New public management 
 
Governance and network perspectives have become particularly relevant over the last 
three decades due to real-world changes in the way the state is structured and 
managed (Rhodes, 1994, Miller et al., 2000, Pierre and Peters, 2012). In the UK this 
began with the Thatcher Government’s public sector reforms in the 1980s, which 
aimed to deal with the problem of ‘policy failure’ whilst simultaneously ‘rolling back 
the state’. Hood (1991) showed how her reforms to state organisations were based on 
principles borrowed from the private sector, and was the first to coin the term ‘New 
Public Management’ (NPM) to describe them – although the phrase caught on 
extremely quickly (Heinrich, 2003). Key characteristics of NPM included the 
introduction of market mechanisms into public services, privatisation, outsourcing, 
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and an emphasis on monitoring and improving the performance of government 
organisations. Overall, these changes represented a major challenge to the traditional 
Weberian model of hierarchical public administration, and were particularly prevalent 
at the local level (Wollmann and Thurmaier, 2012). 
 
Another important aspect was the belief that single-purpose delivery (or ‘Next Steps’) 
agencies should be responsible for implementing policy. In keeping with this 
perspective, the UK Government ‘hived off’ a range of these agencies from existing 
civil service departments, which continued to exist but were now largely responsible 
for policy formulation and liaising with ministers (Rhodes, 1997, Wollmann, 2003). 
These structural changes were accompanied by new approaches to managing public 
bodies, in an attempt to ensure they focused more explicitly on political objectives. As 
a result, many introduced techniques such as objective-setting, ‘agencification’, 
performance monitoring, benchmarking, performance-related pay and bonuses.  
 
Successive UK governments have embraced NPM ideas since the late 1970s, with the 
result that Britain has a plethora of specific functional agencies – including, but not 
limited to, various quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (quangos) that 
are responsible for delivery. As chapter 3 will discuss in greater detail, ministers have 
subjected English local government to a range of initiatives to implement NPM ideas, 
including ‘compulsory competitive tendering’ of local services (Painter, 1991, Jones 
and Stewart, 2002) and the ‘right to challenge’ existing service providers (Eckersley 
et al., 2014). These have led to councils outsourcing the delivery of a range of 
functions and services, after setting out policy objectives in detailed contracts with 
private sector companies. Indeed, English local government is often seen as being at 
the forefront of these developments compared to other countries in the developed 
world (Andrews et al., 2005).  
 
For its part, there have been a number of attempts to implement NPM ideas in 
Germany (Reichard, 2003, Löffler, 2003, Goetz, 2005, Kuhlmann, 2008). As 
Kuhlmann (2010) notes, these have also been led largely by municipalities, many of 
which bought into the idea of developing a neues Steuerungsmodell (‘new steering 
model’) for local government. However, NPM ideas have not always been properly 
implemented due to the legalistic and traditionally Weberian bureaucratic culture that 
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is prevalent within the German public sector (Wollmann and Thurmaier, 2012). 
Moreover, and in contrast to the UK, these changes were not imposed on local 
authorities by Land governments, which resulted in a much more piecemeal and 
patchwork pattern of implementation across the country. Indeed, a large study into 
administrative practices in local government across the country found that only a 
minority of authorities had introduced comprehensive reforms and there had been no 
‘paradigm shift’ towards NPM techniques (Bogumil et al., 2006, Kuhlmann et al., 
2008). Notably, therefore, the German public sector has not been restructured and 
reformed to the same extent as its British counterpart. 
 
However, in spite of Germany’s perceived laggardness, some of the key 
characteristics of a NPM approach have actually been in place for decades. Most 
notable amongst these are its reliance on ‘parapublic organisations’ such as the 
Bundesbank, social insurance providers or the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, which bridge 
the gap between the public and private sectors and carry out important policy 
functions. Katzenstein (1987) was the first to emphasise the importance of these 
bodies, which he identified as one of three ‘political shock absorbers’ that constrained 
democratic governments and meant that West Germany was a ‘semi-sovereign state’ 
– at least during the Cold War. A parallel can be drawn with quangos in the UK, 
although quangos can be set up (and abolished) by ministers or governments, whereas 
parapublic organisations are embedded in the institutional system. Nevertheless, the 
presence of these bodies suggests that some aspects of policy-making are fragmented 
across different institutions in both countries, which could have implications for local 
climate governance in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. Indeed, they show that ideal 
models such as Type I multi-level governance do not necessarily apply, even to 
federal countries such as Germany. 
 
Overall, NPM has evolved from being a set of ideas about how public services should 
be managed and delivered to become a practical reality in many Western 
democracies. As such, critics do not dispute that these changes have taken place, but 
rather focus on the democratic implications of outsourcing, risk transfer and service 
privatisation. This is because private companies are now responsible for many public 
services, but they are accountable to their shareholders rather than to citizens – and 
many of their activities are shrouded in secrecy due to the confidential nature of 
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commercial contracts (Rhodes, 1997, Funnell, 2000, Broadbent et al., 2003). Indeed, 
the vast majority of studies have criticised NPM reforms, even if they may have 
agreed with the overall objectives of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public services (see Pollitt, 1986 for an early discussion of their political implications, 
Rhodes, 1994 for a detailed critique, Talbot, 2003 for an assessment of their inherent 
contradictions, and Hood and Dixon, 2015 for a comprehensive analysis of whether 
they have been 'successful' in the UK). Furthermore, as Rathgeb Smith (2003) has 
identified, NPM has actually constrained front-line professionals more than ever, in 
spite of its rhetoric to ‘free-up’ street-level bureaucrats to ensure that decisions are 
taken by local experts. This is because their roles need to be set out in detailed and 
often inflexible contracts, and they are subjected to significantly more inspections, 
performance monitoring, targets and market-based competition through contracting-
out and privatisation.  
 
Such debates are beyond the scope of this thesis, which seeks only to identify how 
power dynamics and institutional structures shape local policy-making. However, 
NPM reforms have undoubtedly had a significant impact on the structure and capacity 
of municipalities in England and Germany, and therefore they will have influenced 
governance approaches. In addition, these initiatives have resulted in the collection 
and reporting of a huge amount of data on public bodies. Although the quality of this 
data is sometimes questionable (Audit Commission, 2009), it has helped researchers 
to understand what is happening in public bodies much better. As a result, various 
scholars have analysed whether we can measure and compare how different states or 
municipalities are ‘performing’ (Lockwood and Porcelli, 2011, Pickel and Pickel, 
2012) in terms of delivering political objectives, and some of these studies have 
focused on environmental policy (Hammond et al., 1995, Jahn, 1998, Fiorino, 2011).  
 
This project will investigate whether concerns about the effectiveness of public bodies 
have led Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle to consider reforming their institutional 
structures or changing management approaches – and therefore bought into the 
traditional arguments in favour of NPM techniques. Implicitly, this relates to issues of 
institutional capacity (see section 2.2.7) and the extent to which traditional local 
authorities are able to deliver policy objectives. At the same time, however, although 
NPM-inspired reforms may have helped to cement England’s place as having a 
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typical Type II multi-level governance structure, they also raise questions about its 
capacity to co-ordinate and implement policy effectively – both horizontally across 
sectors and also vertically throughout the policy chain (see Wollmann, 2003 for a 
detailed discussion). Therefore, the empirical analysis will also investigate whether 
these concerns have resulted in any structural or institutional reforms to improve 
policy co-ordination or bring public services back ‘in-house’, thereby running counter 
to classical arguments in favour of NPM (see Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Section 
2.3 will illustrate how these pressures are incorporated into the overall theoretical 
approach. 
 
2.2.7  Organisational capacity 
 
As section 2.2.6 suggests, a core driver for the creation of task-specific public 
agencies such as quangos (a central feature of NPM ideas) was the belief that they 
would be better-placed to focus on policy implementation than multi-functional 
government departments or municipalities. This view held that managers could be 
presented with a set of objectives and largely left to get on with the task of delivering 
them on behalf of their political masters. 
 
As section 2.2.4 suggested, however, divorcing formulation from delivery in this way 
could lead to outcomes that are not congruent with policy-makers’ objectives, because 
it gives street-level bureaucrats more freedom to adapt solutions to the local context. 
Therefore, it is somewhat ironic that NPM ideas were largely introduced in an attempt 
to improve the ‘performance’ or ‘effectiveness’ of public bodies – the extent to which 
they are able to achieve desired outcomes (de Montricher, 2003). Furthermore, this 
fragmentation of the local state may have affected the longer-term success of 
particular initiatives, because sub-state governments no longer have as much internal 
capacity to achieve policy objectives (Alexander, 1991, Stewart, 1993).  
 
In other words, the disaggregation of public functions that forms a core part of NPM 
approaches may actually be counterproductive, because it could mean that state actors 
are less able to implement policy effectively. Indeed, stronger and more centralised 
government structures ‘have enjoyed better environmental performance’ than more 
pluralist systems where policy-making is more difficult to co-ordinate (Scruggs, p. 
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13). In addition, others have pointed out the need for fragmented governing actors to 
‘join back up’ in order to address policy problems more effectively (Dunleavy and 
Margetts, 2006), and emphasised how contracting out public services reduces the 
level of central control over implementation (Stewart, 1993).  
 
Overall, these analyses suggest that fragmented public bodies have less capacity than 
more concentrated political systems – and this is particularly the case when they seek 
to deal with wicked issues, given the need for a holistic and comprehensive approach 
to these cross-cutting problems. Indeed, as chapters 4, 5 and 6 will demonstrate, the 
concept of capacity is crucial to the empirical findings of this thesis, because the case 
study municipalities responded to their perceived inability to address climate change 
by changing the nature of their horizontal governance arrangements.  
 
The OECD has defined a society’s capacity for environmental protection as its ‘ability 
to identify and solve environmental problems’ (cited in Jänicke, 2002, p. 1). This 
thesis will adapt this definition for the local government context, and therefore work 
on the basis that a municipality’s capacity to address climate change refers to its 
ability to achieve its policy objectives. Building on the observations of (Jänicke et al., 
1997) and Kern (2013), it will show how the capacity of Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle councils is shaped by their access to resources such as knowledge, money, 
expertise, skills and democratic legitimacy, and that this access is largely determined 
by the institutional and legal framework within which they operate. Crucially, it will 
demonstrate that municipalities seek out external capacity if they lack the internal 
resources to achieve policy objectives, and explain how this changes the nature of 
decision-making processes (see section 2.3). 
 
2.2.8   Environmental policy integration 
 
A related issue concerns the co-ordination and integration of these additional sources 
of capacity, which can also play a key role in determining how effectively public 
bodies are addressing wicked issues. For example, Schout and Jordan (2005) found 
that the EU was having to rely increasing on networks to ‘self-organise’ in order to 
deliver policy objectives, but achieving this was extremely challenging in a cross-
cutting sector such as the environment, due to the plethora of different interest groups 
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involved. More generally, a school of literature has developed on environmental 
policy integration (EPI), which stresses the importance of incorporating 
environmental considerations into other sectors, including energy, agriculture, 
transport or planning (Lenschow, 2002, Lafferty and Hovden, 2003, Jacob and 
Volkery, 2004, Nilsson and Eckerberg, 2009). As these analyses point out, the 
political system needs to address the root causes of environmental problems in order 
deal with them effectively. This often requires co-ordination across policy areas to 
ensure that other sectors are not pursuing initiatives that conflict with environmental 
objectives.  
 
The idea of EPI has gained common currency amongst decision-makers since the late 
1990s, and it has become especially relevant in NPM-inspired fragmented governing 
contexts (Jordan, 2002, Nilsson et al., 2009b). Indeed, it poses a particular challenge 
for municipalities that are directly responsible for a reduced scope of public functions, 
because they may lack the necessary capacity to co-ordinate the activities of external 
actors that deliver services on behalf of the council. Nonetheless, it is a crucial factor 
in determining whether governments are able to address issues such as climate change 
effectively. As such, chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis will investigate sectors that 
influence Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle council’s overall sustainability approach 
(namely their planning and corporate policies), in addition to their climate change 
strategies. This provides an opportunity to analyse the extent to which each 
municipality’s climate and other environmental priorities are integrated into other 
policy sectors and therefore covers their decision-making arrangements in a more 
comprehensive manner. 
 
2.2.9   Policy styles 
 
Another factor that might influence local governance arrangements could be the 
preference for specific national ‘policy styles’ that Jeremy Richardson (1982) argued 
existed within various Western European states. For example, Richardson showed that 
some countries were much more likely than others to involve interest groups in 
policy-making, adopt certain types of policy instrument or try to ensure that policy is 
co-ordinated horizontally and vertically. He argued that distinct ‘standard operating 
procedures’ within national institutions shape how decision-makers will address a 
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specific policy issue – in contrast to Theodore Lowi’s argument that policy problems 
determine the way in which the political system operates (Lowi, 1964, O'Riordan and 
Jordan, 1996).  
 
The idea of national policy styles echoes the historical institutionalist view that 
traditional procedures and structures will endure unless there is a ‘radical shock’ in 
the external environment that ‘punctuates the equilibrium’ and results in the 
emergence of new institutions (True et al., 1999). In the context of this thesis, such a 
perspective suggests that governing actors in Germany and the UK would try to 
address environmental problems in different ways because of how institutions and 
behaviours within the two countries have developed and become embedded over time. 
Indeed, as various scholars have shown, historical legacies are likely to influence 
policy outcomes significantly (Hall and Taylor, 1996, Ostrom, 1986, Thoenig, 2003, 
Lodge, 2003). This is because behaviours, attitudes and working cultures – as well as 
physical organisations – shape decision-making processes in a ‘path-dependent’ 
manner, sometimes long after they have achieved their original purpose (Pierson, 
2000). Moreover, these institutions prove very difficult to change, because actors 
within the system seek to prolong the status quo – either because they benefit from it 
individually and collectively (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995, Scharpf, 1997), or because 
it appears to produce satisfactory policies (March and Olsen, 1989).  
 
Nonetheless, mindful of the idea that external pressures on national policy styles 
could result in a new institutional paradigm, Richardson was interested in 
investigating how factors such as European Union membership might be influencing 
the standard operating procedures of various countries. His work spawned a number 
of empirical studies, many of which aimed to outline the distinctive characteristics of 
individual national styles in order to identify contrasting approaches (Vogel, 1986, 
Jänicke and Weidner, 1997, Weale, 1997, Knill and Lenschow, 1998, Carter and 
Lowe, 1998, Wurzel, 2002, Lees, 2007). Notably, several analyses focused on 
environmental policy and identified clear distinctions between the British (or English) 
and German styles – and a number of them did find that EU membership was 
affecting some standard operating procedures (Wurzel, 2002, Lees, 2005).  
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The differences between typically ‘English’ and ‘German’ environmental policy 
styles are quite stark and cover a range of areas. For example, in keeping with its 
Rechtsstaat (‘legal state’) traditions, environmental policy in Germany has 
traditionally been made by high-ranking officials and legal experts, and resulted in 
laws that penalise polluters, most of which are enforced by the Länder and local 
authorities (Jänicke and Weidner, 1997, Pehle and Jansen, 1998). This contrasts 
sharply with the pragmatic reliance on ‘soft’ law and discretion that is typically 
associated with the UK and England. Britain’s more flexible and consensual approach 
also means that state actors include a range of other stakeholders in policy-making 
processes (sometimes the very same polluters who are penalised in Germany) in order 
to increase the chances that they will adhere to the resulting legislation (Weale, 1997).  
 
Furthermore, German policy-makers are more likely to opt for the ‘best available 
technology’ or ‘state of the art’ (SOTA) solution to address an environmental 
problem, whereas their English counterparts prefer to rely on the ‘best practicable 
means’ (BPM) to deal with an issue (Knill and Lenschow, 1998). Interestingly, 
Armbrüster (2005) has noted how wider societal attitudes in Germany and the UK 
appear to mirror these preferences, which he attributes to the different philosophical 
traditions in the two countries. Regardless of the reasons for the contrast, few doubt 
that the German perspective has enabled its federal government to stimulate domestic 
green manufacturing businesses at the same time as addressing environmental 
concerns (Lütkenhorst and Pegels, 2014, Wüstenhagen and Bilharz, 2006). Although 
Wurzel (2002) found that EU agreements settled on a compromise position between 
the two extremes (the ‘best available technology not entailing excessive costs’), this 
contrast nonetheless represents a worthwhile line of enquiry at the municipal level. 
 
Another key difference is associated with whether policy-makers are concerned with 
measuring the quantity or the consequences of pollution. For example, Héritier et al. 
(1994), and Butt Philip (1998) have distinguished between the traditional German 
focus on reducing the emissions or inputs of environmental ‘bads’ into the air, soil or 
water and the British reliance on monitoring immissions or their outcomes (the 
concentration of harmful pollutants in living organisms, particularly humans). 
Notably, Wurzel (2002) attributes this difference partly to the geographic nature of 
44 
 
the two countries: in direct contrast to Germany, the UK is an island with fast-flowing 
rivers, rough seas and high winds, which means that pollutants disperse much quicker.  
 
 Germany UK 
Regulatory style Interventionist  Mediating  
Traditional 
principles 
Sachlichkeit (objectivity) 
Ressortprinzip (ministerial and 
departmental independence)  
Uniform standards 
Professionalism 
Generalism  
Discretionary approach 
 
Focus of concern Level of pollution emitted 
(emissions) 
Impact on human health of 
pollutants (immissions) 
Preferred 
solutions 
State of the art (‘Best Available 
Technology’) 
Flexible and cost-effective (best 
practicable means) 
State 
intervention 
Hierarchical 
Substantive 
Low flexibility/discretion 
More self-regulation 
Procedural 
High flexibility/discretion 
Consultative 
approach 
Formal 
Legalistic (Rechtsstaat) 
Hard law 
More adversarial 
Informal 
Pragmatic 
Soft law 
Consensual 
Regulatory 
structure 
Functional decentralisation 
Sectoral 
Hierarchical co-ordination 
Sectoral decentralisation 
Sectoral  
Lacking hierarchical co-
ordination of local activities 
 
Table 2.2: Contrasting styles of environmental policy in Germany and the UK 
(adapted from Knill and Lenschow, 1998, Weale et al., 1991, Héritier et al., 1994, 
and Wurzel, 2002) 
 
Table 2.2, which draws on the comprehensive typology of Knill and Lenschow 
(1998), but also incorporates perspectives from Weale et al. (1991), Héritier et al. 
(1994) and Wurzel (2002), summarises some of the main contrasts between the 
typical policy style of each country. Although Knill and Lenschow do an admirable 
job in diagnosing these differences, there is substantial overlap between their six 
categories of contrasting characteristics (namely: regulatory style; traditional 
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principles; focus of concern; state intervention; consultative approach; and regulatory 
structure). For example, the focus of concern will dictate which preferred solutions 
may be desirable, and these would be shaped by the typical degree of state 
intervention. This in turn relates closely to the regulatory style and consultative 
approach, which are strongly influenced by traditional principles (and vice-versa).  
 
Notably, these contrasts overlap with the analysis of Treib et al. (2007), who map 
state-society relations against various dimensions of policy, politics or polity. Table 
2.3, which is based on their analysis, shows how policy styles that are associated with 
the UK or England are more characteristic of governance arrangements, whereas the 
typical German style sits closer towards the government end of the spectrum. More 
importantly for the purposes of this thesis, there is a clear parallel between these 
contrasting regulatory approaches and Hooghe and Marks’ two typologies of multi-
level governance (see section 2.2.3). These similarities reflect the connection between 
a policy-making approach and the institutional and structural context: one is likely to 
influence the other, and vice-versa (Stone, 2005).  
 
However, the sheer number of contrasting features that both Knill and Lenschow and 
Treib et al. identify, together with their overlapping nature, means that using them as 
the basis for any comparison risks getting lost in issues of definition and 
categorisation. Therefore, although their characterisations of typical policy or 
governance styles do shape this research project, it will not investigate each individual 
dimension as a separate line of enquiry. Instead, the thesis will draw particularly on 
two aspects that are relatively straightforward to identify. The first of these is a 
preference for either state of the art (SOTA) solutions or the best practicable means 
(BPM) for addressing a problem, which are associated with Germany and England 
respectively. This should indicate the extent to which each municipality is 
demonstrating leadership and ambition in climate protection – and, by illustrating 
whether the local state is investing significant resources in the sector, may also 
indicate its importance vis à vis other actors in decision-making processes. The 
second line of enquiry will investigate the extent to which each municipality relies on 
hierarchical state regulation or horizontal stakeholder engagement in policy-making. 
As with the typologies of multi-level governance, these national characterisations are 
ideal models, and therefore we would not necessarily expect any state or municipality 
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to fit neatly into any particular category. Nonetheless, figure 2.2, which will act as a 
template to illustrate each city’s approach in chapters 4, 5 and 6, shows how 
jurisdictions that adopt strategies typical of the ‘German’ and ‘English’ policy styles 
might be located against these two sub-dimensions.  
 
 
State intervention 
(‘government’) 
Societal autonomy (‘governance’) 
Policy 
dimensions 
Legal bindingness Soft law 
Rigid approach to implementation Flexible approach to implementation 
Presence of sanctions Absence of sanctions 
Material regulation Procedural regulation 
Fixed norms Malleable norms 
Politics 
dimension 
Only public actors involved Only private actors involved 
Polity 
dimensions 
Hierarchy Market 
Central locus of authority Dispersed loci of authority 
Institutionalised interactions Non-institutionalised interactions 
 
Table 2.3: The government-governance spectrum as it applies to policy, politics and 
polity (adapted from Treib et al., 2007) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Vertical and horizontal dimensions of German and English policy styles 
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When combined with the analysis of multi-level governance types discussed in 
section 2.2.3, investigating these two factors will illustrate the overall governance 
arrangements within the case studies and therefore bridge the (small) gap between 
some of the governance literature and policy styles perspectives. This is because each 
line of enquiry will study the relationship between the state and private actors, 
focusing particularly on how these stakeholders seek to govern climate change at the 
local level together.  
 
2.1.10  Urban governance 
 
As a result, the theory and associated empirical research on policy styles and 
governance will help to shape the analysis of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. Thus far, 
however, the vast majority of comparative studies using these perspectives have 
focused at the national level – and several have been somewhat inconclusive about the 
extent to which convergence is taking place (see for example Richardson, 1982, Hanf 
and Jansen, 1998). This national focus might be expected, given that the concept of 
policy styles assumes that different countries adopt distinct approaches to addressing 
similar policy problems. However, not only does it neglect important actors in policy 
formulation and delivery, but it may also be the case that municipalities are more 
vulnerable to changes in policy style, because they face more complex exogenous 
challenges than national governments (see chapter 1).  
 
Nonetheless, there is a growing literature on local climate policies. For example, some 
commentators have investigated the impact of climate change issues on specific urban 
planning or transport policies (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003), or focused on how 
municipalities have sought to work with private actors on adaptation initiatives (Mees, 
2014). There have also been numerous investigations into how economic 
development goals have shaped climate policy at a local level (Dierwechter, 2010, 
Lundqvist and von Borgstede, 2008, Wesselink and Gouldson, 2014). Another recent 
study has focused on how policy-makers in three German cities have taken account of 
their local contexts and priorities to develop very different approaches to climate 
policy (Heinelt and Lamping, 2015). There have even been comparisons of climate 
change policy in German and English cities, such as Bulkeley and Kern (2006), which 
highlights four useful different ‘modes’ of governing locally. These are: 
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 Self-governing – when municipalities seek to achieve political objectives by 
governing their own corporate activities (such as installing energy efficiency 
initiatives in public buildings, or purchasing green energy).  
 Governing by provision – when municipalities seek to shape the behaviour of 
local actors through services and resources (for example, by providing a public 
transport infrastructure or recycling scheme). 
 Governing by authority – when municipalities introduce traditional 
regulations or directions (like planning policies, road-charging, or 
pedestrianisation), which are enforced by sanctions.  
 Governing through enabling – when municipalities try to facilitate and 
encourage action through partnerships, engagement, incentives and persuasion 
(this includes running advertising campaigns, providing loans to private 
individuals for green initiatives, or guidance to planners, architects and 
transport companies).  
 
Bulkeley and Kern highlight the trend towards governing through enabling in both 
countries, which fits comfortably with multi-level governance interpretations, the 
increasing involvement of non-state actors in policy-making, and the increasing trend 
for municipalities to engage horizontally with other governance actors in order to 
achieve their objectives. It also suggests that one sub-dimension of the typically 
‘English’ policy style is becoming dominant in both countries, and the ‘German’ 
preference for hierarchy is less prevalent. To investigate this further, this thesis will 
analyse three policy sectors over which local authorities are able to exert different 
levels of control (see section 1.3.2 in chapter 1). Indeed, we might expect the case 
study municipalities to rely on each of Bulkeley and Kern’s modes of governing to 
achieve their climate change objectives. For example, climate change strategies are 
likely to involve both ‘governing by provision’ and ‘governing by enabling’, due to 
the need for local authorities to involve other actors in policy-making and also 
persuade them to behave in a more environmentally-friendly manner. In terms of 
planning policies, the fact that municipalities can set out specific rules for new 
building developments means that they have an opportunity to ‘govern by authority’ 
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in this sector. Finally, the analysis of corporate policies on resource use fits neatly into 
the ‘self-governing’ mode. 
 
Bulkeley is one of many geographers who analyse climate change in cities, although 
her colleagues in the discipline tend to focus more on how municipalities have used 
sustainability to try and address economic problems in post-industrial areas 
(Pasquinelli, 2014). Indeed, this idea of the ‘sustainability fix’ (While et al., 2004), 
which involves cities trying to solve problems of urban decline by re-branding 
themselves as being ‘green’ and ‘forward-looking’ undoubtedly plays a role in policy 
development at the local level (see also Keil and Whitehead, 2012). This thesis will 
take account of such perspectives as a way of trying to understand the strategies 
adopted by the case study cities. Indeed, it is particularly relevant when analysing the 
reasons why Gelsenkirchen or Newcastle may have opted for state of the art solutions 
to climate change: such ambitious investments may well suggest that the municipality 
is keen to present the city in a new, sustainable light. However, it highlights how most 
scholars of local climate governance come from a geographical perspective (see 
Hoornweg et al., 2011 for a comprehensive overview of the literature): political 
scientists have largely neglected this important research field. 
 
Another key factor likely to shape policy styles is the institutional and political 
context within which each local authority operates. This includes its relationships with 
other policy-making actors and – crucially – the power dependencies within these 
relationships. Notably, many local (or ‘urban’) governance typologies identify 
significant differences between the local government systems of Germany and the 
UK/England (Goldsmith and Page, 1987, Hesse and Sharpe, 1991, Bennett, 1993, 
Norton, 1994, Pierre, 1999, John, 2001, Hulst and van Montfort, 2007). In particular, 
they highlight contrasts in their legal or constitutional status, functions, size, and 
reliance on central government for financial and other resources. Therefore, even 
though the socioeconomic and historical contexts of Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen are 
very similar, their local authorities are likely to have different levels of capacity to 
achieve their policy objectives (see section 2.2.7).  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, therefore, it is crucial to analyse the evolving nature of 
local governance in England and Germany, because this will shape the capacity of 
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Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle councils to act on particular issues. Indeed, Chapter 3 
will focus particularly on the nature of horizontal and vertical relationships involving 
municipalities, and set out a number of significant differences in the genesis and 
development of local government in Germany and the UK. For example, sub-national 
governments in Germany have enjoyed greater political freedom than their English 
counterparts for most of the last two centuries, in accordance with the constitutional 
guarantee of lokale Selbstverwaltung (local self-administration).  
 
Crucially, however, we should not confuse the concepts of autonomy and capacity. 
For example, a council that enjoys significant freedom from central direction may be 
substantially constrained by a lack of resources, an unclear constitutional status or a 
reliance on unpredictable revenue streams. In other words, although some authorities 
may be quite autonomous of higher tiers of government, they might have limited 
ability to achieve their objectives independently of other actors. Alternatively, local 
authorities that ‘surrender’ some of their freedom by partnering with external actors 
may find that they are better placed to deliver policy goals than municipalities that 
jealously guard their independence. This is particularly the case in sectors such as 
climate change, given the importance of an inclusive and holistic approach to 
addressing such wicked issues (Wollmann, 2004).  
 
As this suggests, a municipality’s internal level of capacity is likely to shape its 
governance approach, because decision-makers will probably try to identify and adopt 
the most realistic and effective way of implementing policy. In other words, a council 
may be able to exercise its hierarchical authority in some areas, but in other sectors it 
might need to compromise with external actors in order to achieve its objectives (see 
Sellers and Lidström, 2007). This principle may also apply across jurisdictions, 
because the institutional context may mean that councils in one country are more 
constrained than their counterparts elsewhere. For example, local authorities in the US 
have far less capacity in the area of environmental policy than municipalities in 
Germany – and therefore they have to rely much more on external actors in 
governance arrangements (Sellers, 2002). Similarly, in his famous study of the city of 
Atlanta, Stone (1989) found that public bodies had to work extremely closely with 
private businesses in order to address racial tensions effectively. Indeed, Stone argued 
that the municipal authority formed a semi-permanent ‘regime’ with private 
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businesses, and emphasised how it sought to increase its ‘power to’ achieve policy 
objectives – rather than its ‘power over’ other actors in the city.  
 
Overall, the literature on urban governance confirms the general shift towards 
governance and away from state hierarchy. It also shows how the desire of 
municipalities to increase their capacity is a key driver of this process, as local 
authorities seek out resources from other actors in order to achieve their policy 
objectives. Crucially, however, it highlights how the institutional context within 
which municipalities operate is likely to affect their level of capacity – and therefore 
shape the nature of their policy-making arrangements. Indeed, as the remaining 
chapters of this thesis will illustrate, differences in the genesis and evolution of local 
government in Germany and England has meant that councils in these countries tend 
to rely on contrasting governance approaches – with the former more likely to rely on 
hierarchy and the latter preferring greater horizontal engagement and compromise. Of 
course, such characterisations fit with the typical policy styles that have been 
attributed to both countries at the national level – something that also represents an 
important finding for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
2.3  Towards a hybrid governance model? 
 
As chapter 1 outlined, a myriad of influences have exerted pressure on traditional 
governance approaches in both Germany and the UK over recent decades – from 
concerns about ‘state overload’ in the 1970s right up to the 2007/8 financial crisis and 
ensuing period of austerity. At the same time, the cross-sector and ‘wicked’ nature of 
climate change has required decision-makers to consider whether they need to change 
their approach to policy-making in order to achieve their objectives. Moreover, the 
cities of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle have tried to deal with economic decline 
throughout this period, which could also be disrupting traditional governance 
structures in their respective municipalities. In fact, since cities tend to be more 
vulnerable to changes in the exogenous environment than nation states (because they 
are more likely to rely on a homogenous economic sector and are subject to a wider 
range of institutional constraints (Pierre and Peters, 2012)), we might expect their 
existing policy-making processes to be coming under particularly severe strain.  
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As this suggests, both case study councils are facing comparable pressures, and these 
challenges are significant. This thesis will investigate if they are responding in similar 
ways, and therefore whether their traditional approaches to multi-level governance 
and policy styles might be converging towards some kind of hybrid model. Indeed, 
this hypothesis, which is set out in figure 2.3, forms the basis for much of the 
empirical inquiry in chapters 4, and 5 and 6. It proposes that Gelsenkirchen has 
traditionally adopted a characteristically ‘German’ policy style and operated within a 
Type I multi-level governance arrangement, whereas Newcastle has relied on a 
typically ‘English’ approach within Type II structures. In this way, Gelsenkirchen’s 
typical approach would be considered ‘foreign’ to Newcastle, and vice-versa. Yet, if 
the cities are responding to their comparable challenges in similar ways, they will 
have ‘imported’ some of these ‘foreign’ characteristics into local climate governance 
arrangements, and a hybrid model of policy-making will be emerging. Therefore, the 
thesis will first identify the extent to which these ideal-type models exist within the 
two cities, and then examine whether they are changing and/or converging in any 
way. As such, it has echoes of recent academic debates about the long-term viability 
of different economic models in Western European countries. In particular, several 
scholars have questioned whether global and European pressures might encourage 
state and private sector actors to reject some aspects of the German model of 
‘coordinated’ or ‘Rhineland’ capitalism and move towards a more Anglo-American or 
hybrid economic approach (Dyson and Padgett, 2005, Busch, 2005). 
 
The oval shapes at the top and bottom of figure 2.3 highlight the typical contrasts 
between England and Germany that this thesis will investigate as sub-dimensions of 
policy style and multi-level governance type. As Hanf and Jansen (1998), (Peters and 
Pierre, 2001) and (Stone, 2005) have argued, there is a link between policies and 
institutions, with structures influencing policy outcomes and vice-versa. Therefore, to 
recognise the fact that these concepts are not necessarily easy to distinguish (because 
institutional structures almost certainly influence policy style, and vice-versa), they 
are separated by a dotted line.  
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Figure 2.3: Hypothesis of converging governance approaches in Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle 
 
The diagram suggests a number of factors that may be causing traditional approaches 
to change, based on the discussion above. Of course, governance models may be 
static, or they may be shifting for different reasons than those set out in the diagram, 
both of which would be worthwhile findings. However, these potential drivers helped 
to frame the data collection process, and therefore they feature in figure 2.3 and the 
empirical chapters. They have also been selected on the basis of logical assumptions. 
For example, Newcastle council might have previously adopted an English policy 
style (according to the two sub-dimensions analysed in this thesis), but may no longer 
prefer to rely on the best practicable means for addressing a problem because of its 
desire to re-brand the city as a forward-looking location and leader in sustainability. 
Similarly, any preference for engaging and compromising with other governance 
actors may be affected by an increasing desire for more ambitious policies, which 
could mean the authority seeks to adopt a more hierarchical approach to achieve its 
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climate protection goals. In terms of the multi-level governance dimension, the fact 
that climate change concerns need to be integrated into other policy sectors could lead 
to the council reappraising its reliance on task-specific organisations and the degree of 
state fragmentation. Finally, a desire for a more stable institutional environment for 
making and implementing policy might result in policy-makers deciding against 
regular tinkering with the vertical structures within which Newcastle operates. 
 
As far as Gelsenkirchen is concerned, any preference it may have had for state of the 
art policy solutions could be threatened by its financial situation, particularly in the 
aftermath of the 2007/08 crisis. In a similar way, the wicked nature of climate change, 
which means that a range of stakeholders need to alter their behaviour in order for 
policies to be effective, might mean that Gelsenkirchen can no longer rely on a 
typically ‘German’ preference for state hierarchy to achieve its objectives. In terms of 
multi-level governance, the city may no longer have the resources to maintain all of 
its services in-house and might therefore be shifting away from the traditional model 
of a multi-functional local authority. Finally, the rigid vertical structures that are 
characteristic of a Type I multi-level governance arrangement may be threatened by a 
desire for greater flexibility. This could manifest itself in the creation of additional 
channels for policy-making and implementation that operate in parallel to ‘official’ 
institutions. 
 
In this way, the framework draws particularly on the work of Richardson et al. (1982) 
and Hooghe and Marks (2003) to analyse the relevant policy styles and institutional 
structures respectively. However, the other perspectives discussed above will also 
help to understand the nature of governance approaches in Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle. For example, those concerned with environmental policy integration (see 
section 2.2.8) will inform the extent to which climate concerns have been 
incorporated into each city’s climate change strategy, planning and corporate policies, 
which are examined in chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively. Furthermore, the literatures 
on NPM (section 2.2.6) and urban governance (2.2.10) will assist in analysing the 
nature of state fragmentation in each city, and especially its corresponding impact on 
horizontal governance structures and societal engagement strategies. In addition, this 
fragmentation (as well as other resource constraints) may have reduced organisational 
capacity within the case study municipalities, and therefore the discussion in section 
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2.2.7 should be instructive. Theories of policy implementation (section 2.2.4), policy 
networks (2.2.5) and governance (2.2.2) are also relevant, particularly considering the 
importance of all actors along the policy chain when addressing wicked issues such as 
climate change. Finally, analyses of the attempts to negotiate some kind of 
international agreement on climate protection (section 2.2.1) will provide the overall 
context for the seemingly intractable nature of this crucial global issue. 
 
2.4  A new approach to analysing governance relationships  
 
As the previous section has highlighted, the case study cities may exhibit various 
national characteristics in their governance arrangements, and various factors might 
be causing them to change and/or converge. However, it has also demonstrated how 
both the multi-level governance typology and the policy styles perspective are 
overwhelmingly descriptive and therefore unable to help explain the processes 
involved in policy-making.  
 
Various scholars have sought to overcome this problem by highlighting the 
importance of ‘meta-governance’: the broad principles and framework within which 
governance arrangements operate (Jessop, 2002, Kooiman, 2003). Indeed, changes to 
this framework (such as in the relationships between key actors) would help to 
explain differences in policy outputs. Nonetheless, meta-governance perspectives 
suffer ultimately from the same problem as governance interpretations: they do not 
include useful tools for analysing power dynamics, which means it is difficult to 
identify which actors are influencing policy. In a similar way, various models of 
federal-state relations, such as those suggested by Wright (1988), do not help to 
analyse who is playing which role in decision-making and therefore what might 
change policy outcomes. Indeed, although Wright’s three different perspectives on 
federalism in the USA (which he terms ‘co-ordinate’, ‘inclusive’ and ‘overlapping’) 
can be used to illustrate varying levels of integration between tiers of government, it 
nonetheless remains overwhelmingly descriptive rather than analytical.  
 
In contrast, although some of the earlier work on intergovernmental relations tends to 
focus on single countries rather than be employed to support comparative analyses 
(Goldsmith, 2012), this literature is much more helpful. In particular, it stressed the 
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importance of understanding power dependencies between different tiers of public 
administration – principles that can also be applied to horizontal relationships 
between bodies at the same level. These ideas have roots in organisational sociology, 
most notably Aldrich’s (1979) theory that high levels of interdependency between 
companies makes them more likely to survive economic downturns. Although the 
Darwinian nature of Aldrich’s argument is not particularly relevant to public sector 
bodies that cannot go out of business, the importance of resource interdependency is 
nonetheless useful in intergovernmental relations.  
 
Indeed, scholars such as Benson (1982) have adapted it for state institutions, by 
stressing the interdependency of sub-national and central governments. For example, 
although the centre normally allocates some funding to the periphery, sub-national 
governments usually provide relevant information and implement central policy in 
return. In a similar way, various studies in the 1970s found that local and state 
governments in Germany had access to crucial sources of local information and 
technical expertise (Baestlein et al., 1978, Garlichs and Hull, 1978, Mayntz, 1978) 
that eluded the federal government. Coupled with the understanding that all 
stakeholders have a preference for ‘conflict avoidance’ (Scharpf et al., 1976), the fact 
that sub-national governments have access to these essential resources has enabled 
them to exercise significant influence over federal policy programmes.  
 
Of course, the extent to which local actors can shape decision-making is likely to vary 
from country to country. This might depend on how resources are distributed within 
these relationships (sub-national actors that can raise additional revenues are in a 
stronger position than those who have no access to extra funding), or the degree of 
local discretion over policy directives. Nonetheless, by focusing on such variables 
within interdependent relationships we can begin to identify which actors are exerting 
most influence over decision-making.  
 
For example, scholars such as Scharpf (1978) have used game theory to model how 
policy-making actors might behave within certain contexts. The nature of these 
relationships is based on the importance of the resources they each hold and whether 
these resources could be substituted with an alternative. This allows researchers to 
identify the extent to which two actors are mutually interdependent, and therefore 
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whether one might be in a position to exploit the other, and/or whether co-ordination 
would be in both parties’ interests. However, various studies have highlighted the 
drawbacks associated with applying game theory approaches to social situations (see 
Ostrom, 1998 for an overview), or pointed out how they are limited by focusing on 
only two actors (Kooiman, 2003). In addition, it is very difficult to identify what 
actors actually want to achieve from the game, since individuals may have different 
objectives from the organisations they represent in negotiations. This makes it even 
harder to ascertain the extent to which any particular actor has achieved its goals, and 
therefore the power it is able to exercise during bargaining processes. 
 
Nonetheless, Rhodes (1981) adopted the idea of power-dependence very effectively in 
the context of central-local relations in the UK. Central to his analysis was the 
importance of identifying the nature of the interdependent relationship, namely which 
resources each tier of government is dependent upon and who can provide those 
resources. These resources are not solely financial: they may also be constitutional or 
political, shaped by the hierarchical nature of intergovernmental relations, or 
associated with particular expertise or access to information. Rhodes recognised that 
power dependencies are rarely symmetrical, but he stressed that different tiers of 
government are always interdependent to some extent and their reciprocal 
relationships are not necessarily a zero-sum arrangement. Therefore, to return to the 
definition of organisational capacity set out in section 2.2.7, greater interdependence 
between two or more actors can increase the ability of all stakeholders to achieve their 
policy objectives. Such a view reflects traditional arguments about the benefits of 
countries ‘pooling’ sovereignty through institutions such as the European Union.3 
Since the municipalities in both Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen have experienced 
severe financial pressures in recent years, their ability to implement policy objectives 
is likely to be an influential factor in shaping governance arrangements. Indeed, to 
return to section 2.2.1, the shift towards governance is often viewed as the result of 
state actors seeking to increase their political power and institutional capacity by 
                                                 
3 Some might argue that greater interdependence weakens the autonomy of nation-states (or indeed 
municipalities). However, since this project seeks to identify the nature of governance structures 
through empirical investigation, it will not attempt to construct normative arguments about the 
democratic implications of ‘pooling sovereignty’ at either the local or supranational level. 
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working with other stakeholders, rather than exerting formal hierarchical authority 
(Peters and Pierre, 2001, Davies and Trounstine, 2012). As a result, incorporating 
capacity-building into the theoretical framework will provide a way of explaining 
why traditional governance approaches might be changing. 
 
In later works, Rhodes (1985, 1986, 1988, 1997) suggests that interdependent 
governance relationships have become so embedded that they constitute vertical 
networks comprising central and local government bureaucrats and outside experts. 
However, as section 2.2.5 argued, the cross-cutting and complex nature of climate 
change means that the development of a highly cohesive network on this issue is 
unlikely – and therefore this thesis will not take this approach. Nonetheless, it will use 
the concept of power-dependency as a tool to help explain changes in the 
relationships between governance actors in both cities. This is because the theory can 
explain how a change in the availability of resources or in the importance that a 
stakeholder attaches to any particular resource will affect power relationships. For 
example, changes in the resource requirements of local and/or central governments 
will influence power dynamics along the vertical dimension. In addition, although 
Rhodes focused on central-local relations, his theory is equally applicable to 
horizontal relationships between government bodies and other actors within the same 
jurisdiction. 
Although he does not address this explicitly, Rhodes implies that dependency is the 
converse of high levels of interdependency. In other words, if the power relationship 
between two organisations is asymmetrical, one would be much more dependent on 
the other. However, if each organisation pursues its own objectives largely 
autonomously (in other words, there is limited reciprocity between the two), they 
would actually both be more independent of each other. This would also be the case if 
one actor would like to source additional capacity from others, but the support is not 
forthcoming and therefore no interdependent (or even dependent) relationship 
develops. Such eventualities cannot be illustrated easily using Rhodes’ framework, 
but it is there are nonetheless perfectly possible. Indeed, to return to Hooghe and 
Marks (2003), Type I multi-level governance structures suggest that municipalities 
operate relatively autonomously within their localities because they have retained 
responsibility for a wide range of public functions.  
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In order to incorporate all three potential scenarios (interdependence, dependence and 
independence) into the empirical analysis, chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis will use 
tri-polar diagrams based on figures 2.4 and 2.5 to illustrate the power relationships 
involved in each policy sector, along the vertical and horizontal dimensions 
respectively. This tri-polar representation has the additional benefit of incorporating 
the characteristically ‘German’ and ‘English’ multi-level governance types into the 
empirical analysis. The diagrams take the municipality’s perspective; in other words, 
where an organisation has been plotted close to the ‘dependence’ pole, this is because 
the local authority relies more heavily on other actors than they do on it.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Vertical power dependency relationships in Types I and II multi-level 
governance arrangements 
 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the vertical dependency relationships within ideal Type I and 
Type II arrangements. Along the vertical sub-dimension selected for this thesis, it 
shows how councils and higher tiers of government in an ideal Type I jurisdiction are 
highly interdependent, because the structured institutional architecture indicates that 
all levels are involved in making and implementing policy. In contrast, since vertical 
Type II arrangements are flexible and dynamic, local authorities in these jurisdiction 
operate much more independently of higher tiers of government.  
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In a similar way, figure 2.5 plots the power dependencies of municipalities in ideal 
Type I and Type II jurisdictions along the horizontal dimension. Since Type I 
arrangements suggest that responsibilities are concentrated into ‘multi-purpose’ 
jurisdictions, these local authorities have responsibility for a wide range of functions 
and do not have to rely on other agencies to achieve their objectives. As such, they 
exist largely independently of other horizontal actors and are positioned close to the 
independence pole. In contrast, municipalities in Type II structures rely heavily on 
task-specific jurisdictions such as special-purpose vehicles, external contractors and 
functional agencies. The local authority can only achieve its objectives by working 
with these other bodies, but this relationship is interdependent because the council 
might provide democratic legitimacy, funding or other resources in return. As such, 
Type II municipalities are positioned towards this pole along the horizontal 
dimension. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Horizontal power dependency relationships in Types I and II multi-level 
governance arrangements 
 
In this way, figures 2.4 and 2.5 show how Hooghe and Marks’ typologies of multi-
level governance interlock with Rhodes’ theory of power dependence, and also 
provide a means of illustrating the nature of institutional structures in the case study 
cities. Furthermore, they can also help to examine power relationships within these 
governance arrangements by highlighting the nature of resource dependencies 
61 
 
between actors. This also makes them extremely useful tools for analysing why the 
dimensions of policy styles adopted for this thesis might apply or be changing. For 
example, if a municipality is highly interdependent with (or dependent on) other 
horizontal actors it may need to adopt a strategy of engagement and compromise – 
whereas greater independence might allow it to act more hierarchically. Alternatively, 
it may be better placed to invest in state of the art solutions if it works 
interdependently with external technical experts or funders, or if it has significant 
autonomy (independence) to raise its own revenue. By extension, therefore, any 
changes in the nature of these power dependent relationships could affect the multi-
level governance arrangements and policy styles exhibited by the case study 
municipalities. 
 
2.5  Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explained the relevance of various academic literatures to studying 
climate governance in English and German cities, and shown how they can be pulled 
together into a framework for analysis. Drawing particularly on ideas of multi-level 
governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2003) and national policy styles (Richardson, 1982), 
it has set out a hypothesis that is central to the rest of this thesis. This posits that 
Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen have sought to govern climate protection policy in 
different ways in the past, but a range of exogenous and endogenous pressures are 
causing these traditional approaches to change and converge. To complement and 
enhance this ‘mapping’ of governance styles, the chapter has also demonstrated how 
Rhodes’ (1981) theory of power dependence in central-local government relations 
might identify the reasons behind this evolution of governance approaches. Indeed, by 
building on Rhodes’ theory, it has shown how the nature of power dependence 
relationships might determine multi-level governance arrangements and policy styles 
within any given jurisdiction. Central to this new theoretical perspective is an 
assessment of the extent to which each city is dependent on, interdependent with or 
independent of other actors, in both vertical and horizontal governance relationships.  
 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate how these relationships can be represented in 
diagrammatic form. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will use these diagrams to highlight the 
nature of governance structures for climate change strategy, planning and corporate 
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policies in the case study cities. By plotting additional points and arrows to indicate a 
‘direction of travel’, they will also illustrate how these structures might be changing. 
Any shifts may be in response to the pressures outlined in figure 2.3 (see page 53) and 
chapter 1, or they may not – but they will be notable phenomena, regardless of the 
cause.  
 
Furthermore, in order to address the central hypothesis more explicitly, this tri-polar 
analysis will inform a set of two-dimensional diagrams based on figures 2.1 and 2.2 
(see pages 28 and 46). These will plot the position of each city’s approach to all three 
policy sectors using the selected sub-dimensions of multi-level governance and policy 
styles. As with the power dependency diagrams, they will also include an arrow to 
signify each municipality’s direction of travel, and therefore indicate whether it is 
moving away from, or towards, its ‘typical’ location on each sub-dimension. In this 
way, chapters 4, 5 and 6 will illustrate the extent to which these ideal models apply in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle, whether traditional governance models are changing or 
converging, and the key reasons why each city addresses these three policy sectors in 
the way that it does.  
 
Prior to this empirical analysis however, the next chapter will focus on the historical 
development of local government in England and Germany, particularly in those 
regions encompassing Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen. It will analyse the evolution of 
central-local relations – especially the extent to which municipalities are 
interdependent with, independent of, or dependent on external actors – and conclude 
with an assessment of where a ‘typical’ local authority in each area might be located 
on the tri-polar diagrams in figures 2.4 and 2.5. In this way, it will also highlight the 
extent to which the characteristics of Types I and II multi-level governance might 
apply to the ‘average’ municipality in each country and therefore assess the relevance 
of the hypothesis set out in figure 2.3. Even if Types I and II are not particularly 
accurate representations of the institutional arrangements that operate within Germany 
and England, the diagrams in chapter 3 will nonetheless act as a useful benchmark for 
the empirical analysis of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. They may also demonstrate 
whether the governance arrangements in the case study cities might be representative 
of municipalities elsewhere in Germany and England, and therefore indicate how 
applicable the findings of this thesis may be to other local authorities.   
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Chapter 3: Local governance in England and Germany – the 
historical context 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines how sub-national governance has developed in England4 and 
Germany and thereby sets the context for the empirical analysis in chapters 4, 5 and 6 
of the thesis. It focuses particularly on changes in the power dependency of local 
government in both countries, and highlights how these shifts have resulted in 
German councils having more capacity to implement their objectives compared to 
their counterparts in England. As a result, municipalities in the two case study 
countries now differ substantially in terms of how they are able to address major 
issues such as climate change. 
 
Although both Germany and England have a long tradition of what we might term 
‘local government’, (Bennett and Krebs, 1991), the kind of multi-functional bodies 
that contemporary observers would recognise as local authorities only began to 
develop after the French Revolution. Therefore this chapter focuses largely on the 
period since 1800, and highlights how the evolution of local government in each 
country has shaped its capacity and perceived role in the local community right up to 
the present day. In order to highlight specific phases of development, it splits the 
evolution of municipalities into three eras: the period up to 1900; between 1900 and 
the early 1970s; and the 1970s to the present day. These specific eras represent key 
shifts in vertical and horizontal power dependency relationships involving local 
government in both countries, and have therefore shaped the extent to which 
individual municipalities have the ability to achieve their policy objectives.  
 
The first period begins in the early 1800s with the creation of modern local authorities 
in both countries, and it traces how local government increased its power and 
                                                 
4 Until devolution at the end of the twentieth century, the British government was responsible for local 
authorities across the United Kingdom. Most of the changes discussed in this chapter affected councils 
in England and Wales; generally speaking, local government in Scotland and Ireland (and Northern 
Ireland after 1918) was administered differently throughout this period. 
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influence during the Victorian era. From around 1900 onwards however, central 
government began to take over responsibility for many local functions as ministers 
sought to standardise welfare state provision at the national level. Finally, the period 
since the early 1970s has been characterised by attempts to rein in council spending 
and influence, whilst a trend towards state fragmentation (particularly in England) led 
to major changes in horizontal relationships between individual municipalities and 
other local actors. Therefore, these decades constitute the final section of this chapter. 
 
As chapter 2 discussed, the multi-level governance typologies proposed by Hooghe 
and Marks (2003) are insufficiently nuanced to explain (or even describe) the nature 
of policy-making processes in each city. Nonetheless, since Hooghe and Marks’ 
model (along with the idea of national policy styles) is central to the hypothesis under 
investigation, the chapter will touch on this issue by mapping governance 
arrangements against the typology as accurately as possible. However, its main focus 
will be on changes to power dependency relationships during the three periods 
outlined above, and it concludes with an overview of how we might expect these 
arrangements to operate in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle.  
 
3.2  Local governance up to 1900 
 
3.2.1  Local governance in Germany up to 1900 
 
German cities have a history of autonomy from higher tiers of governance that dates 
back to the Middle Ages, long before Germany became established as a modern 
nation state (Conradt, 2001). This was largely because most of what is now Germany 
was part of the East Frankish part of the Holy Roman Empire that was created 
following the death of Charlemagne in AD 843. This empire, which some Germans 
later termed the First Reich, was not a ‘state’ in the modern meaning of the term, but 
rather a loose grouping of territories held together by some confederate features 
(Gunlicks, 2003). Crucially, its lack of a centralised structure meant that large cities 
were very powerful and largely autonomous actors. This legacy, together with the fact 
that much of the empire’s territory was outside the contemporary borders of 
‘Germany’, illustrates how the historical development of a German nation state 
differed markedly from either that of England or the wider United Kingdom. 
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The Holy Roman Empire lasted until the Napoleonic Wars, when the occupying 
French introduced a much more centralised system of government administration in 
their new Kingdom of Westphalia – including what was then the tiny village of 
Gelsenkirchen. However, following Napoleon’s defeat, the Congress of Vienna 
awarded Westphalia and the Rhineland to Prussia and its new governor, Baron 
Ludwig Vincke, set about organising the province’s administration along Prussian 
lines (Engel, 1969). Notably, Prussia’s eighteenth-century ruler Frederick II (‘the 
Great’) had introduced various reforms that bore Napoleonic hallmarks – such as 
giving many property-owning men the right to vote, establishing state-funded 
universities, liberalising commerce, developing a highly-trained army of conscripts 
and instituting a legal code (Acemoglu et al., 2011, Gildea, 1987, Bogumil and 
Holtkamp, 2006). Crucially, however, Prussian leaders were much less keen to adopt 
the French model of local administration. Indeed, Baron Karl vom Stein, the Prussian 
First Minister for much of this period, sought to construct a ‘system of urban 
government in accordance with a philosophy contrary to that of Napoleon’ (Norton, 
1994, p. 238). This meant decentralising power to the grass roots, rather than 
developing a strong central authority that nurtured nationalistic fervour.  
 
As a result, a Civic Ordinance of 1808 gave the towns and cities responsibility for 
overseeing economic modernisation and nurturing civic pride, and extended the 
franchise for local councils to all male property owners and salaried professionals. It 
also introduced a powerful (albeit collegial) executive in each city in the form of a 
Magistrat that was appointed by elected councillors. From 1831 onwards the 
Magistrat was able to veto council decisions (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006), in 
contrast to the system of committees and ceremonial mayors that existed in England. 
This meant that Prussian municipalities were able to take decisions much easier than 
their English counterparts, and had substantial capacity to shape the local area during 
this period (Wollmann, 2004).  
 
Some have argued that Stein introduced a decentralised system so that the central 
Prussian state would not have to finance the rebuilding process after the Napoleonic 
Wars (Naβmacher and Naβmacher, 2007). Indeed, the extent of devolution to the 
local level is all the more surprising considering the otherwise authoritarian nature of 
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nineteenth-century Prussia (Edwards and van der Meer, 2000, Passant et al., 1962). 
However, regardless of the reasons behind the Civic Ordinance, it meant that 
municipalities derived their legitimacy from local communities (rather than the 
centre), because they were responsible for instilling civic pride and modernising the 
country from the bottom-up. Indeed, it is important to note that councils became 
firmly established in Prussia at a time when the country was still overwhelmingly 
rural, and that Stein believed local government would be best placed to oversee a 
strategy of industrial and economic development.  
 
In order to achieve this, the 1808 Ordinance granted municipalities a power of general 
competence to undertake any function that they considered to be in the interests of the 
locality, unless that task was specifically assigned to another government body in law 
(Norton, 1994, Wollmann, 2004). Crucially, this power eluded their English 
counterparts for another two centuries, which meant that local authorities in England 
could only undertake activities that were expressly permitted in legislation. In 
Germany, the power of general competence has since become almost synonymous 
with the idea of lokale Selbstverwaltung (local self-administration), which ensures 
that municipalities not only have ‘a high degree of autonomy in decision-making, but 
also a corresponding flexibility in terms of income and expenditure’ (Scherf, 2010, p. 
373). This power was enshrined in the post-1945 Grundgesetz (Basic Law), and 
continues to provide legal authority and legitimacy for local authorities in the present 
day. In particular, it puts them in a strong position in local governance arrangements 
and ensured they have retained significant control over revenues.5  
 
Prussia’s governors were helped by being able to tap into a tradition of civic pride that 
was much stronger than in England (Palmowski, 2002). Furthermore, the introduction 
                                                 
5 In fact, as this chapter will demonstrate, the German concept of lokale Selbstverwaltung actually 
results in what Anglophones might more accurately term ‘local self-government’, because it gives 
municipalities substantial autonomy to take decisions rather than merely administer policy on behalf of 
other organisations. Ironically, ‘local government’ in England is actually more concerned with 
administration and implementation – to the extent that scholars such as Copus (2010) have argued that 
it is neither ‘local’ nor ‘government’. 
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of a wide-ranging – and much admired6 – public education system helped to nurture 
communal identities and equip people with the skills necessary to help transform 
Prussia from a feudal to an industrial country (Gerlach, 2010, Gildea, 1987). In 
addition to education, Prussian municipalities began to provide an increasing range of 
other services, including parks and recreation, sanitation, infrastructure, utilities, 
refuse collection, public transport, sports facilities, hospitals, cemeteries, 
slaughterhouses and cultural services. These services were overwhelmingly 
‘municipalised’ – that is, owned and delivered by the local authority – which provided 
the council with significant revenue streams. Not only were some of these functions 
necessary from a public health perspective, but they also facilitated the process of 
industrialisation, since they ensured that cities had sufficient housing, transport, 
sanitation, education and other services to support their rapidly increasing populations 
(Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006). More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, they 
demonstrated the degree of capacity within local authorities to deliver these services 
‘in-house’, largely independent of central government and non-state actors. To use 
Hooghe and Marks’ characterisation, nineteenth-century German councils were 
archetypal Type I ‘multi-purpose authorities’, because responsibilities for policy-
making and service delivery were concentrated within the municipality.  
 
As the role of Prussian local government expanded considerably, so did municipal 
expenditure – to the extent that spending per head doubled between 1883 and 1902 
(Palmowski, 2002). The vast majority of this money was borrowed, on the assumption 
that economic growth and continued industrialisation would lead to higher levels of 
revenue from business taxes (Gewerbesteuer) in future years. As we shall see later in 
the chapter however, this debt became increasingly difficult to manage and 
contributed towards local government losing influence in the early twentieth century. 
Nonetheless, Prussian councils enjoyed a large degree of fiscal autonomy. From 1820 
onwards, they were permitted to levy the Gewerbesteuer, and from 1891 each 
municipality was also able to decide whether to tax a local company according to its 
                                                 
6 Victorian reformers in England were amongst these admirers. British Liberal governments under 
William Gladstone tried to adopt the Prussian secondary education system as a model but were blocked 
by established interests keen to continue with the elitist and limited nature of schools at the time (see 
Gildea 1987). 
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annual revenue, capital holdings or number of employees (Rehm and Matern-Rehm, 
2010).  
 
As the nineteenth century progressed, Prussia became the pre-eminent state in the 
German Confederation (Deutsche Bund) (Passant et al., 1962, Conradt, 2001, Roberts, 
2000, Carr, 1991). This meant that most other German states adopted Stein’s 
philosophy of civic governance and efficient bureaucracy in order to try and emulate 
its economic, political and military success (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006). Indeed, 
Prussia became so dominant within the confederation that its rulers were essentially 
able to dictate the terms of the 1871 unification that created the Second Reich (Carr, 
1991, Conradt, 2001). As a result, the Prussian King Wilhelm I became Germany’s 
first Kaiser (a term meaning ‘emperor’ that derives from the Latin Caesar), and he 
appointed the Chancellor (the Prussian prime minister Otto von Bismarck) as head of 
the government. Crucially, although the other states (or Länder) retained many of 
their previous institutions (not least their monarchies) following unification, the new 
Reich constitution incorporated the Prussian principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung. As 
a result, municipalities from across Germany developed their own approach to 
delivering utilities, health care and other social services.  
 
In keeping with this principle, the Prussian government passed legislation in 1893 that 
confirmed local government’s power to levy all ‘material taxes’ (Realsteuer – those 
that concerned property and businesses), as well as introduce surcharges on the 
amount of income tax or excise duty that applied within the Land. The law also 
enabled municipalities to raise taxes if their revenue from direct grants, fees and 
charges did not cover their expenditure. Indeed, councils were responsible for 40% of 
all taxation in the Second Reich right up until 1913 (Elsner, 1979). This gave them 
significant capacity to raise revenue and undertake activities independently of central 
government.  
 
Although this situation has changed to some extent over the last hundred years, the 
legacy of Prussia’s preference for lokale Selbstverwaltung, civic pride and bottom-up 
development is still relevant in contemporary Germany. Indeed, as chapters 4, 5 and 6 
of this thesis will demonstrate, this legacy has helped to ensure that German 
municipalities have a higher status in local governance arrangements than their 
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English counterparts, and have consequently been able to exercise greater hierarchical 
authority in decision-making processes.  
 
3.2.2  Local governance in England up to 1900 
 
In England, as in most other European countries, royal charters granted cities 
additional privileges before local ‘government’ became established in the way that we 
would recognise it today. In particular, urban areas were outside the jurisdiction of 
counties (Seeley, 1978, Norton, 1994), which meant that they enjoyed greater 
autonomy than rural areas. As a result, many established ad hoc municipal 
corporations to oversee public facilities such as turnpikes and street lighting, as well 
as the police and fire services. By 1800 there were around 200 of these single-purpose 
public authorities, which were not very well co-ordinated and overseen by an elite 
group of prominent men elected on a very limited franchise (Skelcher, 2003). In 
addition, since Britain’s constitution was (and remains) uncodified, the role of elected 
bodies in the overall governing framework was unclear. For example, these bodies 
had no legal basis to promote general well-being, and were established primarily to 
control the various ad hoc institutions that had developed over previous centuries 
(Norton, 1994).  
 
The industrial revolution, which resulted in serious public health problems in urban 
areas, stretched this piecemeal system to breaking point (Norton, 1994, Aidt et al., 
2010). In particular, the rapid migration of large numbers of people from the 
countryside to the towns placed unbearable pressure on the rudimentary services that 
were in place at the time. For example, only six of the 50 largest towns in England 
and Wales had a pure water supply in 1845, meaning that ‘living conditions were 
filthy and squalid, with a consequent danger of cholera and the plague’ (Seeley, 1978, 
p. 5). Alongside these public health concerns, the Reform Act of 1832 increased 
pressure for elected representation at the local level, and the development of the 
railways led to growing demand for better roads and other transport infrastructure.  
 
In response to these pressures, the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 set out a 
model for elected town councils that became widespread throughout England and 
Wales. This gave municipalities responsibility for policing (though not justice), 
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lighting, the management of corporate property and local bye-laws to prevent what 
would now be described as anti-social behaviour. The Act applied to 178 larger towns 
and cities (excluding London), many of which were granted additional powers later in 
the century (for example the Museums Act 1845 gave larger boroughs the right to 
establish museums (S. Eckersley, 2012)). The franchise was limited at first, but 
authorities had a reasonable amount of autonomy over the services for which they 
were responsible.  
 
Crucially, the 1835 Act established the founding principles for modern English 
councils, and these shaped the nature of local government for well over a century 
thereafter. They included a reliance on committee-based decision-making (in contrast 
to the strong Magistrat in Prussia) and – crucially – the status of municipalities as 
‘creatures of Parliament’, which meant that ministers could reform or abolish them 
quite easily. Indeed, the lack of a codified constitution meant that English 
municipalities were in a much weaker legal position than their Prussian counterparts. 
 
 1800 1850 1871 1911 
England & Wales 9.7 22.6 32.6 43.8 
Prussia  1.8 3.1 4.8 21.3 
 
Table 3.1: The percentage of the population in Prussia and England & Wales who 
lived in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants, 1800-1911 (adapted from Gildea, 1987) 
 
In addition, English local authorities were primarily established in order to deal with 
perceived social problems of behalf of the centre – largely the sanitation and crime 
concerns associated with rapid industrialisation. Indeed, legislation such as the 1848 
Public Health Act gave municipal corporations specific responsibilities for providing 
water supply and drainage. Since urbanisation occurred much later in the German 
confederation than in England and Wales (see table 3.1), Prussian cities did not face 
the same challenges of overcrowding and poor sanitation as their English counterparts 
– at least initially. Yet Prussia established modern local authorities several decades 
before Britain, thereby illustrating that German municipalities were not created to 
respond to the negative externalities of the industrial revolution. Instead, as section 
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3.2.1 discussed, Stein and his disciples felt that empowering the local level would 
stimulate economic development and promote civic pride. As such, they viewed 
municipalities as a means to accelerate the process of industrialisation, rather than a 
necessary response to its negative consequences.  
 
Related to this, municipalities were only permitted to undertake those activities that 
were expressly set out in legislation. If a council stepped outside this framework, even 
if it was demonstrably to the benefit of its residents, it would be acting ultra vires 
(outside the law) and could be prosecuted and fined. Together with their status as 
‘creatures of Parliament’, this meant that English municipalities were more dependent 
on the whims of central government ministers than their Prussian counterparts. 
Indeed, the constitutional guarantee of lokale Selbstverwaltung gave local government 
in nineteenth-century Prussia a much higher status and stronger position vis à vis the 
centre than in England – and this difference between the two countries still applies in 
the present day. 
 
Nonetheless, English councils were able to extend their activities into a range of 
areas, often working on the legal basis that they were dealing with public health 
concerns. As a result, they provided services such as clean water, public 
transportation, gas works, electricity, sewage systems, cemeteries, highways, waste 
management, public toilets and housing. This activism led to the late nineteenth 
century being described as the ‘golden age’ of local government in England and 
Wales (Norton, 1994), due to the scale of public services that authorities were able to 
deliver and the differences they made to citizens’ lives. The city of Birmingham, 
particularly under the leadership of Joseph Chamberlain between 1873 and 1876, is 
often cited as the prime example of a municipality that was able to transform the 
urban environment and consequently the health of its inhabitants (Skelcher, 2003, 
Palmowski, 2002) – and it was certainly not the only borough to do so (Norton, 1994). 
Moreover, as was the case in Prussia, these services were all delivered by the 
municipality (rather than any contracted external provider), and therefore Victorian 
local government in England demonstrated its capacity to implement policy objectives 
independently of other horizontal governance actors. 
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Although central government set out a number of national standards for sewage 
disposal and clean water, there were few other obligations on the municipalities. In 
addition, the differentiated impact of the industrial revolution across England led to a 
general acknowledgment that municipalities were best placed to respond to the issues 
that arose in their own jurisdictions. This meant that local representatives were 
allowed to decide on the extent of service provision within each area, and some cities 
were more inclined than others to increase local rates to fund public amenities (Doyle, 
2001). Since central grants only constituted about 5% of municipal revenues up until 
1888, any decision to spend money on local infrastructure projects or public health 
initiatives would have significant implications for local taxation or lead to higher 
charges for municipal services such as public transport or utilities (Aidt et al., 2010). 
The result was significant variation across the country and a situation that led Bulpitt 
(1983) to describe Britain as a ‘dual polity’, since local and central government 
operated largely independently of one another. Indeed, the Victorian model of local 
authorities as multi-functional, politically strong entities was much admired elsewhere 
in Europe (Wollmann, 2004, Norton, 1994, Page and Goldsmith, 1987). 
 
This variation, together with the very fact that the local franchise differed so much 
from city to city (Wollmann, 2006a, Aidt et al., 2010), suggests that English 
municipalities were able to operate largely autonomously during the nineteenth 
century. In other words, although ministers may have established local authorities for 
overwhelmingly functional reasons, councils were able to exercise a large degree of 
independence for most of the rest of the century, and they had sufficient internal 
capacity to achieve their political objectives alone. Such a characterisation appears to 
reflect a Type I approach to multi-level governance, rather than the Type II model that 
would normally be associated with England. 
 
However, the seeds of greater dependency were sown in the 1835 Act, because 
municipalities remained creatures of Parliament and were therefore subject to the 
whims of government ministers. In addition, the Local Government Act 1888 began a 
process of local authorities becoming increasingly dependent on central government 
for resources, by establishing the ‘assigned revenues’ system of grant funding that 
meant councils would be allocated 40% of specific national taxes (Seeley, 1978). 
Another Local Government Act in 1894 clarified that the different tiers of council 
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were responsible for distinctly separate functions, and therefore districts did not need 
to interact very much with counties in order to co-ordinate service delivery. This 
functional separation has continued to the present day – at least in those parts of 
England where two-tier local government has survived. Notably, the lack of an 
integrative culture means that English authorities are much less likely to co-operate 
vertically than their German counterparts (see section 3.3.1 for a discussion of the 
prevalence of Politikverflechtung in Germany’s public sector). Indeed, this lack of 
support and capacity from vertical governance actors has meant that English 
municipalities need to rely more on horizontal stakeholders to achieve their policy 
objectives – as chapters 4, 5 and 6 illustrate in the context of climate policy in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. 
 
Furthermore, the 1894 Act increased the size of councils significantly and therefore 
increased the distance between local communities and their elected representatives to 
a scale unmatched elsewhere in Western Europe. Indeed, subsequent restructures 
since the 1970s have meant that municipalities have become bigger still (see Norton, 
1994, section 3.4.2 of this thesis). As a result, the lowest statutory tier of government 
in England now caters for an average of seven times the number of people of its 
German counterpart. This illustrates how central government ministers illustrated a 
preference for administrative units that are perhaps more likely to deliver services 
effectively and efficiently, rather than authorities that reflect ‘natural’ community and 
local boundaries. In other words, English councils were viewed increasingly as 
agencies with a responsibility for overseeing public service delivery rather than the 
democratic embodiment of their local communities.  
 
These developments do suggest that the two tiers were becoming more 
interdependent: ministers expected councils to implement policy on their behalf, and 
the municipalities were becoming increasingly reliant on central funding to finance 
their activities. However, the lack of an embedded constitutional relationship between 
central and local government, together with the increasingly asymmetrical nature of 
resource dependencies, meant that ministers were in a much stronger position than 
municipalities. As figure 3.1 shows therefore, although English councils had 
significant de facto freedom during the nineteenth century along the vertical sub-
dimension, their de jure autonomy was largely determined by central government in 
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an increasingly dependent relationship. In contrast, Prussian councils were integrated 
into the constitutional framework and had the right to do anything that was not 
expressly prohibited by legislation. This reflects the different geneses of local 
government in both countries (see table 3.2) – and, as section 3.4.2 of this chapter will 
demonstrate, has allowed the UK Government to restrict the capacity of English 
municipalities significantly since the 1970s. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Vertical dependency relationships for nineteenth-century local 
government in England and Prussia 
 
Notably, however, local government in both countries during the Victorian era had 
significant capacity to achieve their policy objectives independently of other 
horizontal actors (see figure 3.2). Municipalities were archetypal Type I ‘multi-
functional authorities’ along this sub-dimension, since they provided a whole range of 
different services directly to residents, and did not have to rely on other organisations 
for support. Although this fits with the ‘typical’ characterisation of German local 
government, we might have expected English municipalities to be located closer to 
the interdependence pole because this better reflects Type II arrangements (as 
illustrated in figure 2.5 on page 59). However, as later sections of this chapter will 
demonstrate, they did move in this duration as the twentieth century progressed. 
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Table 3.2: Contrasting characteristics in nineteenth-century English and Prussian 
local government  
 
Figure 3.2: Horizontal dependency relationships for nineteenth-century local 
government in England and Prussia 
 
3.3  Local governance between 1900 and the early 1970s 
 
As we have seen, municipalities in both countries had significant internal capacity 
during the Victorian era, and – particularly in Prussia – were able to act largely 
independently of other actors. However this situation changed from around 1900 
onwards, as national and state governments began to assume responsibility for many 
 England Prussia 
Primary reason for 
establishing local 
government 
To respond to the public 
health crisis caused by the 
Industrial Revolution 
To provide civic representation 
and modernise from the 
bottom-up 
Legal/constitutional 
status 
Creatures of statute 
subject to ultra vires 
Embedded into Prussian and 
Second Reich constitutions 
Extent of de jure 
autonomy of local 
government 
Limited Significant 
Capacity to act in the 
interests of the locality 
Significant Significant 
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of their functions, and/or introduced legislation to ensure that municipalities were 
statutorily required to deliver basic services.  
 
In England this happened gradually as the national welfare state developed, although 
it accelerated in the years immediately after 1945. Progress in Germany was far less 
smooth, largely due to the four different political systems that operated during this 
period: the last years of the Second Reich; the Weimar Republic; the Nazi era; and the 
immediate post-WWII decades in West Germany.7 Nonetheless, as this section will 
show, the overall trend during this period in both countries was towards local 
government working more interdependently with the centre, particularly in Germany. 
Along the horizontal dimension however, local authorities in both countries remained 
fairly autonomous and were therefore able to continue operating largely 
independently of other local stakeholders. 
 
3.3.1   Local governance in Germany between 1900 and the early 1970s 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, most German liberals felt that leaving welfare 
and public health programmes to the discretion of local authorities would mean 
unequal provision across the country – and that this was unfair (Palmowski, 2002). As 
a result, the Länder and Second Reich governments expanded the range of statutory 
requirements on municipalities, in order to ensure minimum standards of welfare 
provision and social protection for citizens (Hennock, 2007). This trend towards 
increasing centralisation continued after World War I, when the new Weimar 
constitution gave the federation some significant new powers, including the sole right 
to levy direct taxes (Passant et al., 1962, Elsner, 1979, Carr, 1991). Municipalities 
were now only permitted to raise taxes if they did not conflict with the constitution or 
mirror existing federal taxes, and they had to gain Land approval for any surcharges 
on other forms of taxation (Elsner, 1979). As a result, local government became 
increasingly dependent on direct grants from the federal and state levels, particularly 
after legislation was passed in 1920 that introduced a system of financial 
redistribution across the federation to try and prevent unequal economic development.  
                                                 
7 Since Gelsenkirchen is not located in the eastern part of unified Germany, this chapter does not cover 
sub-national government in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). 
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However, Article 127 of the Weimar constitution did include a formal guarantee for 
local self-government (lokale Selbstverwaltung) and thereby ensured that Stein’s 
legacy endured. Indeed, in spite of the upheaval of the war, subsequent revolutions 
and the new constitution, the structure of the German state was largely unchanged 
from the pre-1914 situation (Norton, 1994). This continuity was also apparent at the 
local level: as Bogumil and Holtkamp (2006) have identified, council boundaries 
continued unchanged and the ideal of ‘municipal socialism’ returned to many German 
cities during this period, as a number of authorities invested in large infrastructure 
projects. 
 
Nonetheless, the Great Depression did lead to major shifts in power dependency 
relationships, because its consequences included an increasingly polarised party 
system, social instability, cities with unmanageable levels of debt and – ultimately – 
the Nazi dictatorship. During the Weimar era, local government was responsible for 
paying state benefits, and the number of welfare claimants in Germany doubled 
between 1930 and 1932 at a time when municipal revenues from business taxation 
plummeted. To respond to the crisis, emergency federal legislation was passed in 
1931 that enabled Länder governments to intervene directly in the financial affairs of 
individual municipalities. Amongst other things, the Länder now had the power to 
stipulate where an authority should reduce spending, including by making staff 
redundant. Over 600 Prussian municipalities had been subjected to this treatment by 
the beginning of 1933 – at a time when they also had to deal with the social impact of 
the Depression. In other words, by the time the Weimar Republic collapsed, local 
authorities had significantly less capacity to achieve their policy objectives and were 
much more dependent on higher tiers of government – particularly the Länder – than 
had previously been the case (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006, Norton, 1994, Gunlicks, 
2003).  
 
These events proved a precursor for the rapid emasculation of local government after 
the Nazis took power in 1933. In line with the policy of Gleichschaltung8, virtually all 
                                                 
8 Gleichschaltung is normally translated as ‘co-ordination’, but in the context of the Third Reich might 
be better understood as ‘synchronisation’, ‘assimilation’ – or Layton’s (1992) term of ‘honeycombing’.  
78 
 
aspects of German state and organised society were brought under the influence of the 
ruling party. This included sub-national governments: the Nazis subsumed municipal 
representative bodies into the Deutsche Gemeindetag (the German Council of 
Municipalities) to ensure Gleichschaltung between councils and the Reich ministries 
and remove any policy ‘discrepancies’ across Germany (Gruner, 1999). Then, 
following the Municipal Government Act of 1935, local government essentially 
ceased to exist, since this legislation abolished local elections and replaced the 
constitutional right of lokale Selbstverwaltung with an obligation for all municipalities 
to implement the will of the Führer. The Act also introduced a uniform system of 
local governance across the Reich and stipulated that local officials would be 
appointed by higher-level Nazi party or governmental agencies (Conradt, 2001).   
 
Within a very short space of time, therefore, the Nazis had completely abolished 
autonomous decentralised government and the principles that extended back well over 
a century to Stein’s Prussia. Indeed, as Passant et al. (1962) have argued, the Third 
Reich was centralised to a similar extent as Napoleonic France – the very model that 
Stein had rejected so consciously. Local government was able to recover some 
capacity in the late 1930s as the economy began to grow again, but councils remained 
totally dependent on the Reich, because they were not permitted to shape their 
localities as they saw fit. Instead, local government was now de facto and de jure part 
of the central state and limited to a functional purpose – the implementation of Reich 
policy.   
 
As a number of scholars have noted however, West Germany’s post-war municipal 
and state structures developed to become very similar to those of the early Weimar 
Republic, almost as though the Depression and Nazi era had never happened (Norton, 
1994, Roberts, 2000, Conradt, 2001). One reason for this was the ‘heroic’ role played 
by local authorities in rebuilding the country immediately after the war (Wollmann, 
2000), which meant they were able to recover a large amount of influence and status. 
Another key factor was the determination of the Allies (particularly the USA) to 
ensure that the new Federal Republic had a decentralised political system, in order to 
prevent the return of dictatorship (Conradt, 2001). This meant that Stein’s principle of 
lokale Selbstverwaltung and the ability of municipalities to act freely in the interests 
of the local area were enshrined in Article 28 of the post war Grundgesetz (Basic 
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Law). The Grundgesetz also gave local authorities the right to levy taxes and 
committed the federal Government to the idea of subsidiarity (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2003), and individual Land constitutions also confirmed the wide role that 
municipalities could play within their localities. The codified nature of these 
principles have ensured that German municipalities have remained very strong actors 
within local governance arrangements over the last 70 years.  
 
Notably, since municipalities were created before the establishment of the Federal 
Republic, their political systems were heavily influenced by the various occupying 
powers. This meant that Gelsenkirchen, together with other cities in the British zone 
of occupation in the north of the country, was governed by the traditional British 
model of a non-executive ceremonial mayor and a non-political town clerk (or 
Stadtdirektor) heading the local administration. Furthermore, instead of having a 
strong executive along the Prussian Magistrat model, which the British feared could 
represent a potential threat to local democracy, municipal statutes were designed so 
that most decisions would be taken by council committees (Wollmann, 2004). In fact, 
the local council as a whole (rather than the mayor or a Cabinet) was given full 
competence in the British zones. Similarly, a British regulation from August 1945 
stipulated that municipal administration should be conducted separately from politics, 
to try and avoid a repeat of the Nazi-era system in which the party’s influence over 
local public officials was very strong (Holtmann, 1985). In contrast, most cities in the 
southern American zone adopted powerful directly-elected executive mayors to fit 
with the US system, whilst municipalities in the French-occupied areas to the west 
were established with council-elected executive mayors along French lines. 
 
However, one aspect of the British local government model that was not introduced 
into northern Germany was the size of municipality. In the years immediately after the 
war, there were over 7,000 local authorities in North Rhine-Westphalia (Roberts, 
2000) and more than 24,000 across the entire Federal Republic (Wollmann, 2000). 
This contrasted with a total of around 1,300 municipalities in the whole of England at 
the time. The size of each municipality is likely to have a direct impact on its ability 
to shape the local area, and therefore individual authorities in Germany may have had 
less capacity than their English counterparts. However, it did mean that German 
80 
 
councils had a greater claim to democratic legitimacy than their English counterparts, 
which could increase their authority vis à vis other actors in the locality.9  
 
Four additional factors changed the nature of power dependency relationships 
significantly after the war. First, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) 
established another tier of administration (the Bezirk, or district) in between the 
municipal and state levels. The five Bezirke were set up to represent the Land 
government but work very closely with local authorities by supporting their 
applications for EU, federal and Land funding, approving council budgets and co-
ordinating conflicting interests in planning policy (Dahme and Wohlfahrt, 2003). As 
such, they were deliberately designed to increase the degree of vertical 
interdependence between government bodies in the state. Second, in 1949 the 
municipalities themselves created a body to support and build capacity in local 
authorities – the Centre for Streamlining Local Government Administration 
(Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle für Verwaltungsvereinfachung, or KGSt). This 
aimed to share ideas, techniques, management approaches and other resources 
between municipalities, and thereby resulted in more horizontal interdependency 
across local government. Third, the Grundgesetz gave every municipality in the 
Federal Republic a formal dual role as both a deliverer of central government services 
and as the democratic embodiment of the local community – something that is unique 
to authorities in Germany and Austria (Norton, 1994, Herrschel and Newman, 2002, 
Wollmann, 2004). This requires local authorities to work closely with federal 
agencies to administer unemployment benefit and other services and thereby increases 
the degree of vertical interdependency between tiers of government.  
 
Most importantly, however, the Grundgesetz required the federal government to 
ensure that all citizens enjoy ‘equivalent living conditions’ (gleichwertige 
Lebensverhältnisse). This has resulted in a complex system of financial transfers 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, all of the Länder sought to rationalise the number of authorities in their territory later in 
the century, on the basis that this would increase capacity and reduce costs (Norton 1994). Indeed, 
North Rhine-Westphalia created the biggest municipalities in Germany after these reforms, although 
these larger authorities were still dwarfed by their English counterparts (Wollmann 2000, Wollmann 
2004). 
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between the Länder, in which tax revenues from wealthier states such as Bavaria and 
Baden-Württemberg are redistributed to poorer areas (including NRW and, after 
1990, the former GDR) in the form of federal grants. This system of Finanzausgleich 
(financial equalisation), has been controversial for several decades, with those Länder 
that are net contributors leading the calls for reform (Hesse and Ellwein, 2012). In 
addition, Article 106 of the Grundgesetz stipulates that the federation and Länder 
must provide municipalities with sufficient funding if they want local authorities to 
implement policies on their behalf – the principle that ‘he who orders, pays’ applies 
(Scherf, 2010, p. 369). These constitutional requirements have meant that poorer 
municipalities rely increasingly on central funding, and has therefore changed the 
nature of power relationships in many areas. Indeed, as a number of cities began to 
suffer from industrial decline from the 1960s onwards, they began to see a steep 
decline in income from the Gewerbesteuer. This contributed to local tax receipts as a 
proportion of municipal revenue in Germany falling from 35% to 28% between 1958 
and 1966 (Hesse and Ellwein, 2012). 
 
Overall, these factors have led to increasing interdependence between governing 
actors. Indeed, Scharpf et al. (1976) argued that this ‘interweaving’ of political 
interests (which they termed Politikverflechtung), was harming democratic 
accountability because it obscured the identity of decision-makers. In a later work, 
Scharpf (1988) also pointed out that it meant a range of different actors had to agree a 
unanimous decision in order to take action. He drew a parallel between German 
federalism and the process of European integration and highlighted that both 
jurisdictions suffer from the existence of ‘joint-decision traps’, which encourage 
policy-makers to focus on bargaining rather than problem-solving and result in ‘sub-
optimal policy outcomes’ (Scharpf, 1988, p. 239). 
 
In spite of these concerns, Politikverflechtung as a co-operative and integrative 
philosophy of governance has become part of the political-administrative culture 
within post war Germany (Hesse and Benz, 1990). Put simply, it means that different 
government bodies work together to agree approaches to policy and implementation 
through negotiation, in recognition of their mutual interdependence and based on the 
principle that closer co-operation will be a positive-sum game. Therefore, although 
the law may attribute powers and responsibilities to a specific tier of government, in 
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reality there is ‘a high degree of interdependence between the Bund, Länder and local 
government and between them and other sectoral interests’ (Norton, 1994, p. 259). 
 
There is some debate about the extent to which Politikverflechtung is a function of the 
constitutional framework (Scharpf et al., 1976, Scharpf, 2009) or a pragmatic 
response by state institutions to increase their capacity for policy implementation 
(Männle, 1998, Kropp, 2010). However, regardless of which perspective is the best 
interpretation of this phenomenon, they all acknowledge the extent of integration 
involving public bodies between and across tiers of government: they only disagree 
about the factors that have driven greater collaboration. Indeed, federal legislators 
recognised how Politikverflechtung made it difficult to identify clear roles and 
responsibilities within state institutions, with the result that they passed two 
constitutional amendments to try and address questions about democratic 
accountability. However, Politikverflechtung has endured in spite of these reforms 
(Scharpf, 2009, Hesse and Ellwein, 2012), perhaps due to a general view within the 
German civil service that it enhances the state’s ability to achieve its objectives (Benz, 
2007). The result is a high (and increasing) level of interdependence between 
government institutions, particularly along the vertical dimension (see figures 3.3 and 
3.4 on page 85). 
 
3.3.2   Local governance in England between 1900 and the early 1970s 
 
Between 1900 and the 1970s, local government in England gradually became less 
independent of the centre. Increasingly, national politicians recognised that the 
negative effects of urbanisation and industrialisation were so extensive that they could 
no longer be addressed at the local level. As a result, they sought to provide much 
more comprehensive and uniform welfare provision across the country – particularly 
after 1945.  
 
The process of centralisation began in earnest with the 1906 ‘People’s Budget’, which 
introduced pensions and sickness insurance for workers. It continued after World War 
I with the House and Town Planning Act in 1919, which placed a statutory 
requirement on local authorities to provide council-owned housing to their residents. 
However, various reforms to funding arrangements changed the nature of the central-
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local relations more fundamentally. For example, the 1929 Local Government Act 
replaced the assigned revenues system with a formula grant, which calculated how 
much funding each authority should receive from central government according to the 
perceived demand for their services. It also gave the Minister for Health the power to 
reduce an authority’s block grant to provide public health services, ‘if he considered 
that the expenditure of the council had not been effective’ (Seeley, 1978, p. 13).  
 
This growing interdependency conflicts with the popular characterisation of Britain as 
a ‘dual polity’ (Bulpitt, 1983). At the same time, however, ministerial control over 
local authority finance meant that central-local relations became increasingly 
asymmetric as the century progressed – in contrast to the more balanced situation in 
Germany. Indeed, only 45% of municipal revenue came from local taxes by 1974, 
compared to 94.5% a century earlier (Hesse and Benz, 1990). By this time, central 
government had assumed a dominant position in the relationship, partly due to the 
plethora of legislation that was introduced shortly after World War II. Some of these 
Acts meant that councils had to provide additional statutory services (such as 
education), a number introduced new legal requirements (for example, all new 
building developments now needed planning permission), and others gave central 
government responsibility for functions that were previously administered at the local 
level (including hospitals). Finally, many services that had previously been owned by 
local authorities – including gas, electricity, telecommunications, railways and many 
airports – were nationalised. Not only did these nationalisations deprive 
municipalities of revenue streams, but they also reduced their capacity to shape their 
localities independently of other actors. Notably, the post war German government 
did not nationalise utilities: instead, the vast majority of authorities retained their 
municipal Stadtwerke and therefore exercised more control over public service 
provision within their communities. 
 
As the century progressed, changes in population distribution, technological 
developments and the growing welfare state led to calls for relations between levels of 
government to be clarified and their respective responsibilities put on a statutory 
footing, in order to stop the trend towards increasing asymmetry (Seeley, 1978). In 
response, ministers set up several commissions and published a number of proposals 
on the future of local government, including the Redcliffe-Maud Report of 1969. This 
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recommended establishing much larger local government areas (including unitary 
authorities in England’s largest cities), clarifying functional responsibilities across 
tiers and abolishing the concept of ultra vires (Thomas, 1969). It argued that local 
government was unable to punch its combined weight in discussions with central 
departments and larger authorities were necessary in order to increase capacity, attract 
better quality staff and help municipalities to achieve their objectives (Garner, 1970). 
Notably therefore, the report did not prescribe greater interdependence with higher 
tiers of government in line with the German culture of Politikverflechtung (which 
encourages public bodies to work across and between tiers in order to achieve policy 
objectives – see section 3.3.1). Instead it argued that bigger municipalities would be 
better placed to achieve their goals because they would have the extra internal 
capacity that was necessary to operate more independently of the centre. 
  
However, the UK Government implemented neither the recommendations of 
Redcliffe-Maud nor those of several other commissions on the future of the 
municipalities. Together with the lack of a codified constitution – which meant that 
ministers could decide to abolish or create new authorities quite easily – this meant 
that the drift towards greater asymmetry in central-local relations continued. There 
were of course powerful arguments in favour of central control, not least that a 
growing proportion of municipal spending was funded by central government, and 
that people across the country should benefit from services of broadly similar quality 
(Seeley, 1978, Norton, 1994). Yet, as section 3.4.2 will illustrate, it resulted in a 
situation where local authorities lacked the capacity to achieve their objectives alone – 
and where higher tiers of government were far more reluctant to provide support than 
was the case in Germany.  
 
Indeed, principles such as Politikverflechtung have been almost entirely absent from 
central-local relations in England, despite the fact that ministers have recognised the 
important role that municipalities play in implementing policy. As a result, English 
councils were far more dependent on the centre than their German counterparts by the 
early 1970s: they were still subject to ultra vires and ministers still viewed them 
primarily as functional agents rather than local democratic bodies. Although the 
growth of national welfare states in both countries meant that the centre had assumed 
responsibility for many services that were previously delivered by local authorities, 
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German municipalities became much more integrated with higher tiers of government 
than English councils. This meant that they could call on a much larger pool of state 
support, co-operate with other bodies to develop consensual solutions and increase 
their capacity as a result. The contrast between the two countries is still relevant in the 
present day, as the empirical chapters will demonstrate in the cases of Gelsenkirchen 
and Newcastle.  
 
Figure 3.3: Shifts in vertical dependency relationships for local government in 
England and Germany, 1900-1970s 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Shifts in horizontal dependency relationships for local government in 
England and Germany, 1900-1970s 
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show how power dependencies shifted between 1900 and the 
early 1970s in both countries and along both dimensions. They illustrate the 
increasing degree of vertical interdependence across tiers of government in Germany, 
which contrasts with English councils’ greater dependence on the centre for resources. 
There was less change along the horizontal dimension, in that German municipalities 
retained control over utilities and other local services and, as powerful local 
institutions, continued to act largely independently of other actors. In England, 
developments such as the utility nationalisations reduced local government’s 
horizontal influence to a greater degree than in Germany and therefore increased their 
dependence on other actors – but not to a significant degree. Nonetheless, as the next 
section will demonstrate, this trend away from horizontal independence began to 
accelerate rapidly from the late 1970s onwards, particularly in England, as 
municipalities sought to work with other actors to increase their capacity to achieve 
policy objectives.  
 
3.4   Local governance since the early 1970s 
 
The 1970s saw a paradigmatic shift in political economy across Western democracies, 
with many academics and politicians rejecting Keynesian theories in favour of more 
neoliberal market economics. This complemented their increasing concerns about 
‘state overload’ or even ‘ungovernability’, which meant that public institutions were 
less able to achieve policy objectives due to the plethora of demands placed upon 
them (Grunow, 2003). Amongst other things, it resulted in politicians introducing 
various New Public Management (NPM) reforms to try and ensure that public 
bureaucracies focused on fewer policy goals and could improve their efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
 
These changes, along with factors such as the increasing influence of the global 
economy and decline of traditional industries, have had a significant influence on 
power dependencies in both Germany and England. Horizontally, the NPM reforms 
have weakened and fragmented many municipalities, and therefore meant that they 
need to work much more interdependently with other actors in the locality in order to 
have sufficient resources to implement policy. This is because local public services 
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have been subjected to market mechanisms such as privatisation, agencification, 
contracting-out and competition. Ironically, these initiatives aimed to improve the 
effectiveness of policy delivery and address the problem of ‘state overload’, but they 
have actually reduced the overall capacity of public institutions to address complex 
issues (Hesse and Benz, 1990, Mayntz, 2009, Hood and Dixon, 2015).  
 
Notably, NPM reforms were implemented much more quickly and comprehensively 
in the UK compared to Germany, with the result that English municipalities have 
become much more interdependent with other horizontal governance actors than their 
German counterparts. Along the vertical dimension, the influence of 
Politikverflechtung has resulted in greater interdependence between tiers of 
government in Germany, although in some areas this relationship is more symmetrical 
than others. The situation in England has been more dynamic: initially councils 
became more dependent on central resources, then ministers introduced elements of 
interdependency to try and co-ordinate policy better. Finally they have begun to 
operate increasingly independently of other tiers since 2010, because support from the 
centre to implement local policies has not been forthcoming. 
 
Therefore, unlike the previous two eras, there have been major shifts in both vertical 
and horizontal relationships since 1970. As a result, this section analyses changes in 
power dependencies along each sub-dimension separately. The discussion then 
informs an overall assessment of where we might expect ‘typical’ German and 
English municipalities to be located on the tri-polar diagram of power dependencies 
developed in chapter 2. In this way, it provides a useful baseline against which we can 
map the findings from the empirical research that are detailed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
3.4.1  Local governance in Germany since the early 1970s 
 
3.4.1.1  Vertical power dependencies in Germany since the early 1970s 
 
In accordance with the principles of Politikverflechtung, changes to power relations in 
Germany have largely been the result of negotiated, consensual and pragmatic 
discussions involving different tiers of government. This is in sharp contrast to the 
UK, where ministers have often imposed their will in the teeth of local opposition 
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(Hartmann, 2013) – and it highlights how German councils work interdependently 
along the vertical dimension, whereas their English counterparts are much more 
vulnerable to central government decisions. Indeed, the degree of interdependence 
between municipalities, the Länder and the federation meant that German policy-
makers could not have emulated the UK by adopting ‘a simple, streamlined, top-down 
approach’ to reforming state institutions in recent decades (Herrschel and Newman, 
2002, p. 126). Instead, public bodies sought to agree on reforms by ‘muddling 
through’ and ‘minimising conflict’ with other agencies (Scharpf et al., 1976, Hesse 
and Benz, 1990).  
 
For example, the North Rhine-Westphalian Land government reduced the total 
number of municipalities in the state from 2,277 to 393 between 1968 and 1978. This 
drop of over 80% was more than in any other Land and meant that NRW had the 
largest units of local government in the Federal Republic – although they were still 
substantially smaller than their English counterparts. However, Norton (1994) stresses 
the overwhelmingly consensual nature of this reorganisation, which contrasts sharply 
with the imposed abolition of metropolitan authorities and the Greater London 
Council in England during the 1980s (see section 3.4.2). In other words, because 
German municipalities were able to contribute to discussions around local 
government reorganisation, they were not as dependent on the whims of central 
ministers as their English counterparts. 
 
In addition, the Land and Bund have asked municipalities to administer an increasing 
number of policies since the early 1970s, in response to public pressure and criticisms 
of a ‘postcode lottery’ of service provision (Norton, 1994). Since state and federal 
levels are required to provide local government with the necessary resources to 
implement policy on their behalf (see section 3.3.1), municipal reliance on central 
grants has increased markedly during this period (Rehm and Matern-Rehm, 2010). 
Indeed, in reflection of the fact that municipalities were asked to administer a growing 
range of Bund and Land policies, total local government spending tripled in cash 
terms between 1970 and 1978. Indeed, by 2012, local authorities in NRW spent 
48.2% of their budgets on implementing Land activities (Hartmann, 2013), 
highlighting the interdependent nature of vertical governance arrangements. 
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However, some municipalities have come to rely much more heavily on central grants 
than others, due to the fact that many poorer areas do not have a large business sector 
and therefore receive less income through the Gewerbesteuer. Although the 
Gewerbesteuer was the most important source of municipal revenue up until the 
1990s, councils cannot predict exactly how much money it will generate in any given 
year – because if a business ceases trading, the local authority suddenly loses a source 
of income (Hartmann, 2013). In addition, cities that have traditionally relied on a 
relatively homogenous business sector (including Gelsenkirchen) are particularly 
vulnerable to structural economic changes (Pierre and Peters, 2012). Up until the late 
1970s, some of the Länder (including North Rhine-Westphalia) had allowed their 
municipalities to levy payroll taxes (Lohnsummensteuer) to try and meet any shortfall 
in revenue caused by sudden economic shocks. Firms that were not in business for 
very long, as well as those that did not make large profits, were largely exempt from 
the Gewerbesteuer, but they did have to pay the Lohnsummensteuer. However, 
payroll taxes were outlawed by federal legislation in 1979, and therefore this affected 
deprived areas particularly badly (Rehm and Matern-Rehm, 2010). Indeed, in 
common with many other municipalities in NRW, Gelsenkirchen’s combined income 
from Gewerbesteuer and Lohnsummensteuer fell between 1977 and 1983, in spite of 
an overall rise in revenue and spending (Karrenberg, 1985).  
 
In order to reduce the unpredictable nature of municipal revenues, as well as reduce 
inequalities across the Länder in accordance with Finanzausgleich requirements, the 
federal government introduced a range of financial reforms from the early 1970s 
onwards (Hesse and Benz, 1990). These resulted in each tier of government receiving 
an agreed percentage of the total revenue from sales, income and business taxes, and 
this amount was then shared out horizontally to individual Länder and municipalities 
according to a needs-based formula (Scherf, 2010). In other words, the reforms 
increased the degree of vertical interdependence and Politikverflechtung, because the 
different tiers of government now shared the income from various taxes. They also 
serve as a useful illustration of how the Bund, Land and municipal levels collaborated 
to try and increase the reliability of revenue sources, and thereby increased the ability 
of local authorities to plan and allocate resources for the future. However, it is crucial 
to note that the needs-based formula began a process in which deprived municipalities 
such as Gelsenkirchen became more dependent on the Land and Bund than was 
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previously the case, since they now received a much greater proportion of their 
revenue in direct grants.10 In contrast, vertical relationships involving those wealthier 
cities that still generated substantial revenues from the Gewerbesteuer were not so 
asymmetric. 
 
This situation was exacerbated following the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent 
German unification in 1990. The ‘new’ Länder in the east were substantially poorer 
than their ‘old’ counterparts in the west, and therefore it became clear that they would 
need to receive significantly bigger grants in order to adhere to the principle of 
Finanzausgleich. As a result, western municipalities transferred 3% of their annual 
income to the east during the 1990s – in a period of deep recession that also led to a 
sharp drop in Gewerbesteuer revenue. At the same time, the federal government had 
to reduce public spending in order to meet the Maastricht criteria and thereby enable 
Germany to join the single European currency. In an echo of the last days of the 
Weimar Republic, these factors meant that local government experienced a deep 
financial crisis and numerous municipalities racked up large debts (Wachendorfer-
Schmidt, 1998, Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006).  
 
Cities in North Rhine-Westphalia were particularly badly affected, to the extent that 
the Land government introduced legislation targeted at those municipalities that were 
unable to generate sufficient annual income to fund their expenditure. As a result, 
since 1991 each indebted municipality has had to submit a plan (the 
Haushaltssicherungskonzept, or budgetary assurance programme) to the Bezirk 
authorities setting out how it would be able to deliver a balanced budget within the 
next five years. If the plan is approved, the council can receive additional financial 
help from the Land government via the Bezirk – but if it is not, the municipality may 
only borrow up to one-quarter of the amount borrowed in the previous year for capital 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, such grants are known as the ‘golden reins’ (‘goldene Zügel’ in German (Norton, 1994, 
p. 262)), which suggests that the recipients are sentient beings – even if their riders would like them to 
travel in a particular direction and at a certain speed. It contrasts with the common English expression 
of having strings attached to funding, which implies that the donor can direct the actions of an 
unconscious recipient in the same way as a puppeteer controls a marionette. This illustrates how 
German municipalities are viewed as more autonomous actors than their English counterparts, which 
are tasked largely with implementing policy on behalf of the central state. 
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investment and restrict revenue spending to essential or statutory services. The depth 
of the financial crisis meant that dozens of authorities in NRW had to agree 
programmes with their respective Bezirke during the 1990s (Timm-Arnold, 2010).  
 
Many of these plans included reforms to structures and processes in line with NPM 
thinking, to try and provide short-term cash injections, improve internal efficiency, 
scale down the scope of municipal activities and reduce overall expenditure. Indeed, a 
large number municipalities in NRW were in such financial straits that they viewed 
managerial and structural reform as essential (Timm-Arnold, 2010). However, it is 
crucial to note that neither the Bund nor the Länder required local authorities to 
introduce any of these programmes (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006) – even if they did 
remove some of the legal barriers to such reforms (Gerlach, 2010, Kost, 2010). 
Instead, councils initiated them on a voluntary basis, albeit in response to financial 
externalities over which they had little control and with strong encouragement from 
the KGSt advisory body and its idea of a ‘new steering model’ for local government 
(Banner, 1991).  
 
In spite of introducing these reforms, however, municipalities in NRW continued to 
experience severe financial problems (Timm-Arnold, 2010, Eckersley and Timm-
Arnold, 2014), particularly after the federal government reduced the number of 
businesses who had to pay the Gewerbesteuer in 2001 (Wehling and Kost, 2010). By 
2005, 194 of the 427 councils in the Land were unable to produce balanced budgets – 
and 105 of these municipalities did not have their Haushaltssicherungskonzepte 
approved by the Bezirk authorities (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006). More recently, the 
2008 financial crisis prevented councils from recovering quickly, despite the fact that 
Germany did not experience economic problems on a scale comparable with other 
European countries (Hesse and Ellwein, 2012). As a result, local government across 
the country owed €7.7 billion by 2013, and the NRW state government agreed an ‘aid 
package’ of €5.85 billion for its most impoverished councils (Timm-Arnold, 2013).  
 
Overall, these financial problems (and the associated Land instrument of a 
Haushaltssicherungskonzept) have created three classes of authority, each of which 
has a different type of power dependency relationship with the Bezirk and Land. The 
first group are in a relatively strong financial position and therefore have not needed 
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to enter into a balanced budget programme – which means they have retained more 
independence from other vertical actors. Those in the second category have agreed a 
financial consolidation plan with the Bezirk to balance their books within three years 
and therefore receive additional grants to fund their expenditure – making them more 
interdependent with the district and state levels. Finally, the third set have had their 
plans rejected and are therefore subjected to very tight restrictions on their spending – 
so they are largely dependent on the Bezirk for financial resources.  
 
At this point it is important to note that these characterisations do not necessarily 
translate into a holistic assessment of vertical power dependencies, because these 
relationships are also determined by the availability and location of non-financial 
resources. Nonetheless, Gelsenkirchen Council agreed a Haushaltssicherungskonzept 
with the Bezirk in 2012, in which it agreed to balance its budget within three years. As 
a result the municipality’s fiscal policy was highly interdependent with the district 
and state tiers during this period. For example, the Bezirk monitored its expenditure 
closely to ensure that the authority remained on track to deliver a balanced budget by 
the end of the programme. Indeed, if the municipality deviated significantly from its 
financial projections, the Bezirk retained the power to intervene and restrict its 
spending autonomy in future years. To demonstrate the reciprocal nature of the 
relationship however, the municipality received additional funding support and advice 
in return for adopting its plan for fiscal consolidation. 
 
Overall, however, although Land-municipal power dependencies across NRW are 
very uneven and often asymmetric, local authorities have become much less 
independent of other vertical actors since the early 1970s. Federal attempts to address 
the accountability concerns inherent in Politikverflechtung have largely failed to 
tackle this issue effectively, with the result that different tiers of government work 
collaborate even more closely in order to increase the public sector’s ability to 
achieve policy objectives. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the Bezirk, Land and 
Bund have all asserted greater control over local taxation and spending, these other 
tiers of government now rely more on municipalities to implement state and federal 
policies and also provide councils with additional funding and advice to help them 
address their financial problems.  
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Nonetheless, the constitutional guarantee of lokale Selbstverwaltung remains in place, 
and (with the exception of the Nazi era), Prussian and German municipalities have 
been able to exercise significant autonomy from higher tiers of government for over 
two centuries. Councils are still considered to be the ‘schools’ or even ‘cradles’ of 
democracy for budding German politicians (ironically a concept initially proposed by 
the British philosopher John Stuart Mill (1946)), and residents view them primarily as 
representative civic institutions rather than local service providers or ‘commissioners’ 
(Blair, 1991, Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006, Schieren, 2010). Indeed, although a 
declining share of the electorate are voting in local (and general) elections in both the 
UK and Germany, the average turnout for a municipal election in North Rhine-
Westphalia since 1979 is 60.5% (compared to the German average of 65.5% (Wilson 
and Game, 2011, p. 252)). As figure 3.5 illustrates, this is significantly higher than the 
corresponding UK level of 38.5%. This suggests local councils are held in a higher 
regard in Germany than the UK – in line with the claims of scholars such as Norton 
(1994).  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Levels of turnout in local elections in the UK and North Rhine-Westphalia 
since 197911 (adapted from Rogers and Burn-Murdoch, 2012, Kost, 2010) 
                                                 
11 Note that local elections occurring on the same date as national or federal polls have been excluded 
to prevent the results from appearing skewed. In addition, local elections in England appear to occur 
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Crucially, however, German councils have this higher status within their communities 
partly due to the resources they receive from higher tiers of government, in 
accordance with the principles of Politikverflechtung. This may appear paradoxical, 
but the extent of vertical interdependence actually enables councils to exercise greater 
autonomy, because other tiers respect the constitutional principle of lokale 
Selbstverwaltung and therefore provide support to help municipalities achieve their 
objectives. For example, the Finanzausgleich requirements ensure that poorer 
municipalities are not unduly disadvantaged in terms of revenues, and still have 
sufficient capacity to undertake their activities. Furthermore, where authorities such as 
Gelsenkirchen have agreed a Haushaltssicherungskonzept with the Bezirk, they 
receive significant additional resources to address financial and capacity problems 
(although, as noted above, this relationship is much more asymmetric if the council 
and Bezirk cannot agree a package to balance the revenue budget). In other words, the 
mutually-supportive nature of these relationships means that most German councils 
operate within a predominantly interdependent vertical context. This buttresses their 
constitutional position and status as civic democratic bodies and, as the next 
subsection will demonstrate, means they have significant capacity to act 
autonomously and pursue their objectives within local communities. Overall 
therefore, we would expect the empirical research to find that Gelsenkirchen is 
located towards the interdependence pole on the triangular diagram for vertical power 
relationships (see figure 2.4 on page 59). 
 
3.4.1.2  Horizontal power dependencies in Germany since the early 1970s 
 
In addition to the trend towards greater Politikverflechtung along the vertical 
dimension, recent decades have also seen an increase in informal regionalisation and 
horizontal municipal interdependence within Germany. In most cases these initiatives 
have developed in response to resource constraints, but it is notable that they have not 
                                                 
more frequently than in NRW, partly because metropolitan, unitary, district and county councils, as 
well as London Boroughs, hold polls according to different timetables. Furthermore, many 
municipalities have multi-member wards and individual councillors are up for re-election on a rolling 
basis, which means that separate polls take place in three years out of every four in these areas. 
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been mandated or incentivised by higher tiers of government. Instead, they have 
developed from the bottom up, as officials and elected representatives in different 
municipalities have sought to work together to achieve common objectives (Herrschel 
and Newman, 2002). As such, a key driver for greater collaboration – namely a desire 
to increase the state’s capacity to implement policy – shapes the nature of 
interdependence along both the vertical and horizontal dimensions. 
 
Notably however, these informal partnerships are dominated by municipalities 
working with each other: the private and voluntary sectors are either not involved at 
all or play a very subordinate role. As the subsection 3.4.2.2 will highlight, this 
contrasts significantly with the situation in England, where private and ‘third sector’ 
organisations are much more prominent and influential. Therefore, although cities in 
both countries have become more interdependent with other horizontal actors over 
recent decades, it is crucial to note the differences between these other actors in each 
country. 
 
A key factor in both vertical and horizontal integration is the strength and extent of 
party political ties within German public administration (Wonka and Rittberger, 
2014). Political parties are subsidised by the state to a greater extent than in the UK 
and have a more defined role in the political system (Hague and Harrop, 2013). This 
reinforces the principle of Politikverflechtung by facilitating co-operation across tiers 
of governance and thereby ensures that representative bodies at all levels are able to 
pull in the same direction (Hesse and Benz, 1990). 
 
These party-political links are particularly close in those parts of North Rhine-
Westphalia (such as the Ruhrgebiet, which includes Gelsenkirchen), where the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) dominates. For example, Timm-Arnold (2010) found that 
party politics was much more important in this Land compared to Baden-
Wurttemberg, partly due to the fact that local politicians in NRW have been trying to 
address similar problems related to the decline of heavy industry in recent decades. 
Indeed, in 1951 the Ruhrgebiet produced 98% of Germany’s coal and 80% of its steel, 
and every third worker in the area was employed in one of these industries. Yet the 
country’s coal exports halved between 1981 and 1988, by which time the 
unemployment rate in NRW had risen to 11% (compared to less than 1% in 1960). 
96 
 
Gelsenkirchen, as a centre of coal mining and steel production, was no exception – the 
closure of its huge Graf Bismarck plant in 1966 is often cited as a key turning point in 
Germany’s industrial history (all figures from Woyke, 1990). In other words, party-
political links within the SPD facilitated the development of a collaborative approach 
to shared socio-economic challenges in the Ruhrgebiet, in line with the principles of 
Politikverflechtung. One notable example was a shared initiative to create the 
international Emscher Park exhibition, which showcased the regeneration, re-use and 
heritage value of former industrial locations on a large brownfield site and involved 
19 different municipalities (Technische Universität Dortmund, 2008). 
 
At the same time, the introduction of NPM-inspired reforms in many municipalities 
led to a greater need for internal collaboration within localities. This was particularly 
the case in poorer areas, which were more likely to outsource or privatise public 
service provision because they tended to have more severe financial problems. 
Héritier (2001) has argued that jurisdictions that relinquish direct control over public 
services have less capacity to exert hierarchical influence and shape local outcomes 
due to the fragmented nature of state institutions. As a consequence, they have to try 
and persuade external actors to collaborate in order to deliver policy objectives – 
whilst at the same time these actors rely on the public body for the revenue streams 
that are agreed in outsourcing contracts. Therefore, the state institution and service 
provider become interdependent along the horizontal dimension. Since Gelsenkirchen 
is a highly-indebted municipality that has been affected particularly badly by 
industrial decline, we would expect it to have relinquished direct control of many 
functions in an attempt to improve its financial situation. This would also mean it has 
developed an interdependent relationship with contracted service providers in order to 
increase its capacity to achieve policy objectives. 
 
However, although there has been a broad movement away from traditional 
administrative structures, there is no clear shift towards service outsourcing and 
contracting within German local government. Indeed, a comprehensive study of 
municipalities in the country found that although 76% of them had introduced NPM-
style reforms, only 15% had embraced the concepts in full (Bogumil et al., 2006). For 
example, although a significant minority have outsourced energy provision and waste 
disposal, water privatisation has proved extremely controversial and public transport 
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remains overwhelmingly in municipal hands (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006). 
Generally speaking, Germany still has ‘multi-purpose “unitary” local government’ 
and single-purpose quangos are virtually non-existent at the municipal level 
(Herrschel and Newman, 2002). Similarly, as Geiβel (2007) has found, civil society 
groups play only a marginal role in policy delivery – in contrast to the UK’s shift 
towards using the third sector in ‘co-production’ activities (Bovaird, 2007, Bovaird 
and Löffler, 2012).  
 
In other words, the German municipal model closely resembles Type I multi-level 
governance along the horizontal sub-dimension (Wollmann, 2001, p. 151) – in 
contrast to England, where central government imposed NPM ideas on municipalities 
and all local authorities became much more fragmented. This has enabled German 
councils to co-ordinate policies and interests much more effectively than in the UK 
(Wollmann, 2006b). Indeed, there has been a trend towards the ‘re-municipalisation’ 
of services in some cities, as decision-makers have recognised the advantages of 
being able to exert direct control over local utility provision (Burgi, 2009, Einhellig 
and Kohl, 2010, Becker et al., 2015).  
 
In addition, various other reforms have attempted to improve local accountability and 
therefore ensure that German councils retained their pre-eminent status in horizontal 
governance arrangements (Wollmann, 2004). For example, federal legislation in 1971 
required municipalities to involve citizens in planning decisions (Bückmann and Oel, 
1981), and various initiatives in the 1990s meant it became compulsory for councils to 
discuss and hold a binding vote if a certain proportion of residents had signed a 
petition on any local issue. Furthermore, the NRW Land government abolished the 
Doppelspitze model of a ceremonial mayor running the municipality alongside the 
head of the administration and replaced it with a single directly-elected position. 
Academics and politicians had criticised the previous system, arguing that the division 
between administration and policy was not clear (Ellwein, 1976, Norton, 1994, 
Wehling and Kost, 2010). In addition, councils in those states that were led by a 
single individual appeared to be more effective at implementing policy (Wollmann, 
2005), and therefore it was argued that the change would increase municipal capacity. 
The result was that legislation to introduce directly-elected Monospitze executive 
mayors was passed in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1994, and votes for the first 
98 
 
Bürgermeister were cast five years later (Eckersley and Timm-Arnold, 2014).12 In 
autumn 2007 the direct link between executives and citizens was strengthened further 
when additional legislation enabled citizens to recall their mayor if they were 
dissatisfied with his or her performance.  
 
These reforms led one prominent academic to describe Germany as a ‘frontrunner’ in 
local direct democracy (Wollmann, 2000), and they undoubtedly bolstered the 
democratic credentials of local government. Some scholars have even argued that 
citizen petitions contributed towards a systemic change in local governance in 
Germany (Wehling, 2010). However, other studies found that municipalities were 
very reluctant to encourage resident participation and often did the bare minimum to 
comply with legal requirements (Gerlach, 2010). Indeed, only 506 petitions were 
initiated in the first fifteen years of operation in North Rhine-Westphalia, 37% of 
which failed to gain the level of support required to be debated by the council (Kost, 
2010). Considering that the state has a population of 18 million, this does not suggest 
that citizens have embraced the idea with enthusiasm.  
 
Moreover, although the introduction of directly-elected executive mayors reinforced 
the municipality’s status as the democratically accountable actor in local governance 
arrangements, it did not necessarily mean that residents exerted greater influence over 
decision-making. A key reason for this is that local government has retained an aura 
of professionalism and competence within Germany (Kost, 2010), and citizens of that 
country are more likely to respect decisions that are made by the ‘Expertokratie’ – 
certainly compared with the UK (Armbrüster, 2005). Indeed, since German councils 
now had greater democratic legitimacy than before, they were perhaps even better 
placed to punch at a higher weight in horizontal governance arrangements than their 
English counterparts. As a result, they do not need to work as interdependently with 
other local actors in order to achieve their objectives.  
 
Furthermore, a number of other factors have actually driven authorities away from 
greater interdependence with other municipalities. For example, many were keen to 
                                                 
12 Notably, every Land that had inherited the British Doppelspitze model also decided to introduce 
directly elected executives at around the same time. 
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try and attract business investment and Gewerbesteuer revenue – potentially at the 
expense of neighbouring authorities. This led to a number of cities seeking to re-brand 
themselves to try to attract external investors and boost economic growth – and, by 
definition, stress how their area might be a more attractive location than others 
(Baeten, 2012). As with English councils, many of them viewed the increasing 
importance of climate change as one area in which they could specialise – and 
Gelsenkirchen was no exception (Jung et al., 2010). However, these developments 
essentially encouraged local authorities to compete with each other (for example, over 
the rate of Gewerbesteuer (Herrschel and Newman, 2002)), and therefore did not 
create an environment that facilitates inter-municipal collaboration. 
 
As this subsection has shown, therefore, most German municipalities have retained a 
significant amount of independence along the horizontal dimension and maintained 
their pre-eminent position in local governance arrangements. In Hooghe and Marks’ 
terms, they remain overwhelmingly Type I ‘multi-purpose authorities’, because the 
municipality continues to have direct responsibility for a wide range of local services 
and functions. However, various factors (not least the economic problems in some 
parts of the country that resulted in lower tax revenues) have led to some councils 
working more interdependently with one another in order to increase capacity. 
Indeed, recent decades have seen the emergence of a patchwork situation in which 
power dependency relationships vary across the country. This is because many 
municipalities have had to divest themselves of some of their responsibilities and 
therefore become much more reliant on other actors within the locality. This is 
particularly the case in NRW (and therefore Gelsenkirchen), where the threat of a 
Haushaltssicherungskonzept hangs over severely indebted authorities and has 
encouraged them to privatise or outsource various functions. In other words, we 
would expect Gelsenkirchen to be located slightly closer to the interdependence 
corner of the tri-polar diagram than a ‘typical’ German council (see figure 3.6 on page 
107). 
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3.4.2  Local governance in England since the early 1970s 
 
3.4.2.1  Vertical power dependencies in England since the early 1970s 
 
As mentioned in section 3.3.2, in 1969 the Redcliffe-Maud Committee recommended 
that local government be reorganised to increase the size of municipalities and 
introduce a single tier of authorities in larger cities. However, the Conservative 
Government that took office in 1970 opposed many of its proposals (Seeley, 1978), 
which meant that the resulting reorganisation set out in the 1972 Local Government 
Act bore little resemblance to the report’s recommendations, particularly in rural areas 
(Jones, 1973).  
 
Nonetheless, this Act did have substantial implications for municipal capacity and 
power dependencies, not least because it created new metropolitan county councils in 
England’s six largest conurbations outside London. One of these conurbations was 
Tyne and Wear, which incorporated the city of Newcastle. The Act also reduced the 
number of lower-tier councils in these areas significantly to ensure that they would 
each have populations of at least 250,000 and therefore (theoretically) sufficient 
capacity to deliver education and social services. For example, the new metropolitan 
county of Tyne and Wear consisted of just five boroughs (Newcastle, North Tyneside, 
South Tyneside, Sunderland and Gateshead), whereas 19 municipalities were 
previously wholly within its territory and parts of a further five were also incorporated 
into the new county.  
 
Indeed, the Act reduced the number of directly-elected municipalities in England from 
1,300 to just 401 (Jones, 1973). This meant that although authorities would be 
significantly smaller than those suggested in the committee’s report, they were still 
many times bigger than their German counterparts. Although much of the re-drawing 
of boundaries was undertaken in response to population movements and continued 
urbanisation, the most important reason for the legislation was to reduce the number 
and increase the size of municipalities. This is important because ministers argued 
that larger municipalities would have more capacity to achieve their policy objectives 
independently of the centre than their smaller predecessors. However, the 
reorganisation actually increased the degree of central influence, because the very act 
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of abolishing hundreds of councils served as a reminder to local authorities that their 
very existence was subject to the whims of central Government. Moreover, as one 
notable critic argued shortly after the reorganisation took effect, it became much 
easier for ministers to monitor and control the activities of fewer municipalities 
(Dearlove, 1979). In other words, the Act represented an important step towards 
greater dependence in local-central relations. 
 
As section 3.3.2 discussed, central government had increased the level of funding it 
provided to local authorities after World War II, in order to finance functions such as 
education, policing and social services. However, from the early 1970s onwards, and 
particularly after the 1973 oil crisis, ministers sought to reduce the size of the state, 
which had risen from around 33% of GDP in 1959 to 38% by 1970 (Pearce and 
Stewart, 2002). Since ministers now controlled a large proportion of local government 
revenue, they were able to cut central grants and reduce overall public expenditure as 
a result (Ferry et al., 2017). Indeed, this was a much more attractive option than 
agreeing lower budgets for central departments, because it meant councils (rather than 
ministers) were responsible for implementing potentially unpopular cuts to services. 
Although the 1974 Layfield Report had argued for a binding framework to clarify the 
nature of central-local relations (particularly regarding revenue and expenditure), 
ministers ignored its recommendations and were therefore able to cut municipal 
funding without too much difficulty (Jones and Stewart, 2002). The result was that 
municipal revenues fell by 7.3% in real terms between 1978 and 1985 (Norton, 1994), 
and local government spending fell from 17.2% of GDP to 14.6% between 1975 and 
1979 (Hesse and Benz, 1990).  
 
Indeed, by the end of the 1970s a constitutional convention had become established 
that ministers could exercise hierarchical control over local spending, and that 
municipalities would need to report back to central government departments 
informing ministers of how grants had been spent (Jones and Stewart, 1983). This 
contrasts starkly with the situation in Germany, where the principle of lokale 
Selbstverwaltung and clauses within the Grundgesetz guarantee that municipalities 
have control over certain taxes and areas of expenditure. Moreover, the new 
arrangement in England was imposed by central government, whereas conflicts 
between central and local government had previously been resolved through 
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negotiation (Rhodes, 1985, Hesse and Benz, 1990) along the German model. This 
contrasts starkly with the continued preference for consensus and mutually-beneficial 
Politikverflechtung in Germany, and highlights how central-local power relations in 
England were becoming increasing asymmetrical and antagonistic. 
 
The hierarchical approach strengthened during the 1980s, as ministers increased their 
control over local government finances (Ferry and Eckersley, in preparation). For 
example, a new law passed in 1980 stipulated that central government could withhold 
some direct grants from overspending local authorities as a penalty. The 1980 
Housing Act then required council landlords to sell their homes to those tenants who 
wanted to buy them, and at a significant discount if the tenants had lived there for 
some time. Shortly afterwards, the 1982 Local Government Finance Act prevented 
municipalities from levying ‘supplementary’ rates on their residents to plug budgetary 
gaps in the middle of the financial year (Pearce and Stewart, 2002), and a 1984 Act 
gave ministers the power to ‘cap’ rates increases that they felt were excessive (Hesse 
and Benz, 1990). Eventually, the 1988 Local Government Finance Act abolished the 
rates altogether and replaced them with the Community Charge, which became known 
as the ‘Poll Tax’. Under the new system, every adult within the locality received a bill 
for the same amount (although students and the unwaged were given a discount), 
rather than the level of their contribution being determined by the rental value of their 
property. Its champions proclaimed that it would lead to greater transparency of local 
government finance (and thereby expose high levels of spending), because every 
resident would have a clearer picture of the amount they were being asked to 
contribute every year.  
 
Although the Government subsequently replaced the Community Charge with the 
Council Tax (which was calculated according to the purchase value of a property, and 
thereby differed from the rates), other aspects of the 1988 Act that increased central 
control over local government finance have remained largely unchanged. For 
example, it required councils to produce balanced revenue budgets every year, 
regardless of the economic circumstances. The Act also gave ministers the power to 
set a uniform national level of non-domestic rates (the local business tax, which 
subsequently became known as NNDR), thus removing this discretion from 
individual municipalities. Local authorities were still responsible for billing and 
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collecting NNDR from businesses based in their areas, but central government 
determined how much the bills would be for (with annual increases capped at the 
level of inflation) and collected all of the revenue before redistributing it across the 
country according to a needs-based formula. This meant that central government now 
controlled the level of direct grants, NNDR, and (after capping was introduced in 
1984) household taxation – which together accounts for the vast majority of municipal 
revenue. As a result, English municipalities became much more dependent on the 
centre to fund their expenditure than their counterparts in other large European 
countries (Ferry et al., 2015).  
 
Other developments confirmed central government’s dominant position vis à vis the 
local level. For example, the UK was the only member of the Council of Europe not 
to sign up to its 1985 European Charter of Self-Government, which committed 
national governments to enforce ‘basic rules guaranteeing the political, administrative 
and financial independence of local authorities’ (Council of Europe, 1985, Norton, 
1994). In 1986, ministers once again exercised their ultimate power over 
municipalities by abolishing the urban metropolitan authorities and Greater London 
Council – and other reforms in the 1980s removed various functions from local 
government, including training, skills and further education (Wilson and Game, 
2011). Indeed, when taken together with the fact that English authorities cover a 
significantly larger geographical area than their counterparts anywhere in the Western 
world, it is perhaps not surprising that some have described the municipal tier as 
being ‘neither local, nor government’ (Copus, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, it is notable that ministers re-organised local government at the same 
time as introducing economic reforms to try and re-orient the UK economy away 
from traditional manufacturing and mining industries and towards an increased 
reliance on the service sector. Newcastle’s history of mining dated back to the 
sixteenth century, and much of its later wealth was built on the development of 
manufacturing and heavy engineering during the Industrial Revolution (Heald, 2011). 
The city’s economy fared particularly badly once these industries began to decline 
more rapidly from the 1980s onwards, which resulted in widespread unemployment, 
deprivation and social problems (Mah, 2010). These developments increased demands 
for council services such as benefits advice and housing at a time when the 
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municipality’s capacity to mitigate the economic decline was extremely limited. In 
other words, Newcastle Council was in a very weak position to shape the future of the 
city independently at this stage, because it was heavily focused on dealing with the 
consequences of economic policy decisions taken by central government. 
 
Following the election of a Labour Government at the national level in 1997, 
ministers were more explicit about the need for central-local interdependence – even 
though relations remained asymmetric. As such, a series of comprehensive monitoring 
frameworks, performance targets and inspections were introduced to ensure that 
central government priorities were delivered at the local level (Eckersley et al., 2014). 
As chapters 4 and 6 will show, many of these targets related to climate change, GHG 
emissions and other sustainability issues – and therefore they highlight how ministers 
sought to improve the vertical co-ordination of environmental policy. In addition, 
central government increased the size of direct grants to local authorities by 56% in 
real terms between 1997/98 and 2006/07. Notably, most of this additional money was 
‘ring-fenced’ for spending on schools or other specific services (Travers, 2006), 
which illustrates how ministers recognised the need to work with local authorities in 
order to implement policy effectively. In other words, central government recognised 
the importance of vertical interdependence, and gave councils the means to deliver 
policy objectives by increasingly their funding.  
 
However, it is important to note that these additional resources could only be spent on 
implementing central policies, which did not always reflect local needs. Indeed, the 
UK Government incentivised local authorities to focus on its priorities through the 
concept of ‘earned autonomy’. This exempted those municipalities who performed 
well against central targets from some future performance inspections, and/or meant 
that they received smaller additional grants to spend as they wished (Hatter, 2005). 
This contrasted with the situation in Germany, where respect for the principle of 
lokale Selbstverwaltung meant that public bodies at all tiers of government helped 
municipalities to implement policies that reflected local priorities. Therefore, both the 
policy ends and also the means of achieving them were determined in a ‘top-down’ 
manner in England, whereas German municipalities could set their own objectives 
and still receive the means to help with implementation (see Capano, 2011 for a 
discussion of these distinctions). This shows how a relatively short period of vertical 
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interdependence in the English context was still much more hierarchical than in 
Germany. 
 
However, by the late 2000s the idea of ‘localism’ was gaining momentum, and after 
taking office in 2010 the Coalition Government introduced a number of initiatives that 
increased municipal independence. For example, the 2011 Localism Act finally 
allowed councils to undertake any activity that was not forbidden in law and 
abolished centralised performance management frameworks – including most of the 
sustainability targets that councils had been asked to meet. Ministers also reduced the 
total number of ‘ring-fenced’ grants from over 90 to just 10 (Pickles, 2010). In theory, 
these reforms meant that municipalities had much greater freedom to act in the 
interests of their residents, because they could decide how to spend most of their 
revenue and would no longer be accused of acting ultra vires. However, the changes 
went hand-in-hand with significant funding reductions for local government, which 
totalled 27% in real terms across the country between 2010 and 2014 (Ferry and 
Eckersley, 2011, Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). Moreover, these cuts affected 
deprived areas in the north of England particularly badly, which meant that cities such 
as Newcastle saw much larger reductions in their revenue than more affluent 
boroughs (Woods, 2014, Hastings et al., 2015). Indeed, central grants for Newcastle 
were reduced by £289 per head between 2010 and 2015, more than double the English 
average (Newcastle City Council, 2015b). 
 
Furthermore, it is worth remembering that English local authorities are unable to raise 
income from other sources to compensate for these reductions. Ministers control the 
level of NNDR and can require any municipality that proposes an ‘excessive’ increase 
in Council Tax to organise a binding local referendum to endorse its decision. 
Notably, the Localism Act expressly forbids councils from levying additional taxes, 
and since 1988 they have been statutorily required to deliver balanced revenue 
budgets every year. This constrained financial situation suggests that English councils 
are perhaps more dependent on central government resources and ministerial 
decisions than ever.  
 
Crucially, however, this vertical support is not forthcoming: indeed, ministers appear 
increasingly disinterested in and detached from the activities of local government. In a 
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complete reversal of the tentatively interdependent situation in the late 2000s, the UK 
Government neither determines municipal policy goals (because centralised 
performance frameworks have been abolished) nor provides councils with many 
resources to help with implementation (because funding has been reduced 
significantly). This is especially the case in deprived cities such as Newcastle, which 
have suffered particularly deep funding cuts. In other words, English councils actually 
operate largely independently along the vertical sub-dimension, albeit within a very 
constrained financial context.  
 
To compensate for this situation, municipalities may need to seek out additional 
sources of capacity along the horizontal sub-dimension (see section 3.4.2.2), or accept 
that their previous policies are too ambitious and potentially undeliverable in the new 
context. Indeed, given that resources are scarcer and municipalities no longer need to 
adhere to central performance frameworks and sustainability targets, it is probably not 
coincidental that climate change has slipped down the political agenda of many 
councils since 2010. One survey found that 28% of English municipalities were 
narrowing their focus on climate mitigation (to focus purely on energy saving, for 
example), and a further 37% were either placing less emphasis on the issue or stated 
that it was never a priority for the authority in the first place (Scott, 2011).  
 
Overall, therefore, vertical power dependencies in England have shifted significantly 
since the early 1970s. At the beginning of this period, local government was largely 
dependent on the centre for resources, a situation that was exacerbated in the 1980s as 
ministers increased their control over municipal activities. However, the Labour 
Government of 1997-2010 introduced various mechanisms to improve policy co-
ordination between tiers of government, resulting in a more interdependent (albeit still 
hierarchical) arrangement. Finally, the Coalition and Conservative Governments have 
given local authorities much greater political freedom and enabled them to operate 
largely independently of the centre. Notably, the dynamic nature of these vertical 
arrangements, together with the fact that central and local government act relatively 
autonomously, is highly characteristic of Type II multi-level governance. Indeed, 
since the regional tier has also undergone significant reform since the late 1990s 
(Elcock, 2014), this suggests that the typically ‘English’ governance structures 
dominate along the vertical sub-dimension. 
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Nonetheless, it is important to note that although councils now have more de jure 
political autonomy than at any point since their creation in the early nineteenth 
century, they actually have very limited de facto capacity to achieve their political 
objectives. This is due to the constrained financial context within which they operate 
and the lack of support from other vertical actors. In other words, the lack of 
interdependence along the vertical sub-dimension has resulted in weaker municipal 
government. This is particularly the case for deprived cities such as Newcastle, which 
have experienced steeper drops in their revenue than wealthier boroughs due to cuts in 
central grants. 
 
Figure 3.6: Shifts in vertical dependency relationships for local government in 
England and Germany since the early 1970s 
 
This process has been out of step with most other European countries (particularly 
Germany), which have empowered sub-national actors and encouraged greater policy 
co-ordination along the vertical dimension (Norton, 1994, Wilson and Game, 2011). It 
is also notable that reforms such as reorganisation, abolition and the gradual 
centralisation of local government finance were imposed by the centre rather than 
negotiated with municipalities (Brenner, 2004). Indeed, this contrasts with the 
German experience and highlights the more antagonistic nature of central-local 
relations in the UK. As figure 3.6 illustrates, the German phenomenon of 
Politikverflechtung has meant that municipalities in this country have become more 
108 
 
interdependent with other levels of government, particularly the Bezirk and Land. It is 
also important to note that vertical interdependence in Germany is also much more 
symmetrical and consensual than in the UK – even under the 1997-2010 Labour 
Government. Crucially, the Bezirk and Land governments work with municipalities to 
help them achieve local objectives – whereas English councils in this period only 
received additional support from vertical actors to implement central policies.  
 
3.4.2.2  Horizontal power dependencies in England since the 1970s 
 
Notably, English councils have become much more interdependent with other 
horizontal actors since the 1970s. This is partly because they cannot draw on the same 
degree of vertical support as their German counterparts, as section 3.4.2.1 
demonstrated. However, it also reflects the fact that various reforms resulted in 
municipalities having direct responsibility for fewer local public functions, which 
means they have had to work with other organisations to achieve policy objectives. 
  
These reforms began with the 1972 Local Government Act, which divested local 
authorities of responsibilities for public health and water conservation and supply, 
allocating these to the National Health Service and new regional bodies respectively 
(Seeley, 1978). It accelerated during the 1980s, however, as central government 
removed a range of other functions from municipalities and allocated them to new 
quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (quangos). As a result, councils 
were also divested of responsibility for training and enterprise, economic 
development, further education and (in many cases) primary and secondary schools 
(Wilson and Game, 2011). Furthermore, the Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
(CCT) initiative required all local authorities ‘to assess whether their services could 
be delivered more cheaply by private providers’ and put them out to tender if this 
proved to be the case (Eckersley et al., 2014). Ultimately, this package of reforms led 
to the outsourcing of services such as local public transport, waste collection, school 
meals provision and street cleaning. As such, the ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Rhodes, 
1994) meant that municipalities had much less direct responsibility for public 
functions, and had to work interdependently with external contractors in order to try 
and ‘join-up’ services at the local level (Dunleavy and Margetts, 2006).  
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In addition, developments at the European and global levels further strengthened the 
position of private companies and weakened the position of municipalities in local 
governance arrangements. For example, many urban areas were affected by the drive 
to stimulate market forces and cross-border competition through agreements like the 
1985 Single European Act. This led to many municipalities working with private 
businesses in order to re-brand themselves as innovative ‘entrepreneurial cities’ and 
thereby secure economic investment and prestige events (Herrschel and Newman, 
2002). Like Gelsenkirchen – and indeed many other cities that sought a ‘sustainability 
fix’ (While et al., 2004) – Newcastle tried to reinvent itself as a centre for science, 
technology, retail and green jobs, as a way of suggesting that it had recovered from 
the decline of older, ‘dirtier’ industries such as coal mining and manufacturing 
(Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). This strategy of reinvention required much closer co-
operation with other local actors than had previously been the case. 
 
Indeed, the UK Government actively encouraged councils to work closer with private 
companies and voluntary groups as a way of increasing local capacity, particularly 
from the late 1990s onwards. For example, ministers offered additional funding to 
those municipalities that established Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) to develop 
strategies for regeneration and sustainability with other horizontal actors (Johnson and 
Osborne, 2003). Similarly, the Coalition Government replaced Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs, public bodies that worked with municipalities to promote 
sustainable economic development) with Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) in 
2010. Although some senior councillors sit on the boards of LEPs, they are dominated 
by local businesspeople rather than public officials or elected politicians. In other 
words, public sector organisations such as municipalities are not the pre-eminent 
actors within these institutions, despite the fact that they are funded by the taxpayer 
(Liddle, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, local authorities now worked much closer with each other in order to 
respond to capacity constraints – in spite of attempts by central government to 
stimulate performance improvement through market-based initiatives that encouraged 
competition between councils. Indeed, municipalities in the North East (including 
Newcastle) pooled their resources to establish the Association of North East Councils 
(ANEC) in 2009. After the Coalition Government encouraged the development of 
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such collaborative arrangements in ‘city regions’ around England, ANEC evolved 
into the North East Combined Authority (NECA), which now provides leadership on 
transport, skills development and planning across the region. Along with the other 
four combined authorities in England, NECA has developed from the ‘bottom-up’, as 
groups of councils agreed to work together to increase their capacity to address these 
strategic issues. Although central government needs to approve the establishment of 
combined authorities, the fact that they are essentially platforms for inter-municipal 
collaboration means that this thesis will treat them as horizontal rather than vertical 
governing actors. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Shifts in horizontal dependency relationships for local government in 
England and Germany since the early 1970s 
 
With this in mind, it becomes clear that English municipalities operate much more 
interdependently than their German counterparts in horizontal governance 
arrangements (see figure 3.7). Moreover, they work much more closely with private 
and voluntary actors within their localities, as well as other councils at the regional 
level, whereas German councils only tend to collaborate with other public bodies. 
Notably, these characterisations map quite closely on to the types of multi-level 
governance that are often ascribed to each country. For example, the fact that German 
municipalities have retained responsibility for a wider range of public functions 
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means that they could be described as ‘multi-purpose’ local authorities in line with 
Type I characterisations. By way of contrast, the dynamic and fragmented nature of 
horizontal arrangements in England resembles Type II structures, in which ad hoc 
bodies assume responsibility for specific public functions and can be created and 
abolished relatively easily.  
 
In part, English councils have become more interdependent along the horizontal sub-
dimension because central government has encouraged closer collaboration (for 
example, by providing funding to LSPs). However, a more important driver has been 
their realisation that they lack the capacity to achieve their objectives alone. There are 
two main reasons for this. Firstly, the higher degree of local state fragmentation 
requires English councils to work with external organisations to ensure that services 
are provided to the public. Generally speaking, German municipalities have retained 
direct responsibility for far more public functions that their English counterparts, and 
this enables them to operate more independently of other horizontal actors. Secondly, 
a lack of interdependency along the vertical sub-dimension means that English 
councils receive far fewer resources from higher tiers of government than German 
municipalities and are therefore in a much weaker position vis à vis other horizontal 
actors. Indeed, although many German councils have become more fragmented in 
recent decades (particularly those – such as Gelsenkirchen – that have been beset by 
financial problems), they remain largely independent of other local actors. This is 
because of the extra support they receive from other tiers of government, in 
accordance with the institutionalised principles of Politikverflechtung and lokale 
Selbstverwaltung. 
 
3.5  Conclusions 
 
This chapter has traced the evolution of power relationships involving local 
government in Germany and England since the early nineteenth century. It has 
stressed how German councils are now working more interdependently with other 
vertical actors (especially the Bezirk and Land), due to the culture of 
Politikverflechtung and lokale Selbstverwaltung, which result in different tiers of 
government collaborating to help municipalities achieve their objectives. As far as 
England is concerned, however, municipalities are now more independent of central 
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government (see figure 3.6 on page 107). Ministers appear detached from local 
activities, have reduced the resources they provide to councils and abolished 
performance frameworks that sought to co-ordinate policy-making along the vertical 
sub-dimension.  
 
Crucially, although English councils (especially those in deprived areas such as 
Newcastle) may be more independent of the centre, this autonomy does not 
necessarily translate into greater capacity to implement policy. Indeed, it is important 
to note that English municipalities operate within a very tightly constrained financial 
context and do not have the power to generate much revenue. As a result, we would 
expect Newcastle (and indeed any ‘typical’ English municipality) to be a much 
weaker actor in vertical power relationships than Gelsenkirchen and other German 
councils. To illustrate this contrast, local government restructures and reforms in 
Germany have proceeded on the basis of consensus and Politikverflechtung, in that 
councils were keen to work closer with higher tiers of government as a way of 
increasing capacity. The situation in England was very different, because the UK 
Government has imposed a range of changes on local authorities since the early 
1970s, often in the teeth of opposition. These have included abolishing and 
reorganising municipalities and exercising an increasing amount of control over 
revenue and expenditure.  
 
As the previous chapter suggested, closer examination of central-local relations in 
Germany and England suggests that some of Hooghe and Marks’ characterisations of 
Type I and Type II multi-level governance are contradictory. In particular, the 
institutionalised nature of Politikverflechtung within Germany suggests that it sits 
closer to a rigid Type I structure; however, the fact that different tiers of government 
collaborate in policy-making processes conflicts with the Type I idea that functions 
are clearly divided across levels and memberships do not intersect. However, the 
simplified and condensed typologies set out in chapter 2 do appear more relevant. For 
example, German municipalities operate within a more fixed vertical context (in line 
with the Type I characterisation), whereas these relationships are much more dynamic 
and flexible in England (thereby fitting a Type II description). Therefore, we might 
expect the empirical investigations to find that Gelsenkirchen sits closer to a 
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characteristically Type I arrangement along the vertical sub-dimension in figure 2.2 
(see page 46), whilst Newcastle would be more akin to Type II. 
 
In terms of their horizontal relationships, cities in both countries are shifting closer 
towards a Type II characterisation, because an increasing number of different 
organisations have responsibility for public services. Crucially, however, German 
councils have retained a wider range of local public functions ‘in-house’ when 
compared to their English counterparts, and therefore have not moved as far towards 
the interdependence pole. Furthermore, the identity of other horizontal actors, and the 
influence that they are able to exert over decision-making, differs between the two 
countries. In Germany the council remains the pre-eminent organisation in local 
governance arrangements, and it is able to draw upon its status as the legitimate 
democratic embodiment of the local community to exercise authority over other 
actors. In contrast, English municipalities engage with other local organisations on a 
much more equal basis. In addition, the private sector has a much more prominent 
role through bodies such as Local Enterprise Partnerships, which raises questions 
about democratic accountability (see chapter 2).  
 
Overall, however, local governance approaches in the two countries do not appear to 
be converging, particularly along the vertical dimension. German municipalities are 
becoming more interdependent with higher tiers of government, whereas their English 
counterparts are increasingly independent of the centre. Although cities in both 
countries are collaborating more along the horizontal dimension, and therefore 
operating more interdependently with other local actors, English municipalities are 
further down this road than their German counterparts, and also work much closer 
with the private and voluntary sectors. The following three chapters will demonstrate 
the extent to which these general findings apply in the specific empirical contexts of 
climate change policy in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. 
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Chapter 4: Climate change strategy in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
As chapter 1 clarified, this thesis aims to study governance approaches rather than the 
specific policies of each case study city or their ‘effectiveness’ in addressing climate 
change. As a result, this chapter (along with the other empirical analysis in chapters 5 
and 6) will focus on the role and influence of governance actors in policy-making and 
implementation, rather than any particular policies that emerge from these processes. 
Nonetheless, occasionally it will refer to specific policies, not only to provide context 
for the discussion, but also to illustrate how some actors may have proved more 
influential than others in determining policy outcomes.  
 
The chapter will focus particularly on how Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle councils 
develop and implement their strategies for combating climate change. These strategies 
comprise the cities’ explicit political objectives on mitigation and adaptation, which 
both municipalities have set out in policy documents, namely the Integriertes 
Klimaschutzkonzept der Stadt Gelsenkirchen (Stadt Gelsenkirchen, 2011) and the 
Citywide Climate Change Strategy & Action Plan 2010-2020 (Newcastle City 
Council, 2010) respectively. Both of these documents include explicit targets to 
reduce the level of carbon dioxide emitted from each city by over 20% between 2005 
and 2020, and break down this overall figure into various work streams, each of 
which has its own target for carbon reduction. As such, it will draw heavily on these 
documents, as well as interviews with key stakeholders, other internal policy literature 
and media reports. 
 
Drawing on the theoretical discussion in chapter 2, the chapter maps each city’s 
approach against the vertical and horizontal sub-dimensions of multi-level governance 
and policy styles. These sub-dimensions, which are summarised in table 4.1 for ease 
of reference, will inform two illustrative diagrams based on figures 2.1 and 2.2 in 
chapter 2. By depicting each city’s arrangements for governing climate change 
strategy, this mapping process will show the extent to which these ideal types apply in 
practice and may have evolved in recent years. 
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However, as chapter 2 mentioned, this mapping of multi-level governance and policy 
styles will only help to describe the way in which jurisdictions address policy 
problems: it does not assist with explaining why certain arrangements are in place, or 
indeed why they might be changing. Therefore, the chapter complements this 
mapping process by employing the illustrative tripolar diagrams from chapter 2 
(figures 2.4 and 2.5) to identify the nature of vertical and horizontal power 
dependencies within each city. This enables us to ascertain which organisations are 
driving climate change strategies, as well as the reasons why they may be more 
influential than other actors. As such, this approach provides a much more holistic 
picture of the governance arrangements associated with climate change strategy in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. It also contributes towards the overall analysis of why 
these governance arrangements have developed in the way that they have, and what 
might be forcing them to change. 
 
  
Typically ‘German’ 
characteristics 
Typically ‘English’ 
characteristics 
Multi-level 
governance 
dimension 
Vertical sub-
dimension 
Highly-structured vertical 
framework 
Loose and flexible vertical 
arrangements 
Horizontal 
sub-dimension 
Responsibilities 
concentrated in the local 
authority 
Fragmented local public 
service provision 
Policy styles 
dimension 
Vertical sub-
dimension 
Strong state hierarchy 
Horizontal engagement and 
compromise 
Horizontal 
sub-dimension 
Reliance on state of the art 
(SOTA) technological 
solutions 
Preference for best 
practicable means (BPM) 
and cost-effectiveness 
 
Table 4.1: Dimensions and sub-dimensions of ‘ideal type’ multi-level governance and 
policy styles in Germany and England 
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4.2  Multi-level governance and climate change strategy  
 
4.2.1  Gelsenkirchen 
 
This section addresses the two sub-dimensions of multi-level governance in the 
context of Gelsenkirchen. As table 4.1 suggests, it begins by identifying the extent to 
which the city’s develops its climate change strategy within a structured vertical 
framework that involves other tiers of government. If a characteristically ‘German’ 
Type I arrangement applies, then we would expect these vertical structures to be static 
and rigid. It then analyses the council’s relationships with other local actors on the 
horizontal sub-dimension, where Type I characterisations would suggest that 
responsibility for determining and delivering public services are concentrated within 
the municipality, rather than in fragmented, task-specific organisations. 
 
4.2.1.1  Vertical governance structures  
 
The Type I model suggests that institutions are fixed within a system-wide 
architecture, and organised into a limited number of levels. In terms of the functions 
assigned to jurisdictions, the city of Gelsenkirchen sits within the Land (federal state) 
of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). Unlike Germany’s other fifteen Länder, NRW 
also has an intermediate tier, the Bezirk (region), which sits in between municipalities 
and the state: there are five Bezirke within North Rhine-Westphalia, and 
Gelsenkirchen is located within the Münster region. In addition, the larger cities in 
NRW that sit outside county boundaries (including Gelsenkirchen) have yet another 
tier of governance below the municipal level – the Stadtbezirk, or city district – which 
maintains local public facilities and provides democratic representation below the city 
level, whilst also working closely with the municipality (Erichsen, 2011). The 
Stadtbezirke were created in the 1970s, but every other vertical jurisdiction affecting 
Gelsenkirchen has remained virtually unchanged since the 1950s. As such, the 
institutional structure appears to fit with a ‘Type I’ characterisation of multi-level 
governance, whereby each general purpose jurisdiction fits neatly into the other and 
remains largely static and rigid.  
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There is some evidence to suggest that this ‘Russian doll’ image of nested institutions 
operates in practice and can be applied to the development of climate change strategy 
in Gelsenkirchen. Indeed, officials in Gelsenkirchen certainly view themselves as 
operating within a Type I multi-level governance framework. Several interviewees 
mentioned the importance of United Nations or EU initiatives in raising the profile of 
climate protection and encouraging Gelsenkirchen to act (interviews 14, 19 and 20), 
whilst others stressed the importance of local governance for policy implementation: 
 
I would say that climate protection takes places at various levels – global, EU, 
federal, and state… And then there is the execution of laws, which we have to 
implement as municipalities (interview 24). 
 
More recently, even though hundreds of German municipalities have experienced 
severe financial difficulties since the early 2000s (Timm-Arnold, 2010), the vast 
majority have retained a reasonable degree of autonomy over spending, including in 
relation to climate protection. This is in spite of the fact that local government has had 
to rely increasingly on funding from the federal and Land levels (see chapter 3), much 
of which is distributed to individual municipalities in NRW through the Bezirk 
authorities. For example, Gelsenkirchen received funding from the federal 
government to cover 90% of the budget for implementing its climate protection 
strategy, the Klimaschutzkonzept, which sets out how the city aims to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions by 20% by 2020 (interview 21). This money has to be spent on 
climate protection initiatives, and government auditors will assess the extent to which 
it has been effective both mid-way through the programme and at the end of the 
decade. Importantly, however, the municipality is able to determine the nature, timing 
and type of projects that it wishes to undertake (interview 14).  
 
Indeed, closer inspection reveals that the ideal Type I model does apply to the real-life 
context within which Gelsenkirchen operates. Most notably, the fieldwork research 
revealed that the notion of Politikverflechtung (see Scharpf et al., 1976, and also 
chapter 3 of this thesis) is very much a reality within the city and wider Land. This 
concept describes the ‘political integration’ of state institutions that has developed 
within Germany since the 1950s. It is characterised by close co-operation between 
public bodies at all levels of government, and by senior individuals moving from one 
118 
 
institution to another but nonetheless still working on the same policy initiatives. 
Crucially, although Hooghe and Marks (2003) argue that ‘intersecting memberships’ 
of this nature are associated with Type II multi-level governance, chapter 2 
highlighted how they actually reinforce the static vertical arrangements that are 
characteristic of Type I jurisdictions. In other words, Politikverflechtung across tiers 
of government fits with this study’s condensed definition of vertical Type I structures, 
and appears to apply in the context of Gelsenkirchen’s climate change strategy. 
 
Indeed, Politikverflechtung in the climate and energy sectors has been further 
encouraged by the Energiewende narrative, which stresses how Germany needs to 
move away from a reliance on fossil fuels and nuclear power, and towards renewable 
sources (Mautz et al., 2008, Wyman, 2015, Moss et al., 2015). The Energiewende 
concept has its origins in the federal government’s decision to introduce feed-in-
tariffs for small-scale electricity producers, as well as the (SPD-Green) federal 
government’s decision to phase out nuclear power by 2021.13 In parallel with these 
environmental goals, politicians have also emphasised the potential economic benefits 
of linking climate protection objectives with an active industrial policy that promoted 
green businesses (see chapter 5).  
 
Notably, the policy has provided a common language around which governance actors 
from various sectors and organisations can coalesce, as well as a clear strategy for 
developing policy across the country. In this way, it has facilitated even closer 
working between public bodies at different tiers on energy and climate change 
initiatives, and increased the degree of integration and interdependence between state 
actors (interview 21). Indeed, both the Energiewende and Politikverflechtung were 
cited by a number of interviewees in Gelsenkirchen as a pervading influence over 
climate protection policy in the city (interviews 16, 19 and 21). They stressed how 
                                                 
13 Although the CDU-CSU-FDP coalition that took office in 2009 initially wanted to prolong the life of 
existing nuclear reactors by an additional 12 years, ministers reversed this decision after the Fukushima 
disaster in 2011. Nuclear power provided Germany with one-quarter of its electricity in 2011 (Wyman 
2015), which means that a significant investment in renewables is required to ensure that supply will 
continue from 2022 onwards. 
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both concepts contributed towards a culture of mutual support and co-operation that 
increased the capacity of all public bodies and made it easier to implement policy.  
 
In a similar way, interviewees within the Bezirk authority saw their role as being 
primarily to help municipalities to bid successfully for Land funding and deliver local 
policy objectives – rather than stipulating what the money should be spent on, or 
auditing specific projects. As such, their relationship with local government is more 
akin to that of consultant-client rather than master-servant (interview 26). Such an 
image does not fit with the Type I model, which suggests a hierarchy of nested 
jurisdictions that operate largely independently of each other. Instead, it is much more 
reminiscent of the interdependence between tiers of government that Rhodes 
identified in his theory of power relations. Crucially, however, this interdependence 
actually reinforces existing vertical structures and thereby ensures that local 
authorities operate within a much more stable and rigid institutional context – in line 
with the Type I characterisations selected for this thesis.  
 
Furthermore, as chapter 3 outlined, Gelsenkirchen works even more interdependently 
along the vertical sub-dimension than many other municipalities in North Rhine-
Westphalia. This is due to it agreeing a Haushaltssicherungskonzept (budgetary 
assurance programme) with the Bezirk, which sets out how the council will be able to 
balance its revenue and expenditure within three years and how the Bezirk will help 
them to achieve this. In contrast, those authorities that have not experienced serious 
financial problems often operate more independently of higher tiers of government, 
because the Land has not required them to develop a plan for fiscal consolidation. 
Furthermore, many other councils have had their plans rejected, and are subjected to 
very tight restrictions on their spending as a result – this means they depend more on 
the Bezirk for financial and advisory resources. 
 
Overall, therefore, Gelsenkirchen Council is actually operating in a more rigid and 
structured (albeit interdependent) vertical context than was previously the case. 
Generally speaking, the enduring nature of Politikverflechtung, as well as the more 
recent emergence of the Energiewende, has encouraged actors within the Land to 
operate across jurisdictions to increase their capacity to implement policy. More 
specifically, the nature of Gelsenkirchen’s collaboration with the Bezirk authorities 
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means that it is closer to this Type I ideal than some of its neighbouring municipalities 
in NRW (see figure 4.1 on page 134). 
 
4.2.1.2  Horizontal governance structures  
 
Chapter 3 showed how most German municipalities have retained a greater degree of 
control over local utilities and other public services than their English counterparts. 
This suggests that Gelsenkirchen’s horizontal structures are more likely to fit with 
Type I multi-level governance characterisations and the idea of a ‘multi-purpose local 
authority’, because responsibilities are more concentrated within a single 
organisation. Furthermore, the relatively rigid and self-reinforcing nature of vertical 
relationships (see section 4.2.1.1) suggests that German councils may be less likely to 
‘step outside’ these official channels and collaborate horizontally with other 
municipalities or public bodies. 
 
However, Gelsenkirchen does work with various partners outside the formal, 
hierarchical state framework. Indeed, one interviewee suggested that Germany’s more 
positive attitude towards inter-authority collaboration was one reason why 
municipalities in the country had greater capacity than their English counterparts 
(interview 24). Interestingly, the officer also argued that these local perspectives 
mirror the prevailing attitudes at the national level, since German ministers are more 
likely to see the benefits of working with other EU member states than their British 
counterparts (see section 2.4 in chapter 2 for a short overview of the implications of 
‘pooling’ sovereignty to achieve policy objectives). 
 
Internationally, Gelsenkirchen subscribes to two cross-border networks for 
municipalities that aim to reduce CO2 emissions: the Covenant and Mayors and 
Climate Alliance. However, these networks have not really influenced the city’s 
policies – primarily because resource constraints made it very difficult to attend 
conferences or discuss ideas with colleagues in other countries (interview 14). 
Instead, the authority has worked very closely with various other organisations at the 
regional level, both within and outside the scope of structured state institutions.  
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For example, the state of NRW has five Bezirke, all bar one of which cover some part 
of the heavily-industrialised Ruhrgebiet area. In other words, there is no statutory 
regional body to oversee this territory – in spite of its shared history, economy and 
demographics (interview 22). Instead, the municipalities within the region work 
across Bezirk boundaries on various initiatives related to climate change (such as 
transportation and planning),14 in recognition of the fact that they have more in 
common with each other than with many of their neighbours in the same Bezirk 
(interviews 14, 21 and 22). This began in the 1990s with the re-development of some 
of the Ruhrgebiet into the international Emscher Park exhibition (Technische 
Universität Dortmund, 2008), and this collaboration subsequently evolved into the 
Regionalverband Ruhr (interview 20). As such, council officers bypass traditional 
jurisdictional boundaries and engage in Politikverflechtung horizontally as well as 
vertically, in order to increase their municipality’s capacity to achieve its objectives. 
This partnership working has resulted in the creation of new public organisations that 
are charged with delivering political objectives in each participating municipality. 
Therefore, although it involves greater integration of state institutions at the regional 
level, it also represents a shift towards the fragmented local state that is characteristic 
of Type II multi-level governance arrangements. 
 
This fragmentation is also evident within Gelsenkirchen, where the municipality 
created various task-specific organisations to develop and implement its economic 
development strategy. For example, since the mid-1990s the council has been keen to 
nurture the generation and consumption of renewable energy (particularly solar 
power) within the city (Jung et al., 2010). Together with the single-purpose state 
development corporation that was established to promote economic development 
across the Land (Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft Nordrhein-Westfalen), 
Gelsenkirchen established a new science park that aimed to attract low-carbon energy 
companies to the city. In 2004, the council and the science park, together with 
representatives from Emscher Lippe Energie (ELE, the privatised energy utility), the 
local chamber of crafts, a housing company and the solar industry, founded a separate 
                                                 
14 BOGESTRA, a partnership between the municipalities of Gelsenkirchen and Bochum, provides 
public transport services in the two cities, in spite of them being situated in different Bezirke (Münster 
and Arnsberg respectively). 
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company, Solarstadt Gelsenkirchen (Solar City Gelsenkirchen), to promote and 
encourage the use of photovoltaic panels in the area. In 2013 the company evolved 
into a climate alliance with the neighbouring borough of Herten, and it aims to pursue 
joint projects to help reduce carbon emissions in both cities (interview 20). Although 
the science park became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the municipality in 2007, these 
developments nonetheless illustrate an increasing reliance on specific-purpose bodies 
to achieve public policy objectives and therefore suggest a shift towards Type II 
multi-level governance. 
 
Moreover, and as chapter 3 outlined, many municipalities also sought to sell off or 
outsource services as a way of generating revenue and avoiding the threat of Land 
intervention through the imposition of a budgetary assurance programme. This was 
certainly the case with Gelsenkirchen’s privatisation of its Stadtwerke (local utility 
provider): 
 
It was about the money. It’s that banal (interview 24). 
 
The result has been the creation of a number of additional task-specific organisations 
that carry out public functions, including ELE (which is jointly owned by 
Gelsenkirchen, two other municipalities and the energy giant RWE) and the water 
company Gelsenwasser. This fragmented institutional arrangement, which requires 
local government to liaise with external organisations on issues related to climate 
protection, suggests a move towards Type II multi-level governance. However, it is 
worth nothing that 49.9% of the shares in ELE are owned by local authorities, and 
therefore Gelsenkirchen and two neighbouring municipalities are able to exert some 
control over the organisation’s strategy. Indeed, the organisation is led by two 
executives, one of which is employed by RWE and the other by the three authorities 
combined – and any major decisions must be approved by both of these individuals. 
As the following subsection on Newcastle will illustrate, this gives the German 
council much more influence over local energy provision than its English counterpart 
and highlights how some aspects of Type I multi-level governance have persisted. 
 
Notably, as with the city’s horizontal engagement with other Ruhrgebiet 
municipalities, a lack of capacity played a crucial role in Gelsenkirchen’s decision to 
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outsource its utility provision. On this occasion, these capacity constraints related to 
financial resources – whereas creating the Regionalverband Ruhr was driven 
primarily by a recognition that existing institutional structures were unfit for the 
purpose of delivering effective services across the former industrial region. 
Nonetheless, it is clear how capacity concerns have led to Gelsenkirchen becoming 
increasing interdependent with other governance actors, and thereby adopt more Type 
II characteristics than was previously the case.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, the wicked nature of climate change has meant 
that the council cannot rely solely on public bodies to make and implement policy. As 
chapters 1 and 2 outlined, a huge range of human activities have some kind of climate 
impact, which means that policy-makers need to persuade businesses, citizens and 
voluntary groups to change their behaviour in order to address the issue effectively. 
Effecting such behavioural change is not easy – it may well be the case that traditional 
resources, such as money, knowledge, information or contacts are unable to persuade 
stakeholders to act in a different manner. Nonetheless, it means that a variety of 
private actors, particularly businesses and citizens, need to be involved in horizontal 
governance arrangements in order to try and achieve this change. In this sense, Lowi’s 
argument that the nature of the policy problem dictates the way in which the state will 
try to address it, appears to apply (Lowi, 1964).  
 
For example, and as section 4.3.1.1 will illustrate in more depth, Gelsenkirchen 
council has engaged with major landlords in order to try and improve the energy-
efficiency of homes and non-domestic properties in the city. The authority has also 
involved large employers in its plans to increase the use of low-carbon modes of 
transport, such as cycling, walking, buses and trams. For their part, these private 
sector actors have been happy to participate in governance arrangements and help the 
municipality implement its objectives by retrofitting buildings and encouraging more 
sustainable commuting. Interviewees attributed this willingness to the council’s 
dominant position as the city’s democratically elected body, which means that other 
actors feel compelled to respect its policies (interviews 14 and 21). Indeed, the overall 
impression from conducting fieldwork in both countries was that municipalities in 
Germany are held in higher esteem than their English counterparts, and that this status 
enables them to cast a larger ‘shadow of hierarchy’ over other actors in local 
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governance arrangements (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2011). Yet, it still illustrates a shift 
towards more fragmented governance arrangements, since policy-making and public 
functions are no longer concentrated within Gelsenkirchen Council. 
 
Regardless of the relative status of the municipality in local policy-making processes, 
wicked issues do not map particularly well on to Hooghe and Marks typologies of 
multi-level governance because they require the involvement a range of external 
actors (see section 2.2.3 in chapter 2). Crucially, these typologies do not explain how 
to treat those organisations and individuals that have no responsibility for delivering 
or deciding on public services yet still influence policy outcomes. Since private 
businesses, citizens and voluntary groups need to play a key role in addressing climate 
change, and may not liaise directly with the council about the issue, this questions 
how applicable such typologies are for this policy sector.  
 
Nonetheless, if we adopt the definition of governance actor set out in section 2.2.3 
(namely, an organisation or individual that the municipality has actively sought to 
involve in its governing arrangements), Gelsenkirchen appears to be moving away 
from a characteristically Type I multi-level governance arrangement along the 
horizontal sub-dimension. Although the council still retains responsibility for a 
greater scope of public functions than its English twin, recent developments are 
weakening official state structures in the city and challenging the idea of the ‘multi-
purpose local authority’. For example, Gelsenkirchen Council’s collaboration with 
neighbouring authorities in the Ruhrgebiet has by-passed traditional state channels, 
and it has also created task-specific organisations to foster economic development and 
tackle the problems associated with de-industrialisation. Similarly, the outsourcing of 
its Stadtwerke means that a broader range of organisations are now responsible for 
public services in the locality, and the authority has to try and work with them to 
achieve its policy objectives. Most importantly, the fact that climate change requires a 
co-ordinated response that includes non-state actors in decision-making has also led to 
a situation where governance arrangements are fragmented horizontally. 
 
Fundamentally, these developments have been caused by a lack of capacity within the 
council to achieve its political objectives independently of other organisations. These 
capacity constraints are partly financial (this was certainly the key driver behind 
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privatising the Stadtwerke), partly due to the fact that pre-existing state institutions 
were unable to respond effectively to industrial decline (this was a crucial reason for 
the creation of the Regionalverband Ruhr and Solarstadt Gelsenkirchen), and partly a 
function of the fact that wicked issues need to be addressed by both state and societal 
actors. As figure 4.3 on page 137 illustrates, the result is that Gelsenkirchen now 
works increasingly interdependently with other horizontal governance actors. In 
particular, as section 4.3.2.1 will demonstrate later in this chapter, the municipality 
has also engaged more closely with private companies – in recognition of the fact that 
it needs to change their behaviour to achieve the city’s climate objectives.  
 
4.2.2  Newcastle 
 
This section provides a counterpoint to the analysis of multi-level governance in 
Gelsenkirchen by examining the extent to which Type II arrangements apply to 
Newcastle. As table 4.1 on page 115 suggests, Type II structures are flexible and 
loose along the vertical sub-dimension (in that jurisdictions can be created and 
abolished relatively frequently), whilst municipalities also operate fairly 
autonomously of central government. In addition, a range of organisations are 
involved in public services and policy-making along the horizontal sub-dimension, 
because these functions are not concentrated in ‘multi-purpose’ jurisdictions. 
 
4.2.2.1  Vertical governance structures 
 
Since the UK is not a federal country, the national (rather than Land) government is 
directly responsible for local authorities – and its relationship with municipalities has 
undergone significant change in recent decades (see section 3.4.2.1). The most recent 
shift has been away from tentative interdependence along the vertical sub-dimension 
and towards greater independence for municipalities – albeit within a tightly 
constrained financial context. As this section (and indeed the other empirical findings 
in chapters 5 and 6) will demonstrate, this has had significant implications for local 
governance, particularly in terms of Newcastle Council’s relationships with other 
horizontal actors. 
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Whilst it was in office between 1997 and 2010, the Labour Government introduced 
various mechanisms to facilitate greater co-ordination of central policy. These 
included providing municipalities with funding to implement ministerial objectives, 
setting targets to track their progress and offering various incentives to encourage 
councils to implement policies effectively (Jas and Skelcher, 2014). Notably, the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) framework included several 
indicators to monitor how local authorities were implementing the UK Government’s 
policy of cutting the country’s carbon dioxide emissions by 80% by 2050 (as set out 
in the 2008 Climate Change Act). For example, each municipality was required to 
measure and report the level of per capita greenhouse gas emissions from the local 
area every year, as well as its own consumption of natural resources – and these data 
contributed towards an overall performance score for the authority. As chapter 3 
discussed, this attempt to provide a more structured and interdependent framework for 
central-local relations suggested that England was shifting towards Type I multi-level 
governance arrangements, even if the intention was only to improve the 
implementation of central (rather than local) policy priorities.  
 
However, there was little awareness of centralised performance frameworks amongst 
staff at Newcastle, especially the way in which the municipality was assessed on its 
consumption of natural resources (see chapter 6 for more details). Several officials 
were keen to stress that the council developed its policies largely independently of 
central government priorities (interviews 1, 3 and 5). As a result, although the relevant 
national indicators are mentioned in the city’s climate change strategy, they did not 
influence its overall content significantly. Instead, they acted more as a reference 
point to provide additional support, context and legitimacy for the council’s policy 
(Newcastle City Council, 2010). Moreover, any strategy to address climate change 
would seek to make progress against the relevant national indicators anyway, since 
they monitor the level of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions from the local area and 
from local authority operations, as well as the way in which the municipality is 
seeking to adapt to extreme weather events. Therefore, Newcastle Council’s climate 
change strategy was developed and implemented largely independently of central 
government in a largely Type II context even before 2010, in spite of attempts by 
ministers to co-ordinate policy more effectively along the vertical sub-dimension. 
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In keeping with its rhetoric of ‘localism’, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition that came to office in 2010 abolished central performance frameworks for 
English local government. Although some targets have survived in different guises, 
they no longer contribute towards an overall performance score for individual 
municipalities. Together with the fact that councils are not required by statute to 
combat climate change, this has given them more explicit independence to develop 
their own arrangements for addressing and monitoring progress on climate change. 
Moreover, these reforms happened at a time when local government funding was 
reduced significantly, which has led most (if not all) municipalities to re-consider 
their spending priorities (Ferry and Eckersley, 2015). As a result, many councils now 
focus fewer resources on climate protection than was previously the case (Scott, 
2011).  
 
As one of the councils that has seen its funding reduce by more than average, 
Newcastle has been particularly hard hit by these developments. Indeed, although the 
city continues to attach great importance to environmental issues, the funding cuts 
have led the council to reorganise its service directorates and incorporate its climate 
change strategy into other priorities: 
 
There has been some evolution of our climate change or sustainability policy. It 
[now] has to have a far greater focus on how it can deliver on tackling inequalities… 
and I think that’s a good thing (interview 30). 
 
As a result, the council is now much more concerned about issues of fuel poverty (and 
how to tackle this problem in a way that also benefits the environment) than was 
previously the case. In other words, because there are no mechanisms to co-ordinate 
policy along the vertical sub-dimension, Newcastle Council’s climate change strategy 
has become even more independent of the centre since 2010 (figure 4.2 on page 136 
illustrates this using the tri-polar diagram of power dependencies). Unlike the 
Energiewende in Germany, there is no clear narrative around which governance actors 
can coalesce that also relates to those based outside the environmental policy sector. 
Therefore, even though different tiers of government agree about the need to combat 
climate change and reduce carbon emissions, there is less leadership and direction 
from the centre than was previously the case.  
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In terms of multi-level governance, the abolition of centralised performance 
frameworks meant that Newcastle moved closer towards ‘ideal’ Type II 
arrangements, which stress the independence of different tiers. The reforms also 
provide a clear illustration of the flexible nature of state institutions, which is another 
key feature of Type II structures. This lack of stability, in which ministers can create 
and abolish institutions relatively easily, contrasts with the relatively static and fixed 
structures that operate in Gelsenkirchen. 
 
Some channels to facilitate central-local interdependence have continued to exist. For 
example, Newcastle is one of many councils that have sought out central government 
grants to fund the installation of charging points for electric vehicles (EVs) and 
thereby encourage their take-up. One interviewee felt that the authority would not 
have been able to do this without central government funding: 
 
Charge Your Car was grant-funded – and they were able to able to offer discounts or 
free installation of electric vehicle charging points throughout the region. So, you 
know, it is very much led by national government policy and what is available, and if 
things are available then you’d be incredibly foolish not to take these opportunities 
(interview 8). 
 
This suggests that ministers recognise the importance of policy co-ordination and are 
prepared to support local authority with delivery. In other words, some elements of 
vertical interdependence remain – albeit largely to help with implementing ministerial 
priorities, rather than those of the council, in an echo of the Labour Government’s 
approach. However, the Charge Your Car scheme is a notable exception: there are 
very few other central funding streams available that support municipal attempts to 
combat climate change (interviews 8 and 12). In part this reflects the ‘un-ringfencing’ 
of many grants, in that the vast majority of central government funding is no longer 
earmarked for councils to spend on specific services or functions. More generally, it 
reflects the austerity cuts to overall public spending that ministers have introduced 
since 2010, which have meant that municipalities have the unenviable task of 
choosing which local public services should be scaled down or stopped altogether 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012, Ferry and Eckersley, 2015).  
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Crucially, therefore, although Newcastle Council may not possess significant internal 
resources to implement its climate change strategy, the authority cannot be described 
as being highly dependent on other vertical actors because central government does 
not provide much additional capacity either. This means that the two tiers actually 
operate largely independently of each other, even though the council has to cope with 
severe financial constraints imposed by the centre. As figure 4.2 on page 136 points 
out, the current situation marks something of a shift from the 1997-2010 period, 
where vertical actors worked more interdependently – albeit primarily to implement 
central objectives rather than local priorities. To return to the multi-level governance 
characterisations, the changing nature of these power dependencies also illustrates 
how vertical relationships are loose and dynamic and therefore reminiscent of Type II 
structures (see figure 4.1 on page 134). Moreover, as the next subsection will show, 
these vertical arrangements have played a key role in determining the city’s horizontal 
governance relationships, due to the impact they have had on municipal capacity.  
 
4.2.2.2  Horizontal governance structures  
 
As Chapter 3 outlined, various central government reforms between the early 1970s 
and 2010 took functions away from English municipalities and restricted their room 
for manoeuvre. At the same time, however, initiatives such as the Community Charge, 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering, Best Value and Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment (CPA) encouraged a climate of competition both within and between 
authorities, in an attempt to reduce costs (and therefore taxes) and improve service 
outputs (Ferry and Eckersley, in preparation). This conscious attempt to encourage 
councils to be more independent of each other contrasts sharply with the situation in 
Germany, where the principle of Politikverflechtung predominates both vertically and 
horizontally and facilitates greater co-operation between municipalities. It also led to 
more outsourcing and privatisation of local services, thereby fragmenting the 
municipality. Such a scenario is highly characteristic of Type II multi-level 
governance. 
 
In spite of this prevailing culture, however, Newcastle Council has sought to 
collaborate with other municipalities on policies related to climate change. At the 
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international level, it subscribes to a number of cross-border municipal networks for 
climate protection, although – like Gelsenkirchen – they do not appear to have 
influenced policy to any great extent (interview 12). More importantly, the city has 
developed particularly close links with neighbouring Gateshead as a way of 
increasing state capacity on both banks of the River Tyne. For example, the two 
councils produced a shared local development strategy (Newcastle City Council 
2013), have liaised very closely on issues of sustainable development (interviews 1, 2 
and 12) and even created a joint brand of NewcastleGateshead to promote the area 
(Pasquinelli, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, Newcastle Council played a key role in the development of the North 
East Combined Authority (NECA), which comprises council leaders and elected 
mayors from all seven municipalities in the region. As section 3.4.2.2 in chapter 3 
discussed, this thesis treats combined authorities as horizontal governance actors 
(rather than a higher tier of governance), because they are essentially inter-municipal 
fora that aim to increase the capacity of individual councils to implement policy. 
Indeed, NECA operates largely virtually, in that its administrative staff have largely 
come from municipal payrolls and often continue to work in the offices where they 
are currently based (interview 30). This means that officers and elected 
representatives from across the region act on behalf of both their local council and the 
combined authority. Interestingly, these interlocking memberships are characteristic 
of Type I, rather than Type II multi-level governance, and therefore NECA’s creation 
signifies a shift away from those arrangements that might normally be associated with 
the UK. Furthermore, they also suggest greater horizontal interdependence, as 
Newcastle Council seeks to increase its capacity to achieve its policy objectives by 
working with neighbouring municipalities. 
 
NECA was created officially in 2014 and took some significant decisions related to 
climate change within a few months of being established. In particular, the combined 
authority has decided to abolish the contracted-out system of public transport 
provision across the North East. The Leader of Newcastle City Council, Nick Forbes, 
is NECA’s regional transport lead and he argued that greater public control would 
help in the creation of a single, integrated system with transferable ‘smart’ tickets that 
are valid across different transport providers in all seven municipal areas 
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(Wearmouth, 2014). NECA argued that this would increase passenger numbers, 
protect less profitable bus routes and make public transport easier to use (North East 
Combined Authority, 2014). Therefore, if the decision results in fewer people using 
private cars, it would help every municipality in the region (including Newcastle) 
achieve its climate change targets, as well as contribute towards other policy 
objectives on improving social inclusion and reducing traffic congestion.  
 
In this way, we can see how the region’s municipalities have sought to reverse the 
fragmentation of local public services that is characteristic of Type II multi-level 
governance arrangements in order to try and increase the use of public transport. 
Indeed, it illustrates how decision-makers, upon realising that NPM-inspired reforms 
had weakened the influence of state bodies and hampered the co-ordination of policy, 
sought to ‘join-up’ state institutions again in order to increase their capacity to 
implement policy. In other words, horizontal governance arrangements have become 
more interdependent in response to concerns that individual local authorities were 
unable to achieve their policy objectives independently of each other. This serves as a 
useful illustration of the local state re-asserting its authority vis à vis market actors in 
order to try and achieve its climate change, social inclusion and mobility objectives 
more effectively. 
 
However, because water, electricity and gas were nationalised in the late 1940s (and 
then privatised in the late 1980s), Newcastle City Council is unable to exert much 
influence over public utilities in the city. Unlike many other UK councils, the 
authority does run some small district heating networks (in the housing estate of 
Byker and the shopping centre at Eldon Square, for example), but these only account 
for a very small amount of the energy consumed in the city. More recently, the 
council has investigated various ways of re-asserting greater control over energy 
provision, by extending these heating networks or working with other large cities to 
re-establish municipal power companies (interview 12). Indeed, several English 
municipalities have begun to generate their own energy, albeit largely for use in 
council buildings and housing and therefore on a small scale (Hetherington, 2013). As 
of 2015, however, the authority had not taken this step: instead it has focused on 
aggregating demand amongst residents to negotiate cheaper prices with private energy 
companies, in line with its policy priority of reducing fuel poverty (Newcastle City 
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Council, 2015a). Instead, as chapter 5 will discuss, Newcastle University has actually 
taken a lead on local power generation and smart grids within the Science Central 
development. 
 
Therefore, because the council does not have significant influence over any power 
generating company, it has to try and encourage greater energy efficiency and use of 
renewables in an environment that is dominated by the ‘Big Six’ companies – British 
Gas, Npower, SSE, Scottish Power, E.On and EDF. Together, these firms supply 
around 95% of domestic gas and electricity in the UK (BBC, 2014), yet local 
authorities and other public bodies have failed to influence their behaviour. This 
means that Newcastle Council is almost entirely dependent on the goodwill of power 
companies and private customers (which are perhaps unlikely to purchase more 
expensive green energy without being incentivised or forced to do so) to take 
decisions that might help to reduce carbon emissions in the city. Other than favouring 
renewable sources through its own procurement policies, the council can offer very 
few incentives that might encourage external actors to generate and consume energy 
in more sustainable ways. In contrast, and as this chapter outlined earlier, 
Gelsenkirchen and three neighbouring municipalities in the Ruhr can influence 
decision-making at ELE, and indeed they have been able to persuade the local energy 
provider to increase its reliance on green electricity (see section 4.3.1.1 in this 
chapter). This is because they have a more interdependent relationship with the 
dominant power supplier in the area – whereas Newcastle is highly dependent on the 
behaviour of its energy providers and citizens. 
 
In addition, Newcastle’s increasingly precarious financial situation has had a 
significant impact on internal capacity and increased the pace of state fragmentation 
within the city. Along with a number of other municipalities for example, it has 
sought to devolve responsibilities for environmental and cultural services (including 
libraries and leisure centres) to non-state organisations (interview 30). As one of the 
Newcastle interviewees acknowledged, this has potentially significant implications 
for policy delivery: 
 
I think increasingly we’ll be faced with situations where the Council simply cannot 
deliver certain aspects of services that we have in the past, perhaps even whole 
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services. So the funding will not be there, and increasingly our partnership working 
will be about working with organisations who can and want to maintain services, 
either in a particular area or across the city. And we will be working with them in an 
enabling, facilitation-type role, but not as a funder. And I think that’s a very new way 
of working, because in a sense we will not be in control (interview 30). 
 
The above quote highlights how the council has had to rely on other organisations in 
the area to implement policy, including on climate change mitigation. This approach 
fits with the authority’s wider strategy of involving residents and local businesses 
more in policy-making. For example, in 2011 the council replaced its climate change 
partnership, which incorporated mainly public sector bodies from within the city, with 
a ‘Greening Newcastle’ group that had a broader membership (interview 12). 
Although this group was fairly short-lived, following its demise the council has made 
a conscious effort to create an even wider coalition of local actors to assist with its 
environmental policy. This manifests itself in open ‘Green Cabinet’ meetings at least 
once a year, which involve businesses, voluntary groups, academics and citizens, who 
debate and contribute towards the city’s environmental strategy. In addition, the 
municipality has provided strong support to grassroots projects such as ‘Greening 
Wingrove’, a community co-operative aimed at encouraging residents to live more 
sustainably and improve their local environment (interview 31, see 
www.greeningwingrove for further information). This approach fits with the council’s 
wider strategy of developing a dialogue with residents and voluntary groups to try and 
ensure that they support the authority’s decisions on how to cope with funding cuts 
(Ahrens and Ferry, 2015).  
 
As the previous subsection illustrated, Gelsenkirchen Council is also becoming more 
fragmented along the horizontal dimension, primarily due to resource constraints that 
led the council to sell some of its shares in local utilities to raise revenue and thereby 
retain some control over its budget. In addition, the municipality recognised (perhaps 
somewhat belatedly) that the wicked nature of climate change required it to work 
more closely with other local actors (see sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.3.1.2). In spite of this 
increased interdependence, however, Gelsenkirchen Council has retained more 
control over public services within the locality than its counterpart in Newcastle. This 
is because far fewer services have been outsourced, privatised or ‘hived off’ to arms-
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length bodies – and where shares have been sold, the state has often retained a 
significant stake in the controlling organisation. In addition, it has not had to rely on 
the voluntary or community sectors to act on its behalf along the Greening Wingrove 
model – partly since third sector bodies just do not exist to the same extent in 
Germany (interview 27), but also because there is a much stronger belief that state 
bodies should provide public services and not divest themselves of these 
responsibilities (interview 24). As such, the horizontal governance arrangements for 
Gelsenkirchen’s climate change strategy remain closer to a Type I arrangement than 
the structures that are in place at Newcastle. The only exception to the shift towards 
an even purer Type II situation in Newcastle is public transport, where the combined 
authority has re-asserted some control over local provision and strategic planning.  
  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Changes in the sub-dimensions of multi-level governance types as applied 
to climate change strategy in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
As far as the vertical arrangements are concerned, Newcastle’s situation has changed 
markedly over the last fifteen years. During this period, various institutions have been 
created and then abolished, officials and organisations have changed responsibilities 
and ministers have restructured the arrangements for facilitating policy co-ordination 
on numerous occasions. In contrast, Gelsenkirchen is moving away from this model, 
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thereby suggesting that the hypothesis set out in chapter 2 does not apply. Crucially, 
the Energiewende narrative and the tradition of Politikverflechtung ensure that 
different vertical actors coalesce and co-ordinate policy-making and implementation, 
resulting in a more rigid institutional framework. The situation is much different in 
England, where central government appears increasingly detached from 
municipalities. These shifts in the vertical and horizontal arrangements in both cities 
are illustrated in figure 4.1 and table 4.2. 
 
 Gelsenkirchen Newcastle 
Vertical sub-
dimension 
Fixed institutions at all levels Flexible and dynamic structures 
Politikverflechtung and the 
Energiewende result in significant 
vertical interdependence 
Increasing independence from 
central government since 2010, 
due to funding reductions and the 
abolition of performance 
frameworks 
Horizontal 
sub-
dimension 
Some fragmentation of service 
provision 
Significant fragmentation of 
service provision 
Some collaboration with 
neighbouring councils in the 
Ruhrgebiet 
Increasing collaboration with 
neighbouring councils through the 
combined authority 
More independent of other local 
actors 
More dependent on other local 
actors 
 
Table 4.2: Contrasting multi-level governance structures for climate change strategy 
in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
Crucially, however, figure 4.1 demonstrates that multi-level governance can only help 
us to describe what arrangements are in place for governance to ‘happen’ within 
particular jurisdictions. Although it may suggest potential units of analysis, it does not 
assist with undertaking that analysis. This is because it cannot help us examine 
institutional capacity, and even the two typologies presented do not give an indication 
about power relations and/or the extent to which municipalities are able to operate 
autonomously from other tiers of governance. In other words, it does not provide the 
theoretical foundations for supporting the fact that the municipalities of Newcastle 
and Gelsenkirchen can call upon different levels of resources for developing and 
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implementing policy. By identifying the reasons why they have different levels of 
internal capacity, we can begin to understand which actors are most influential in their 
respective governance arrangements.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Vertical power dependency relationships for climate change strategy in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
As such, the tri-polar diagrams in figures 4.2 and 4.3 give us a better indication of 
power relations in the two cities, and how these have changed in recent years. For 
example, figure 4.2 shows how Newcastle has become more independent of central 
government since 2010, after local authorities no longer needed to report their 
progress against central targets to government ministers, and also received much less 
funding through the grant system. This is in spite of the fact that it operates within 
severe financial constraints imposed by ministers in London.  
 
In contrast, the common narrative of the Energiewende in Germany helps to ensure 
that all tiers of the state coalesce around common policy goals and collaborate to 
achieve them. Combined with the endemic nature of Politikverflechtung in 
government institutions, this serves to ensure that municipalities have a high degree of 
interdependence with those jurisdictions ‘above’ them – despite the constitutional 
guarantee of lokale Selbstverwaltung. Indeed, the precarious nature of 
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Gelsenkirchen’s finances has actually increased the degree of interdependence, since 
the Bezirk level of government makes a special effort to support the city in 
implementing its climate protection strategy within the budgetary constraints that 
apply. Figure 4.2 illustrates how the vertical relationships involving both cities have 
shifted in recent years, and highlights the fact that they are diverging, rather than 
converging, along this dimension. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Horizontal power dependency relationships for climate change strategy in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
Along the horizontal dimension, Newcastle Council has been more dependent on 
private energy companies than its Gelsenkirchen counterpart for several decades. On 
top of this, recent decisions to allocate an increasing number of public functions to 
voluntary groups such as Greening Wingrove will mean that its climate change 
strategy is increasingly dependent on other actors within the city. This is because the 
municipality will no longer be directly involved in an increasing number of activities 
that relate to climate change and sustainability in the city. Interestingly, the council 
has sought to regain some of its influence by taking a leading role in the creation of 
the combined authority, which resulted in greater interdependency with other 
municipalities in the region. It also seeks to work with other private and voluntary 
actors in the city through the Green Cabinet initiative and has considered taking a 
more direct role in generating and providing energy to local residents. However, its 
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financial situation and lack of internal capacity to implement policy means that it is 
increasingly dependent on the decisions and actions of other local stakeholders (see 
figure 4.3). 
 
By comparison, Gelsenkirchen Council operates more independently in climate 
change policy development and implementation along the horizontal sub-dimension. 
This is because it can exercise more control over public services in the city, and also 
because councils in Germany have a higher status within their local communities. 
Nonetheless, the municipality has begun to realise that the actions of organisations 
outside the local authority will play a key role in the success of its climate protection 
initiatives, and this has led to it working more interdependently along the horizontal 
sub-dimension. As figure 4.3 shows, therefore, the councils are moving towards 
different poles in terms of their power relations with other local actors. Indeed, when 
combined with figure 4.2, which shows how they are diverging along the vertical sub-
dimension, it highlights how their approaches to climate change strategy cannot be 
interpreted as converging towards a hybrid model. 
 
The next section will highlight how these institutional arrangements and power 
dependencies for climate change strategy have shaped the policy styles of 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle councils. In particular, it will demonstrate how both 
municipalities rely more on horizontal engagement than was previously the case, in 
recognition of the fact that they need to collaborate more with other actors to address 
climate change effectively. Nonetheless, Newcastle Council is significantly further 
down this road than its German counterpart. Furthermore, it will show how financial 
constraints have tempered Gelsenkirchen Council’s enthusiasm for state of the art 
solutions, although it is still less likely than Newcastle to choose the best practicable 
means for addressing a policy problem.  
 
4.3 Policy styles and climate change strategy 
 
This section analyses the climate change strategies of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle in 
the context of typical policy styles that are associated with Germany and the UK. 
Based on the fieldwork investigations, it examines two sub-dimensions of policy 
style: the extent to which the council relies on hierarchy rather than engagement; and, 
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its preference for state of the art (SOTA) solutions instead of relying on the best 
practicable means (BPM) to address a problem. The chapter maps Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle against these sub-dimensions to illustrate the empirical findings and then 
analyses the reasons why each city follows a particular approach. 
 
As will become apparent, there is some evidence to show that the two municipalities 
have followed policy styles that are ‘typical’ of their respective countries. For 
example, Gelsenkirchen Council has been more likely to adopt a hierarchical 
approach to other societal actors, whereas its counterpart in Newcastle sought to 
engage with them more in policy-making processes. Similarly, Gelsenkirchen has 
invested in state of the art solutions for climate protection (partly due to a belief that 
this would also help to support economic development in the city), whereas 
Newcastle has placed greater emphasis on cost-effectiveness and the best practicable 
means for achieving policy objectives. 
 
However, the fieldwork also found that both cities are shifting towards the ideal 
‘English’ policy style along both sub-dimensions. Both authorities have recognised 
that public bodies need to work more closely with non-state actors to achieve climate 
objectives, because they do not have the internal capacity to deliver them 
independently. Therefore, they are seeking to engage more with other organisations 
instead of relying on more hierarchical techniques. In addition, Gelsenkirchen’s 
financial situation has reduced its ability to fund exemplar SOTA initiatives and it is 
therefore moving towards BPM approaches for dealing with a problem. For its part, 
Newcastle is also operating in an increasingly pragmatic way by focusing more on 
adaptation, and thereby directing scarce resources at climate initiatives where the 
municipality is able to have the greatest impact. As the chapter will demonstrate, this 
illustrates how the council prefers to adopt the best practicable means rather than 
invest in state of the art solutions. 
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4.3.1   Gelsenkirchen 
 
4.3.1.1  Hierarchy versus engagement  
 
The fieldwork revealed that officers at Gelsenkirchen expected the municipality to 
take a strong leadership role in the city’s climate protection strategy. In particular, the 
hierarchical process that the authority followed to develop its Klimaschutzkonzept 
illustrated the extent to which it relied on a traditional ‘German’ policy style along 
this dimension. This document was drafted by an advisory body of municipal officers 
and politicians, together with some managers from the local energy supplier ELE – 
other businesses and voluntary groups in the city were not involved in these 
discussions (interviews 14 and 21). Some staff have since engaged with other local 
stakeholders to try and persuade them to play their part in achieving the planned 
reductions in carbon emissions, for example by reducing their reliance on road 
transport. However, it is notable that this only happened after the strategy was 
adopted formally by the council. Furthermore, prior to the development of the 
Klimaschutzkonzept, the municipality had adopted a hierarchical approach when it 
sought to develop and promote the city as a centre for solar energy in the 1990s. In 
both cases, municipal decision-makers felt that the authority had a responsibility to 
provide local leadership in response to climate change and industrial decline 
(interview 25).  
 
Interestingly, some interviewees suggested that other German cities would take a 
more consensual approach to climate protection policy than Gelsenkirchen. Indeed, 
these views chime with a recent empirical study that compared climate policy in 
Frankfurt, Munich and Stuttgart (Heinelt and Lamping, 2015). Gelsenkirchen 
Council’s approach reflected the political realities in a city that has struggled 
economically for many years, and where most residents have more pressing concerns. 
Nonetheless, this contrast with other, more affluent, municipalities only serves to 
underline the fact that its strategy was very hierarchical: 
 
Politically, it can be useful to speak about the issue of climate protection. But, as 
opposed to Freiburg or Tübingen, a large part of the people of Gelsenkirchen have 
completely different concerns (interview 25). 
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Freiburg is more ‘bottom-up’… and here with us it’s more ‘top-down’ (interview 19) 
 
Furthermore, neither public officials nor other stakeholders in Gelsenkirchen 
questioned the municipality’s leadership role and authority within the city. This 
highlights the fact that the authority has the capacity to exert very strong influence 
over other local actors. Indeed, as section 4.2.1.2 explained, German councils can 
operate more independently of other actors in the locality compared to municipalities 
like Newcastle. One interviewee, who had extensive knowledge of local government 
in both Germany and the UK, agreed that the status of the municipality in governance 
arrangements differs significantly between the two countries. Crucially, this plays a 
key role in shaping relationships with other horizontal actors, because it means 
German councils can employ more traditional hierarchical approaches to policy-
making: 
 
Municipalities in Germany have a very, very much stronger position than in Great 
Britain and therefore do not have to do so much with civil society. They don’t have to 
work with other actors – at least at the moment (interview 27). 
 
This analysis fits with the argument made in chapter 3 about the historical evolution 
of local government in England and Germany and how this has shaped its perceived 
role in both countries. The legacy of German municipalities as more overt political 
actors than their English counterparts has continued to the present day, and this helps 
to explain the different governance approaches taken by Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle.  
 
However, the traditional German reliance on state hierarchy is beginning to change, 
partly in response to the increasing importance of wicked policy issues. For its part, 
Gelsenkirchen Council has taken a more active role in involving additional actors in 
its approach to climate protection, largely because decision-makers have 
acknowledged that they need to persuade residents and businesses to change their 
behaviour in order to reduce carbon emissions (interviews 14 and 15). Indeed, the 
municipality recognised the importance of public engagement in the mid-1990s, when 
it tried to mobilise support for the city’s regeneration plans (interview 19). By 
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promoting the development of solar housing estates, the authority sought to include 
citizens in its plans for taking the city forward (Jung et al., 2010). Indeed, once the 
housing estates were completed, their residents created a local citizens’ association to 
represent the area and work with the council on supporting similar developments 
elsewhere (Jeromin and Karutz, 2010).  
 
Nonetheless, several interviewees felt that the municipality should have taken an even 
more collaborative approach to developing this solar strategy. These officers 
recognised that the demographic make-up of Gelsenkirchen meant most residents do 
not consider the environment to be a priority, and therefore argued that the 
municipality should have done more to promote its vision to nurture civic pride and 
local identity: 
 
I think that is one of the things that we have learnt in the last twenty years or so – that 
you always need allies… There are some people who would say, ‘Oh, yes, solar city! 
At least we’re leading on that!’ But it is a difficult task to communicate this issue to 
people who are outside leadership circles (interview 19). 
 
As the above quote suggests, officers were aware of the need to persuade local 
residents to support the council’s objectives. In line with this, the municipality’s 
Klimaschutzkonzept recognises the importance of other governance actors in the 
implementation of its climate change strategy. Indeed, it notes how the municipality is 
only responsible for 2% of the city’s CO2 emissions, and therefore private households 
and businesses need to make a significant contribution to the overall target of 
reducing GHG emissions by a quarter between 2010 and 2020. Yet, although the 
council relies heavily on these other actors to achieve its climate objectives, it cannot 
use many hierarchical tools to force them to operate in a more sustainable manner. 
Therefore, by adopting an ‘enabling’ mode of governance rather than relying on 
‘governing by authority’ (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006), officers in the municipality have 
increasingly sought to persuade local actors to engage with the Klimaschutzkonzept, 
rather than introduce binding regulations.  
 
For example, the council has provided advisory ‘helpline’ services to local businesses 
and residents to help them reduce carbon emissions since 1987 (interview 15). In 
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recent years it has begun to take a more active approach to initiating behaviour 
change, including marketing campaigns to inform households and businesses that they 
would benefit from feed-in tariffs if they installed PV panels (interviews 19 and 24). 
In 2012 and 2014 it organised climate conferences and invited key actors from across 
the city to share ideas on carbon reduction (interview 20). Furthermore, the 
Klimaschutzkonzept lists numerous other examples of how the municipality is hoping 
to persuade stakeholders within Gelsenkirchen to change their behaviour. They 
include: encouraging cycling through a rent-a-bike initiative; a more co-ordinated 
campaign to encourage people to use public transport and car-sharing schemes; real-
time updates to bus, train and tram timetables; and a tool on the municipal website 
that allows householders and businesses to calculate the financial viability of 
installing solar panels on their properties (Stadt Gelsenkirchen, 2011). These all 
illustrate a growing reliance on horizontal governance tools, as the municipality 
recognises that it needs to work with other societal actors in order to achieve its 
climate objectives. Indeed, interviewees stressed that they viewed the 
Klimaschutzkonzept as a living document: if external actors were to suggest other 
initiatives that would contribute towards climate protection, then the council would 
seek to incorporate them into the strategy (interview 20).  
 
As the section 4.2.1.2 mentioned, Gelsenkirchen Council has also sought to persuade 
housing landlords to retrofit their properties in order to increase energy efficiency. 
The authority faces a particular challenge in this area, because only 16% of homes in 
the city are occupied by their owners – a significant proportion belong to hedge funds 
or companies listed on the stock exchange (interview 14). In addition, population 
decline has resulted in a surplus of housing, which has reduced market rents and 
meant that landlords are reluctant to invest in property improvements that may not 
deliver a financial return. As a result, the council faces a significant challenge in 
persuading these landlords – many of whom are legally required to act in the interests 
of their shareholders rather than the city of Gelsenkirchen – to insulate their buildings 
more effectively and/or install more efficient heating systems.  
 
As of summer 2013, however, most of the major landlords were engaging with the 
council and seeking to improve the energy efficiency of their housing stock. Officers 
at the municipality attributed this to the council’s status and its authority as the 
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democratic voice of local residents, pointing out that private companies often look to 
the state for leadership and are willing to follow (interview 14). Indeed, council staff 
were not particularly surprised that these landlords agreed to participate in governance 
processes, in spite of the fact that the city was not in a position to coerce or incentivise 
them in any way. This illustrates the high regard in which municipalities are held in 
Germany: Gelsenkirchen is not even able to cast a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Héritier and 
Lehmkuhl, 2011) over large private companies, yet it could still use its democratic 
resources and status as the local authority (in every sense of the term) to persuade 
them to invest in building retrofits.  
 
In addition, the council is able to exert its hierarchical authority more formally in 
some areas – albeit to a lesser extent than in the past. Most notably, the outsourcing of 
municipal utilities has led to it needing to collaborate with the other ELE partners in 
order to achieve climate change objectives (see section 4.2.1.2). Notably, 
Gelsenkirchen Council worked with the other two municipalities that have a share in 
the energy provider (Bottrop and Gladbeck) to include a clause in the most recent 
energy contract that requires ELE to generate up to 20GwH of Gelsenkirchen’s annual 
electricity provision from renewable sources by 2020 (interview 20). Although the 
risks associated with re-municipalising energy provision may be very high (interview 
24), it can still be raised as an option during contract negotiations and thereby serve as 
an example of the state casting its ‘shadow of hierarchy’ over market actors to achieve 
policy objectives. In contrast, the UK energy sector has been almost wholly privatised 
and the prospect of local (or even national) government asserting significant control 
over gas and electricity provision is extremely unlikely. Therefore, although 
Gelsenkirchen’s capacity for hierarchical climate governance may have been reduced 
in recent decades, it remains in a much stronger position to instruct other actors than 
Newcastle.  
 
As this subsection has demonstrated, Gelsenkirchen is moving slowly away from an 
ideal ‘German’ approach of state hierarchy and towards greater flexibility and 
stakeholder engagement. This is largely because the municipality has recognised that 
it needs to persuade other actors to change their behaviour in order to reduce the city’s 
carbon emissions. In other words, the council has acknowledged that it lacks the 
capacity to achieve its policy objectives alone and has therefore sought to work more 
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interdependently with other organisations in order to deliver its climate protection 
strategy. In Bulkeley and Betsill’s (2005) terms, it has had to adopt a mode of 
governing by ‘enabling’ rather than ‘authority’ to try and co-ordinate the behaviour of 
actors across the city, although the municipality can resort to the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ to exercise some control over local energy provision. These developments 
also show how the authority responded to events by developing a pragmatic coping 
strategy (Salomon and Mokhtarian, 1997) that involves changing traditional processes 
and styles to deliver more effective policy. At the same time, however, it is crucial to 
note that Gelsenkirchen Council still exerts more hierarchical authority over other 
horizontal actors than its counterpart in Newcastle (see figure 4.6 on page 157). 
 
4.3.1.2  State of the art solutions versus best practicable means 
 
This subsection examines the extent to which Gelsenkirchen adopts state of the art 
(SOTA) solutions or prefers to rely on the best practicable means (BPM) in its climate 
change strategy. It highlights how the city has shown preference for the former in the 
past, but that this commitment has weakened in recent years, primarily due to 
financial pressures. Nowadays, the council considers wider economic and financial 
benefits to be a more important (and demonstrably deliverable) part of any policy 
initiative on climate change, which has changed the way in which officers make the 
case for investing in strategic projects. In this way, the subsection highlights once 
again how capacity constraints have shaped policy styles, because the municipality 
has had to be more pragmatic in trying to achieve its climate change objectives with 
limited resources. 
 
Gelsenkirchen’s most notable examples of SOTA solutions date from the 1990s, when 
the municipality sought to re-brand itself as a location for solar power. Council 
officers sought to promote the idea of Gelsenkirchen as the Stadt der tausend Sonnen 
(‘city of a thousand suns’), in direct contrast to its previous image of Stadt der 
tausend Zechen (‘city of a thousand pits’, (Jung et al., 2010)). This was exemplified 
by the installation of what was then the world’s largest solar power station of its type 
(210 kW) on Gelsenkirchen’s new science park in 1996 (interview 19, see also figure 
4.4). Notably, the science park pre-dated the German federal government’s decision to 
introduce feed-in-tariffs for renewable power generation. At the time of installation, 
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therefore, it appeared that the PV panels would not produce enough energy to pay for 
themselves, and indeed officers in the municipality did not expect them to make a 
profit. This led to some criticism of the council’s decision: 
 
The renewable energy law came a few years’ later and quite a few people ridiculed us 
at the time… especially in the established energy industry (interview 19). 
 
Instead, the municipality believed that an ambitious approach, which sought to put 
renewable energy at the heart of the city’s regeneration strategy and nurture these 
‘industries of the future’ (interview 19), could help to prevent Gelsenkirchen’s 
economic decline. As a result, it invested in the PV panels as a symbolic way of 
showing how the city was embracing the emerging low-carbon sector by investing in 
state of the art technologies rather than the best practicable means.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: The PV panels on Gelsenkirchen’s science park (Wissenschaftspark, 
photograph taken in July 2013) 
 
Alongside the PV panels on the science park, the council also supported local 
businesses that manufactured products in the renewable energy supply chain, 
including solar cells. Building on the Stadt der tausend Sonnen idea, its ultimate 
objective was to transform the Gelsenkirchen area into a ‘Solar Valley’, which would 
draw on the Ruhrgebiet’s legacy of energy production but place it in a modern, 
renewable context (interview 19). Indeed, the municipality initiated several more 
high-profile projects to demonstrate its commitment to this strategy, most notably 
around the development of solar housing estates. These included the Ruhrgebiet’s first 
such project in the Bismarck area of the city, which was constructed between 1999 
and 2001 (see figure 4.5). Although the council’s ambitious and interventionist 
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approach was adopted initially for overwhelmingly economic reasons as part of 
Gelsenkirchen’s re-branding strategy, it chimed subsequently with the authority’s 
policies on sustainability and climate protection (interview 19). 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Homes in the Solarsiedlung in the Bismarck suburb of Gelsenkirchen 
(photograph taken in July 2013) 
 
Unfortunately for the city, however, Gelsenkirchen’s nascent solar manufacturing 
industry did not take off to the extent that was initially hoped. Although Shell opened 
a solar cell factory in the city in the late 1990s, as a global company it relied much 
more on its existing multinational supply chains than on local businesses (interview 
19). Eventually, due largely to the lower labour costs of Chinese competitors, the last 
solar module manufacturer left the city in the summer of 2012. As a result the 
municipality reappraised its strategy, but nonetheless still sought to exploit the idea of 
Gelsenkirchen as a forward-looking ‘city of a thousand suns’:  
 
We have to reinvent and reinterpret that [brand image]. And I think the best 
interpretation would be that we can’t be an industrial cluster at the moment – in fact, 
the whole of Germany or the whole of Europe can’t be an industrial cluster. Instead 
we could be an applications cluster, in particular with these solar housing estates, and 
we now have four of them (interview 19). 
 
In addition, the municipality’s budgetary situation has worsened considerably since 
the mid-2000s, with the result that all projects now require a robust business case 
before they are approved by the finance department. For example, the environment 
and climate change team had to bid for €750,000 from the council’s central budget in 
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order to secure the remaining 90% of the necessary funding to implement the 
Klimaschutzkonzept from the federal government. Crucially, they were conscious that 
this bid needed to emphasise how the strategy would benefit the city’s economy. 
Indeed, they feared that the application would not be granted and the money would 
not be forthcoming if they argued solely from an environmental or sustainability 
perspective: 
 
The evidence to support the funding bid was important. We didn’t rely on the climate 
protection arguments, instead we said ‘basically, climate protection is also economic 
development’. Why? Because if we invest in building retrofits, for example, or new 
heat pumps, or energy efficiency programmes in other areas, then that means, 
basically, a certain proportion of that money will flow into the local economy 
(interview 20). 
 
This pragmatic approach also reflects the increasingly constrained political 
environment, which is unlikely to be sympathetic to radical climate protection 
policies. Interestingly, officers were keen to stress their concerns about the electoral 
impact of ambitious policies, emphasising that they felt the council should reflect 
voters’ concerns: 
 
A politician who came out strongly on climate protection here would not do well at 
the next election… The policy is always a bit more advanced than the average voter, 
but it cannot lose touch from them. I think the policy in Gelsenkirchen is where it is 
able to be… That means that we don’t prevent people from driving into the city 
centre. But we do do other things: we promote cycling and we provide very good 
local public transport (interview 24). 
 
The above quote highlights the fact that the council felt it should respond to citizens’ 
concerns – not to the demands of large companies or other powerful actors in the area. 
This reflects the fact that private and voluntary organisations play a subordinate role 
in the city’s governance arrangements, and how other horizontal actors view the 
municipality as the pre-eminent, democratically legitimate institution that reflects and 
operationalises public preferences. In addition, however, it illustrates how 
Gelsenkirchen is having to take a pragmatic approach to climate protection, in 
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response to the limited enthusiasm of its residents. Such an approach is more 
consistent with BPM principles than a preference for state of the art solutions. 
 
Therefore, in spite of the high-level of concern for climate protection issues amongst 
both officers and politicians (interview 24), Gelsenkirchen is moving towards the 
characteristically English style along this sub-dimension. This represents a significant 
shift away from the 1990s preference for SOTA technologies, as exemplified by the 
Stadt der tausend Sonnen initiative and its associated science park and solar housing 
estates. Although the municipality’s promotion of solar industries may have had 
explicit regeneration objectives, it did not require the officers involved to spell out 
how specific projects would benefit the city’s economy or deliver a financial return. 
Indeed, a combination of Germany’s relatively cloudy climate, a technology that was 
still evolving in the mid-1990s and the lack of feed-in tariffs to subsidise renewable 
energy production meant that officers would not have managed to develop a business 
case in favour of investing in PV panels anyway. Instead, Gelsenkirchen Council 
poured significant resources into (what were then) state of the art solar power 
facilities because officers felt that associating the city with this emerging industry 
would deliver economic benefits and (subsequently) support its climate protection 
strategy.  
 
However, after global economic forces crushed the idea of a Solar Valley in the Ruhr, 
the city is no longer in a financial position to be so strategically ambitious. As a result, 
it now relies more on pragmatic, cost-effective solutions that represent the best 
practicable means for addressing environmental concerns (see figure 4.6 on page 
157). This is partly due to financial constraints, which have meant that officers need 
to demonstrate the additional benefits that any climate protection initiative would 
deliver. However, it also reflects political realities, because decision-makers feel that 
voters do not want the council to take a more radical approach. Overall therefore, 
Gelsenkirchen’s policy style is shaped by its capacity to deliver its climate change 
strategy, which in turn is determined by the resources (financial and political) at the 
municipality’s disposal. 
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4.3.2  Newcastle 
 
As might be expected, Newcastle Council’s strategy for climate protection has 
included many more characteristics associated with the typical English policy style 
than that of Gelsenkirchen. The council takes a much more inclusive approach to 
governance and solutions have been overwhelmingly flexible and pragmatic in recent 
decades. For example, along the horizontal sub-dimension of policy style, Newcastle 
has sought to develop a broad coalition of actors from across the city to help in 
developing its strategy and overseeing its implementation. Indeed, as section 4.2.2.2 
demonstrates, it has moved further in this direction in recent years, rather than relying 
on the sort of hierarchical approach that is more typically associated with the 
Germany.  
 
Similarly, the council has recognised that its low levels of capacity and financially-
constrained environment mean it can only have a very limited impact on climate 
protection. As a result, it has begun to focus more on adaptation measures over which 
it can exercise more control. Such a pragmatic approach bears many hallmarks of the 
‘English’ policy style, not least a preference for the best practicable means for 
addressing a problem. As this subsection will demonstrate therefore, a lack of 
resources has meant Newcastle is moving even closer towards the ideal ‘English’ 
position in its climate change strategy, at least in terms of the two sub-dimensions 
under investigation for this thesis. 
 
4.3.2.1  Hierarchy versus engagement 
 
From the outset, Newcastle adopted a much more inclusive approach to the 
development of its climate change strategy than Gelsenkirchen. Although council 
officers drafted the original document, they incorporated ideas and input from other 
members of the city’s climate change partnership, including the universities, 
hospitals, police force, transport authority and some community groups. The drafting 
process also included formal consultations, with senior officers considering which 
ideas from the public might be included in the final document (interview 31). The 
council did not adopt all of the public’s suggestions, but Newcastle’s process for 
developing the strategy nonetheless contrasts sharply with that of its twin town in the 
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Ruhr. In the latter, the only contributors to the Klimaschutzkonzept were either 
employees of the municipality or the energy supplier ELE – other non-state actors did 
not even get to see the plan until after it was published. Although council staff led the 
development of Newcastle’s strategy, the authority’s preference was undoubtedly for 
Cabinet-style government (in which other actors held ministerial roles) rather than 
ruling by decree. 
 
Indeed, the Newcastle’s relationship with other local actors has become even more 
horizontal since the late 2000s. For example, the municipality replaced its climate 
change partnership with a broader ‘Greening Newcastle’ body following the election 
of a Labour council in 2011 (interviews 12 and 31). This panel involved senior 
executives from a range of public, private and voluntary bodies, whom the council felt 
would be much better placed to shape the city’s strategy. However, it has since 
become less significant than the public ‘Green Cabinet’ meetings mentioned in 
section 4.2.2.2. These discussions allow individuals from across the city to listen to 
and question local politicians about the council’s environmental policy (Newcastle 
City Council, 2013a). Indeed, the authority is able to invite a much broader group of 
stakeholders to this forum than its predecessors, and thereby involve some actors that 
were previously excluded from formal governance arrangements.  
 
In addition, the council has engaged actively with major employers in the city to 
encourage more sustainable travel, and sought to facilitate behavioural change where 
necessary. For example, it has installed electric vehicle charging points near to large 
offices, in response to demand from some businesses (interview 8). It is also working 
with retail, business and commercial units to develop a shared courier service for 
delivering goods into the city centre (interview 4). The council’s support for voluntary 
sector initiatives, such as the ‘Greening Wingrove’ community co-operative, also 
highlights this continuing trend away from state hierarchy (see section 4.2.2.2).  
 
One officer at the authority felt that nurturing these relationships and involving 
societal actors ‘in the tent’ of policy-making at the outset made it easier to 
disseminate the city’s climate protection strategy to a wider audience. This was 
because the partnering organisations were more likely to support and promote a 
document that they helped to create (interview 31). Indeed, Newcastle Council gives 
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voluntary and other groups explicit responsibilities to encourage local citizens and 
businesses to change their behaviour. For example, the Tyne and Wear metropolitan 
area (a conurbation of over one million people that also includes the municipalities of 
North Tyneside, South Tyneside, Gateshead and Sunderland) received £4.9m through 
the UK Government’s Local Sustainable Transport Fund (LSTF) to try and persuade 
people to leave their cars at home when travelling to work. Notably, however, third 
sector organisations will undertake most of the marketing and engagement work for 
this initiative. One interviewee argued that the involvement of these wider bodies was 
particularly beneficial, because it enabled the council to use the expertise and 
resources of other like-minded organisations and therefore increase policy-making 
capacity: 
 
Because of LSTF, it brings everybody together, all the partners. Because it’s not just 
local authorities, it’s companies like Sustrans, BikeRight, Living Streets, [and] Nexus 
– the integrated transport authority. It’s everybody who has a vested interest in 
transport, all are a partner within the mix. We’ve got… a framework contract where 
we can call-off advice from everyone (interview 8). 
 
In contrast, staff at Gelsenkirchen Council emphasised the importance of promoting 
their Klimaschutzkonzept only after it was published, and took sole responsibility for 
this task rather than contracting it to other bodies (interview 14). This is partly due to 
key decision-makers in Germany and the UK having different views on the role that 
the state should play in wider society. For example, staff in Gelsenkirchen were keen 
to stress that municipalities should try to retain control over local public services, 
whereas their counterparts in Newcastle were much happier to allow external 
organisations to deliver them on behalf of the council (interviews 23, 25 and 30). Yet, 
it also reflects the fact that the municipality in Gelsenkirchen has a higher status in the 
local community, which enables it to act as the genuine local authority in horizontal 
governance arrangements. This means that private sector actors are more influential in 
Newcastle Council’s decision-making processes, and therefore the municipality is not 
able to exert as much hierarchical authority as its German counterpart. One 
interviewee recognised how this has resulted in Newcastle’s policy style being more 
consensual and horizontal: 
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I think at a very basic level, we can’t tell the big partners what to do… There are 
certain strategic powers that we can use around transport planning and cycling and 
planning generally, and we’re seeking to do that, and all of that has an impact on 
partners. But that’s something that, particularly given the very fragile state of the 
recovery of our economy locally and nationally, we can’t just go in very heavy-
handed on that. So there’s a real balancing challenge there around how we use our 
strategic powers to further the green agenda, whilst at the same time taking 
businesses with us and making sure that the recovery that we’re starting to see in the 
city is not just killed off by some very heavy-handed policies (interview 30).  
 
The language used by interviewees in the two cities is also instructive. As the above 
quote illustrates, officers at Newcastle referred consistently to local ‘partners’ that 
help to develop and implement climate protection policies. This term was noticeably 
absent from discussions in Gelsenkirchen, where interviewees would instead refer to 
specific organisations by name or mention the general economic sector within which 
they operated. This illustrates the extent to which Newcastle Council staff subscribe 
to the view that their horizontal relationships with other actors are helping to deliver 
shared objectives. 
 
As chapter 3 highlighted, the financial situation is also extremely tight for many 
English municipalities – particularly for those in the north that have smaller tax bases 
and therefore are more dependent on central grants (Ferry and Eckersley, 2012, 
Butler, 2015, Hastings et al., 2015). This has accelerated the process of Newcastle 
devolving responsibility for some public services to voluntary groups – and thereby 
represents another way in which the wider community is involved in the city’s climate 
change strategy. Indeed, Newcastle’s objective of developing a ‘broad coalition’ 
across the city for climate protection and sustainability fits very closely with the 
traditional ‘English’ style and contrasts with Gelsenkirchen’s more hierarchical 
approach. Interestingly, leading politicians in Newcastle’s Labour group were keen to 
develop this coalition before they took office, at a time when they were unaware of 
the full extent of the financial problems they would face: 
 
It was very much a core part of their manifesto when they were fighting to take over 
the council in the 2011 elections… We knew there were big financial challenges, 
but… at that point we didn’t fully realise how big they were… This would have been 
154 
 
core Council policy, whatever the financial challenges. It’s something that the Leader 
and the Cabinet believe in very much. The budget challenges mean that we have to 
increase the pace around this. And the budget challenges mean that we simply don’t 
have a choice – this isn’t something that we’d like to do, this is something that we 
must do if we’re going to preserve public services, because the Council simply won’t 
have the money to do all of those things. It just necessitates getting local residents 
more involved (interview 30). 
 
The above quote shows how Newcastle Council’s decision to create a broad coalition 
for climate change policy was made for political reasons, as well as in response to 
financial constraints. However, in reality these political preferences reflected a belief 
that greater interdependence with societal actors would also increase the council’s 
ability to achieve its objectives, because pooling resources with other organisations 
would increase the overall level of capacity to implement policy. Once again 
therefore, this shift towards a more ‘ideal’ English policy style along the horizontal 
dimension reflects how the council has had to respond to events and the perceived 
ineffectiveness of previous approaches. As such, it shows how – like Gelsenkirchen – 
Newcastle has adopted a pragmatic coping strategy to try and achieve policy 
objectives in spite of significant capacity constraints. Figure 4.6 on page 157 
illustrates how both cities have shifted along the two sub-dimensions of policy style in 
recent years, largely in an attempt to increase their ability to make and implement 
effective policy. 
 
4.3.2.2  State of the art solutions versus best practicable means 
 
Along the vertical sub-dimension for policy styles, Newcastle has also exhibited many 
typically ‘English’ characteristics, in that it shows a marked preference for the best 
practicable means to address a problem, rather than investing in state of the art 
solutions. The recent financial pressures have brought this preference into starker 
relief, as initiatives require even more robust business cases to be approved and the 
council is increasingly reluctant to spend money on non-statutory services such as 
climate protection (interview 1).  
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However, the authority is keen to portray Newcastle as a forward-looking investment 
location that embraces science, sustainability and technology, and thereby move away 
from its image as a declining, post-industrial city. Such a strategy requires key actors 
in the city to invest in ambitious projects to convince outsiders that the re-branding 
exercise is based on something real and substantial. As chapter 5 will illustrate in 
much greater detail, the council has put the Science Central development at the 
forefront of its plans, and indeed this is an ambitious project that will feature a 
number of state of the art sustainability features (interviews 6, 11 and 31). Other 
initiatives also show how Newcastle Council is trying to use sustainability as a tool 
for local economic development. For example, the Nissan plant in nearby Sunderland 
manufactured over 17,000 electric Leaf cars for sale across Europe in 2014 (Ford, 
2015), and the council is encouraging residents to purchase these vehicles by offering 
free-to-use charging points at various locations around the city (see section 4.2.2.1). 
Indeed, the overall strategy of sustainability-led regeneration has distinct echoes of 
Gelsenkirchen’s solar power policies in the 1990s.  
 
Crucially, though, many of these initiatives would not have been possible without 
external funding and support. Science Central is a joint project with Newcastle 
University, which has taken the lead on its more ambitious sustainability features (see 
chapter 5), and the initiative is also supported by the UK Government’s Regional 
Growth Fund and the EU’s Economic and Regional Development Fund (interview 6). 
The council retains significant control over what will be built on the site and officers 
have stressed the centrality of sustainability to the whole project. However, staff 
within the municipality are comfortable that the university is the more ambitious 
partner in terms of sustainability. Indeed, this is a pragmatic and understandable 
strategy, given that the academic institution has significantly more resources and 
capacity to integrate climate change considerations into the overall design of the 
development. In a similar way, the council would not have been able to support 
electric vehicles had it not received central government grants to install charging 
points across the city (interview 8).  
 
Moreover, as central government funding streams for climate protection have 
diminished, Newcastle has begun to place a greater emphasis on adaptation, where 
more money is available (interviews 12 and 32). This illustrates how Newcastle’s 
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(and also the UK Government’s) climate change strategy is increasingly pragmatic 
and reliant on the best practicable means for addressing a problem. In addition, the 
city’s relatively recent experience of extreme weather – over 50mm of rain fell in the 
area in the space of two hours on 28th June 2012, a day that became known locally as 
‘Thunder Thursday’ – made adaptation an even more urgent priority for the council. 
Flooding caused by this unprecedented rainfall affected over 1,200 properties, and the 
council faced a bill of £8m to repair infrastructure such as roads and public buildings 
(Newcastle City Council, 2013b). In response to these events, both the council and 
local voluntary bodies have stressed the importance of improving climate resilience to 
enable organisations and households to deal with the impact of flash floods:  
 
It is very much about adaptation and building resilience, about making the North East 
a resilient place to live, to work… It’s like the insurance mentality isn’t it? You 
wouldn’t buy a house and not get buildings insurance would you? (interview 32). 
 
Indeed, although decision-makers in the municipality accept that the climate is 
changing, they recognise that individual local authorities have almost no capacity to 
influence the level of global GHG emissions. Instead, they feel that the best way for 
the authority to respond is to equip residents and businesses with the tools to manage 
its impact. As one individual from the voluntary sector pointed out, this approach also 
de-politicises the issue of climate change, which can make it easier to persuade 
businesses and citizens to act – even if they may be sceptical about the science upon 
which predictions about the future of the climate are based: 
 
The whole climate change thing, we don’t get involved in that debate any more. We 
just say, we can see the weather, the impact of flooding, we can see the heatwaves, 
the number of deaths, we’ve got all the evidence here. Whether you believe it’s man-
made, or whether you believe it’s a natural cycle, it doesn’t matter – you’ve still got 
to do something about it (interview 32). 
 
Such pragmatism is also highly consistent with a preference for BPM. By helping 
property owners, businesses and individuals to cope better with extreme weather 
events, Newcastle’s focus on adaptation also addresses the potential impact of climate 
pollution on human wellbeing, rather than the amount of pollutants that are emitted. 
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This shows how BPM relates to another characteristic supposedly typical of the UK 
policy style: the focus on immissions (the extent to which pollution affects human 
health) rather than emissions (the type and quantity of pollution released into the air, 
soil or watercourse – see table 2.2 on page 44). Although this thesis does not address 
this particular dimension of German and UK policy styles, such an illustration 
nonetheless helps to identify the context within which Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
decide their strategic priorities.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Changes in the sub-dimensions of policy styles as applied to climate 
change strategy in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
Overall, therefore, Newcastle has shifted further towards an ‘ideal’ English policy 
style along both of the two sub-dimensions under investigation (see figure 4.6 and 
table 4.3). The municipality now seeks to engage even more with other actors in the 
city, to the extent that voluntary groups have taken responsibility for local 
environmental initiatives and contribute regularly to council policy-making. The 
council also takes a very pragmatic approach to its climate strategy, reflecting a 
reliance on the best practicable means for achieving policy objectives. This is 
illustrated by the fact that it now focuses more on adaptation than was previously the 
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case, and is also happy to tweak its climate priorities if this means it might be able to 
draw on external resources.  
 
As the figure and table show, Gelsenkirchen is also moving towards a more ‘English’ 
policy style. However, it began from a different starting point and still has 
considerably further to travel in this direction before it reaches the top-right quadrant. 
Nonetheless, the German council now recognises the need to engage more with local 
businesses and residents in order to achieve policy objectives, and this has led to a 
weakening of its previously very hierarchical position vis à vis other governance 
actors. Similarly, its budgetary situation has meant that the council is no longer able to 
invest in state of the art solutions, because potential environmental projects need to be 
justified in terms of their wider economic benefits as well as their contribution 
towards climate protection. Nonetheless, a preference for adaptation and building 
community resilience to extreme weather events are not (yet) as important in 
Gelsenkirchen as they are in Newcastle, and therefore the German city is still some 
way away from the ideal ‘English’ policy style along both sub-dimensions. 
 
 Gelsenkirchen Newcastle 
Hierarchy vs 
engagement 
Lower but increasing level of 
horizontal engagement to reflect 
the ‘wicked’ nature of climate 
change 
Higher level of horizontal 
engagement to mobilise a broad 
coalition of actors from across the 
city 
Council’s higher status and 
capacity means it exerts 
significant hierarchical authority 
in local governance 
arrangements 
Council’s lower status and capacity 
means it needs to engage with other 
local actors in governance 
arrangements 
SOTA vs 
BPM  
Financial constraints mean the 
previous preference for SOTA is 
weakening 
Increasingly strong preference for 
BPM – SOTA initiatives rely on 
external resources 
Continued prioritisation of 
mitigation over adaptation 
Focusing more on adaptation rather 
than mitigation 
 
Table 4.3: Contrasting policy styles for climate change strategy in Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle 
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Crucially, both municipalities have changed their previous approaches after realising 
that they do not have the capacity to achieve their policy objectives independently of 
other organisations. As figure 4.3 in section 4.2.2 demonstrated, the result is that 
Gelsenkirchen now works more interdependently with other horizontal actors and 
Newcastle is increasing dependent on local stakeholders, since they need to encourage 
businesses and citizens to change their behaviour in order to reduce carbon emissions. 
Similarly, both municipalities are taking a much more pragmatic approach to their 
climate change strategies, in line with the principle of best practicable means rather 
than a preference for ambitious state of the art solutions. To a large extent this reflects 
the budgetary constraints within which they now operate, and which require them to 
demonstrate how investments will deliver wider financial and economic benefits to 
their respective cities. For Newcastle Council specifically, it also illustrates how 
decision-makers feel they can make a bigger difference to the lives of local residents 
by focusing on climate adaptation rather than mitigation.  
 
4.4   Conclusions 
 
In the area of climate change strategy, both Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle have 
operated within institutional frameworks and have adopted policy styles that are 
sometimes associated with their respective national approaches. Notably, however, 
both cities are changing their governance arrangements in order to address capacity 
constraints and try to address the issue of climate change more effectively. In 
particular, both cities now take a more horizontal and pragmatic approach, in order to 
try and persuade societal actors to support council objectives, provide additional 
resources and facilitate behavioural change amongst local businesses and citizens. 
These changes were necessary to address the complex and unprecedented challenge of 
climate change, which means that the state has to work much more interdependently 
with other societal actors than in traditional ‘non-wicked’ policy sectors. 
 
Nevertheless, as far as the multi-level governance dimension is concerned, 
Gelsenkirchen operates within a more structured vertical framework, which is 
increasingly characteristic of ‘ideal’ Type I arrangements. This is primarily due to the 
tradition of Politikverflechtung and the common policy narrative of the 
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Energiewende, both of which encourage collaboration and interdependence across 
different tiers of government. In recent years the city has also worked increasingly 
closely with neighbouring municipalities in the Ruhrgebiet and, following the 
outsourcing of some local services and utilities, now has to co-ordinate policy with a 
greater number of task-specific agencies. As such, it has shifted slightly towards the 
Type II characterisation along the horizontal sub-dimension, due to its greater degree 
of interdependence with other governing actors in the locality. Nonetheless, the 
council’s high status in the community as the legitimate democratic local authority, 
means that it is still comfortably the most important player in governance 
arrangements. Furthermore, its strong position is buttressed by the high level of 
vertical interdependence and mutual support, which provides the council with 
additional capacity and therefore enables it to operate more independently of other 
local actors. 
 
The sub-national governance framework in England has been more dynamic – partly 
due to the lack of a codified constitution to guarantee the continued existence of any 
public body. Together with the abolition of local government performance 
frameworks and a significant reduction in central grants, this means that Newcastle 
operates within a very flexible and loose vertical arrangement, and more 
independently of the centre than was previously the case. Notably, this 
characterisation strongly resembles Type II multi-level governance. The authority has 
also shifted further towards an ideal Type II arrangement along the horizontal 
dimension, as the local state has become increasingly fragmented and municipal 
decision-makers have sought to mobilise a broad coalition of local stakeholders on the 
issue of climate change in order to try and address it more effectively. Furthermore, 
its collaboration with neighbouring authorities through the combined authority is also 
characteristic of Type II structures. 
 
Notably, the lack of support from higher tiers of government contributed towards 
Newcastle Council becoming a weaker local actor, because resources have not been 
forthcoming that could have helped the authority implement its climate policy 
objectives. As a consequence, the municipality has had to rely much more on other 
local actors to fill the capacity gap – for example, it has given voluntary groups 
responsibility for delivering some environmental services. In other words, the 
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increasing vertical independence has resulted in more horizontal dependence, because 
the council is no longer able to undertake certain public functions.  
 
These multi-level governance arrangements have influenced the policy style of both 
cities, particularly along the horizontal dimension. In previous years, decision-makers 
and bureaucracies in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle relied more on the ‘standard 
operating procedures’ (Richardson 1982) that are associated with their respective 
countries. In other words, the German municipality operated more hierarchically than 
its English counterpart and also expressed a stronger preference for state of the art 
(SOTA) solutions rather than the best practicable means (BPM) of addressing a 
problem. However, the increasing fragmentation of the local state, coupled with the 
realisation that climate change is a ‘wicked problem’ that the state cannot solve alone, 
has led both councils to engage more with other local governing actors in order to 
draw on their resources and address the issue more effectively. Since financial 
pressures caused by industrial decline and the austerity agenda have also weakened 
municipal capacity, they have accelerated this trend towards greater horizontal 
engagement – with the result that Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen are travelling in the 
same direction along this sub-dimension (see figure 4.6 on page 157).  
 
Nonetheless, Gelsenkirchen Council has a higher status in the local community and 
greater democratic resources than Newcastle, due to the way in which local 
government in the two countries has evolved over the last two centuries (see chapter 
3) and the additional support it receives from higher tiers of government. As a result, 
the German authority can (and does) take a more hierarchical approach to its climate 
change strategy than its English counterpart. For its part, capacity issues, coupled with 
political convictions about the most effective way to achieve strategic objectives, have 
resulted in Newcastle Council building a broader coalition of stakeholders to 
contribute towards decision-making.  
 
As far as the vertical sub-dimension is concerned, both municipalities are also 
showing a greater preference for BPM to address the issue of climate change. 
Although Newcastle Council does have ambitious plans to promote the city as a 
location for low-carbon industry, it is relying on the university to invest in SOTA 
sustainability solutions. In addition, the authority has been prepared to tweak its 
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climate change priorities to fit with grant funding requirements, which means it is 
focusing increasingly on adaptation rather than mitigation for pragmatic reasons.  
 
Gelsenkirchen Council is also moving towards the ideal ‘English’ position of BPM, 
largely because an increasingly tight budgetary situation means that officers have to 
show how any large project would deliver wider economic benefits. However, this 
authority did begin from a different starting point, due to its ambitious 1990s strategy 
of investing in the emerging solar industry to try and regenerate the city’s economy. 
In addition, the fact that the adaptation agenda is not such as a high priority in 
Gelsenkirchen means that the German council is still located some distance away 
from Newcastle on figure 4.6 (see page 157).  
 
Table 4.3 on page 158 summarises the key characteristics and changes to policy styles 
in each city. Together with table 4.2, it illustrates that the councils still adopt different 
approaches to climate change strategy, although they are moving in the same direction 
along most of the sub-dimensions of multi-level governance and policy styles. To a 
large extent these different approaches reflect their respective legacies: Gelsenkirchen 
Council has more democratic resources and can draw on increasing levels of support 
from higher tiers of government than Newcastle, which means that it is more powerful 
actor in local governance arrangements. As such, the German council can behave 
more hierarchically vis à vis other governance actors than its English counterpart.  
 
This highlights how each city’s governance approach is largely determined by its 
council’s ability to achieve policy objectives. Decision-makers have sought to identify 
the most effective way of implementing policy and adopted this as a coping strategy 
in order to increase the chances of success. As such, although both municipalities 
recognise that they need to work with other organisations to deliver their climate 
change strategies, Newcastle has to collaborate more closely with horizontal actors 
than Gelsenkirchen because it does not receive as much support from higher tiers of 
government. Overall, the English authority has less capacity than its German 
counterpart: not only does it have fewer democratic resources, but it also has very 
little control over revenue streams. This puts it in a weaker position in horizontal 
governance arrangements, and means it needs to rely more on the resources of non-
state actors to achieve its aims. In contrast, Gelsenkirchen Council is able to exercise 
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a greater degree of authority within the locality, because it receives more support 
along the vertical sub-dimension and therefore does not have to rely on other 
horizontal actors to the same extent as its English counterpart. 
 
In other words, although Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle councils have adopted 
characteristics that resemble their respective national policy styles, this is due to the 
resources, capacity and institutional contexts within which they operate. These 
contexts may indeed shape the ‘standard operating procedures’ that municipal 
decision-makers apply to policy problems, but (at least in the case of these two cities) 
they almost certainly precede them. As such, their policy styles in the area of climate 
change strategy are influenced primarily by the level of municipal capacity available 
to address particular problems, rather than any prevailing institutional culture.  
 
Chapter 5 will take this analysis further by investigating how issues of capacity and 
resource dependency apply in the specific area of planning policy. It will do this by 
analysing flagship development projects in each city: the redevelopment of the 
Ebertstraβe area in Gelsenkirchen (particularly the refurbishment of the Hans-Sachs-
Haus building, which subsequently became the Town Hall), and the design of the 
Science Central site in Newcastle (with a special focus on the council-owned Core 
Building). In keeping with this chapter’s findings, it will investigate how resource and 
capacity dependencies have shaped the planning policies of Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle and how these major projects have developed.  
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Chapter 5: Planning policy in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
Following the high-level analysis of climate change strategy that features in chapter 4, 
this thesis now delves into a specific example of municipal decision-making, namely 
planning policy. Planning is often viewed as a policy sector over which local 
government has retained significant autonomy – even in England, where 
municipalities have lost responsibility for many other functions in recent decades 
(Bulkeley, 2005, Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). Indeed, because regional, Land and 
national tiers of government have relatively limited influence over this policy sector, 
we might expect planning decisions to reflect the political nature of individual 
municipalities in England and Germany quite closely.  
 
Furthermore, there are not many differences between planning procedures in the two 
countries. Both Germany and England rely heavily on regulation and legal processes 
in order to ensure that municipalities are seen to treat every application on its own 
merits, and the potential appeals processes that property owners or developers can 
pursue if applications were unsuccessful are also very similar (Heidenreich, 2008). 
For example, developers can challenge councils in the courts if they are refused 
permission to build, and are often successful. In 2007/08, around 18% of all 
applications that were refused in England were appealed by developers or other 
interest groups, and the planning authority’s decision was overturned in 
approximately one-third of these cases (Killian and Pretty 2008). On occasions, 
council committees even turn down their own authority’s planning applications, 
because granting permission could set a precedent for similar developments in future 
(News Guardian, 2008).  
 
This regulatory aspect suggests that a more rigid and hierarchical ‘German’ approach 
to decision-making might be more widespread in planning policy than the flexible and 
horizontal ‘English’ style. Indeed, as Bulkeley and Kern (2006) have pointed out, 
planning is one sector in which councils might still be able to ‘govern by authority’ 
(rather than ‘through enabling’), since they can institute regulations or directions to 
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ensure that the activities of other actors help to achieve policy objectives. As such, we 
might expect councils to assert their position more readily when taking planning 
decisions, particularly when compared to climate change strategy for example. This 
means it represents another useful policy sector for studying governance 
arrangements, since they may contrast with those in the previous chapter. 
 
The analysis of planning policy focuses in particular on two comparable development 
projects: the complete refurbishment of Hans-Sachs-Haus and the adjacent public 
square (Heinrich-König-Platz) in Gelsenkirchen (which is henceforth termed the 
Ebertstraβe redevelopment); and the construction of the Core Building and 
regeneration of the wider Science Central site in Newcastle. Both projects are located 
in ‘brownfield’ city centre sites, and both councils view them as a highly symbolic 
developments that seek to convey the message that they are forward-thinking and 
sustainable locations. The Hans-Sachs-Haus refurbishment was completed in August 
2013 and the Core Building was finished in September 2014. Each building was 
designed and developed by the respective local authority, and the two councils were 
heavily involved in decision-making processes. Hans-Sachs-Haus now serves as 
Gelsenkirchen’s new town hall, housing the council chamber and around 300 
municipal employees. Newcastle City Council still owns the Core Building, but it is 
occupied by various small businesses and some staff from Newcastle University.  
 
This means that, in contrast to private sector planning applications (for new private 
homes, supermarkets, office blocks or factories, for example), neither local authority 
had to enter into lengthy discussions with external actors over the design of the 
development. Indeed, they had significant control over the design and construction of 
each building. As a result, we might expect the completed projects to embody 
potentially progressive local policies on climate change by including sustainability 
features such as renewable energy installations, water recycling, high levels of 
thermal efficiency and low levels of electricity demand. This is because both 
municipalities have set out ambitious targets to reduce carbon emissions by 20% 
before 2020, and view themselves as important leaders in local efforts to improve 
sustainability and mitigate climate change (see chapter 4). 
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The next section of this chapter will explain the background to each development 
project. It will then analyse how decision-making processes associated with planning 
policy in general, and the specific construction projects under investigation in 
particular, relate to the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2. In this way, it 
addresses the two sub-dimensions of multi-level governance and policy styles in turn 
(see table 5.1), and assesses whether these arrangements are converging or changing 
in any way. As with chapter 4, it also puts this analysis into the context of power 
dependency relationships within the two cities, and therefore identifies the extent to 
which each municipality operates independently of or interdependently with other 
actors, or depends more on external capacity to achieve its policy objectives. Notably, 
it echoes one of the key findings from chapter 4, which highlighted how these 
dependency relationships shape the institutional policy framework in both cities, and 
then influence the policy style that each municipality is able to adopt.  
 
  
Typically ‘German’ 
characteristics 
Typically ‘English’ 
characteristics 
Multi-level 
governance 
dimension 
Vertical sub-
dimension 
Highly-structured vertical 
framework 
Loose and flexible vertical 
arrangements 
Horizontal 
sub-dimension 
Responsibilities 
concentrated in the local 
authority 
Fragmented local public 
service provision 
Policy styles 
dimension 
Vertical sub-
dimension 
Strong state hierarchy 
Horizontal engagement and 
compromise 
Horizontal 
sub-dimension 
Reliance on state of the art 
(SOTA) technological 
solutions 
Preference for best 
practicable means (BPM) 
and cost-effectiveness 
 
Table 5.1: Dimensions and sub-dimensions of ‘ideal type’ multi-level governance and 
policy styles in Germany and England 
 
5.1.1  Background to Hans-Sachs-Haus and Heinrich-König-Platz  
 
Gelsenkirchen Council began a major programme of regeneration and urban renewal 
in 2004, particularly in the city centre (interview 17). The municipality sought to 
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replace or refurbish many post-war buildings, expand the pedestrian precinct and re-
use a number of derelict brownfield sites. At the centre of the plans was the 
redevelopment of Hans-Sachs-Haus and the adjacent public square (Heinrich-König-
Platz), which are located at the south-eastern end of Ebertstraβe, a street which runs 
from this site to the famous Musiktheater (see figure 5.1).  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Picture of the Heinrich-König-Platz redevelopment project in July 2013. 
Hans-Sachs-Haus is in the background (partly obscured by the tree) 
 
The council viewed the redevelopment of Ebertstraβe as important for various 
reasons. Many buildings in the area were in a poor state of repair, which meant that 
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businesses were reluctant to base themselves in the city centre. In addition, 
Gelsenkirchen’s population was around 400,000 when the square was built in the 
1960s, and the council had expected it to continue growing at a rapid rate. As a result, 
the main underground station at Heinrich-König-Platz was designed to cope with far 
more people than the 260,000 who now live in the city (interview 17). The station’s 
large sunken entrance dominated the square (see figure 5.1) and the council decided to 
reduce it in size significantly, cover over the sunken entrance and reclaim the space 
above it for the wider public (interview 17). As such, it advertised for a contractor in 
March 2009 through the EU’s procurement process, and work began on redeveloping 
the square in January 2013.  
 
The refurbishment of Hans-Sachs-Haus was part of the same regeneration 
programme, although its history was somewhat different. This building dates from the 
1920s and is one of the few remaining examples of neo-gothic brick expressionism 
left in the Ruhrgebiet. Designed by the architect Alfred Fischer, it was one of the first 
buildings to incorporate the developing ideas of the iconic Bauhaus group, which was 
a famous modernist design and architectural movement in inter-war Germany 
(interview 23). It was originally styled as a multi-functional building, and hosted local 
carnivals and conventions, although some of it was soon occupied by council 
officials. After World War II it also housed the council chamber and registry office, 
but these functions were slowly dispersed around the city. By the mid-1990s Hans-
Sachs-Haus lay empty. Aware of the architectural value of the building and its local 
popularity, the council contracted a private investor to refurbish it and turn it into 
office space. However, after the costs of this project increased tenfold the city ‘pulled 
the plug’ and the project was stopped (interview 23).  
 
At this point, a number of politicians and officers in the council argued that the 
building should be demolished to accommodate something else on the site, 
particularly because this would have been cheaper than refurbishing it (interview 17). 
The council was even given permission to do so by Germany’s Denkmalschutz system 
that protects historical or important buildings. However, there was significant local 
opposition to such a move. This manifested itself in a local campaign and pressure 
group (the Hans-Sachs-Haus Bürgerforum), which organised a petition to ‘rescue’ the 
building. The group’s campaign ensured that its future became a major issue at the 
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2004 local elections (Hans-Sachs-Haus Bürgerforum, 2006). In response to this public 
pressure, the Social Democrat (SPD) mayoral candidate promised to retain the 
building were he to be elected, and he narrowly defeated the incumbent Christian 
Democrat (CDU) mayor in a run-off. As one interviewee commented, this meant that 
the building became a major political issue in the city: 
 
The history of Hans-Sachs-Haus around the end of the last century, in the mid-1990s, 
was characterised by arguments and quarrels… The council hasn’t been very sensible 
when it comes to old buildings… the architectural damage during the war was 
actually exacerbated by some of the rebuilding. People destroyed quite a lot after the 
war: their preferences for cheap 1960s architecture and poor consideration for town 
planning made a mess of many a place… In that respect, Hans-Sachs-Haus has a 
particular importance for this city, because local people succeeded in convincing the 
political class to keep it and to refurbish it (interview 23). 
 
Figure 5.2: Hans-Sachs-Haus shortly before it was reopened (photograph taken in 
July 2013) 
 
By the mid-2000s, after the building had been empty for over a decade and covered 
by a provisional façade, the council launched a competition to refurbish it. At the end 
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of a drawn-out procurement process, the municipality awarded the contract to the 
architectural firm Gerkan, Marg und Partner (GMP), which started work in 2009 and 
continued until the refurbished building opened in August 2013. Notably, the project 
was so politically controversial that councillors set up a specific, ad hoc committee to 
oversee the first few months of work, before transferring its scrutiny to the transport 
and buildings committee. Since then, the brick expressionist exterior has been fully 
restored in keeping with its original design (see figure 5.2). However, this façade was 
separated from the interior of the building, which was completely re-designed to 
incorporate a central atrium and smaller rooms around the outside for its new 
occupants. It now houses the council chamber and political party groups (including 
the elected mayor and his staff), as well as various ‘non-technical’ officers – a total of 
320 people. 
 
The controversy over the future of Hans-Sachs-Haus ran in parallel with the decline 
of traditional heavy industry in Gelsenkirchen and the city’s attempts to re-orient the 
local economy around newer technologies, particularly solar energy (see chapter 4). 
Indeed, because the political nature of the building meant that it became an even more 
prominent local landmark, the council sought to ensure that any redevelopment would 
project the idea of Gelsenkirchen as a forward-looking and sustainable city. 
Furthermore, the building’s location in the centre of town, and the council’s desire to 
re-brand the area around Ebertstraβe as ‘the heart of the city’, ensured that Heinrich-
König-Platz and Hans-Sachs-Haus would symbolise the city of Gelsenkirchen in the 
eyes of both local people and visitors (interviews 23 and 24). In this way, we might 
expect the council’s policies on climate change to manifest themselves in the 
building’s design and energy requirements.  
  
5.1.2  Background to Science Central 
 
The Science Central site in Newcastle is significantly larger than the Ebertstraβe area 
in Gelsenkirchen: indeed, at 24 acres it was the largest city centre redevelopment 
project in the UK when building began (Ford, 2013). Like the Ebertstraβe project, 
however, it is also located near the town centre and has come to symbolise how the 
council views the future of the city. A brewery was located on the site until its closure 
in 2006, after which it was bought by a consortium of Newcastle City Council, 
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Newcastle University and One North East (ONE, the former Regional Development 
Agency for North East England). Although these initial partners did not have a very 
clear idea about what they would do with the land after purchasing it, they were all 
keen to avoid it falling into disuse. For its part, Newcastle City Council was acutely 
aware that the site of the former Vaux brewery in the centre of nearby Sunderland had 
been derelict for many years after it closed in 1999, and it was keen to avoid a similar 
situation developing within its own city boundaries (interview 6). Alongside this, the 
university wanted to construct new buildings close to its existing city centre campus, 
whereas ONE felt that the site had significant long-term potential as a focus for urban 
regeneration (interview 11).  
 
Shortly before this, in December 2004, Newcastle was designated as one of six 
‘Science Cities’ in the UK. This was essentially a branding exercise by central 
government to promote the study and application of science, technology, engineering 
and maths (STEM) in regional economies outside London. Together with Newcastle 
University and ONE, the council decided to put the former brewery site at the centre 
of its Science City initiative, and the partners sought to identify how they could use 
the area to nurture new and existing businesses in the science and technology sector. 
The university already had a global reputation for biosciences and stem cell research, 
and the council wanted to build upon this by encouraging other ‘knowledge’ or 
‘future’ industries (the ‘new economy’) to the area (interviews 6 and 13). As such, 
Science City chimed with the council’s longer-term objective to encourage science 
and technology firms to invest in Newcastle and became a central plank of its 
economic development policy (interview 11). Similarly, the emphasis on diversifying 
Newcastle’s economy away from a reliance on public sector and retail employment 
ensured that the third partner in the consortium, ONE, also supported the Science 
Central plans. Indeed, Newcastle’s partnership has been much more pro-active and 
successful than those of some other Science Cities (Webber, 2008), partly because of 
its decision to place the former brewery site at the centre of its strategy, ‘with the 
expressed intention of turning it into the place where the science economy would be 
encouraged to grow’ (interview 11). 
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Figure 5.3: The Core Building, Science Central (photograph taken in August 2014) 
 
Due to its importance to the overall Science City initiative, and also because of its 
location next to the heart of Newcastle, the site became known as Science Central. Its 
prominent place in the council’s economic development plans meant that it assumed 
great importance for the city in general and the council in particular – in the same way 
that the area around Ebertstraβe became a key part of Gelsenkirchen’s regeneration 
strategy. In addition, Newcastle Council’s objectives around science and technology 
chimed with the university’s plans to invest in research into renewable energy, 
climate change and sustainability more generally. Indeed, Newcastle University has 
chosen sustainability as one of three ‘societal challenge themes’ under which its 
research is categorised, and created a Institute for Sustainability in 2008 to undertake 
work in this area (Newcastle University, 2014a). As such, these ideas assumed great 
significance for the overall project – in the same way as Gelsenkirchen sought to 
exemplify its position on solar power and renewable energies through the 
redevelopment of Hans-Sachs-Haus. The Science Central site comprises a total of 
nineteen plots, on which more than 40 buildings may be constructed by the mid-
2030s. By summer 2015, work had only been completed on the Core Building (see 
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figure 5.3), although it has also begun on another, the university’s Urban Sciences 
Building.  
 
With the context for each case and their comparability now clear, the remainder of 
this chapter analyses how the decision-making processes in Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle for these projects relate to the sub-dimensions of multi-level governance 
and policy styles that we might expect to be apparent in each city. These sub-
dimensions inform two diagrams (based on figures 2.1 and 2.2 in chapter 2), which 
show how each city has adopted different arrangements for governing planning 
policy. Moreover, this mapping exercise is also placed in the context of vertical and 
horizontal power dependency relationships using the illustrative tripolar diagrams 
from chapter 2 (see figures 2.4 and 2.5). As such, it identifies which actors are able to 
exert the greatest influence over planning policy in both cities, and highlights how 
these power dependencies shape the institutional context within which Gelsenkirchen 
and Newcastle operate. Furthermore, it highlights how these institutional structures 
determine the nature of multi-level governance arrangements, and ultimately the 
policy styles that each city is able to adopt. 
 
5.2  Multi-level governance and planning policy  
 
5.2.1  Gelsenkirchen  
 
This subsection maps planning policy in Gelsenkirchen against the two sub-
dimensions of Type I multi-level governance. As such, it begins by analysing how the 
city’s role in planning decisions is shaped by a structured vertical framework 
involving other tiers of government. This is followed by an investigation into whether 
the council retains its position as a multi-functional body in planning policy, or has 
divested some of its planning responsibilities to task-specific agencies within the city. 
As with chapter 4, it also analyses organisational capacity and the nature of power 
dependencies within governance arrangements, in order to identify which actors are 
most influential in policy-making processes. 
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5.2.1.1  Vertical governance structures  
 
There is a lot of evidence to suggest that planning policy in Gelsenkirchen, 
particularly in the context of the Ebertstraβe development, is determined by Type I 
multi-level governance arrangements. For example, there is significant vertical 
interaction between municipalities, the Länder and the federation (through a process 
known as the Gegenstromprinzip, or ‘counter-current principle’) to ensure that 
planning policies in Germany are co-ordinated effectively and do not conflict (Oxley 
et al., 2009). This decentralised framework relies heavily on legal instruments, which 
provide additional support and capacity to local authorities that want to use the 
planning system to further their policy objectives (Schmidt and Buehler, 2007). As a 
result, planning decisions in Gelsenkirchen are informed by federal legislation, Land 
regulations and a regional spatial strategy that covers six municipalities and outlines 
general guidelines for developments within the area. At the same time, and in 
accordance with the principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung, German councils have 
significant autonomy to take and implement their own decisions within this 
framework. This enables individual council to produce their own planning policy that 
could either endorse or reject some of the objectives in the regional strategy: 
 
A political party could say ‘climate protection and adaptation are so important to us 
that we say “here in Gelsenkirchen we have the following objectives”’… and then the 
council might say ‘we will only pass something that, for example, would only 
consider development on this many hectares of greenfield land’ (interview 15). 
 
Similarly, provided they are acting within the law, councils can take decisions on land 
use that override state or federal opinions and regulations – and also the views of their 
officers (interview 15). For example, there are federal, state and Bezirk ‘prompts’ to 
restrict greenfield development, but these are general in nature and therefore local 
authorities have significant autonomy to decide on planning applications within the 
overall framework. Nonetheless, planning approvals must stipulate how any proposed 
development is in keeping with these broader strategies – and, by the same token, 
developers often refer to them to support an appeal against a decision to refuse 
permission to build.  
 
175 
 
One important federal law that municipalities – and indeed property developers across 
Germany – must take account of is the Energieeinsparverordnung (Energy 
Conservation Act) of 2009. This legislation forms a key part of the German 
government’s aim to reduce energy demand, and helped to ensure that Germany had 
the world’s most energy-efficient economy in 2014 (Young et al., 2014). It stipulates 
that new buildings need to adopt energy-efficient and climate-friendly features such 
as solar thermal water heating systems, renewable heat sources, more efficient boilers 
and thermal insulation. Crucially, these requirements do not apply solely to new 
developments: if any building constructed before 1990 undergoes significant 
refurbishment, it has to reach at least the same level of energy efficiency 
(EnergieAgentur Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2008). The legislation also introduced energy 
performance certificates for all buildings (Power and Zulauf, 2011), which describe 
how well they conserve energy and the extent to which they rely on renewable 
sources (interview 26).  
 
These stipulations set out a ‘floor’ of standards that apply across Germany: in other 
words, individual municipalities can stipulate that new developments within their 
jurisdiction need to meet higher criteria than those required by the Act. 
Gelsenkirchen’s economic situation means that it needs to attract outside investment 
and therefore the council is reluctant to place expensive demands on potential 
developers (interview 25). Nonetheless, because of this strong legal support along the 
vertical dimension, the authority has the capacity to demand that buildings meet high 
sustainability criteria. By way of contrast, councils in countries that do operate within 
such a structured and interdependent arrangement may have to agree lower 
sustainability standards with potential developers, which means that they find it more 
difficult to achieve their policy objectives (see section 5.2.2 for a more detailed 
discussion). 
 
More specifically, the council was keen to ensure that the redeveloped Hans-Sachs-
Haus had a very high score for energy performance, so that it would act as a ‘beacon’ 
of sustainable design in the city (interviews 23 and 26). As a result of this internal 
political pressure, the refurbished building significantly exceeds the minimum (though 
nonetheless ambitious) requirements of the Energy Conservation Act. Indeed, it 
incorporates a plethora of sustainability features, including photovoltaic panels on the 
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roof, rainwater toilet flushing and a geothermal heat exchange system. This illustrates 
how the Gelsenkirchen Council has a reasonable degree of autonomy in decision-
making, but nonetheless operates within a structured and interdependent vertical 
framework – in line with Type I multi-level governance.  
 
Indeed, the Hans-Sachs-Haus project shows how such a high degree of 
interdependence between tiers of government can increase municipality capacity. As 
a heavily-indebted municipality that is subject to a Haushaltssicherungskonzept 
(budgetary assurance programme, see chapters 2 and 3), 80% of the funding for 
capital projects in Gelsenkirchen comes from the Land government via the 
Bezirksregierung in Münster. In this way, the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia 
provided a significant share of the budget to redevelop Heinrich-König-Platz and 
Hans-Sachs-Haus (including the building’s central atrium and foyer area).15 This 
meant that the regeneration programme had to adhere to Land regulations for urban 
development projects. These regulations accord climate change considerations the 
same status as statutory anti-discrimination and accessibility requirements 
(Ministerium für Bauen und Verkehr, 2008). Nonetheless, as long as Gelsenkirchen 
Council met these criteria, it was able to exercise its autonomy over the building 
design – and indeed the entire Ebertstraβe redevelopment (interviews 17 and 23). 
 
Therefore, although German councils do have a certain degree of local autonomy to 
decide on the nature of municipal development projects, they have to operate within a 
broader framework of state and federal regulations, particularly when they rely on 
funding from the Land or Bund. Indeed, other development projects that received 
significant support from higher tiers of government also had to meet the Land’s strict 
sustainability criteria, including the Solarsiedlung (solar village) that was mentioned 
in chapter 4. This illustrates the structured nature of intergovernmental relations, in 
line with Type I characterisations of multi-level governance. It also suggests a high 
                                                 
15 The total budget for Hans-Sachs-Haus was around €60m, but the Land only provided 80% of the 
€17m that was required to refurbish those parts of the building that are now open to the general public. 
Gelsenkirchen Council had to pay the entire balance of €43m, because this was to finance work on 
areas that had no public access, such as the council chamber and offices for party groupings, council 
administrative staff and the mayor (interview 23). 
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degree of interdependency along the vertical sub-dimension. This is because councils 
are supported by a strong legal framework and financial resources that enable them to 
pursue their own objectives, whilst higher tiers of government have set out a range of 
standards that mean municipalities will help to implement central policies. 
 
As chapter 2 outlined, the city’s status as an indebted authority means that it is less 
independent of the state and Bezirk levels of government than many other councils in 
NRW. Notably, the Land covers only 60% (rather than 80%) of the capital for similar 
projects in municipalities that have not had to enter into a budgetary assurance 
programme. In fact, the terms of its budgetary agreement meant that Gelsenkirchen 
Council would have needed Land approval (via the Bezirk) for the Ebertstraβe 
redevelopment even if it had funded the whole project internally through borrowing 
(interview 23). As might be expected, the Bezirk monitors this investment carefully, 
which appears to threaten Gelsenkirchen’s autonomy.  
 
The official processes for bidding, approving and monitoring the spending of Land 
funding also suggest that relations between the municipal and district tiers are 
becoming increasingly asymmetric. In theory, the Bezirk follows a transparent 
procedure, in which architects, project managers and financial experts examine 
individual grant applications on a case-by-case basis, before forwarding a limited 
number of outstanding proposals on to the Land. The state government then agrees to 
provide each region with the necessary funding up to an annual limit, and the Bezirk 
allocates grants to the most deserving applicants within its jurisdiction. In 2013 this 
limit for the Münster Bezirk was €24m, of which just over half was earmarked for 
regenerating Gelsenkirchen city centre, including the Ebertstraβe area (interview 27). 
 
Crucially, however, this does not really happen in practice. In particular, because the 
municipal and Bezirk levels of government co-operate on bidding for capital funds 
(and both tiers want proposals to be approved), this exacerbates the degree of 
Politikverflechtung between the tiers. It means that staff in the Bezirk view themselves 
primarily as consultants, whom municipalities can approach for advice, rather than 
people who hold tight purse strings and are reluctant to allocate funding for any 
projects. This involves working with local authorities to ‘edit and improve’ their 
submissions (interview 27), in order to ensure that they fit the necessary criteria for 
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approval. For example, one such requirement stipulates that projects must be clustered 
around a particular area (Gebietsbesschluss), in order to show how they fit into a 
wider strategy for regeneration. If the Bezirk feels that a particular submission does 
not meet this criterion, it might suggest that the municipality should group various 
separate projects into a single bid or split one proposal into two or more initiatives 
(interview 27). All five Bezirke in NRW collaborate with municipalities to a similar 
extent on these bids, to the extent that ‘99% are approved eventually’ – even if some 
proposals have to wait for a year or two because the Bezirk in question is approaching 
its allocated funding limit (interview 27). As such, there is a very high degree of 
interdependency between these tiers of government, and this mutual support and co-
operation helps to ensure that municipalities have more capacity to achieve their 
policy objectives. 
 
Once a funding bid is authorised, the relationship between tiers does become slightly 
more asymmetric, because officials from the Bezirk monitor individual projects 
closely and meet the responsible municipal officers at least every six months to 
discuss their progress (interview 17). In line with this approach, the Bezirk allocates 
the overall funding package in stages, after the project passes specific milestones that 
are agreed at the outset – and if the initiative does not deliver its objectives, the 
council could face having to pay some of the money back (interview 23). As might be 
expected, the progress of projects in highly-indebted municipalities such as 
Gelsenkirchen are observed particularly closely: 
 
That means every bank transaction… [We] need approval for the budget and the 
spending from top to bottom… It’s not the case that we have €10m for the city centre 
and can do absolutely anything with it (interview 17). 
 
Indeed, although Gelsenkirchen Council has delivered successful capital projects 
before (such as a new underground line and childcare facilities), recent history has 
given the Land and Bezirk understandable concerns about its financial competence. 
One interviewee in Gelsenkirchen did feel that the extra monitoring reduced the 
council’s autonomy in decision-making and could even exacerbate its budgetary 
problems:  
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I’m not a politician. I’m just a manager. Nonetheless, as a council we always have 
budgetary problems if there is a level of jurisdiction above us that has said what we 
can spend money on (interview 23).  
 
However, interviewees from both the municipal and regional tiers agreed that they co-
operated very closely on the redevelopment of Hans-Sachs-Haus and Heinrich-König-
Platz, in line with the phenomenon of Politikverflechtung that has characterised 
German policy-making for several decades (see chapter 2). Indeed, an official in the 
Bezirksregierung characterised their relationship with the city thus: 
 
I cannot imagine that it is possible to work any closer together than we do now 
(interview 27). 
 
Similarly, although several interviewees in Gelsenkirchen were annoyed by the 
increased level of oversight from the state and regional tiers, they were noticeably 
positive about the support provided by the Bezirk. One manager, who had compared 
his situation to that of a child who has to ask his or her parents for extra pocket 
money, was effusive in his praise – even if he felt that his experience may have been 
atypical: 
 
It’s not normal that higher tiers of government understand those underneath them 
very well, but it has worked out wonderfully here (interview 23). 
 
Indeed, and notwithstanding the paternalistic nature of state-municipal relations that 
apply to heavily-indebted councils, it is crucial to note that much of this vertical 
collaboration is done on an entirely voluntary basis, on the understanding that both 
tiers of government will be better placed to achieve their objectives if they work 
together. For example, both the municipality and Bezirk viewed the Bismarck 
Solarsiedlung and the Ebertstraβe project as initiatives could put Gelsenkirchen on the 
map as a sustainable city. Furthermore, after funding was secured for both projects, 
the positive attitudes of Bezirk officers meant council staff could discuss issues with 
them in a relatively unthreatening environment. 
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Interestingly, one officer at Gelsenkirchen compared this voluntary pooling of 
capabilities with the politics of the European Union (interviewee 23). German 
authorities appear to be concerned primarily with increasing their capacity (the ability 
to implement their policies), whereas recent discussions around ‘localism’ in England 
have stressed the need for English councils to have greater autonomy in decision-
making (the ability to take decisions for the benefit of their communities). Such a 
distinction has echoes of the debate around ‘national sovereignty’ in the UK’s 
relationship with the EU. This debate tends to view power as a zero-sum game (it 
either rests with ‘Westminster’ or ‘Brussels’) rather than interpret it as a country’s 
capacity to maximise its influence in an increasingly interdependent world (see Howe, 
1990 for a discussion of this distinction). Such a contrast in perspectives also appears 
to be evident in how English and German local authorities view their roles vis à vis 
other state institutions. 
 
Crucially, this preference for vertical interdependence in Germany reinforces pre-
existing vertical structures, because it means that the municipal and Bezirk tiers 
collaborate to achieve common objectives in accordance with the principles of 
Politikverflechtung. Together with the strong legal framework within which 
municipalities operate (as exemplified by the Energy Conservation Act), this means 
that Gelsenkirchen is moving even further towards ideal Type I arrangements along 
the vertical sub-dimension (see figure 5.4 on page 192). 
 
5.2.1.2  Horizontal governance structures  
 
By way of contrast, there is some evidence to suggest the existence of Type II 
structures along the horizontal sub-dimension. For example, Gelsenkirchen Council 
has worked with neighbouring municipalities in its approach to planning for some 
time, and this has resulted in the creation of informal, unofficial governance structures 
to improve policy co-ordination. A key reason for this is that the Ruhrgebiet straddles 
multiple Bezirke within North Rhine-Westphalia (see section 4.2.1.2). This means that 
councils in the area face a number of administrative hurdles if they try to co-ordinate 
more broader regional planning initiatives through official channels: 
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If Gelsenkirchen wants to plan something together with Herne, two districts need to 
be involved – Münster and Arnsberg… I think it would be good if the Ruhrgebiet had 
its own regional jurisdiction (interview 23). 
 
To overcome this problem, several authorities developed close relationships outside 
the official framework, often building on existing party-political networks. Indeed, a 
number of interviewees stressed that Gelsenkirchen was much more likely to work 
with other SPD-led authorities and mayors than collaborate with municipalities where 
the CDU dominates. As a result, west-east transport connections within the 
Ruhrgebiet are much better than those from north to south, since municipalities 
located along the latter dimension are mostly controlled by CDU mayors and councils 
(interviews 14, 21 and 23).  
 
This illustrates how local politicians are bypassing the official state institutions that 
map onto a Type I multi-level governance model, in favour of more private networks 
and informal channels. Notably, Dahme and Wohlfahrt (2003) also identified this 
trend in their analysis of economic development policy in the area. Indeed, the 
absence of a Bezirksregierung specifically for the Ruhrgebiet means that official 
institutions are not designed to enable municipalities to co-ordinate their transport or 
planning policies and increase their capacity in these sectors. As a result, they have 
developed informal governance arrangements that sit outside official channels, whilst 
also continuing to work within traditional administrative boundaries. Such a 
characterisation sits closer towards the fragmented and dynamic arrangements 
associated with Type II multi-level governance, rather than the Type I ideal of a rigid 
‘multi-purpose authority’.  
 
Crucially, however, these arrangements have been in place for several decades 
(interviews 14 and 21). Indeed, Gelsenkirchen Council is not shifting further towards 
an ideal Type II position along the horizontal sub-dimension, because it has not 
become more interdependent with other Ruhrgebiet councils in recent years. In fact, 
with the exception of this informal collaboration with neighbouring municipalities, 
the authority operates in a predominantly Type I context along the horizontal sub-
dimension, because it ensures that decision-making responsibilities are concentrated 
in the authority and also seeks to retain control of public projects ‘in-house’.  
182 
 
 
Indeed, the Ebertstraβe redevelopment illustrates how Gelsenkirchen Council is 
actually moving further towards an ideal Type I arrangement. For example, the 
council’s property and regeneration departments oversaw the entire project from start 
to finish, thereby illustrating its position as a ‘multi-functional authority’. Although 
the council awarded the design and construction contracts to external companies, the 
project managers for Hans-Sachs-Haus and Heinrich-König-Platz were salaried 
employees of municipality. By way of contrast, a range of different external, ad hoc 
agencies or special-purpose vehicles have been involved in managing the Science 
Central project in Newcastle (see section 5.2.2.2).  
 
This decision to maintain control and oversight of the project ‘in-house’ may have 
been a legacy of the initial, failed attempt by a private investor to redevelop Hans-
Sachs-Haus on behalf of the authority (interview 23, see also page 167). Nonetheless, 
it illustrates the council’s continued belief that it should not outsource or ‘hive off’ too 
many functions to outside agencies. This belief held firm in spite of criticism of other 
large public projects, such as Berlin’s new international airport, Stuttgart’s new 21 
train station or Hamburg’s concert hall – all of which were overseen by salaried 
council employees in other large German cities (Diekmann et al., 2013). Staff and 
politicians in Gelsenkirchen were well aware of this general criticism of public works 
projects, but nonetheless stressed the importance of ensuring democratic control over 
planning developments: 
 
The fewer competences we have as a council, the more people take away the story of 
the city, or give away the story of the city, particularly in terms of its buildings 
(interview 23). 
 
Furthermore, because there is no research-intensive university in Gelsenkirchen, it 
was much more incumbent on the council to take responsibility for some of the 
technical aspects of the project – and indeed the city’s climate change policy more 
broadly. This is an important difference between Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle, where 
a strategic partnership between the municipality and the university allowed the 
council to offload most of the responsibility for sustainability in the Science Central 
site (see section 5.2.2.1). Although the Ebertstraβe redevelopment is undoubtedly a 
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smaller project than Science Central, and Gelsenkirchen Council was much keener to 
retain functions in-house than its counterpart in Newcastle, the German authority did 
not have easy access to a group of local technical experts (interview 20). Nonetheless, 
the fact that it still wanted to undertake the Ebertstraβe project alone illustrates how it 
had substantial confidence in its capacity to implement policy independently of other 
horizontal actors.  
 
Similarly, local authority staff and elected representatives became the main occupiers 
of Hans-Sachs-Haus upon completion of the redevelopment. This ensured that the 
council was able to control the project from the beginning until after its completion, 
and other actors were not involved in any aspect of its design and subsequent use. The 
only exception to this is a café space on the ground floor that is leased out to a local 
operator – but this represents a very small part of the overall building (interview 23). 
In contrast, although the Core Building in Newcastle remains the property of the local 
authority, it is occupied entirely by other organisations and therefore the council has 
much less influence over the way in which the building functions. 
 
Notably, by taking and retaining control of Hans-Sachs-Haus, Gelsenkirchen Council 
completely reversed its 1990s decision to contract a private company to refurbish the 
building and lease it out as office space (see section 5.1.1). In terms of the multi-level 
governance typology, this shows how it has shifted towards a more ideal Type I 
arrangement along the horizontal dimension, since the council took direct 
responsibility for a greater number of public functions. It also highlights a shift 
towards greater independence in local governing arrangements, because the council 
no longer needs to rely on an external contractor to manage the project. 
 
In other words, Gelsenkirchen’s Ebertstraβe redevelopment project fits comfortably 
within a Type I characterisation of multi-level governance along the horizontal sub-
dimension. Indeed, by reversing its previous decision and taking direct control of the 
Hans-Sachs-Haus redevelopment, the municipality is located closer to the Type I ideal 
of a ‘multi-purpose local authority’ than was previously the case. A key driver for this 
was the belief that the council should retain control over public services and 
buildings, in order to ensure that they are subjected to traditional democratic 
accountability mechanisms and local residents can continue to shape the ‘story’ of the 
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city. In terms of power dependencies, this also meant that the council was able to 
operate almost entirely independently of other horizontal actors, both during the 
project and after it was completed (see figure 5.6 on page 194).  
 
5.2.2  Newcastle  
 
The thesis now analyses whether Newcastle operates within characteristically Type II 
multi-level governance arrangements along the vertical and horizontal dimensions. In 
this way, it discusses the vertical framework that shapes the council’s planning policy 
and role in the Science Central project, and then investigates the extent to which 
planning and development functions are concentrated within the municipality. As 
with section 4.2.2 in chapter 4, it also provides further analysis of power dependency 
relationships involving Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle Councils and external actors, 
and highlights how these have created distinct institutional frameworks that influence 
how each authority governs major planning developments. 
 
5.2.2.1  Vertical governance structures 
 
The UK Government requires English municipalities to set out their planning policies 
and objectives in a Local Development Framework (LDF), which includes a Local 
Plan. These documents act as key reference points for planning decisions: if the 
council agrees that a proposed development is in keeping with its Local Plan, it 
should approve the application in question. At Newcastle, the LDF has regard to the 
overall economic strategy, the 1Plan, which was developed together with 
neighbouring Gateshead and aims to stimulate newer industries that will help to grow 
the core of both cities by ‘pioneering a new model of sustainable urbanism’ (1NG, 
2010, p. 7, interview 11). 
 
Until 2011, English councils used to prepare their LDFs within the context of 
Regional Spatial Strategies (RSS), but the Coalition Government abolished RSSs 
alongside other regional institutions shortly after it took office. As a result, LDFs are 
now only required to fit within the context of a National Planning Policy Framework 
(NPPF), which was supposed to give local authorities increased autonomy but 
actually required them to adhere to poorly-defined central definitions of sustainable 
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development in planning decisions (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2012, interviews 1 and 2). Similarly, in 2015 the UK Government 
abandoned its previous commitment to ensure that all new homes would be ‘zero-
carbon’ by 2016 (Webster, 2015), which has weakened the overall framework for 
mitigating climate change through the planning system even further. Although 
councils in the North East of England have created a combined authority to increase 
the state’s capacity at the regional level (see chapters 3 and 4), this will not set out the 
kind of detailed planning requirements or standards that featured in RSSs or the zero-
carbon homes standard.  
 
In terms of multi-level governance, this dynamic and unstructured vertical picture 
illustrates the Type II nature of central-local relations. The reforms have also left a 
void at the regional level and threatened to trigger a ‘free for all’ in which councils 
could ‘race to the bottom’ to attract development and permit the construction of low-
quality, energy-inefficient buildings (Hetherington, 2011). One officer at the authority 
was acutely aware of this problem: 
 
Ideally, if you talk about being serious about climate change… it should be almost 
top-down and then you kind of get more detail as you go through it. The current 
government’s completely turned it on its head and said ‘ok, well, we’re not going to 
take it on, it’s up to you to do it’. And therefore it then throws it in the basket with all 
the other things you need to negotiate [with developers]. Because if the government 
says this and you’re going to have to build to this standard, then it’s a level playing 
field – everybody in the whole of England has to do it and therefore there’s no kind of 
advantage in going to another council or whatever… To me you really should set 
high-level standards at the high level and your regional standards because you have 
regional variation, and then your local standards at the local level (interview 2). 
 
As this quote demonstrates, the lack of a robust vertical framework for sustainable 
development in England weakens the position of local authorities in planning policy. 
This is particularly the case in deprived municipalities such as Newcastle, which are 
desperate to encourage external investment and therefore very reluctant to require 
developers to construct more sustainable buildings.  
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More specifically, the institutions involved in the Science Central project also reflect 
Type II characterisations. For example, the closure of ONE, which was closely 
involved in the Science City programme from the outset until the Regional 
Development Agencies were disbanded in 2011, illustrates how some public bodies 
can be created and dissolved easily within this model. The agency’s abolition 
represented a significant threat to the viability of the whole project: ONE had already 
contributed £1.2m towards developing the site and was expected to provide additional 
support further down the line (interviews 6 and 11). This illustrates another way in 
which the unstable nature of Type II multi-level governance arrangements can 
weaken the capacity of state institutions to achieve their objectives.  
 
Nonetheless, after ONE was abolished, the remaining partners were able to bid 
successfully for £6m of European Regional Development Funding (ERDF), and 
thereby ensure that the initiative could continue. Notably, although the EU stipulates 
that ERDF projects need to meet high sustainability standards, the Science Central 
masterplan – a document that sets out the vision for the site, including the criteria that 
buildings would have to meet in order to be approved for construction – exceeded 
these demands significantly: 
 
We’ve actually volunteered to give ourselves more of a straightjacket than was ever 
required of us… So a lot of what we’re doing is because we’ve chosen to do it 
(interview 11). 
 
As such, despite the fact that the EU was involved in funding the programme, it had 
very little influence over the design of individual buildings or their environs. An 
interviewee from the council was keen to stress that they did not need to ‘fudge 
around the edges’ or re-draft their bid to ensure that it would meet the EU’s 
sustainability criteria (interview 6). Indeed, the EU’s perspectives on Science Central 
were similar to those of the now-defunct ONE, in that they viewed it almost entirely 
as a driver for local economic development by nurturing the creation of new science 
and technology companies: 
 
Their primary… goal was to get jobs. That’s what they’re buying with their money, 
rather than any sustainability (interview 11). 
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In other words, the EU exerted very little influence over Science Central from an 
environmental sustainability perspective. Together with the unstable nature of 
regional institutions and a weak National Planning Policy Framework, this means that 
the council and university do not have to adhere to strict vertical standards for 
buildings on the Science Central site. Referring back to table 5.1 on page 166, this 
situation highlights how Newcastle Council operates within a characteristically Type 
II multi-level governance framework along the horizontal sub-dimension. 
Furthermore, it also contrasts starkly with the Type I vertical arrangements for 
planning policy that apply in Germany, as exemplified by the Energy Conservation 
Act and the continued support from the Bezirk and Land for Gelsenkirchen’s 
Ebertstraβe initiative (see section 5.1.1.1). Crucially, as section 5.3 will demonstrate, 
these vertical arrangements have shaped the different policy styles of Newcastle and 
Gelsenkirchen, because they have influenced the capacity of municipalities to achieve 
their political objectives independently of other horizontal actors. 
 
5.2.2.2  Horizontal governance structures  
 
Newcastle also operates within a largely Type II arrangement along the horizontal 
dimension of multi-level governance. For example, it has worked closely with 
neighbouring Gateshead by developing a joint Local Development Framework 
(interviews 1 and 2) and an urban development company, 1NG (interview 11). 
Initially, 1NG was responsible for the Science Central initiative, as part of its remit to 
develop the infrastructure that might attract investment to both sides of the river Tyne. 
This company ‘basically provided a development consultancy service to the project’, 
for which the Science City partners paid the market rate: it was ‘a pretty 
straightforward client-service provider relationship’ (interview 11). Such an 
arrangement, in which governing actors create task-specific agencies in an ad hoc 
fashion, bears all the hallmarks of Type II multi-level governance. 
 
Although financial constraints meant that the two councils decided to abolish 1NG in 
2008 (Pearson, 2011), responsibility for overseeing the site remained with an external 
organisation, Newcastle Science Central. The three Science City partners had set up 
this specific vehicle to manage the initiative, and it was able to continue and seek 
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additional funding after ONE ceased to exist (interview 31). An interviewee at 
Newcastle Council explained the rationale for this arm’s-length arrangement in the 
following terms: 
 
We’ve appointed this external organisation really, to deliver it on the partners’ 
behalf… we had a different model in the earlier days, where the city had a, kind of, 
project team that we led on, but there wasn’t really the focus on the project really, 
where people were doing it as part of another job. Whereas [the Science Central 
project manager’s] pure job is to deliver Science Central for us, and he’s got a small 
team (interview 6). 
 
Crucially, therefore, managers at Newcastle felt that salaried council employees 
would not have the capacity to deliver the project effectively – in direct contrast to the 
Ebertstraβe development in Gelsenkirchen. Indeed, Science Central continued to 
operate separately from the council even after it was brought more definitively into 
the wider Science City programme in 2013 to try and ensure that it contributed more 
directly to the council’s regeneration objectives (interview 31). For the purposes of 
this thesis, this restructure did move Newcastle slightly closer towards a Type I model 
of multi-level governance, in that the number of external agencies with responsibility 
for Science Central was reduced from two to one. Nonetheless, it contrasts sharply 
with Gelsenkirchen Council’s reliance on in-house resources and capacity throughout 
the life of the Ebertstraβe project, and therefore illustrates how Type II arrangements 
apply much more to Newcastle than its German counterpart (see figure 5.4 on page 
192). 
 
Moreover, Newcastle University’s involvement in Science City illustrates the extent 
to which the council needs to rely on other local actors to achieve its policy goals. 
These two organisations worked together to develop the masterplan for Science 
Central (in fact, they developed two – the first document was scrapped after being 
deemed much too ambitious in the aftermath of the financial crisis, interviews 6 and 
11). Indeed it is notable that the council and university had their own, separate 
objectives for Science Central, and these became apparent during the drafting process 
for the masterplan:  
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One of the interesting things is to try and balance things from both sides, because 
obviously the council is about delivery, it’s about jobs, it’s about new housing, it’s 
about all these things. Whereas the university’s maybe a little bit more interested, 
well they are, in maybe the academic, the research opportunities. And, obviously, 
research and the commercial world don’t always meet in the middle (interview 31). 
 
The same interviewee illustrated this point by explaining what it meant for housing on 
the site: 
 
When we looked at it last year the university would have been interested in building 
houses with lime hemp, just to get an idea, and then sensor-up the building so that 
people living there would have been like little guinea pigs and they’d understand how 
the building and the fabrics work. Whereas the council would be: ‘What the hell’s 
that? We just want solid houses built that people want to buy!’ (interview 31). 
 
Nonetheless, there was widespread agreement between the council and the university 
on how the site could be used strategically. Both parties were excited about the 
opportunity to use it as a demonstrator or ‘beacon’ (interview 6) for sustainability 
ideas, and thereby boost the city’s profile and help to attract science and technology 
investment: 
 
I think there’s a pretty strategic meeting of minds on general purpose and what that 
then means for actual delivery. We’ll get debate on specific things that come up in the 
proposals, but… at the most strategic and the most vision-setting level, I would say 
there’s a very good overlap of ambition and objectives (interview 11). 
 
As such, the fact that Newcastle Council shares responsibility for Science Central 
with the university illustrates how it is trying to increase its capacity to achieve policy 
objectives by working with other horizontal actors. Indeed, such a strategy has echoes 
of the power-sharing arrangements that Gelsenkirchen has relied on through 
Politikverflechtung and its vertical collaboration with other tiers of government (see 
chapters 2 and 4). Newcastle Council was quite open about its desire to work closer 
with the university, viewing it as an institution that is more likely to share its public 
service ethos than private companies – and one that was not at risk of going out of 
business following the financial crisis (interview 6). For its part, Newcastle University 
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‘has a stated aim of playing a greater part in the civic life of the city’ (interview 6) and 
fits the description of an ‘anchor institution’ (Goddard and Vallance, 2013) that has a 
strategic interest in the long-term future of the locality. It might therefore be expected 
to have a valuable perspective on how sites such as Science Central could be 
developed successfully.  
 
Indeed, if the university and ONE had been unwilling to get involved in the project at 
the outset, the council would not have been able to purchase the entire site and 
develop a coherent and realistic plan for its development (interviews 6 and 31). Since 
this may have resulted in it becoming derelict like the former Vaux brewery in 
Sunderland, the council felt it was crucial to work with the university to ensure that it 
had the capacity to avoid such an eventuality.  
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that modern English higher education institutions 
are largely run as private businesses and rely increasingly less on public funding. 
Since Gelsenkirchen Council works more with other state institutions than local 
companies, the analogy with vertical Politikverflechtung in Germany is not quite 
accurate. Although Newcastle Council’s partnership with the university has 
undoubtedly enabled the authority to increase its capacity to implement policy, it 
compromises the municipality’s position as the civic leader and raises questions of 
democratic accountability through traditional voting mechanisms. In other words, the 
council is not able to operate as independently of other horizontal governance actors 
as its German counterpart – even if it may be in a stronger position to achieve its 
political objectives as a result of this relationship. 
 
Furthermore, although the Core Building remains a council asset, is occupied by 
university staff and local businesses, and it is operated on a day-to-day basis by an 
external facilities management company. This Type II-style fragmentation contrasts 
sharply with Gelsenkirchen Council’s in-house approach to the management, 
operation and occupation of Hans-Sachs-Haus. In this way, it provides a clear 
illustration of how each city operates within different multi-level governance contexts 
along the horizontal sub-dimension. 
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As table 5.2 shows, these contrasts between the two cities are broadly in line with the 
standard characterisations for England and Germany. Gelsenkirchen appears to fit 
with the ideal Type I model, which suggests that institutional structures remain rigid 
and ‘multi-functional’ public authorities retain responsibility for a wide range of 
services. In contrast, Newcastle operates within a flexible vertical framework and 
relies on a range of task-specific bodies to carry out local public functions, in 
accordance with Type II characterisations. In other words, we can conclude that 
Hooghe and Marks’ ideas do apply to planning policy in Newcastle and 
Gelsenkirchen, and that the two cities are not converging along this dimension.   
 
 Gelsenkirchen  Newcastle 
Vertical 
structures 
Dominant Type I: a structured, 
multi-tiered vertical framework 
reduces local independence but 
results in strong state influence 
over planning policy 
Dominant Type II: a dynamic 
and unstructured framework 
gives councils de jure 
autonomy but weakens the 
local state, especially in 
deprived areas 
Horizontal 
structures 
Dominant Type I: Gelsenkirchen 
operates as a multi-purpose local 
authority and has sole 
responsibility for the Ebertstraβe 
redevelopment 
Dominant Type II: task-
specific agencies are 
responsible for Science 
Central and the university 
plays a key role 
 
Table 5.2: Contrasting multi-level governance structures for planning in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
Indeed, as figure 5.4 illustrates, they are actually diverging. This is primarily because 
vertical structures are increasingly weak and unstable in England, whereas they have 
become stronger and more integrated in Germany in recent years – particularly for 
councils such as Gelsenkirchen that are subject to financial restrictions. Crucially, 
these vertical arrangements have shaped the nature of horizontal relationships, 
because they have ensured that Gelsenkirchen Council is a stronger local actor than its 
counterpart in Newcastle. As a result, the English municipality has had to work 
together with a range of local actors (not least the university) on the Core Building 
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and Science Central, and is also less able to insist that developers adhere to stringent 
sustainability criteria for new buildings. By way of contrast, Gelsenkirchen brought 
the entire Ebertstraβe initiative in-house (thereby reversing a previous decision to rely 
on a private developer to redevelop Hans-Sachs-Haus) and can rely on a strong legal 
framework to ensure that new developments meet strict environmental standards. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Changes in the sub-dimensions of multi-level governance types as applied 
to planning policy in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
A more detailed analysis of power dependencies helps to explain how these 
institutional structures developed and have been reinforced in recent years. Crucially, 
the UK Government has weakened the vertical legal framework for sustainable 
development in England, and also removed the regional element from planning 
policy. As a result, municipalities have significantly more autonomy to decide on 
applications independently of other vertical actors. In stark contrast, Germany has 
reinforced its strong legal framework to underpin planning policy across tiers of 
government, which means that Gelsenkirchen operates much more interdependently 
along the vertical sub-dimension (see figure 5.5). Although this has reduced 
municipal autonomy (since councils cannot permit any development to go ahead, 
regards of its environmental impact), it has helped to ensure that developments are 
more sustainable across the country. It has also facilitated greater co-operation 
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between local, regional and state institutions, which means that all tiers of government 
work together to help councils achieve their policy objectives. This is particularly the 
case in those municipalities that are subject to budgetary restrictions, such as 
Gelsenkirchen.  
 
These developments have also resulted in the two cities diverging along the horizontal 
sub-dimension, because they have helped to make Gelsenkirchen Council a stronger 
local actor than its counterpart in Newcastle. In particular, the weaker legal 
framework for planning policy in England has increased the power of non-state actors 
vis à vis local authorities, especially in deprived areas that are desperate for 
development and investment. In other words, Newcastle Council’s increasing 
independence from other vertical actors has actually reduced its overall capacity to 
use planning policy as a tool for achieving its climate and wider environmental goals.  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Vertical power dependency relationships for planning policy in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
Moreover, by outsourcing and devolving functions to a range of task-specific 
organisations (such as the various bodies that have been responsible for Science 
Central), English municipalities have weakened their position in local governance 
arrangements even further. The result is that Newcastle Council has to rely much 
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more on the capacity of other horizontal stakeholders to achieve its policy objectives. 
Indeed, in the specific case of Science Central, the council depended on the university 
to get the project off the ground in the first place, and the authority also relies on its 
academic partner to take the lead on the sustainability aspects of the project (see 
section 5.3.2.2 for further details). This is reflected in figure 5.6, which shows how 
Newcastle has shifted away from a position mid-way between interdependence and 
independence with horizontal actors, and towards the dependence pole. 
 
For its part, Gelsenkirchen’s greater interdependence along the vertical sub-dimension 
(as exemplified by the stronger legal framework for sustainable development and the 
support provided by the Bezirk) means that the German municipality has more 
capacity to operate independently in horizontal governance arrangements. In addition, 
the fact that it had the capacity and determination to undertake the Ebertstraβe 
regeneration in-house (which reversed the council’s previous decision to rely on a 
private developer to redevelop Hans-Sachs-Haus), ensured that it retained full control 
over the project. This illustrates how planning policy in the German authority has 
actually become even more independent of other horizontal actors than was 
previously the case – and much more so than its English counterpart (see figure 5.6).  
 
 
Figure 5.6: Horizontal power dependency relationships for planning policy in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
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These shifts largely reflect the coping strategies that each council has adopted to try 
and increase their capacity to achieve policy objectives, and the legal context within 
which they operate. The strong institutional framework in Germany, together with the 
mayor’s democratic mandate to restore Hans-Sachs-Haus to its former glory, ensured 
that Gelsenkirchen Council was the most powerful local actor in planning decisions. 
In contrast, weaker and more flexible structures in England meant that Newcastle 
Council was more vulnerable to private sector pressure over planning decisions. 
Specifically, it is heavily reliant on the capacity of Newcastle University to achieve its 
policy objectives for the Science Central site. 
 
As the next section will illustrate, these power dependencies have shaped the policy 
style of each municipality regarding new planning developments. At one level, this is 
not particularly surprising: a strong independent council is perhaps more likely to act 
hierarchically, whereas a weaker municipality might need to negotiate with actors to 
achieve its objectives. Nonetheless, the power dependency model allows us to 
pinpoint a reason why public institutions might adopt different policy styles. 
Moreover, it also acts as a starting point for analysing the extent to which local 
decisions are democratically accountable, since the model helps to identify which 
actors are driving policy-making processes. For example, if a municipality has to 
compromise on its sustainability principles in order to persuade developers to build in 
the city, this suggests that private actors are able to determine council policy to some 
extent. 
    
5.3  Policy styles and planning policy 
 
This chapter now analyses the extent to which planning policies in Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle, in particular their respective projects to redevelop Ebertstraβe and Science 
Central, exemplify the typical policy styles of Germany and England. By following 
the same pattern as chapter 4, it investigates the extent to which each municipality 
relies on hierarchy rather than engagement and its preference for state of the art 
(SOTA) solutions rather than the best practicable means (BPM) to address a problem. 
It finds that Gelsenkirchen Council is shifting towards the English policy style in 
many respects, primarily due to pressure from other local actors and the 
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municipality’s fragile financial position. However, it continues to prefer hierarchy and 
SOTA solutions, particularly when compared to Newcastle.  
 
For its part, the English municipality is relying even more on horizontal engagement 
than was previously the case. Notably, this has resulted in Newcastle University 
taking the lead on the sustainability aspects of Science Central – and, since it has 
significantly more capacity than the municipality in this area, it has been able to 
invest in some high-end technical features that will reduce the development’s overall 
carbon footprint. In other words, Newcastle Council has been able to use its 
partnership with the academic institution to implement SOTA solutions by proxy – the 
sustainability features in its own Core Building are much less ambitious by 
comparison. 
 
5.3.1  Gelsenkirchen 
 
As this section of the chapter will show, there is certainly some evidence to suggest 
that the Ebertstraβe redevelopment was characterised by ‘German’-style hierarchical 
decision-making and a preference for SOTA solutions. However, it will also highlight 
how Gelsenkirchen Council is beginning to exhibit some ‘English’ characteristics, 
particularly around horizontal engagement and the need to develop a business case for 
investment. As with chapter 4, this section addresses each of these characteristics in 
turn and locates each municipality on both sub-dimensions to identify the extent to 
which they are converging towards a hybrid policy style. 
  
5.3.1.1  Hierarchy versus engagement  
 
Since the Ebertstraβe redevelopment is owned and managed entirely by the city of 
Gelsenkirchen, and Hans-Sachs-Haus is occupied solely by council employees and 
party-political staff, we might expect the state to adopt a very hierarchical and 
standardised approach to this project. This is because the council did not need to 
negotiate with a private developer, and therefore there was no question of it trying to 
encourage outside investment by reducing its sustainability demands. More generally, 
German municipalities operate within a set of strict legal requirements, which mean 
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that Gelsenkirchen would have very little room for manoeuvre when processing a 
planning application for an installation that might have environmental implications: 
 
If a company initiated something here, then questions about their emissions, or about 
noise, air, water and soil pollution would be administered in exactly the same way in 
Gelsenkirchen as in every other German city. There would be no difference. And the 
local authorities would administer it exactly like the state authorities, which are 
responsible for big industrial facilities. In that sense, politics is not allowed to make 
compromises (interview 24). 
 
Indeed, a number of hard-and-fast planning rules applied to the Ebertstraβe 
redevelopment, and they came from both the federal and the local government. For 
example, the 2009 Energy Conservation Act sets out a series of non-negotiable 
sustainability standards for new developments and the refurbishments of buildings 
constructed before 1990 (see section 5.2.1.1). Although standards at the state level are 
no stricter than this federal law (even for those regeneration projects that are part-
financed by Land funding), property professionals can find it very demanding to meet 
them, particularly when then apply to the refurbishment of an historic building like 
Hans-Sachs-Haus:  
 
It is difficult to upgrade an old building so that it chimes with the new energy saving 
regulations… If I pack up an old house in a plastic bag so it does not produce more 
emissions, I often encounter problems with the building’s physical structure. So it’s 
very, very important that we are careful… Because, for example, I might have 
problems with moisture, but we will only know this once the building is in use, if 
there are 320 people in there who breathe in and out (interview 23). 
 
Notably, Gelsenkirchen Council has taken sustainability requirements further than is 
required by statute for any new developments in those parts of the city that are owned 
by the state development corporation. This means that all new buildings constructed 
on this land must include photovoltaic panels and developers must avoid ‘major 
shading’ of south-facing roofs and walls to maximise solar access (Jung et al., 2010). 
In this way, the city is using traditional hierarchical regulations in order to further its 
Solarstadt branding and objectives. Since the state owns this land, it is able to 
exercise hierarchical authority much more easily: if it tried to introduce similarly 
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ambitious criteria for new buildings on private property, a developer would almost 
certainly be able to overturn them on appeal because they do not fit within the local 
framework (interview 20). 
 
Similarly, after the council assumed responsibility for Hans-Sachs-Haus in 2004, it 
was in a position to take such a hierarchical approach to the sustainability aspects of 
the refurbished building. Indeed, the initial competition for an architect indicated the 
importance of design features that mitigated climate change: the authority warned all 
bidders that it would not contemplate the use of materials such as PVC or 
unsustainable timber (interview 26) and also listed sustainability as a criterion for 
bidder selection (interview 23).  
 
However, the council did listen to the views of other organisations associated with the 
project. For example, the successful architectural firm (GMP) suggested a number of 
innovative ways in which the refurbished building could meet the requirements of the 
Energy Conservation Act. Not only did these include the use of photovoltaic panels 
on the roof and grey water recycling, but also – at GMP’s instigation – the project 
investigated whether the building might be sitting on a geothermal energy source from 
the former coal mine underneath the site (interviews 23 and 26). This investigation 
proved successful, and the refurbished building now includes an underfloor heating 
system that is connected to a geothermal source 70 metres underground. Similarly, 
GMP proposed that much of the south-facing side of the building be covered by a 
glass façade in order to maximise the passive solar benefits within the building and 
reduce demand for lighting and heating (interview 26). The fact that these features 
were suggested by the architect, rather than council employees, illustrates that 
Gelsenkirchen is open to ideas from other actors and does not always operate in a 
hierarchical decision-making mode. 
 
More broadly, the highly political nature of the Hans-Sachs-Haus building, together 
with the importance of the entire Ebertstraβe project for the future of the city centre, 
meant that the authority needed to demonstrate transparency in its decision-making 
and project management. This required significant engagement with the organisations 
occupying neighbouring properties and the wider public. For example, large and 
prominent Lutheran and Catholic churches overlook Heinrich-König-Platz, and there 
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were concerns that the demolition work would affect the fabric of these historic 
buildings (interview 17). Similarly, a number of local businesses, such as an ice cream 
parlour that experienced a significant drop in sales because of the amount of dust 
produced during the construction phase, were not particularly happy with the plans 
(interviews 17 and 23). In addition, other groups within the city argued that the money 
should have been spent on schools or kindergartens rather than redeveloping the city 
centre. These criticisms were bolstered by the poor management of public works 
projects elsewhere in Germany, which fed a growing suspicion that ‘the council can’t 
do it, or local government can’t do it’ (interview 23, see also section 5.2.1.2).  
 
To ensure a continuing dialogue with local residents, the council erected an 
information centre (the ‘blue box’) towards the northern end of Ebertstraβe, where 
people could find out more about the project, and put their questions and concerns to 
officers (interview 17, see figure 5.7). Although suggestions from individual residents 
and the pressure group Bürgerforum Hans-Sachs-Haus did not alter the overall 
project to any great extent, the principle of greater societal engagement still 
represented a shift away from the council’s traditional reliance on hierarchical 
decision-making (interview 23). Indeed, the authority took to unusual step of inviting 
critics of the Heinrich-König-Platz redevelopment onto the jury that decided which 
bidder should be awarded the contract for this work. This helped to ensure that 
 
the project was pushed from various angles, from council staff and from politicians, 
but also from citizens… Everyone came together during the process of involvement 
and information provision. So those who we saw previously as the biggest opponents 
were actually in the jury for the competition, and then they suddenly became 
supporters (interview 17). 
 
This shift towards greater citizen consultation in planning policy sits within a broader 
federal framework that requires all German councils to consult with their citizens 
about major planning developments (interview 23, Bückmann and Oel, 1981). Indeed, 
the principle of Bürgerbeteiligung (citizen involvement) has gained wider currency in 
Germany in recent decades, and one interviewee in particular felt that decision-
makers are now much more likely to take account of the wider public in planning 
policy decisions:  
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The planning process here is a very open process... there are always phases for public 
involvement. That means anyone can say anything about the plan, within a specific 
framework. And their views have to be considered: if they are rejected there needs to 
be a justification for that (interview 15). 
 
The participants in this process are mostly those who are directly affected by any 
potential development. As such, the churches, local businesses and the Bürgerforum 
Hans-Sachs-Haus made their voices heard about the Ebertstraβe project (interview 
23). This sits in stark contrast to any idea that the local state can impose its will in a 
hierarchical fashion, and it is notable that Gelsenkirchen went beyond its statutory 
duties to involve wider societal actors in its decision-making.  
 
Figure 5.7: The ‘blue box’ to engage with stakeholders about the Ebertstraβe 
redevelopment project (photograph taken in July 2013) 
 
In another striking example of its shift towards horizontal engagement rather than 
hierarchical regulation, the council has begun to allocate Land funding to property 
owners in the city centre in order to help them finance the renovation of public-facing 
façades and courtyards. Around 15% of buildings in the city centre are empty, which 
means that attempts to improve the look and feel of the area can be difficult: in a 
tenant’s market, there is little incentive for landlords to increase rents in order to 
finance property upgrades. As a result, rather than stipulate that the buildings must 
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meet a certain energy performance standard after the renovations are complete,16 
landlords only need to be informed about the sustainability improvements they could 
make in order to receive the money. In other words, the council does not attach any 
environmental strings to this funding: 
 
Together with the environment directorate, we have developed this process to provide 
advice on renewable and clean energy. And we’ve said the property owners can 
actually get this investment if they allow themselves to be advised. They don’t have 
to take it on board, but we are creating awareness of it (interview 17). 
 
Notably, the council felt that landlords would have done nothing to improve the 
appearance of their properties if they had been required to undertake a sustainability 
retrofit in return for the funding. Indeed, it is notable that ‘very few’ landlords 
installed features to improve the energy performance of buildings, and other ideas, 
such as putting green roofs atop garages, have also failed to take off in the city centre 
(interview 17). In that sense, it is probably fair to assume that the council’s fears 
would have materialised – but for the purposes of this thesis it illustrates how 
Gelsenkirchen is relying more on citizen engagement and persuasion than was 
perhaps previously the case. The council did not feel it had the capacity to take a more 
hierarchical approach, because this would not have been effective – instead, it adopted 
a more pragmatic coping strategy to try and achieve its objectives. 
 
In addition, the council also felt strongly that that engaging with local residents and 
businesses was ‘the right thing to do’ – for normative democratic reasons and also to 
increase the likelihood that the final project would be popular and successful 
(interview 17). The council may have been keener to act in this way because of the 
controversial history of Hans-Sachs-Haus and the importance of Ebertstraβe for the 
future of the city, but this nonetheless suggests that it embraced citizen engagement 
rather than hierarchical control primarily for political reasons. Crucially, however, 
this is still intrinsically related to the issue of municipal capacity. The controversial 
                                                 
16 Since this money is only earmarked for external renovations, and not whole-property refurbishments, 
these projects are exempt from the Energy Conservation Act requirement that stipulates the 
redevelopment of any pre-1990 property must meet the same standards as a new build. 
202 
 
nature of the project and the chequered history of Hans-Sachs-Haus meant that the 
authority’s overwhelming priority was to convince sceptical residents that the 
redevelopment project would be a success. The council recognised the importance of 
greater horizontal engagement to achieve this objective, and therefore rejected a more 
typically ‘German’ reliance on hierarchy. 
 
5.3.1.2  State of the art solutions versus best practicable means 
 
As chapter 3 outlined, Germany’s environmental policy style has traditionally relied 
on the ‘best available technologies’ or state of the art solutions (Knill and Lenschow, 
1998, Wurzel, 2002). This has gone hand-in-hand with an active industrial policy that 
has tried to stimulate domestic green industries by introducing legal regulations that 
encourage citizens and businesses to adopt increasingly sophisticated low-carbon 
technologies. As such, we might expect Gelsenkirchen Council to place a higher value 
on the technical environmental performance qualities of new buildings than its 
counterpart in Newcastle.  
 
Notably, the redeveloped Hans-Sachs-Haus does incorporate a range of sustainability 
features – and in this sense it is a more ambitious project than the Core Building in 
Newcastle. As one interviewee put it: 
 
Hans-Sachs-Haus is already heated by renewable energy, by geothermal and district 
heating – and the district heating system is supplied 100% by waste incineration. We 
also have a reusable water system, in other words a grey water tank that supplies all 
of the toilets in the building with rainwater… And of course we have photovoltaics 
on the roof (interview 23). 
 
Figure 5.8 shows how much of the roof of Hans-Sachs-Haus is covered in PV panels. 
Together with the other features mentioned in the above quotation, they contributed 
towards the building exceeding the requirements of the Energy Conservation Act and 
illustrated the council’s belief that it should act as a sustainability role model for other 
local actors (interviews 20, 21 and 23). Other notable aspects of the redeveloped 
Hans-Sachs-Haus include planting greenery on those parts of the roof that were in 
shade, installing low-energy lighting that is triggered by movement sensors, and a 
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conscious decision not to include any space for car parking on the site. The building’s 
innovative heating and cooling systems also illustrate how the council was keen to 
adopt the most sustainable support systems for its occupants: 
 
I haven’t got any air conditioning in the building, because air conditioning systems 
just gobble up electricity. But we have got a cooling system, and we have also 
provided a different system, a heat-exchange system, which… reduces energy 
consumption significantly (interview 23). 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Photovoltaic panels on the roof of Hans-Sachs-Haus (photograph taken in 
July 2013) 
 
The cooling system begins to function when the temperature in some parts of the 
building (such as the glass-fronted south-facing rooms) rises above a set temperature. 
This triggers a process in which cold mains water is sent through the underfloor 
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heating system – the same pipes that provide geothermal warmth during the winter 
months. In addition, hot air in the building is sucked out through the heat exchange 
system overnight, and replaced with fresh air from outside. 
 
This reliance on advanced technological solutions builds on Gelsenkirchen’s legacy of 
exemplar sustainability projects that stretches back to the mid-1990s (see chapter 3). 
These projects, which included the Ruhrgebiet’s first solar housing estate and a 
science park that was covered in PV panels, illustrated how the council sought to 
embrace state of the art green industries and hoped that other actors would follow its 
lead and stimulate the local market further. By ensuring that the newly refurbished, 
iconic council building also incorporated such advanced features, the city has raised 
its profile as a beacon of sustainability, to the extent that one officer was ‘pretty sure 
that this town hall will become important across Europe’ (interview 23).  
 
Indeed, it is worth re-iterating that Gelsenkirchen Council chose to restore Hans-
Sachs-Haus voluntarily – and it was not required to install quite so many 
environmentally-friendly features in the refurbished building. Despite its position as a 
heavily-indebted authority, the council wanted to get involved in a project on which 
any private investor would have made a loss (interview 23), as the first attempt at 
refurbishing the building proved (see section 5.1.1). Crucially, the municipality 
viewed Hans-Sachs-Haus as an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to 
sustainable technologies and act as a beacon for others to follow. In other words, there 
appeared to be an overwhelmingly preference for adopting SOTA solutions.  
 
However, the council’s precarious budgetary position has meant that it now wants its 
investments to deliver a financial return over the medium term (see chapter 6 for more 
details of how this applies to other corporate projects). This suggests that the 
municipality is shifting towards a preference for the best practicable means (BPM) for 
dealing with a problem. Indeed, the principle of ensuring a return on investment has 
become increasingly important across tiers of government in Germany. New federal 
accounting requirements now require local authorities to consider the whole-life costs 
of assets when taking investment decisions (interview 19). At the state level, the 
principle that any sustainability investment should also be financially sound is 
incorporated into the appraisal of municipal funding bids. Indeed, officials in the 
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Bezirksregierung will only consider whether construction projects are feasible from a 
technical perspective if they are able to demonstrate that the benefits will outweigh 
the costs (interview 27). In line with this principle, Gelsenkirchen Council stipulates 
that the payback period for investment in sustainability (or indeed any other) features 
is ten years, working on the basis that energy prices will double in cash terms over 
that period (interview 25).  
 
In spite of these pressures, various other factors have ensured that the authority does 
still approve cutting-edge installations. The most important of these is the Energy 
Conservation Act, which means that substantially refurbished buildings have to meet 
the same level of energy performance as a new construction (see section 5.2.1.1). As a 
result of this legislation, the council had to spend a significant amount of money 
upgrading Hans-Sachs-Haus in order to comply with the law. A second factor is 
Germany’s federal law that provides subsidies for small-scale renewable electricity 
generation through feed-in-tariffs (FITs). This initiative, which dates back to the early 
2000s, means that the Federal Government sets a fixed price for every unit of 
electricity that is generated through PV, wind power, biomass, hydropower or 
geothermal sources. Power companies are then required to buy any surplus energy at 
this fixed rate over a 25-year period and redistribute it through their electricity grids 
(Mendonca et al., 2010).  
 
This scheme has enabled Gelsenkirchen Council to generate an increasing amount of 
revenue from the sustainability features it has installed on public buildings. Indeed, 
the authority now has a policy that PV panels must be installed on all public buildings 
that are either refurbished or built from scratch, provided they will pay for themselves 
over the course of a decade. Where this business case does not stack up, the building 
has to be given a green roof instead. This requirement has been in place since 2000, 
which shows how long Gelsenkirchen has been committed to these principles 
(interview 20). Due to advances in solar technology over recent years, nearly all 
unshaded south-facing roofs are now covered with solar panels when the building is 
refurbished – and the council begins to reap a financial return on this investment 
within ten years of their installation (interview 25). 
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Crucially, therefore, the council views sustainability features as a way of meeting the 
budgetary requirement of delivering a return on investment, because they will either 
reduce energy consumption (and therefore expenditure) or generate income through 
feed-in-tariffs – or potentially do both simultaneously. As such, adopting green 
technologies helps to achieve both environmental and financial objectives, even if it 
can take some time to generate a return on the initial investment: 
 
We do it because we think it’s the right thing to do. We’re not required, for example, 
to install geothermal heating systems. We don’t have to put PV panels on the roof. 
But we do need to reduce energy costs (interview 23). 
 
In other words, although Gelsenkirchen Council no longer embraces the idea of 
‘green at all costs’, it does install advanced sustainability features into new and 
refurbished buildings – and can often generate a profit from its investment in these 
technologies. Moreover, because the sustainability features within Hans-Sachs-Haus 
go above and beyond what is required by statute, we should not characterise 
Gelsenkirchen as relying on BPM for resolving environmental problems. Nonetheless, 
the financial constraints within which it has to operate mean that the council has 
shifted away from its position of relying on ambitious SOTA solutions in the mid-
1990s. During this period it sought to put the solar industry at the centre of 
Gelsenkirchen’s regeneration plans and invested in a wide range of expensive 
exemplar projects to demonstrate its commitment to these new technologies (see 
chapters 3 and 4). Instead of preferring state of the art solutions, council planners now 
have to take much more account of their long-term costs – and therefore the authority 
has shifted away from its previous position along this sub-dimension (see figure 5.10 
on page 218). 
 
5.3.2  Newcastle 
 
This subsection sets out how planning policy in Newcastle, with a particular focus on 
the Core Building within the Science Central development, maps on to the two sub-
dimensions of ‘English’ policy style. Therefore, we might expect Newcastle to rely 
more on horizontal procedures than Gelsenkirchen, and also only include 
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sustainability features within the Science Central development if these solutions were 
the best practical way to address a particular problem. 
 
5.3.2.1  Hierarchy versus engagement 
 
Newcastle Council’s approach to planning relies increasingly on engaging with other 
horizontal actors, including developers and the wider public. Crucially, the abolition 
of the Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS), which means that the council no longer 
operates within such a rigid vertical framework (see section 5.2.2.1), has reduced its 
standing vis à vis other local stakeholders and meant it is becoming increasing 
dependent on them for resources. More specifically, the municipality has engaged 
very closely with Newcastle University on the Science Central project – to the extent 
that it depends on this institution for the necessary capacity to implement policy (see 
section 5.2.2.2). Indeed, as this subsection will demonstrate, the council sits very 
close to the ‘ideal’ English position along this sub-dimension. 
 
The RSS stipulated that at least ten per cent of the energy requirements for new 
developments would need to come from renewable sources, and these buildings 
would have to meet at least ‘very good’ BREEAM standards.17 The standards were 
subsequently incorporated into the Unitary Development Plan that set out the 
framework for planning decisions in the city (interview 2). However, the abolition of 
RSSs meant that the council could not enforce these regulations, which puts 
developers in a much stronger position than was previously the case. More 
importantly for the purposes of the policy styles typology, it diminishes the potential 
for hierarchical state regulation, particularly in a deprived part of the country. Indeed, 
as subsection 4.3.2.1 highlighted, the weaker vertical framework actually results in 
local authorities competing in a ‘race to the bottom’ on sustainability and other 
standards in order to try and attract investment: 
 
In the North East we are desperate to get development, we are desperate to have 
employment, we are desperate to have housing and everything else. And we do not 
                                                 
17 BREEAM is an internationally-recognised methodology for assessing the sustainability of buildings 
(see www.breeam.org).  
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have the luxury of those areas down south where there is enormous pressure for 
development... We’ve got to be careful, because there is a dire amount of 
development taking place in the North East, all of the councils are competing with 
each other… Councils are very concerned about pushing development away. And 
viability therefore is an enormous issue. You don’t want to load too much on 
developments so that a developer decides, ‘well, in that case I’m just going to go to 
North Tyneside, I’m going to go to Gateshead.’ So there is that kind of a concern, and 
therefore at the end of the day, when all the chips are down, the council may 
sometimes relax all these standards. That’s the reality (interview 2). 
 
Newcastle is keen to promote its image as a ‘green council’ and its Local Plan now 
asks potential developers to keep to the sustainability requirements that were set out 
within the old RSS and consider issues such as climate change mitigation (Newcastle 
City Council, 2014). However, developers are not obliged to do so and therefore they 
could appeal against any council decision to reject a planning application on the 
grounds that it does not meet these criteria. Although the authority has managed to 
agree strict standards for new developments in some locations, this is not something 
that it feels able to translate into a broader policy that is binding across the city. This 
situation echoes the conundrum faced by Gelsenkirchen Council when it incentivised 
landlords to improve the façades of their buildings but did not feel it could require the 
recipients to retrofit their properties in return for funding. Indeed, the economic 
situation in both cities means that their councils are less able to exert hierarchical 
pressure on private actors, and therefore they have to rely on horizontal engagement 
and persuasion in order to try and achieve their objectives. For Newcastle, this means 
that developers can exercise significant influence over the resulting policy: 
 
The council would love to be green… but the reality sometimes is that gets watered 
down further along the line… [Sometimes] we do succeed, but it’s by negotiation 
(interview 2). 
 
In the specific case of Science Central, the partners drafted an overarching site 
masterplan, which sets out the principles to which new buildings should adhere when 
they seek planning permission. In this way, it acts like the Local Plan, but its 
applicability is restricted to potential developments on the Science Central site. In the 
words of one interviewee, the masterplan sets out the ‘fundamentals, aspiration and 
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vision for the site’ by establishing the sustainability (and other) criteria that enable 
planning officers to decide on potential applications (interview 31). Local authorities 
are obliged to consult on these framework documents, and Newcastle did more than it 
was required to try and stimulate local interest in the whole Science City agenda: 
 
It was statutory, but it was a fairly pro-active exercise as well, so it wasn’t just 
pitching up telling people we’re going to be there and hope they turn up – there was 
an effort made to go and engage with people (interview 31). 
 
Notably, an initial masterplan for Science Central was scrapped after it became clear 
that its expectations for economic development were unrealistic in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis (interview 11). Nonetheless, although its economic 
ambitions were scaled down, the environmental requirements in the revised 
masterplan remained largely intact. These included the provision of bus lanes, cycle 
parking and pedestrianised areas, as well as stipulations that buildings must meet 
certain energy performance criteria (interview 8). 
 
Crucially, the council developed the masterplan together with the local university. 
The global engineering consultancy Arup also contributed to the final document – as 
well as drafting a complementary sustainability statement (Ove Arup & Partners, 
2010). This contrasts sharply with the situation in Gelsenkirchen, where the 
municipality took full ownership of the Ebertstraβe project and was solely responsible 
for determining its sustainability features. Although some have argued that the 
expertise of Arup’s consultants improved the chances of success for the whole 
Science Central initiative (Goddard and Vallance, 2013), one interviewee felt that 
their influence may have watered-down some of the partners’ sustainability 
objectives: 
 
So I could see at the time what the university requirements were, what the council 
requirements were, but then seeing the pressures from [Arup] also to say ‘yeah, ok, 
this is all right, but we do have to have something that is going to attract businesses, 
and, you know, generate wealth’… So the university has got its high ideals of it being 
an exemplar sustainable site, the Council kind of say ‘yes, we do too, with some 
caveats,’ and then you’ve got the developer that says ‘yeah, ok, we appreciate all of 
this, but there are some hard economic facts and we need to deliver’ (interview 13). 
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The above quote is instructive, in that it highlights the nature of discussions around 
the formation of the masterplan, and how the council’s sustainability ambitions were 
not as high as those of the university. More importantly, it shows how the council’s 
engagement with an external body meant that it compromised its ambitions in order to 
reduce the financial risk of the project. The same interviewee illustrated this point 
with the example of car parking: 
 
Clearly, cars per se, and bringing them into the city centre, are not desirable on a 
sustainability exemplar site. But, in order for the site to be viable, businesses need to 
want to come and locate there, and if they don’t have car parking they might not want 
to come. So the compromise that was reached was that car parking would be provided 
in the first instance, because it’s a huge site and there’s lots of space, but that that 
would be whittled down as the site got developed, and there may or may not be a 
multi-storey car park in the final [development], depending on how far that ‘no car’ 
policy could be pushed… So it’s kind of managed down, and ‘let’s test the water with 
how far we can get rid of cars’ (interview 13). 
 
Although the Science Central site is significantly bigger than Ebertstraβe, and 
therefore there is much more land available to accommodate cars, the contrast with 
Gelsenkirchen could not be more striking. The German council exerted its 
hierarchical authority by not countenancing the construction of a car park on 
principle, even underneath Hans-Sachs-Haus where there would have been sufficient 
space. Conversely, its English twin city’s involvement of external actors in the 
development of the masterplan led directly to the inclusion of a car park at Science 
Central. Therefore, both in terms of policy-making processes (the more horizontal 
approach that engages with external actors) and outputs (the ultimate decision to 
include a car park), Newcastle gave greater prominence to other organisations and 
their views on the interests of potential site users. These examples serve as classic 
case studies of the different policy styles normally attributed to Germany and 
England.  
 
Moreover, in spite of assurances from interviewees within the council and Science 
City that the sustainability criteria outlined in the masterplan could not be 
211 
 
compromised, an interviewee from the university suspected that these rules might be 
bent in future (interview 13). An officer at the council echoed these concerns:  
 
I suspect it may well be as we get further down the line, in sort of ten or fifteen 
years… there might be a bit of weakening round the edges, because we’ve achieved 
what we really set out to do apart from a small bit, but nobody’s wavering yet 
(interview 6). 
 
The quote above reiterates that there was no sign of the partners agreeing to lower 
sustainability standards at the time. Nevertheless, it does suggest that there is room for 
manoeuvre within the overall framework – and the masterplan itself suggests that 
incorporating some sustainability features into buildings on the site will be entirely 
voluntary. For example, green roofs on new buildings are not a necessary 
precondition for securing planning permission, because the masterplan merely states 
that they are to be ‘encouraged’ (interview 31). Once again, this illustrates how 
Newcastle is more prepared to engage horizontally with stakeholders rather that exert 
hierarchical authority, and potentially compromise over certain sustainability 
requirements in order to entice potential investors on to the site. 
 
Although the university and developer exercised some influence over the masterplan 
for the whole site, all parties were clear that the council had sole responsibility for the 
design of the Core Building (interviews 13 and 31). This does contain a number of 
notable sustainability features (see section 5.3.2.2), but they are not as innovative or 
ambitious as the university’s plans for its adjacent Urban Sciences Building, which 
will open in autumn 2017. Indeed, both the university and the council were keen to 
stress that the Urban Sciences Building will function as a ‘living laboratory’ 
(Newcastle University, 2014b, interview 31) to identify which technical or 
engineering solutions are most effective in achieving sustainability objectives: 
 
The building is about experimenting with different things, like different forms of 
cladding or, you know, different technologies... We want to study the… inhabitants of 
the building and how they respond… to changes in the building. So in particular, 
practices that are considered sustainable – actually, do the people respond well to 
those? Do they actually just override the systems? (interview 13). 
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As this quote suggests, data produced by the Urban Sciences Building should improve 
its own sustainability performance and also inform the design of future buildings. 
Interestingly, we can see how this perspective encapsulates the ‘English’ policy style 
of horizontal engagement. By ensuring that the building can respond to its occupants’ 
behaviour and technological developments, the university is effectively continuing to 
consult (albeit implicitly) with relevant stakeholders after it has been constructed. 
Although Gelsenkirchen could upgrade the sustainability features of Hans-Sachs-
Haus in the future (for example, it might replace the existing PV panels with more 
efficient solar technology once it becomes available), these flexible principles are not 
integrated into its core design. 
 
Overall, therefore it is clear that Newcastle’s approach to development planning, and 
its implications for climate change, is much more reliant on horizontal engagement 
than that of Gelsenkirchen. Indeed, recent legislative changes and the economic 
situation within Newcastle have exacerbated this situation, because the municipality is 
now a much weaker actor in local governance arrangements than was previously the 
case. Crucially, the lack of a robust vertical framework to underpin sustainable 
development means that any decision from the council to increase sustainability 
requirements could result in the city missing out on much-needed investment. As a 
result, it is very reluctant to exert hierarchical pressure on other local actors and relies 
even more on the typically ‘English’ characteristic of horizontal engagement instead 
(see figure 5.10 on page 218).  
 
5.3.2.2  State of the art solutions versus best practicable means 
 
As the previous subsection identified, the Science Central masterplan stipulates that 
new developments on the site must adhere to various environmental criteria. Notably, 
the Core Building contains a number of ambitious sustainability features: it has an 
‘excellent’ BREEAM rating; it collects rainwater from the flat roof areas, which is 
stored in an underground tank and then pumped back into the building to flush the 
toilets; there are photovoltaic panels on the roof; most of the rooms have a natural 
ventilation system rather than air conditioning; the open-plan design allows for a 
greater use of natural light than would otherwise be the case; and England’s largest 
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‘living wall’ has been erected on one side of the building (interview 31,  The Journal, 
2014, see Figure 5.9). Since these features exceed the standards set out in both the site 
masterplan and the council’s planning policy, they suggest that Newcastle is moving 
towards a preference for state of the art (SOTA) solutions, instead of relying on the 
best practicable means (BPM) and a hard financial business case for investment.  
 
Indeed, several officers in the council were sceptical about the extent to which it is 
possible to calculate the costs and benefits of potential climate change solutions 
(interviews 1, 11 and 31). For example, one interviewee highlighted the lack of 
common measurement standards for sustainable buildings, which meant that it was 
difficult to factor these considerations into a business case:  
 
There is no industry benchmark for what sustainability is. And as poor substitutes for 
that commonly-agreed benchmark we use things like BREEAM and these kinds of 
measurements – which are fine, you know, they measure very specific things for what 
they’re required to do. But in the absence of anything else they tend to be used as 
labels for things that they’re not really designed to be for (interview 11). 
 
The individual contrasted this confused picture with the clarity of economic data such 
as property prices or employment figures, which means that it is possible to calculate 
the costs of certain solutions but very difficult to determine their value in terms of 
potential sustainability benefits. In addition, although the UK Government has 
introduced feed-in-tariffs for small-scale energy producers, these producers receive a 
lower price per unit of electricity than their German counterparts. Together with the 
fact that the UK does not enjoy as much sunshine as Germany, this means that the 
payback period for installing PV panels is much longer. Thus, although the Core 
Building does have a number of photovoltaics on the roof, their installation was not 
supported by a cost-benefit analysis and detailed business case: 
 
I don’t think we’ve gone into that detail at all. I think it’s probably just a design team-
led decision on PV and location… I don’t think it was financially driven. Obviously 
there’ll be an element of payback on that but I don’t think there’s enough on there to 
make a huge dent… [But] at the same time I don’t think it’s just a tokenistic effort. It 
was a conscious decision to put them up there (interview 31). 
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Figure 5.9: The ‘living wall’ on the side of the Core Building (photograph taken in 
August 2014) 
 
As such, Newcastle Council decided to install photovoltaics on the Core Building 
because they felt it was the ‘right thing to do’ and would support the notion of Science 
Central as a beacon of sustainability. This suggests that the characteristically English 
reliance on BPM may not apply, since environmental technologies are not required to 
deliver a return on investment for the council. Indeed, the principle of preferring 
SOTA may be more relevant to Newcastle than Gelsenkirchen, where the council 
needs to recover the cost of installing PV panels over a ten year period.  
 
Nonetheless, the financial costs of the entire Science Central project were still a 
crucial consideration for the council. Indeed, the authority rejected an initial 
masterplan on the grounds that it would be an expensive ‘white elephant’ (interview 
6). More importantly, Newcastle’s City Deal with central government designated 
Science Central as an Accelerated Development Zone, which means that the council 
can keep all of the business rate revenue that is generated from those firms that 
operate on the site. As part of the Tax Increment Finance scheme it can also borrow 
against future income from this source for other capital projects – indeed, some of the 
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future investment in Science Central will be funded through this initiative (interview 
6). This increases the council’s incentive to attract investment to the site, and it sees 
Science Central’s image as a hub for science and sustainability as a way of achieving 
this objective (interview 31).  
 
As such, although the sustainability features in the Core Building are not supported by 
an explicit financial business case, they do fit within a wider strategy that aims to 
increase the council’s revenue by attracting investment to the area. Indeed, since the 
entire project is predicated on the idea that a further £19m of private sector investment 
will be forthcoming by 2033 (to complement the £31m of public money that has 
already been committed), the Science Central partners need to attract many additional 
organisations to the site in order to make it financially viable (interview 11). 
 
Furthermore, neither the Core Building nor the wider site will be as ambitious from a 
sustainability perspective as many council officers hoped at the outset. For example, 
ideas for a district heating network – a solution that normally reduces carbon 
emissions by heating properties more efficiently than traditional distributed systems 
(Gleeson et al. 2011) – did not take off as expected. In a fascinating echo of Hans-
Sachs-Haus, the council and university had initially planned to tap a geothermal well 
that they discovered underneath the site during the construction phase, and use this as 
the source of heat. The partnership was awarded £1m from central government to 
support these investigations, which was announced to great fanfare and placed at the 
centrepiece of Science Central’s narrative as a sustainable location (Trott, 2011, 
Goddard and Vallance, 2013). However, the project had to be shelved due to 
engineering problems encountered when accessing the source, which was much 
deeper underground than its counterpart in Gelsenkirchen (interview 31). Indeed, after 
the Core Building was connected to the main gas network in late 2014, the very idea 
of establishing a district heating network for the site appeared to be on hold (interview 
33).  
 
Notably, one interviewee suspected that much of the initial trumpeting of these 
features was to try and reinforce the sustainability rhetoric in the minds of potential 
investors, when in fact the reality was less impressive due to the compromises 
involved between the partners and developer: 
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We’ve looked at everything from hot rocks, no mechanical cooling, photovoltaics, a 
green wall, and a green roof, but there’s tensions… Sometimes I think we’re just 
tinkering around the edges, I mean doing stuff that’s visual (interview 6). 
 
Although some of the ideas above were incorporated into the Core Building, others 
were not. Indeed, even the much-vaunted green wall will only be temporary: it will 
disappear when an additional building is constructed in an adjacent plot in the future 
(interview 31), and was only actually proposed as an afterthought to improve the 
appearance of the building from the road (interview 6). The result is that ‘the building 
doesn’t have high sustainability credentials’ – a fact that one interviewee feared could 
jeopardise the overall marketing strategy for Science Central, particularly as it was the 
first to be completed on the site (interview 13). Whilst agreeing with this analysis, 
another interviewee pointed out that the potential cost of some solutions was 
undoubtedly a factor in this decision: 
 
It’s not going to win an award for the most sustainable or the most innovative 
approach to building design. The money wasn’t there necessarily to do that and the 
driver was really to get the first building on the site (interview 31). 
 
The last part of this quote is especially instructive: the need to construct the Core 
Building quickly and relatively cheaply had become the dominant priority, and its 
sustainability features had become subordinate to that. Indeed, the council now hopes 
the university will take on more responsibility for promoting Science Central as a 
location for green investment. In particular, it expects the innovations within the 
Urban Sciences Building to shape the future development of the site in terms of 
energy use and building performance: 
 
Without the uni we wouldn’t be doing things as we are now. There’s a whole range of 
things going on in this [Urban Sciences] building that will probably make it a game-
changer. It will set us apart nationally, and probably internationally as well in certain 
things: it would be potentially something unique to the whole country (interview 31). 
 
As such, although Newcastle Council is still keen on SOTA solutions, it has 
transferred much of the responsibility for developing (and resourcing) them to the 
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university. Indeed, its approach can be characterised as preferring state of the art 
solutions by proxy, since the authority has successfully managed to offload much of 
the bill for these innovations onto the university. This increased dependence has 
involved a significant trade-off in terms of the council’s ability to exert its influence 
over policy-making, because the focus is much more on how the university researches 
the viability of different sustainability solutions than stressing how the city as a whole 
is embracing this agenda (see also section 5.2.2.2). However, officers at Newcastle 
are largely content with such an arrangement (interview 31). 
 
 Gelsenkirchen Newcastle  
Hierarchy vs 
engagement 
Lower but increasing level of 
horizontal engagement due to 
politically-controversial nature of 
Ebertstraβe project 
High level of engagement with 
other societal actors, particularly 
the university 
Strong vertical framework enables 
the council to be more dominant vis à 
vis developers and use the planning 
process to further its sustainability 
objectives 
Weak vertical framework makes 
the council vulnerable to 
powerful developers and more 
likely to agree lower 
sustainability standards 
SOTA vs 
BPM 
Not as keen on SOTA as during the 
1990s: financial problems mean that 
solutions need to pay for themselves 
over ten years  
Financial issues mean the 
council is keener on BPM than 
previously 
Legal framework supports (and even 
mandates) the use of high-end 
technical solutions 
University’s ambition for 
Science Central results in SOTA 
solutions by proxy 
 
Table 5.3: Changes in the sub-dimensions of policy styles as applied to planning in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
Drawing on the discussion above, table 5.3 and figure 5.10 highlight how the case 
study councils adopt distinct styles for planning policy. If we discount the fact that 
Newcastle relies on ‘SOTA by proxy’ due to its close relationship with the university, 
they illustrate how both cities are moving in the same direction along both sub-
dimensions of policy style. Nonetheless, their planning approaches still remain very 
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distinct. For example, although Gelsenkirchen is now more open to public comment 
and engagement than previously (as evidenced by its charm offensive to maintain 
support for the Hans-Sachs-Haus and Heinrich-König-Platz projects), the 
municipality remains the dominant actor in the locality and takes decisions fairly 
autonomously. In particular, developers in Germany are not able to exercise as much 
influence over decisions as they are in England, where councils are incentivised to 
agree lower sustainability standards in order to encourage investment. This contrast 
was illustrated most starkly in the decision-making processes regarding car parking 
spaces at Hans-Sachs-Haus and the Core Building: Gelsenkirchen Council stuck to its 
principles in the former case, but Newcastle was persuaded by the developer to 
construct a car park as a way of encouraging external investment in the latter.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Changes in the sub-dimensions of policy styles as applied to planning in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
Fundamentally, these contrasts are a function of the different multi-level governance 
arrangements identified earlier in the chapter. In England, the weak nature of vertical 
regulations places municipalities in deprived areas at the mercy of private companies, 
who can demand lower environmental standards in return for investing in the 
borough. In other words, Newcastle Council’s independence along the vertical 
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dimension of multi-level governance means that it is much more dependent on other 
horizontal actors for the capacity to achieve its policy objectives. In comparison, 
Germany’s stronger vertical framework for sustainable development, along with the 
strict environmental standards of the Energy Conservation Act and the tradition of 
Politikverflechtung, means that municipalities are unable to compromise with 
developers. Crucially, this degree of vertical interdependency enables Gelsenkirchen 
Council operate much more independently within the borough compared to 
Newcastle.  
 
This suggests that the institutional framework within which each city operates is a key 
driver of policy style. Indeed, the relative strength of the municipality vis à vis other 
societal actors influences whether it can exercise hierarchical authority within local 
governance arrangements. Since Gelsenkirchen retained responsibility for the 
redevelopment of Ebertstraβe in-house and exhibits Type I multi-level governance 
characteristics along the horizontal sub-dimension more generally, it was much better 
placed to exert its authority through hierarchical decision-making. By way of contrast, 
various different organisations have assumed some responsibility for the Science 
Central site at some point over the last ten years, and this fragmented situation meant 
that Newcastle Council needed to rely on other bodies to implement its policies. This 
has resulted in a much more horizontal approach to decision-making, because the 
authority needs to co-ordinate and agree compromises with other bodies (especially 
the university).  
 
In terms of the council’s preference for BPM or SOTA solutions the picture is 
somewhat different – but again, it is shaped by the contrasting institutional 
arrangements that operate within each city. Germany’s highly interdependent vertical 
framework means that new or refurbished buildings such as Hans-Sachs-Haus must 
install advanced sustainability features. Furthermore, its more lucrative system of 
feed-in-tariffs, which were designed both to reduce dependence on nuclear energy and 
to encourage the domestic renewables sector to develop highly technical solutions, 
has meant that small-scale energy installations deliver a return on investment over a 
shorter timeframe. As a result, Gelsenkirchen Council can assume that high-end 
technologies will pay for themselves over ten years and therefore invests in them 
despite severe financial pressures. Since this situation encourages the installation of 
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advanced features (provided that they are supported by a business case), it can still be 
characterised as a preference for SOTA – although not as strong as was previously the 
case during the 1990s (see figure 5.10). 
 
Interestingly, and in contrast to what we might expect from an English city, 
Newcastle Council did not even undertake a business benefits assessment before 
deciding to install sustainability features in the Core Building – and the authority does 
not expect them to deliver a financial return. Instead, it wanted the building to 
symbolise the city as a sustainability leader – something that is much more akin to the 
idea of preferring state of the art solutions. However, the features within the Core 
Building are considerably less ambitious from a sustainability perspective than those 
in Hans-Sachs-Haus, or Newcastle University’s Urban Sciences Building. Indeed, the 
university’s heavy involvement in the Science City project, and its desire to design 
buildings as ‘living laboratories’ for green technologies, has enabled the council to 
divest itself of some responsibility to lead the city in this area. As such, Newcastle 
Council does have a preference for state of the art sustainable technologies, but this is 
exercised by proxy, rather than through the municipality directly. Once again, this is a 
result of the different structural arrangements that operate within the city: Newcastle 
Council’s weaker position vis à vis other actors means that it needs to develop these 
partnerships in order to increase its capacity for policy implementation. Moreover, the 
presence of a university that is keen to fund sustainability research has provided the 
council with a very useful partner and ‘anchor institution’ to help achieve its 
objectives. 
 
5.4  Conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown the extent to which planning decisions in Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle, particularly the Ebertstraβe and Core Building development projects, are 
characterised by typically ‘German’ and ‘English’ multi-level governance structures 
and policy styles. In particular, it has demonstrated how the contrasting institutional 
frameworks in each country have shaped how Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle Council 
make and implement their planning policies. Crucially, the strong and interdependent 
nature of vertical structures in Germany enabled Gelsenkirchen to operate much more 
independently than Newcastle in horizontal governance arrangements. The result is a 
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more hierarchical local authority, planning decisions that are much less open to 
negotiation and a stronger preference for SOTA solutions. In contrast, the weaker 
institutions in England mean that Newcastle operates more independently along the 
vertical dimension, which means it is more dependent on the capacity of horizontal 
actors to invest in sustainability features and achieve its political objectives.  
 
There is some evidence to suggest that this situation is changing, with 
Gelsenkirchen’s approach moving towards the traditional English position. For 
example, the controversy over the Hans-Sachs-Haus redevelopment meant that the 
council needed to engage more with residents to ensure continued public support for 
the project, and the authority is attempting to persuade (rather than compel) landlords 
to improve the energy performance of their buildings in return for receiving public 
money to renovate their façades. Nonetheless, the highly structured nature of 
Germany’s institutional environment restricts the power of developers to influence 
decisions and requires new and refurbished buildings to install advanced technologies. 
As a result, the overall approach is very unlikely to change significantly.  
 
It is also unlikely that Newcastle’s approach to planning and climate change will alter 
much in the foreseeable future. The UK government has been much more reluctant to 
insist on strict sustainability criteria for new buildings, and northern English cities 
remain economically disadvantaged compared to many parts of the south. These 
factors, together with the lack of a robust regional framework for sustainable 
development, make it much more likely that councils such as Newcastle will 
compromise with developers on environmental standards. Therefore, barring change 
at the national level that would tighten up sustainability requirements for planning 
applications, local government will still be involved in a race to the bottom to attract 
investment.  
 
Furthermore, English municipalities that wish to promote themselves as sustainability 
leaders will need to continue working horizontally with other actors in order to 
increase their capacity. Newcastle Council’s partnership with one of the city’s 
universities through the Science Central project does suggest that the council can 
achieve political objectives through such an arrangement, and it has been able to 
associate itself with the university’s preference for state of the art technical solutions 
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as a result. Notably, however, these ambitious sustainability features are geared 
primarily towards meeting the university’s research objectives, rather than projecting 
an image of the city as a cutting-edge, environmentally-friendly place. In addition, if 
municipalities are becoming increasingly dependent on private or semi-private 
organisations (such as universities) in this way, it means that local citizens are 
exerting less democratic control over policy-making processes. These issues will be 
explored further in the next chapter, which looks at how both Newcastle and 
Gelsenkirchen have sought to include climate change considerations in their corporate 
activities. 
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Chapter 6: Corporate policies in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
As the previous chapter highlighted, councils are not always able to exert hierarchical 
control over planning policy, even though decision-making for this sector is devolved 
to local government in both England and Germany. In the case of Newcastle, this is 
due to the lack of a robust vertical framework to buttress the council’s position vis à 
vis other horizontal actors, whereas the controversial nature of Hans-Sachs-Haus 
meant that Gelsenkirchen Council sought to engage with civil society to ensure that it 
retained support for its regeneration project. When compared to planning, we might 
expect municipalities to have more control over their corporate policies – in other 
words, their positions as organisations on consuming natural resources in day-to-day 
activities, corporate procurement, transport or municipal buildings. Indeed, Bulkeley 
and Kern (2006) use the term ‘self-governing’ to describe the mode that a local 
authority adopts when it takes decisions about organisational operations in this way.  
 
By illustrating how organisations can operate in a less carbon-intensive manner, these 
corporate policies also allow the municipalities to set an example to other societal 
actors. This is particularly the case in cities that are trying to portray themselves as 
forward-looking, sustainable locations, including Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. 
Indeed, both councils’ climate protection strategies include details of how the 
municipality as an organisation will help with the city’s overall objectives to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (Stadt Gelsenkirchen, 2011, Newcastle City Council, 
2010).  
 
Moreover, the financial constraints within which both municipalities have to operate, 
along with the fact that wholesale fuel prices have increased significantly in recent 
years, mean that corporate energy conservation has become an increasingly important 
issue. On top of this, English authorities such as Newcastle also face two additional 
pressures that do not apply to German authorities. Firstly, the UK Government’s CRC 
Energy Efficiency Scheme requires large energy consumers to pay an additional levy 
per tonne of CO2 that they emit from electricity and gas consumption (interview 3). 
224 
 
Secondly, English municipalities are faced with rapidly increasing rates of landfill 
tax, which has increased the importance of waste minimisation (interview 10)18. 
Nonetheless, although resource conservation may be a slightly more pressing issue for 
Newcastle, both authorities have placed this at the centre of their climate change 
strategies, whilst also seeking to increase their reliance on renewable energy sources. 
 
As such, this chapter investigates the decision-making processes involved in 
determining each authority’s position on issues such as energy and water 
consumption, procurement, travel policy and asset utilisation – and how they 
incorporate climate change considerations. It focuses in particular on energy 
consumption and corporate transport, since they account for the vast majority of the 
CO2 produced by each authority (Newcastle City Council, 2008, Stadt Gelsenkirchen, 
2011). Although these corporate activities are not necessarily highly visible to the 
wider public at the ‘front line’ of interactions between the state and its citizens, ‘self-
governing’ nonetheless represents an extremely useful object of academic analysis. 
Indeed, these corporate policies should provide a valuable counterpoint to chapters 4 
and 5, which focused on sectors over which the authority may be able to exert less 
hierarchical influence. 
 
The remainder of this chapter covers each city in turn and maps the decision-making 
processes against the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2. In this way, it 
addresses the vertical and horizontal nature of multi-level governance arrangements, 
followed by an analysis of the extent to which each city relies on hierarchy rather than 
engagement, and state of the art (SOTA) solutions instead of the best practicable 
means (BPM, see table 6.1). As with chapters 4 and 5, it also examines how capacity 
issues within each municipality have shaped the nature of vertical and horizontal 
power dependencies, and, by extension, local governance arrangements and policy 
styles. The chapter then concludes by summarising how these approaches have 
changed in recent years, and the drivers of this process.  
  
                                                 
18 The German Federal Government phased out the use of landfill sites in 2006 and therefore these 
potential costs do not affect Gelsenkirchen. 
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Typically ‘German’ 
characteristics 
Typically ‘English’ 
characteristics 
Multi-level 
governance 
dimension 
Vertical sub-
dimension 
Highly-structured vertical 
framework 
Loose and flexible 
vertical arrangements 
Horizontal 
sub-dimension 
Responsibilities 
concentrated in the local 
authority 
Fragmented local public 
service provision 
Policy styles 
dimension 
Vertical sub-
dimension 
Strong state hierarchy 
Horizontal engagement 
and compromise 
Horizontal 
sub-dimension 
Reliance on state of the art 
(SOTA) technological 
solutions 
Preference for best 
practicable means (BPM) 
and cost-effectiveness 
 
Table 6.1: Dimensions and sub-dimensions of ‘ideal type’ multi-level governance and 
policy styles in Germany and England 
 
6.2  Multi-level governance and corporate policies  
 
6.2.1  Gelsenkirchen  
 
This section addresses the two sub-dimensions of Type I multi-level governance in 
the context of Gelsenkirchen. As such, it identifies whether the city’s corporate 
policies on resource use are shaped by a structured vertical framework involving other 
tiers of government, before analysing the extent to which responsibility for these 
policies is concentrated in the local authority. It also highlights how capacity issues 
have led to the authority working more interdependently with other horizontal actors 
in this sector and thereby changed the nature of institutional governance arrangements 
over recent years.  
 
6.2.1.1  Vertical governance structures  
 
As chapter 4 demonstrated in the context of planning policy, local government in 
Germany operates within a structured vertical framework, with the result that 
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municipalities do not have much room to negotiate with developers about the nature 
or location of a particular project. This strengthens the hand of the municipality vis à 
vis other horizontal actors and thereby helps it to achieve sustainability objectives – 
even though it suggests that local authorities are not as autonomous as the concept of 
lokale Selbstverwaltung might suggest. 
 
However, a similarly structured vertical framework does not apply to corporate 
policies within municipalities. Neither the federal nor the state government of North 
Rhine-Westphalia have obliged local authorities to work towards reducing GHG 
emissions caused by their own activities, or to report on their progress towards this 
objective. Nonetheless, interviewees did feel that changes in societal attitudes and the 
wider political context have created a culture in which citizens increasingly expect 
public bodies to rely on renewable energy. This has encouraged Gelsenkirchen 
Council to set an example by operating more sustainably: 
 
You couldn’t have predicted the end of nuclear energy in Germany ten years ago, but 
then the CDU government changed its mind after Fukushima. In reality, that 
increased the political pressure from outside [on us]… Public opinion has definitely 
changed (interview 20). 
 
The above quote refers, albeit implicitly, to the principle of Energiewende (energy 
transition), which stresses the importance of moving Germany away from a reliance 
on traditional sources of electricity and towards renewables (see chapter 3). Although 
the Energiewende is a policy of the federal government, there is widespread public 
support for the principle across the country (Huß, 2014). Notably, staff at 
Gelsenkirchen Council recognised that public bodies across Germany need to play a 
crucial role in implementing the policy, by reducing their overall consumption and 
procuring energy from renewable sources (interview 22). This provides a further 
illustration of the consensual nature of policy-making across different tiers of the 
German state, and the way in which the Energiewende has facilitated policy co-
ordination between vertical actors (see also chapter 3). 
 
Indeed, the Energiewende narrative extends downwards below the municipal level to 
the Stadtbezirke, or city districts, which have their own representative assemblies and 
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mayors and can take decisions about the future of their area (see section 4.2.1.1 in 
chapter 4). Gelsenkirchen has five of these districts, which play an important role in 
corporate policy-making. For example, the Stadtbezirk assembly must approve any 
investment in public infrastructure in its district that costs between €20,000 and 
€75,000 (projects exceeding this valuation are considered by the council). The 
Stadtbezirk mayors also produce annual plans for public building initiatives at the 
district level, which must be authorised by the assembly (interview 20). These 
districts, which have been embedded in Gelsenkirchen’s governance arrangements 
since 1975, liaise frequently with the city council on how public bodies can reduce 
their impact on climate change and take these considerations into account in their 
infrastructure decisions (interview 20). The mutually supportive and interdependent 
nature of this relationship, as well as its anchoring within a structured framework, 
suggests that Gelsenkirchen Council’s corporate policies fit within a broadly Type I 
model of multi-level governance.  
 
In addition, higher tiers of governance are able influence Gelsenkirchen Council’s use 
of energy, due to the financial constraints within which the authority operates. As 
previous chapters have outlined, the municipality is subject to a budgetary assurance 
programme that restricts its ability to spend money and results in the Land (via the 
Bezirk) having greater oversight of financial decision-making. Not only does this 
increase the importance of resource conservation within the authority, but it also 
means that the council needs to meet the Land’s criteria to obtain grants for corporate 
projects. As a result, the Land can pull on these ‘golden reins’ and influence 
municipal policies and activities. For example, applications for Bezirk funding to 
finance kindergarten refurbishments were only approved in 2008 and 2009 if the 
renovated buildings would meet higher standards of energy performance than those 
that applied at the time to new build properties (interview 27). This illustrates how the 
Land, via the Bezirk, was able to shape Gelsenkirchen Council’s policy on the energy 
efficiency of corporate buildings. At the same time, however, the municipality 
benefited from this interdependent arrangement, because it was able to access external 
resources and ensure that the buildings had a very high level of energy performance – 
in fitting with its policy objectives.  
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Furthermore, as chapter 4 highlighted, the Bezirk provides significant support to 
municipalities to ensure that they meet the funding criteria, in line with 
Politikverflechtung and the principle that different tiers of government in Germany 
are mutually supportive. Similarly, the Land has provided funding for Gelsenkirchen 
to install LED street lighting in some areas (interview 20). Through its 
EnergieAgentur institute, the state government has also advised the council on its 
annual corporate electricity saving week, as well as an initiative to help the city’s 
schools conserve energy (interview 16). The schools’ programme was funded by the 
federal government, in another example of how the different tiers of government were 
able to work together interdependently in pursuit of ambitious policy goals at the 
local level.  
 
Crucially, these higher tiers of government do not specify how municipalities should 
spend the money, and are quite content to let individual authorities take control of 
their own internal affairs (interview 27). In other words, although local authorities 
recognise their crucial role in implementing the Energiewende agenda, they do not 
have to report their progress to the Bezirk, Land or Bund. This also means there are no 
hard mechanisms through which the federation or Land could ‘reward’ or ‘punish’ 
individual municipalities. Indeed, the idea that ministers could or should exert their 
influence over councils in this way struck staff as somewhat peculiar (interview 16). 
Instead, the institutional environment is more oriented towards providing 
municipalities with financial and advisory support to help them achieve their own 
policy objectives at the local level, and the Energiewende provides a common 
framework for cross-tier co-operation. Although these vertical structures for corporate 
policy are not as formal or interdependent as the framework that is in place for 
planning (see chapter 4), they are nonetheless closer to a Type I multi-level 
governance model than the flexible, unstructured nature of Type II arrangements.  
 
This vertical context means that Gelsenkirchen Council works more interdependently 
with other tiers of government on its corporate policies than its counterpart in 
Newcastle (see figure 6.2 on page 244). Indeed, the recent emergence of the 
Energiewende narrative has built upon the prevailing trend of Politikverflechtung to 
ensure that vertical actors have become even more integrated in recent years. As with 
climate change strategy and planning policy, the mutually-supportive nature of these 
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relationships reinforces the existing institutional structures along this sub-dimension, 
since different tiers of government recognise how greater co-operation can increase 
their capacity to achieve policy objectives. As section 6.2.1.1 will demonstrate, this 
contrasts sharply with the situation in England, where dynamic (but nonetheless 
largely detached) central-local relations and the lack of a prevailing Energiewende 
narrative means that municipalities operate much more independently along the 
vertical sub-dimension and Type II characteristics predominate (see also figure 6.1 on 
page 243).  
 
6.2.1.2  Horizontal governance structures 
 
As chapters 3 and 4 highlighted, Gelsenkirchen Council has privatised a number of 
former municipalised services in recent years to try and counteract a significant fall in 
revenue from business taxation. As a result, the authority no longer has direct control 
over water and energy provision, and the city’s Stadtwerke is responsible solely for 
leisure services. Senior managers recognise the implications of this arrangement for 
their ability to mitigate climate change, both across the city as a whole and also within 
the local authority, because it means they no longer control how the city’s energy is 
produced. However, they do not feel that re-municipalisation is a realistic option: 
 
Yes, that decision was crucial. With hindsight you can see that. But the economic 
risks of re-establishing the Stadtwerke are so incalculable that doing so would be 
irresponsible (interview 25). 
 
As another interviewee explained, any publicly-owned utility company would need to 
compete with established private providers. Since the municipality no longer owns 
any large power stations, it would have to buy energy on the open market – almost 
certainly at higher wholesale prices than multinational companies such as RWE. 
Therefore, a re-municipalised Stadtwerke would be in a very vulnerable position 
compared to the established private energy companies, even if the council might itself 
be a customer: 
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We could create a greener energy company, but in the end it would need to make a 
profit… Of course you can set something up with different priorities, but the bottom 
line is that a municipal company has to operate in the black (interview 20). 
 
This suggests that the Type I horizontal characterisation of a multi-functional 
authority, where responsibilities are concentrated within the municipality, does not 
apply to Gelsenkirchen’s corporate policy-making arrangements. However, as section 
4.2.1.2 in chapter 4 outlined, the council still has some control over Emscher Lippe 
Energie (ELE), the main energy provider in the city. This is because the company is a 
partnership between RWE and three other municipalities in the Ruhrgebiet: 
Gelsenkirchen, Bottrop and Gladbeck. Together, the local authorities own a joint 49% 
stake in ELE and they need to agree to any strategic decisions that the company takes. 
The city also has three extensive district heating networks, which can be fuelled by 
various different energy sources, including gas, coal, oil or wood pellets (interview 
20). In other words, Gelsenkirchen Council has retained some responsibility for some 
energy provision within the city (and it buys this energy for itself as a customer). This 
suggests that it remains some distance away from a model Type II authority along the 
horizontal sub-dimension and is certainly not dependent on other local actors in this 
area (see figure 6.3 on page 245). 
 
The market dynamic does not operate for water provision, where a single provider, 
Gelsenwasser, is responsible for supply in the city. Gelsenwasser is an independent 
state-owned company belonging to the four Ruhrgebiet municipalities of Bochum, 
Dortmund, Herna and Gelsenkirchen. Notably, a number of officers stressed the 
importance of ensuring that responsibilities for water remained in the public sector, 
partly to ensure that all citizens have access to this essential resource. They also 
argued that a functioning market in water supply is potentially dangerous, since price 
competition might encourage companies to cut corners and put public health at risk 
(interview 20). More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, however, although 
the shared ownership model suggests that corporate water policies operate within a 
fragmented horizontal context, each municipality remains responsible for deciding its 
position on corporate consumption. Therefore, as with energy use, the council retains 
control over the organisation’s water policy in accordance with the Type I model of 
multi-level governance. 
231 
 
 
However, the implementation of corporate policies to reduce energy and water 
consumption has proved somewhat difficult. For example, the manager in charge of 
some projects in this area bemoaned the fact that the property directorate was 
reluctant to engage with the agenda (interview 16). This officer had tried to persuade 
staff across the council that they needed to change their behaviour, such as by 
switching off computers and lights when their offices were not in use, but found it 
very difficult to make any progress. Eventually, the authority contracted-out the 
management of these projects to a private company, which has undertaken this work 
since 2003. By allocating certain functions to task-specific ‘delivery’ organisations in 
this way, Gelsenkirchen Council recognised that it lacked the capacity to implement 
the policy alone, and therefore had to rely on external support to achieve its 
objectives. As such, it has moved away from Type I horizontal arrangements, because 
some responsibilities are no longer concentrated in the local authority.  
 
The contract works on a revenue-sharing and payment-by-results basis, which means 
that the private supplier must change staff behaviour and reduce energy consumption 
before it receives any money for its work. Initially, there was some internal opposition 
to the idea of contracting-out any municipal activities, with some staff questioning 
why their colleagues appeared unable to carry out the work themselves and suspicious 
about the involvement of private companies. However, the arrangement has strong 
support from council directors and politicians – particularly because the municipality 
does not carry any financial risk: 
 
The project is cost-neutral… The mayor’s representative said to me, ‘You’re bringing 
money into the council… It’s good. No politician is going to say we’ll get rid of that’ 
(interview 16).  
 
Indeed, senior managers were so pleased with the arrangement that the council has 
entered into a similar contract to try and change staff behaviour in schools and 
childcare facilities. As the following breakdown illustrates, the contract still ensures 
that Gelsenkirchen Council will save money as a result of lower energy and water 
bills: 
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 30% of the financial savings are kept by the private company as commission; 
 40% is reinvested by the relevant directorate in additional energy-saving; 
measures, such as a new LED lighting system for a library; 
 15% is taken by the council’s finance office to contribute towards 
Gelsenkirchen’s debt reduction programme; 
 15% is kept and spent by the corporate energy-saving team to promote its 
activities. 
 
However, it is notable that officers opted for this arrangement because they did not 
have the capacity to achieve policy objectives independently of other horizontal 
actors. These constraints were a caused by a combination of two factors. Firstly, the 
manager responsible for encouraging behavioural change was frustrated at the lack of 
engagement from other parts of the municipality, and therefore felt that the issue 
would be better tackled by external experts. Secondly, because local politicians took a 
major interest in the energy-saving programme, they wanted regular updates from the 
energy conservation team, which meant that officers spent a lot of time in council 
committees and responding to queries from elected representatives – rather than 
delivering awareness-raising workshops to colleagues (interview 16).  
 
The decision to outsource this work illustrates how Gelsenkirchen Council has had to 
respond to a vertical context that is less structured than in other sectors, particularly 
planning. Importantly, the authority sought to work more interdependently with 
horizontal actors in order to access the resources that were necessary to increase its 
capacity to achieve policy objectives (see figure 6.3 on page 245). As one officer 
pointed out, if more support had been available from higher tiers of government to 
facilitate behavioural change amongst staff, officers may not have needed to seek 
assistance from elsewhere to fill the capacity gap (interview 16). This shows how the 
power dependencies that apply to corporate policy-making are more similar to those 
that relate to climate change strategy (see chapter 4), rather than planning (chapter 5).  
 
The above discussion also illustrates how Gelsenkirchen Council’s corporate policies 
on resource use no longer fit comfortably within an ideal Type I model of multi-level 
governance along the horizontal sub-dimension. The municipality now has direct 
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responsibility for fewer functions than was previously the case: instead, it relies 
increasingly on external task-specific organisations to deliver policy. As with the shift 
away from Type I arrangements for climate change strategy, this change can be 
attributed to a realisation that the authority does not have the capacity to achieve its 
objectives independently of other local actors.  
 
Furthermore, it suggests that municipalities may need to rely on other actors to 
implement their policies even in areas where they may be ‘self-governing’. This is 
particularly notable because we might expect organisations to have significant control 
over the activities of their own staff, and therefore the council would be able to 
achieve its objectives on reducing energy consumption with relative ease. The very 
fact that the council needed to outsource some of its activities in this area suggests 
that it is not able to exert hierarchical authority as effectively as it might wish.  
 
At this point it becomes clear that the employees of Gelsenkirchen Council are 
governing actors in their own right. Indeed, since the authority has sought to involve 
them in policy-making and implementation, they are covered by the definition of 
governing actors set out in section 2.2.3 (see chapter 2). This means that the power 
dependencies involved in employer-employee relations are a key dynamic in 
corporate policy-making along the horizontal sub-dimension. As a result, we might 
expect a more interdependent approach in jurisdictions such as Germany, where the 
vertical macroeconomic context means that workers and their representatives tend to 
be more influential in organisational decision-making than in those countries that 
have adopted more ‘Anglo-American’ policies (see Crouch and Streeck, 1997, for a 
comprehensive overview of different types of Western capitalism). Indeed, as section 
6.3.1.1 will illustrate, a key reason why Gelsenkirchen Council has had to engage 
more with its staff than Newcastle relates to the German economic model of 
consensus-based capitalism, which requires employers (often by statute) to consult 
widely with employees and their representatives before introducing any changes into 
the workplace. 
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6.2.2  Newcastle 
 
This section follows the pattern of 6.2.1 by addressing the two sub-dimensions of 
multi-level governance in the context of Newcastle. As such, it begins by identifying 
the extent to which the council’s corporate policies are shaped by a structured vertical 
framework involving other tiers of governance, particularly the UK central 
government. This is followed by analysis of other actors that may influence decision-
making along the horizontal sub-dimension. It also examines how the nature of power 
relationships have influenced and changed these multi-level governance arrangements 
over recent years. 
 
6.2.2.1  Vertical governance structures 
 
In recent decades, central government has introduced a number of hierarchical 
performance frameworks and targets, against which all English municipalities had to 
report and were assessed by the Audit Commission (see chapter 3 for further details). 
This stands in contrast to the German (and indeed North Rhine-Westphalian) view 
that the federal and Land governments should not direct the affairs of local 
authorities: indeed they should endeavour to help them achieve their local objectives 
wherever possible. To illustrate the importance of this influence, Newcastle Council’s 
climate change strategy makes a direct link between the municipality’s aim to deliver 
a 60% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and the UK Government’s 
Climate Change Act. It also lists details of the ministerial targets that relate to local 
government’s role in mitigating and adapting to climate change, and sets out how the 
authority will endeavour to achieve them (Newcastle City Council, 2008, p. 8). 
 
UK Government ministers began introducing these detailed performance frameworks 
with the Best Value regime in 1998. Best Value was followed by Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment (CPA) in the early 2000s, which was succeeded by 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) in 2009. Although the incoming Coalition 
Government abolished CAA a year later, these frameworks set out ministerial 
priorities for local government and incorporated various incentives that encouraged 
councils to implement central government policies. These incentives included ‘local 
authority league tables’ that were based on the how Audit Commission judged each 
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municipality, and which led to ‘high-performing’ councils receiving additional 
‘freedoms’ whilst their ‘poor-performing’ counterparts were threatened with direct 
central intervention (Jas and Skelcher, 2014).  
 
Notably, CAA assessed how individual municipalities were using natural resources 
such as energy, water and raw materials: this formed one of ten ‘key lines of enquiry’ 
that contributed towards the Audit Commission’s overall judgement on resource and 
financial management. As a result, corporate policies on climate change contributed 
directly towards this overall score for the municipality. In addition, both CPA and 
CAA required all local authorities to report the CO2-equivalent emissions that were 
produced as a result of their activities. This constituted National Indicator 185, which 
the Audit Commission incorporated into its overall performance assessment for the 
municipality (Audit Commission, 2012). Despite the fact that CAA was abolished in 
2010, local authorities still have to report the level of their corporate carbon emissions 
on an annual basis to central government. However, this target no longer contributes 
towards an overall assessment of the council’s performance, and therefore it has a 
much lower profile than it did prior to 2010. As such, there is less co-ordination and 
interdependence along the vertical sub-dimension than was previously the case. In 
other words, the weakening of central performance frameworks means that English 
councils appear to be moving back towards more flexible Type II arrangements, since 
they can now make and implement their corporate policies more independently of the 
centre compared to previously. 
 
In spite of this, the fieldwork revealed that national performance frameworks did not 
influence Newcastle Council’s corporate policies to any great extent. Indeed, an 
officer who was responsible for collating data on resource usage was largely unaware 
of the Audit Commission’s key line of enquiry related to natural resources, in spite of 
having been in post whilst this was in operation (interview 10). In addition, central 
government targets that sought to influence corporate behaviour did not have a high-
profile within the municipality (interview 1). Although interviewees agreed that wider 
debates about climate change do influence the council’s position (interview 3), they 
did not feel unduly pressured by centralised target regimes to change their corporate 
policies. As with Gelsenkirchen, financial pressures to reduce expenditure on energy, 
together with the council’s own policy priorities on climate protection, were far more 
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influential than ministers in determining how the municipality sought to control staff 
behaviour: 
 
There’s a drive because of the policy and the Council’s approach to reducing 
emissions, but there’s a financial driver as well (interview 7). 
 
Similarly, although a number of other municipalities did downgrade the importance of 
climate protection after centralised targeting frameworks were abolished in 2010 
(Scott, 2011), Newcastle Council’s priorities did not change. Indeed, interviewees 
were keen to stress that they still considered it to be a key concern:  
 
I don’t think [the abolition of centralised performance frameworks] forced the 
Council to reassess its climate change policy or its priorities around sustainability 
generally (interview 30). 
 
As such, we can see how these centralised targets actually had very little influence 
over Newcastle Council’s day-to-day activity. Similarly, although the UK 
Government’s desire to combat climate change is shared by the vast majority of 
municipalities, there is not as much vertical interaction and interdependence as in 
Germany. One reason for this is that England does not have a single unifying concept 
that is comparable to the German Energiewende. As both chapter 3 and the previous 
section illustrated, the Energiewende narrative permeates through government bodies 
at the federal, central, state, regional and municipal tiers in Germany, thereby giving 
staff at all levels a clear point of reference and helping to make policy more coherent 
(interviews 22 and 27). It is a particularly useful concept for German policy-makers 
because it is not confined to the environment or climate sector: it also stresses the 
importance of nurturing the green industrial sector and ensuring Germany’s energy 
security. This makes it easier for public officials to understand the links between 
different policy areas and ensure that activity is ‘joined-up across departments’ 
(interview 22). The term also has positive connotations: indeed, the word Wende is 
still used as shorthand for the democratic transformation that happened in the former 
German Democratic Republic after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
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However, corporate purchasing at Newcastle Council does operate within a more 
structured vertical environment than energy consumption, namely the national 
sustainable procurement framework. This sets out detailed standards for five stages of 
progress against which local authorities can benchmark themselves and undertake 
‘peer reviews’ of neighbouring councils. Notably, Newcastle has acted as a pilot 
municipality within the North East and now monitors its procurement decisions 
against the framework. This includes using a complex system to calculate the amount 
of carbon dioxide that is emitted as a result of each major procurement, from energy 
consumption to construction (interview 9). As a result, the authority needs to co-
operate closely with its suppliers, who have to track their activities (and those of sub-
contractors) and report progress on a regular basis.  
 
In spite of this, there are fewer incentives for a municipality to demonstrate that it has 
sustainable procurement practices compared to the pre-2010 situation, which perhaps 
makes it less likely that authorities will adhere to its recommendations. Indeed, the 
framework stresses that its standards and proposed benchmarking exercises are 
largely for internal purposes rather than external consumption. This is illustrated by 
the fact that there are no ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ from central government to encourage 
authorities to achieve high standards: 
 
There are no other incentives other than being able to say ‘we are doing well’ 
(interview 9). 
 
Overall, staff view the framework as a way of validating their expertise as 
procurement professionals and demonstrating that the council takes sustainability 
seriously as an organisation (interview 9). More than anything else, it provides a 
structure and agreed set of standards that the council is striving to achieve, and 
therefore helps staff to focus on these priorities. Taken together with the fact that local 
authorities still have to report the level of greenhouse gases they emit on an annual 
basis, this shows how there is some interdependence between tiers of government on 
corporate policies, although not as much as was previously the case.  
 
As a result, Newcastle sits much closer to a characteristically Type II position than 
Gelsenkirchen along the vertical sub-dimension. Indeed, because centralised 
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performance management systems for local authorities have been short-lived and 
unstable, municipal managers are reluctant to commit significant resources to the 
latest trend in case they have to respond to a new agenda within a few years 
(interview 1). Ironically, therefore, despite attempts by ministers to direct local 
authority activity through performance targets, the unpredictable nature of these 
frameworks actually weakens vertical structures and has led Newcastle to operate 
increasingly independently of the centre. This dynamic vertical context, in which 
central government provides little support for municipalities to implement local 
priorities, also fits closely with Type II characterisations of multi-level governance 
and contrasts sharply with the longer-lasting, more interdependent and coalescing 
nature of the Energiewende in Germany (see figure 6.2 on page 243). 
 
6.2.2.2  Horizontal governance structures 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 showed how the local state in Newcastle Council is more 
fragmented than in Gelsenkirchen, and how this has resulted in the English 
municipality having to work more interdependently with other horizontal actors to 
achieve its climate change strategy and planning objectives. The situation for 
corporate policies is somewhat different, however, since managers at Newcastle 
Council have more capacity to exert hierarchical authority over their staff, and have 
therefore been able to operate more independently than their colleagues in 
Gelsenkirchen when seeking to introduce internal workplace reforms. Nonetheless, 
the greater fragmentation of public functions in England means that the authority 
needs to work more interdependently with external actors than its German 
counterpart.  
 
Unlike Gelsenkirchen Council, Newcastle has not contracted out the task of trying to 
persuade staff to adopt more climate-friendly behaviour. Instead, the authority has 
given a number of existing employees the additional role of ‘green champion’ within 
their departments, in the hope that they will be able to persuade colleagues to switch 
off electrical equipment at the end of the day and avoid other unnecessary uses of 
energy (interviews 3 and 4). This system was still in its infancy in 2013, largely 
because the authority had only just begun to address behavioural change in its 
corporate climate change strategy. Most of its previous initiatives on energy 
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conservation were associated with relatively ‘easy wins’ such as introducing low-
energy lighting and insulating buildings (interview 3), or ensuring that new corporate 
vehicles were more fuel-efficient (interview 7).  
 
In a similar way to Gelsenkirchen Council, however, the authority soon discovered 
that facilitating behavioural change amongst staff is much more difficult than 
installing technical solutions of this nature (interview 16). Indeed, initial impressions 
suggested that the green champions system was not particularly effective (interviews 
5 and 12), and therefore Newcastle may end up following Gelsenkirchen’s lead and 
seek an external contractor to encourage behavioural change amongst staff. 
Nonetheless, the municipality is still keen to retain control over its corporate policies, 
which shows how its horizontal arrangements exhibit some characteristics that are 
normally associated with Type I multi-level governance. 
 
In addition, Newcastle Council takes a unified corporate approach to procurement and 
therefore purchasing activity is not fragmented across the municipality (in contrast to 
many other English authorities). This structure fits more Type I characterisations, in 
which functions are concentrated in a ‘multi-functional’ local authority, rather than 
dispersed around different agencies and organisations, and also enables the authority 
to exert more hierarchical control (see section 6.3.2.1). As a result, the authority is 
largely able to ensure that directorates comply with corporate policies on 
sustainability. For example, 
 
we’ve got a corporate control in terms of procurement and I think it’s quite difficult 
when it’s siloed [delegated to individual departments]. So we’re in a better 
place…because we have a lot more control… In other councils where everybody’s 
doing it, it’s much harder (interview 9). 
 
To illustrate the nature of central control, any department that wants to purchase 
goods and services valued at over £5,000 must put in an official request to the 
procurement team, which then ensures that it meets with corporate standards and 
policies. Managers who want to buy anything under this threshold have to use existing 
supplier contracts, if they exist. The result is that the council is able to control 
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purchasing behaviour and operate as a more cohesive, multi-functional and 
independent unit – in contrast to the devolved image of Type II characterisations.  
 
Nonetheless, the municipality is only able to exert this influence over its directorates, 
and therefore schools and other outside organisations are exempt from the corporate 
policy. Since the local state in Newcastle has become increasingly fragmented in 
recent years, this means that the council is not in a position to impose its policies on 
other public bodies. Staff within the authority recognise the limitations of this 
situation and are seeking to work more closely with other organisations (including 
both of the city’s universities) to align their standards on sustainable procurement, 
aggregate demand, and hopefully negotiate better deals with suppliers. As with 
previous examples in earlier chapters, this situation highlights some of the ironies 
inherent in New Public Management initiatives that lead to state fragmentation: in 
order to have the capacity to implement policy effectively, decision-makers have to 
try and ‘join-up’ institutions and work more interdependently with other actors (see 
Dunleavy and Margetts, 2006). Moreover, it illustrates how Type II characteristics 
still predominate along the horizontal sub-dimension. 
 
Similarly, an arm’s-length management organisation (ALMO), Your Homes 
Newcastle (YHN), has been responsible for council housing in the city since 2004, 
and views itself as a separate organisation from the municipality (interview 4). In 
common with many other English municipalities, Newcastle Council established the 
ALMO in order to access additional central government grants to fund necessary 
renovations and thereby bring its housing up the statutory Decent Homes Standard 
(Pawson, 2006, interview 4). This arrangement means that the ALMO is able to 
exercise significant discretion over its activities (interview 4). For example, although 
the council sets YHN a number of high-level targets, these focus largely on issues of 
stock condition and tenant satisfaction – they do not include any environmental or 
climate change indicators such as energy consumption. The result is that:  
 
On climate change, the [council’s] climate change plan… would set a direction for us, 
but we can do what we want to within that (interview 4).  
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To illustrate this, the officer explained that although YHN takes account of the 
council’s procurement standards, it developed its own procurement charter, which 
then informed a more detailed purchasing framework. In addition, the ALMO has its 
own sustainability strategy, which incorporates targets for reducing the organisation’s 
carbon footprint, but is not linked explicitly to the council’s objectives.  
 
Furthermore, the UK Government’s more recent initiatives on ‘academy’ and ‘free’ 
schools have fragmented municipalities even more, since these establishments receive 
their funding directly from central government and (unlike traditional schools) are 
completely independent of local authority control (Waterman, 2014). Therefore, 
although academies and free schools work together with the municipality in some 
areas (for example, on utilities procurement), the council is not in a position to 
influence their energy or water consumption (interviews 3 and 34). Crucially, 
academies receive more state funding per pupil than traditional schools, partly to help 
them procure services from external providers that local authority schools receive free 
of charge directly from the municipality. This incentivises traditional schools to 
convert to academy status – a process that was championed initially by the Coalition 
Government that took office in 2010, and subsequently by its Conservative successor. 
Indeed, the number of academies in Newcastle increased from four to twelve between 
December 2011 and September 2014, and England as a whole saw a similar 
percentage increase (Department for Education, 2014). This illustrates how the local 
state has fragmented further in recent years, and therefore the extent to which 
Newcastle Council operates within a Type II multi-level governance context along the 
horizontal sub-dimension (see figure 6.1 on page 243). It also means that the authority 
has to work more interdependently with external actors in order to achieve its 
objectives. 
 
In addition, the departmental system within Newcastle Council has led to the 
development of internal contracting arrangements when one directorate would like to 
use the services of another part of the authority (interview 10). The reforms were 
introduced primarily for accounting reasons, to ensure that different services were 
properly recognised (and sufficiently resourced) to undertake the activities required of 
them. However, they have strengthened horizontal relationships and weakened 
hierarchical authority within the council, resulting in a less cohesive and coherent 
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municipality. For example, Newcastle’s Environment and Regeneration Directorate 
buys and owns nearly all of the authority’s vehicles, and agrees Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) with other council departments that want to use them. The 
leasing department takes over responsibility for maintenance, excise duty and fuel, as 
well as how the vehicle will be used (interview 7). Yet, because the SLAs do not 
stipulate any conditions about fuel consumption, individual departments do not need 
to take account of the corporate policy on using council vehicles. 
 
 Gelsenkirchen  Newcastle 
Vertical 
structures 
Type I model is increasingly dominant 
Type II model is increasingly 
dominant 
Structured support network and the 
Energiewende narrative supports 
interdependence 
Weakening vertical framework is 
resulting in greater independence 
from higher tiers of government 
Macroeconomic model encourages 
consensus-based workplace decision-
making 
Macroeconomic model empowers 
management in workplace decision-
making 
Horizontal 
structures 
Type I still dominant, but shifting 
towards Type II model  
Increasingly dominant Type II 
model 
Resource and capacity constraints are 
leading to more interdependence 
Greater fragmentation and 
interdependence between 
organisations 
Council managers take workplace 
decisions more interdependently with 
staff 
Council managers take workplace 
decisions more independently of 
staff 
 
Table 6.2: Changes in the sub-dimensions of multi-level governance types as applied 
to corporate policies in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
These examples illustrate how various reforms have weakened vertical relationships 
and encouraged horizontal state fragmentation within Newcastle. Crucially, they have 
reduced the council’s ability to operate as a multi-functional municipality, and meant 
that it needs to implement its corporate policies on climate change interdependently 
with other external actors in the locality (see figure 6.3 on page 245). The result is a 
horizontal institutional structure that is edging closer towards a model Type II 
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characterisation – and one that has further implications for state capacity at the local 
level.  
 
Indeed, as table 6.2 and figure 6.1 show, Newcastle’s arrangements for corporate 
policy-making and implementation remain some distance away from those that 
operate in Gelsenkirchen, despite the German city’s shift away from a classic Type I 
structure along the horizontal dimension. In particular, Gelsenkirchen still receives 
more support from higher jurisdictions, and the Energiewende has provided an 
additional impetus for public bodies across tiers of government to work together 
interdependently. This contrasts with the UK central government’s increasingly 
detached approach, and the lack of a single narrative around which public bodies can 
co-ordinate their policies. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Changes in the sub-dimensions of multi-level governance types as applied 
to corporate policies in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
Furthermore, although both cities are moving closer towards a classic Type II 
arrangement on the horizontal dimension, Newcastle is further down this road than 
Gelsenkirchen and has also pursued it for different reasons. Gelsenkirchen contracted 
out some services because of the municipality’s precarious financial position and the 
belief that an external provider might be better placed to effect behavioural change 
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amongst staff. In contrast, the fragmented local state in Newcastle is primarily the 
result of central government’s attempts to impose New Public Management (NPM) 
techniques on local authorities. However, it is worth remembering that the vertical 
macroeconomic context means managers at Newcastle Council do not have to work 
quite as interdependently with their internal governance actors (in other words, their 
employees) as their Gelsenkirchen counterparts – as section 6.3.2.1 will discuss.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Vertical power dependency relationships for corporate policies in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
The shifts highlighted in table 6.2 and figure 6.1 are largely a result of changes in the 
nature of power dependencies within each city. Several years ago, the municipalities 
in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle had more similar relationships with higher tiers of 
government, with Politikverflechtung encouraging interdependence in Germany and 
national performance frameworks meaning that English councils worked towards 
central policy objectives. However, the abolition of ministerial targets has left 
Newcastle Council very independent of higher tiers of government in this policy 
sector. In contrast, the Energiewende has provided a common narrative for different 
tiers of government in Germany and improved policy co-ordination as a result. As a 
result, Gelsenkirchen now works more interdependently with other actors along this 
sub-dimension than was previously the case. As figure 6.2 shows, it also means that 
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vertical power dependencies for corporate policies are actually diverging rather than 
converging. 
 
In terms of horizontal relationships, the increasingly fragmented nature of 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle councils means that both municipalities are moving 
away from the independence pole. Gelsenkirchen’s outsourcing of various public 
utilities in recent years, together with its reliance on an external firm to persuade staff 
to adopt more environmentally-friendly behaviour, means that the German 
municipality has moved towards a more interdependent position along this dimension. 
Similarly, although Newcastle Council takes an integrated approach to sustainable 
procurement, its lack of control over social housing and – increasingly – publicly-
funded schools in the city means that it has to try and work with other local actors to 
achieve its corporate policy objectives. Indeed, the fact that these external bodies 
operate largely autonomously of the council means that the authority cannot influence 
them to any great extent and actually depends on them to act on its behalf. Therefore, 
as figure 6.3 shows, Newcastle Council’s relationships with other local bodies are 
more asymmetrical than those of its German twin. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Horizontal power dependency relationships for corporate policies in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
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Nonetheless, if we focus just on those governing actors that are concentrated within 
the municipality (in other words, council employees rather the external, ‘task-specific’ 
organisations), power dependencies in the two authorities are very different. 
Crucially, differences between the German and Anglo-American models of capitalism 
(which themselves are the result of central or federal government policies – and 
therefore the vertical framework within which municipalities operate) mean that 
operational managers at Newcastle Council are more powerful than their colleagues in 
Gelsenkirchen. As a result, the English authority has the resources and capacity to 
operate more independently of governance actors that are located within the council – 
in other words, its staff. Since it has been in this position for some time, the council 
has not moved from its original position in figure 6.3 – in contrast to the shifting 
nature of its relations with external actors in the locality. For its part, Gelsenkirchen 
Council has to work more interdependently with employees, due to federal 
requirements on staff consultation and consensus-based decision-making in the 
workplace, and this is reflected by its location in the tri-polar diagram. As section 6.3 
will highlight, these relationships have significant implications for the policy styles 
that each municipality has been able to adopt. 
 
6.3 Policy styles and corporate policy 
 
This section analyses the extent to which the decision-making and implementation 
styles for corporate policies in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle Councils fit with 
typically ‘German’ and ‘English’ characterisations. As with the previous two 
chapters, it addresses each city in turn, mapping the empirical findings against two 
sub-dimensions of policy style: the extent to which the council relies on hierarchy 
rather than engagement; and, its preference for state of the art solutions instead of the 
best practicable means for addressing a problem. 
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6.3.1 Gelsenkirchen 
 
6.3.1.1 Hierarchy versus engagement 
 
Interviewees at Gelsenkirchen acknowledged the importance of changing staff 
behaviour for achieving their corporate policy objectives, and recognised the need to 
engage with employees to try and facilitate this. However, the authority only 
addressed this issue after corporate sustainability policies were agreed and set out in 
internal documents in a hierarchical fashion. Managers did not feel that significant 
employee consultation would be necessary, because they expected their colleagues to 
understand that it would be in their own interests to reduce energy consumption – 
after all, this would allow the municipality to save money and lower the risk of 
redundancies (interview 16). Notably, the situation in Newcastle was very similar 
(interview 4). As such, the following discussion (as well as section 6.3.2.1) recognises 
that policy priorities in both councils were agreed in a hierarchical fashion at the 
outset, and therefore focuses largely on the techniques that each authority adopted to 
manage and implement them. 
 
As with the climate change strategy and planning sectors (see chapters 4 and 5), the 
fieldwork revealed that Gelsenkirchen Council exerts its hierarchical authority in 
those aspects of corporate policy where it is able to do so. Some examples of this are 
not particularly high-profile, such as improving thermal insulation in council 
buildings, replacing incandescent light bulbs with LEDs and installing light wells in 
office corridors (interview 20). In fact, staff were keen to stress that they have been 
trying to save energy by retrofitting buildings in various ways for at least two 
decades, and particularly after the council’s financial situation worsened in the early 
2000s. Although these changes were imposed in a top-down fashion, it is important to 
note that they had a very limited impact on the workforce – a factor that one 
interviewee felt meant they were much more likely to succeed (interview 22).  
 
In addition, the authority has worked with other municipalities to adopt a more 
hierarchical position in energy procurement (interview 20). In 2013, half of the 
electricity purchased by Gelsenkirchen council came from renewable sources, and 
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managers expect to hit their target of 100% by 2020 (interview 22). The fact that local 
authorities still own a substantial stake in ELE, the local energy provider, should help 
them to achieve this objective. Indeed, pressure from the four municipalities on the 
ELE board has meant that the supplier will increase the amount of green electricity it 
provides up to a total of 20 GWh per year by 2020 (interview 22). This shows how the 
combined purchasing power of several councils means they can persuade electricity 
suppliers to source more of their power from renewables, and thereby contribute 
towards climate protection objectives.  
 
Indeed, the fragmented nature of the local state actually empowers municipalities in 
this context, because it gives them greater leverage over energy companies. Suppliers 
are aware that customers can choose a different company if they refuse to meet their 
requirements, and therefore they are keen to accommodate the councils’ wishes in 
order to retain their business (interview 18). In other words, although local public 
services are becoming more fragmented along the horizontal dimension (in line with a 
trend towards ‘English’ Type II arrangements), Gelsenkirchen Council is still able to 
adopt a largely ‘German’ policy style and exercise hierarchical control over energy 
providers. Nonetheless, it would be in an even stronger position to direct a municipal 
electricity supplier than a power company like ELE that operates on the open market. 
Therefore we do need to acknowledge that the abolition of Gelsenkirchen’s 
Stadtwerke has reduced its hierarchical influence to some extent. 
 
In another example of the extent to which the authority can control its corporate 
policies, public buildings need to meet strict criteria on energy consumption. Some of 
these are related to the Energy Conservation Act, which stipulates that all properties 
constructed prior to 1990 in Germany (along with new buildings) need to meet strict 
energy performance and sustainability standards when they are refurbished (see 
chapter 5). Others, however, are the result of hierarchical decision-making within the 
council, most notably the requirement that new or refurbished buildings must have 
either photovoltaic or green roofs. This corporate standard has been implemented with 
the full support of council employees, because it means that refurbishment projects 
can be planned within a stable framework: 
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A manager who wants a new building can plan from the beginning whether they want 
a green roof or a solar roof… If it is technically feasible, so if the roof can face south 
and not be in the shade or anything else, then solar panels have to go on top. That’s a 
requirement. Or, if we have an existing roof and we don’t have to put solar on top, 
then the question is, ‘can we do a green roof?’ If so, then we have to put a green roof 
on it… Staff buy into these standards without objections… it’s the same with 
disability access, or inclusion, it is a political decision and we implement it (interview 
20).  
  
Interestingly, one officer felt that the political structure of the council increased the 
reliance on hierarchical management techniques within the authority. Unlike most 
English municipalities, Gelsenkirchen has a directly-elected mayor, who is in charge 
of both the elected Council and the salaried officers in the municipal administration. 
In Newcastle, by contrast, the Leader of the Council is responsible for the former and 
the Chief Executive is tasked with the latter. One interviewee, who had worked for the 
municipality in Gelsenkirchen since before the elected mayoral system was 
introduced in 1999, felt that staff now had clearer objectives, which resulted in a more 
focused and hierarchical approach to decision-making: 
 
Politicians have definitely had more influence over the authority since then. Some 
issues are now non-negotiable (interview 20).  
 
Crucially, therefore, staff now pay more attention to the political views of the mayor. 
For example, despite the authority’s precarious financial position, they no longer opt 
for an energy provider purely on the basis of cost, but rather take account of the 
mayor’s desire to demonstrate local leadership on sustainability (interview 20). Once 
again, this highlights a greater reliance on hierarchy rather than engagement with 
other local actors. 
 
Similarly, the authority has not subscribed to more ‘bottom-up’ systems for 
monitoring corporate energy use, such as the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS). As Meinke (2002) has argued, this scheme relies on consensus and self-
assessment rather than hierarchy, and therefore fits more closely with the typically 
‘British’ policy style. Indeed, as section 5.3.2.1 will show, Newcastle Council used it 
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for several years, whereas officers in Gelsenkirchen felt that the scheme was 
unnecessary and more relevant for the private sector than public bodies (interview 
22). Instead, they felt that they could create ‘a climate for climate protection’ within 
the municipality through more hierarchical command and control techniques 
(interview 14). 
 
In spite of this attitude, however, Gelsenkirchen Council’s systems for monitoring 
energy consumption do rely on bottom-up participation to a large extent. Unlike 
municipalities such as Aachen for example, ‘we still don’t have proper energy 
controlling systems’ that allow staff in the corporate centre to view real-time power, 
heating and water consumption (interview 16). Instead, individual building managers 
compile monthly reports based on their own meter readings, and these data inform 
discussions with procurement staff around where and how they might conserve 
energy. Similarly, the council has not installed software in corporate vehicles to track 
fuel consumption and inform performance appraisals. This contrasts with Newcastle 
Council’s greater reliance on hierarchy and automated data reporting systems, which 
seek to inform decision-making and change behaviour (see section 6.3.2.1).  
 
Notably, one interviewee at Gelsenkirchen Council felt that sophisticated software 
systems and monitoring procedures would not be popular with staff (interview 16). 
Indeed, their potentially intrusive nature would almost certainly be opposed by unions 
and employees more widely, which would make them very difficult to introduce in 
the municipality – or indeed in many other German workplaces. At this point, the 
academic literature on contrasting models of Western capitalism can help to 
understand and explain differences between the case study municipalities’ approaches 
to implementing corporate policies. These studies highlight the post-war German 
traditions of employee consultation, labour market regulation and collective 
bargaining, and contrast them with an Anglo-American model of flexible labour 
markets and more powerful employers (see in particular Crouch and Streeck, 1997). 
This suggests that German trade unions and employees are in a stronger position vis à 
vis their employers than their English counterparts, and workplace cultures are more 
accustomed to the idea of consensual decision-making.  
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Ironically, therefore, the German macroeconomic model actually hinders local 
authorities from adopting a typically German policy style in their corporate policies, 
because staff are better placed to prevent the introduction of hierarchical and 
potentially intrusive reforms in the workplace. By treating employees as ‘distinct 
governing’ actors, we can see how managers at Gelsenkirchen Council have to work 
more interdependently with them, whereas their counterparts in Newcastle do not 
have to take account of employee perspectives to the same extent (see also section 
6.2). As chapters 4 and 5 suggested in the context of climate change strategy and 
planning, a higher degree of interdependence along the horizontal sub-dimension 
tends to lead to a greater reliance on engagement rather than hierarchical techniques – 
and this also appears to be the case with corporate policies. 
 
Indeed, a range of corporate initiatives have been characterised by a typically 
‘English’ approach of persuasion, incentivisation and stakeholder engagement. For 
example, the authority publishes monthly energy-saving tips on the corporate intranet 
and encourages staff to consult them when completing annual quizzes. These quizzes 
have offered a range of attractive prizes to those employees who participate, including 
all-expenses trips to Alsace-Lorraine, Berlin and Hamburg. One interviewee felt that 
this approach has been very successful in engaging employees with the energy-saving 
agenda: 
 
They are really great prizes and people recognise that now. There are more than 30% 
of staff who participate, over a thousand people altogether. It’s worked really well 
(interview 16). 
 
The council has also tried to instil a competitive element to energy conservation 
across its schools, by introducing a centralised reporting system to measure 
consumption and making the results available for benchmarking purposes. It awards 
points to those schools that have made particular progress in saving energy and 
highlights their achievements across the council. Since municipal employees 
generally express their support for energy-saving initiatives, a consensual and 
encouraging approach of this nature should theoretically prove effective. However, 
the officer in charge of behavioural change projects lamented the fact that staff were 
very reluctant to put their environmental principles into practice: 
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People talk all the time about wanting to protect the environment and how it’s very 
important to them. But it doesn’t manifest itself in their behaviour or actions… 
Energy prices have got so high recently that they notice it at home, [but]… although 
they say they behave in a certain way at home, they don’t do that here because they 
don’t pay the electricity bill, or the heating bill either… They come into their offices 
and turn everything on. Everything. Every time. Then they go for a meeting 
somewhere. Then they go out for lunch. And then they go to the next meeting. And at 
5pm, or 4.30pm, or whenever, they go back into their offices, turn everything off and 
go home (interview 16).  
 
Eventually, the authority concluded that an external supplier might be better placed to 
encourage staff to reduce energy consumption (see section 6.2.1.2). Notably, 
however, the contractor has continued with the council’s engagement strategy, 
preferring to use ‘carrots’ rather than ‘sticks’ to try and persuade employees to change 
their behaviour. This is in spite of the fact that council managers recognised that a 
more hierarchical strategy might be necessary to reduce consumption significantly. As 
one officer put it, ‘we want to reward people, but we want to penalise them as well’ 
(interview 16) – but the industrial relations context makes this more difficult than in 
England. Nonetheless, the contractor has even less control over staff than the 
municipality, because it does not employ them and therefore cannot threaten potential 
sanctions very easily. As a result, the reliance on negotiation and consensus looks 
likely to continue for the foreseeable future – even though it may not reduce energy 
consumption by as much as the municipality would like.  
 
As this subsection has shown, therefore, Gelsenkirchen Council relies more on 
engagement than hierarchy when trying to and implement its corporate policies. The 
top-down way in which policy priorities were agreed at the outset, together with the 
fact that the authority is still able to exert control over energy providers (in spite of the 
privatised nature of the market), means that elements of hierarchy still exist. 
Moreover, the introduction of an elected mayor in 1999 has given internal decision-
making a more political and hierarchical focus, and resulted in the council shifting 
slightly leftwards along the horizontal axis in figure 6.4 (see page 270).  
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However, the authority is only able to encourage (rather than force) staff to change 
their behaviour, and tries to use a range of mechanisms to incentivise them to do so. 
Similarly, the lack of central monitoring systems for measuring electricity, water and 
fuel consumption means that senior managers do not have as much oversight and 
control over staff behaviour as their counterparts in Newcastle. In contrast to what we 
might expect, therefore, Newcastle Council is actually located closer to the ideal 
‘German’ position in terms of its reliance on hierarchy rather than engagement. This 
is largely due to the different levels of capacity that employers have at their disposal 
to introduce workplace reforms independently of their staff. 
 
6.3.1.2 State of the art solutions versus best practicable means 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that corporate policies at Gelsenkirchen exhibit a 
preference for ambitious state of the art (SOTA) technical solutions, in line with the 
‘German’ policy style. As the previous subsection 6.2.1.2 discussed, for example, the 
municipality has a target to purchase all of its electricity from renewable sources by 
2020, up from around 50% in 2013. Interviewees were convinced that they would 
meet this target, even though green electricity may not be cheap enough by this date 
for it to be the most cost-effective option (interview 18). In other words, they felt that 
any potential premium on sustainable power was a price worth paying for achieving 
this political objective. 
 
Moreover, interviewees were keen to stress that the council takes great interest in how 
energy suppliers generate their renewable power. As one member of the procurement 
team put it, they only want to buy ‘proper green electricity’ – in other words, not 
power from old and inefficient hydroelectric plants in Austria or Norway, and 
certainly not from nuclear stations (interview 18). Indeed, since 2010 the authority has 
asked its suppliers to certify that most of their green electricity comes from new 
renewable plants, and that none comes from nuclear power. Since ‘high quality’ green 
electricity is normally more expensive than power from fossil fuels, this also 
illustrates the fact that Gelsenkirchen does not prefer to opt for the best practicable 
means (BPM) in terms of technical solutions. Indeed, interviewees emphasised how 
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the council expected them to continue ‘turning the screw’ in sustainability terms, 
including in discussions with energy suppliers (interview 18).  
 
Furthermore, as chapter 5 mentioned, new or refurbished public buildings in 
Gelsenkirchen must incorporate photovoltaic panels if they will deliver a financial 
return within ten years. If the building fails to meet this test, it should be given a green 
roof when they are refurbished. As such, the council still relies on high uniform 
standards for climate protection policy in this area.  
 
In spite of this ambition, however, the council has adopted a more pragmatic approach 
in recent years, particularly as financial constraints have begun to take effect. This 
partly reflects a loosening of the vertical framework within which it operates. In 2008, 
for example, the Bezirk authorities considered energy performance to be the most 
important part of any application for grants to fund kindergarten refurbishments. In 
the words of one officer, ‘it was not important, how economic the project was’ 
(interview 26). This stipulation was removed a year later, once the severe impact of 
the global financial crisis became apparent and after some of its objectives were 
incorporated into the federal Energy Conservation Act (interviews 22 and 26). As a 
result, financial considerations became predominant once again and climate protection 
regulations became much less prescriptive, stating only that ‘programmes should 
promote… measures to reduce CO2 emissions and increase energy efficiency, 
including the use of renewable energies’19 (Ministerium für Bauen, Wohnen, 
Stadtentwicklung und Verkehr des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2014, emphasis 
added). 
 
There was also pressure from outside the council to ensure that public buildings 
reached the very high Passivhaus standard for energy consumption following any 
refurbishment – rather than stipulate only that they should incorporate PV panels or a 
green roof. However, interviewees pointed out that such an ambitious approach would 
be ‘financially impossible’ for the cash-strapped municipality (interviews 22 and 24), 
                                                 
19 ‘Im Rahmen integrierter städtebaulicher Gesamtkonzepte sollen dabei Maßnahmen zur Verringerung 
der CO2-Emissionen und zur Steigerung der Energieeffizienz einschließlich des Einsatzes… gefördert 
werden’. 
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which shows how resource constraints prevented it from adopting SOTA solutions. 
Indeed, as chapter 5 illustrated in the context of Hans-Sachs-Haus, municipal officers 
now need to demonstrate that environmental technologies in or on public buildings 
must deliver a financial return within ten years of their installation. This emphasises 
the importance of cost-effectiveness in procurement decisions, and thereby challenges 
the typically ‘German’ preference for SOTA technologies, because cutting-edge 
solutions tend to be more expensive than products that have been on the market for 
some time.  
 
Nonetheless, the mere fact that citizens in Gelsenkirchen were even able to raise the 
prospect of retrofitting public buildings to Passivhaus standards illustrates the 
council’s level of ambition in adopting green technologies. Furthermore, Germany’s 
generous system of feed-in-tariffs means that technologies such as photovoltaics 
normally deliver a profit in less than a decade, and therefore the authority expects to 
install PV panels on the roofs of most of its buildings (see also chapter 5). It is also 
relatively straightforward to demonstrate a return on investment for insulation and 
energy-saving projects, which encourages the council to invest in these initiatives on a 
large scale. As a result, when the roof of a building needs repairing, the authority will 
install more insulation than is required by statute, provided there is space available 
(interview 18). Indeed, managers try their utmost to try and fund any project that will 
reduce energy demand: 
 
We have to keep in mind how much money we have at our disposal, [but] we try to 
make the most of this. When we invest in something we want to have a relatively big 
impact in terms of saving energy… Everything that I don’t use, I don’t pay for. And 
that’s why we are always trying to reduce consumption (interview 18). 
 
In addition, recent changes to the accounting regulations for German local authorities 
mean that they should calculate the whole-life cost of assets before purchasing them 
(Rehm and Matern-Rehm, 2010, interviews 18 and 19). Since buildings (including 
their fittings) can have a lifetime of anywhere between 30 and 100 years, this reform 
enables managers to stretch out the up-front cost over a much longer period for 
accounting purposes – and encourages them to take a long-term perspective on 
investment. Related to this, Gelsenkirchen Council’s procurement directorate has 
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developed a matrix to calculate the whole life cost of particular solutions, depending 
on their price at the outset and likely energy consumption over the coming decades 
(interview 18).  
 
This illustrates once again how an interdependent vertical framework can increase the 
capacity of municipalities to adopt ambitious policies at the local level. Indeed, it 
enables German authorities to spend more money on assets up front, in the knowledge 
that they will have lower maintenance or running costs over the coming decades. For 
example, Gelsenkirchen Council has invested in geothermal heating for a new school 
and kindergarten (as well as Hans-Sachs-Haus, see chapter 5), because this will prove 
cheaper over the longer term than relying on more conventional sources – particularly 
considering the volatile nature of wholesale energy prices (interview 18).  
 
Notably, English municipalities have been able to borrow for capital investment on a 
similar basis since 2004, but interviewees at Newcastle were still more concerned 
about the up-front cost of assets than their Gelsenkirchen counterparts (interviews 5 
and 9; see also section 6.3.2.2). This suggests that Newcastle Council is more likely to 
opt for cheaper solutions that may be fit for purpose but do not necessarily deliver as 
many longer-term environmental benefits as those purchased by its German twin. 
Such characterisations illustrate how the two cities do exhibit characteristics of their 
national policy styles. 
 
Overall, therefore, Gelsenkirchen Council still tries to adopt a principled stance on 
sustainability, and does not always choose the easiest and cheapest option. This means 
that sits closer to SOTA than the traditional English attitude of BPM along this sub-
dimension (see figure 6.4 on page 270). Although the council’s ten year rule for 
delivering a return on investment means that it is no longer an organisation that 
prefers SOTA solutions regardless of their costs, it sets its sights only marginally 
lower. As with climate change strategy and planning, support from higher tiers of 
government and the degree of vertical interdependence between actors has enabled 
the municipality to adopt this ambitious position. This is because changes in the 
federal accountancy framework and the introduction of feed-in-tariffs make it easier 
to justify investing in new technologies, and legislation such as the Energy 
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Conservation Act require property owners to retrofit buildings in a sustainable 
manner.  
 
6.3.2 Newcastle 
 
6.3.2.1 Hierarchy versus engagement  
 
In line with the characteristically English policy style of consensus, Newcastle 
Council has relied traditionally on employee engagement to try and persuade its staff 
to act in a more environmentally-friendly manner. This approach is reaffirmed in the 
authority’s corporate climate change strategy, which explains how the council’s 
Energy Centre works to raise awareness of sustainability issues amongst employees 
(Newcastle City Council, 2008). Recently, however, the authority has begun to 
introduce more hierarchical methods in order to try and effect behavioural change 
amongst staff, largely because managers felt that the previous softer strategy was not 
proving sufficiently effective. Notably, the council achieved this relatively easily, 
because it has been able to introduce information and data reporting systems into the 
workplace without encountering significant employee opposition. As a result, 
Newcastle now follows a more ‘German’ approach to corporate policy-making than 
Gelsenkirchen – thereby contradicting the idea that national styles might apply in this 
context. 
 
The council’s ‘green champions’ idea (see section 6.2.2.2) is a typical example of the 
‘English’ persuasive strategy, but it also highlights the limitations of this approach. 
This initiative involves members of staff in each council department trying to 
persuade colleagues to consider how their everyday working activities might affect 
the environment. The champions also provide a ‘sounding board’ for employees who 
may have their own ideas for reducing the organisation’s sustainability impact 
(interview 3). However, the system has struggled to make a major impact, and a 
number of directorates still lacked a champion over a year after they were supposed to 
be introduced in 2012. In addition, as one champion noted, they were becoming 
disillusioned at their lack of progress and the attitudes of some colleagues: 
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For a while I sent an email to people locally, people who sat around who left their 
computers on, that sort of thing. But, number one, sometimes you want tea made for 
you and, number two, it’s just not the way to do things… If people don’t have an 
interest in climate change I’m afraid you can’t teach them (interview 4). 
 
Similarly, attempts to send less corporate waste to landfill have also relied largely on 
communication and persuasion. The council has had paper recycling facilities in its 
offices for at least a decade, and staff do tend to use them. However, one green 
champion felt that his colleagues needed to be reminded of them on a regular basis: 
 
We’re about to restart a bit of communications and update the infrastructure in the 
offices, because people forgot what the [recycling] boxes are for… There’s just a 
need for continual communication on these things. You’ve got to keep reminding 
people every so often (interview 4). 
 
As this suggests, adopting a strategy of engagement requires green champions to 
invest a lot of effort in trying to persuade employees that they need to recycle, and it 
is not necessarily effective. Similarly, the authority has also appreciated the 
limitations of its previous strategy to engage with employees in its corporate transport 
policy. The council organises pool bicycles, as well as shared cars and bus or metro 
passes, and has tried to encourage staff to use these facilities rather than their own 
vehicles. It also funds the activities of a staff bicycle user group, such as weekly cycle 
maintenance sessions for colleagues (interview 8), which aim to increase the number 
of employees who commute by sustainable forms of transport. A more ambitious 
programme trained staff in ‘eco-driving’ techniques that are more fuel-efficient and 
therefore result in lower costs and CO2 emissions for the council. By November 2012, 
over 600 employees had undertaken the training programme, and the manager in 
charge of the initiative did feel that it helped to reduce fuel consumption across the 
authority’s fleet (interview 7). However, he remained frustrated by the habits of some 
staff who drive on authority business: 
 
I’ve watched people use council vehicles and they’re not using them in the way they 
might use their own vehicles… they might be idling, with the keys in, using fuel 
(interview 7). 
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These examples highlight how Newcastle Council experienced exactly the same kind 
of employee reluctance as its counterpart in Gelsenkirchen, and the staff responsible 
for persuading their colleagues to change felt similarly frustrated. The authority’s 
response has been to institute more hierarchical procedures into the workplace in 
order to increase levels of compliance. For example, it stipulated that all used 
aggregate must be re-purposed for road maintenance elsewhere in the borough after 
the Highways Department invested in a concrete batching machine in 2010 (interview 
10). Although solutions of this nature may not be as overt as sanctions or penalties on 
staff, they nonetheless illustrate that the authority is less focused on employee 
engagement to try and achieve its objectives. 
 
More explicitly, in 2008 Newcastle Council installed software into corporate vehicles 
to monitor fuel consumption and activity, as well as restrict their maximum speed to 
50mph. A parallel initiative to reduce the council’s reliance on hired vehicles has seen 
the weekly spending on them fall from over £11,000 to under £3,000, which means 
that staff are now much less likely to drive cars that do not incorporate the monitoring 
software (interview 7). In addition, the municipality froze the amount of money that 
employees could claim back for each mile they travel in their own cars, thereby 
increasing the incentive for staff to use the corporate vehicles (interview 8). As a 
result of the software, service managers are now able to identify which employees are 
driving in the most fuel-efficient manner. They also receive monthly ‘league tables’ 
of the number of miles driven by each member of their staff, which inform staff 
performance appraisals and thereby act as an incentive for employees to change their 
driving habits. In this way, we can see how the authority is seeking to gather more 
management information associated with day-to-day corporate activities, and take 
decisions that are based on this evidence in line with some New Public Management 
(NPM) ideas (see section 2.2.6 in chapter 2). 
 
Indeed, the monitoring system has led to a reduction in overall travel and fuel 
consumption, because employees have stopped making unnecessary journeys and 
begun to drive in a more environmentally-friendly manner (interview 7). More 
generally, it illustrates how the council’s strategy to reduce fuel consumption in 
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corporate vehicles is shifting towards an overtly hierarchical approach. In the words 
of one interviewee: 
 
It’s very much not about trying to win over people’s hearts, but [instead] putting a 
structure in place that means people have to follow a certain path. And you’d like to 
think that some of them would follow that path because they think it’s a really good 
thing, but in the harsh reality of trying to reduce emissions, reduce expenditure, 
sometimes it’s just better to put the structure in place that forces drivers to change 
their behaviour (interview 7). 
 
Crucially, employees and trade unions did not prevent Newcastle Council from 
introducing these systems, in spite of some concerns about their intrusive nature. 
Indeed, as section 6.3.1.1 discussed, the contrasting approaches to industrial relations 
in each country mean that British employers in general (not just municipalities 
specifically) are empowered by the vertical framework to operate more hierarchically 
in the workplace. This is because they are not required to consult as much with their 
employees as their German counterparts, or agree consensual decisions with staff 
representatives. In other words, and chiming with the findings in chapters 4 and 5, the 
vertical framework in England helps to shape Newcastle Council’s policy style vis à 
vis internal governing actors, because it makes it easier to introduce management 
reforms into the workplace. 
 
The authority’s approach to corporate procurement also reveals how it now relies 
more on hierarchy than consensus. In line with a typically ‘English’ engagement 
strategy, the council consulted its suppliers on a new procurement strategy before it 
was agreed and introduced. However, the new approach requires suppliers to collect 
and report some information to the municipality about the sustainability credentials of 
sub-contractors. This allows the council to monitor its progress against the (voluntary) 
national procurement strategy that was discussed earlier in the chapter. One 
interviewee acknowledged that some smaller local providers view this as being 
unnecessarily bureaucratic. However, they nonetheless stressed how it was important 
for the council to try and improve environmental and social outcomes right down the 
supply chain – even if it has to rely on suppliers to monitor this: 
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It shouldn’t come as any great shock to the supply base that the public sector is 
wanting to do that… we should be the lead, and they should understand that… But I 
don’t think we’ll have the resources to look after the tail-end of the supply chain... So 
there will have to be a reliance at some point, we can only go to probably level one, 
level two. After that there’ll have to be something in-built into contracts that they 
[contractors] have to do (interview 9). 
 
In spite of some opposition from smaller suppliers, the authority adopted the new 
strategy and has put it into operation. This shows how it pursued a more top-down 
approach than the policy styles literature might suggest. However, because Newcastle 
Council takes a single, unified approach to procurement (see section 6.2.2.2), it could 
deal with suppliers from a position of strength and therefore introduce new procedures 
and requirements without needing to take much account of their views. As far as 
suppliers were concerned, they had to accept the new system or cease selling goods or 
services to any part of the council. This illustrates how the interdependence of 
municipal departments, and a more Type I horizontal governance approach, enabled 
the municipality as a whole to act more hierarchically with other local actors. 
 
Furthermore, the procurement system also puts council managers in a stronger 
position to act hierarchically in the future, because staff will be able to take informed 
purchasing decisions based on the sustainability credentials of sub-contractors. 
Moreover, the municipality could opt to buy from another supplier if it felt its current 
provider was not trying to monitor and/or improve the sustainability of its supply 
chains. This threat is likely to persuade many existing suppliers to change their 
behaviour (or that of their sub-contractors) in order to try and keep the council as a 
customer. 
 
In a similar way, some parts of the authority began to use the Eco-Management and 
Audit Scheme (EMAS) in the late 1990s. This allows organisations to report and 
benchmark their progress against agreed sustainability standards, and generates a 
wealth of management information as a result. Although a lot of departments 
subscribed to the system initially, and the monitoring reports show a steady fall in 
energy and water consumption (Newcastle City Council Technical Services, 2012), 
most left in around 2009 when cuts in central government grants began to take effect 
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and the council had to re-allocate resources elsewhere. The final directorate – 
Technical Services – also stopped using EMAS in 2014, shortly after staff were 
interviewed for this thesis20.  
 
As section 6.3.1.1 mentioned, some have argued that EMAS is based on typically 
‘English’ principles of bottom-up engagement, because it relies on service managers 
to measure and report on their progress and awareness-raising initiatives (Meinke, 
2002). Crucially, however, the monitoring reports meant that Newcastle Council 
could blend its strategy of persuading employees to change their behaviour with an 
implicit threat of hierarchical sanctions. In particular, staff were acutely aware that 
senior managers took a keen interest in the EMAS data, and were able to use this to 
ensure that employees complied with corporate policies: 
 
We are improving, and it’s because it’s driven from the top… the staff all know it’s 
got to be done correctly because there’ll be the threat of actions raised (interview 10).
  
Indeed, EMAS gave senior management access to a wealth of information about their 
employees’ activities and therefore increased their power over staff. As such, it 
operated in a similar way to the software that monitors corporate vehicles, because 
managers could use these data in performance appraisals and decision-making. This 
principle also applies to Newcastle’s energy and water consumption, for which the 
council has installed smart meters across its estate that link to a central system 
(interview 3).  
 
In all of these cases, the authority hopes that staff will change their behaviour and 
conform to corporate norms, in the knowledge that senior managers may be 
monitoring their activity. In this way, Newcastle’s approach has echoes of Jeremy 
Bentham’s ‘Panopticon’ model of a prison, in which inmates do not know whether 
they are being observed but obey the rules in case a guard happens to be watching 
                                                 
20 Interviewees were keen to point out that unsubscribing from the system was a financial (rather than 
political) decision, and the council’s current budgetary position means that it is very unlikely to be 
reversed. Service managers had spent a lot of time measuring and reporting against a large number of 
indicators, and each department employed at least one officer on a full-time basis to compile the 
reports. 
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them (Bentham, 1995). Therefore, contrary to what the literature on policy styles 
would suggest, Newcastle Council’s system for implementing corporate policies is 
now more hierarchical than Gelsenkirchen’s (see figure 6.4 on page 270). This is 
primarily due to the nature of power relations within the municipality, which are 
buttressed by the vertical macroeconomic context that allows English employers to 
operate more independently of their staff than their German counterparts. As section 
6.3.1.1 discussed, the German municipality still relies on separate monthly bills and 
has no centralised system to monitor corporate energy or vehicle use – partly because 
employees would oppose such ‘Panoptical’ systems. Instead, Gelsenkirchen Council 
relies much more on trying to change staff behaviour through horizontal engagement 
and persuasion, albeit through workshops run by an external contractor.  
 
Moreover, this increased hierarchy also highlights the difference between NPM ideas 
that focus on improved internal management (most notably a greater reliance on 
performance information systems to aid decision-making) and those that seek to 
fragment the organisation (such as the outsourcing, privatisation and ‘agencification’ 
of certain functions that leads to more Type II governance arrangements). Chapters 3 
and 4 showed how reforms of the latter type meant that Newcastle Council had to 
work much more with other horizontal actors to try and achieve its objectives in 
climate change strategy and planning. This contrasted with the municipality in 
Gelsenkirchen, which retains responsibility for a much wider range of public 
functions and is therefore able to act more hierarchically. However, this subsection 
has illustrated how NPM initiatives that focused on generating management 
information have put Newcastle Council in a much stronger position to influence staff 
behaviour and ensure that their objectives are implemented. In terms of corporate 
policies, therefore, these particular NPM reforms have actually increased Newcastle’s 
ability to adopt a hierarchical stance over those functions that it still controls – and 
meant that its approach in these areas is more akin to the ‘German’ style than that of 
Gelsenkirchen. 
 
Crucially, however, the council cannot impose this mode of governance on other local 
actors over which it has little direct influence. In other words, it depends on external 
organisations (including Your Homes Newcastle, academy schools, local public 
transport providers and utility companies) to contribute towards its climate change 
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objectives. The contrast with Gelsenkirchen, which has retained significant control 
over each of these functions and therefore operates much more independently in these 
sectors, is stark.  
 
Indeed, this difference between the range of public functions for which each 
municipality has direct responsibility highlights the problematic nature of a direct 
comparison between their corporate policies. If we only consider those services that 
are concentrated in the municipality, Newcastle Council operates more independently 
than its counterpart in Gelsenkirchen. Crucially, because the vertical industrial 
relations context means that English employers are stronger vis à vis their staff than 
German ones, Newcastle Council does not need to consult with its employees as much 
as the municipality in Gelsenkirchen and is therefore able to operate more 
hierarchically and independently of these actors.  
 
However, if we extend the scope of corporate policies to cover all public services in 
the locality, Newcastle Council is in a significantly weaker position, due to the 
fragmented nature of public service provision. This means that the municipality has to 
engage with other organisations to have any chance of achieving its policy objectives. 
As a result, the authority relies on typically ‘German’ and characteristically ‘English’ 
policy styles along this sub-dimension, depending on the extent to which it can exert 
direct influence over the function in question (see figure 6.4 on page 270).  
 
Furthermore, as with climate change strategy and planning (see chapters 4 and 5), it 
also highlights the importance of the vertical context in determining a municipality’s 
horizontal governance arrangements and – ultimately – its policy style. This is 
because if a municipality receives significant support and capacity from higher tiers of 
governance, it is able to exert more control over local public services – and, by 
extension, does not need to engage as much with other horizontal actors. In other 
words, if interdependent Type I multi-level governance arrangements predominate 
along the vertical sub-dimension, this creates the conditions for a more hierarchical 
and ‘German’ policy style. 
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6.3.2.2 State of the art solutions versus best practicable means 
 
If Newcastle Council’s corporate policies were to conform to the typical ‘English’ 
policy style, we would expect it to opt for cheaper solutions than Gelsenkirchen, and 
base decisions primarily on cost rather than environmental effectiveness. As this sub-
section will demonstrate, the authority actually sits somewhere in between the two 
extremes: it requires managers to produce robust business cases for any investment, 
but is nonetheless keen to support initiatives that use leading-edge sustainability 
technology. Notably, this represents a shift away from its previous clearer preference 
for the best practicable means (BPM). Nonetheless, this shift is grounded in practical 
financial considerations, because managers recognise that state of the art technologies 
tend to conserve much more energy than cheaper alternatives and will therefore pay 
for themselves over the medium term.  
 
For example, Newcastle was the first council in England to trial extra-low voltage 
(ELV) systems in its traffic lights. These are more expensive to buy, but use less than 
10% of the energy of traditional lighting and also require less maintenance – and will 
therefore deliver a return on investment within a few years of installation. As a result, 
the Highways department was able to build a convincing business case for ELV 
systems at the outset, and since then the council has stipulated that any new 
installation must use this technology (interview 10).  
 
The council’s approach towards electric vehicles (EVs) also illustrates how it is keen 
to embrace high-end solutions within the constraints of its financial situation. 
Together with other councils in the region, Newcastle has sought to encourage the 
adoption of EVs within the locality, partly because Nissan manufactures its Leaf car 
in nearby Sunderland and therefore higher levels of take-up could benefit the local 
economy (see chapter 4). Indeed, the authority is keen to set an example by investing 
in this technology, and it had purchased 33 electric vehicles by summer 2013 
(interviews 7 and 8). However, officers remained concerned about some of their 
potential drawbacks, and stressed that an EV would not be appropriate for every task 
the authority undertakes: 
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It has to match the business needs, and it has to match the cost in particular. It’s fine 
to reduce emissions, but it doesn’t mean you can go out and buy all electric vehicles, 
because… it’s an unproven technology, there are range factors, and some of them just 
aren’t suitable. I mean, you can imagine trying to run a snow plough in the winter 
with an EV, you’re not going to get very far. I took part in a pilot where they said the 
range was 100 [miles], but I only got 45 because I went out in the dark and put the 
lights on (interview 7). 
 
Another reason why the council has not embraced EVs wholeheartedly relates to the 
unknown re-sale value and potential costs of upkeep. As one manager put it: 
 
We don’t know what residual value these vehicles will have…, [whereas] if we’ve 
got a [Ford] Transit, then we know… what the value of that will be in five years’ time 
in terms of our investment. The other thing is maintenance… We’ve got top-quality 
maintenance technicians… now we couldn’t maintain the electric vehicles to that 
level… They’re the practical, real-world obstacles (interview 7). 
 
The above quote highlights how the council’s financial situation and the need to 
demonstrate a return on investment were both key determinants in decision-making. 
However, environmental concerns and the desire to set an example to the wider 
community still played an important role (interview 3). To illustrate this, officers 
stressed that the council would not buy any EVs at all if decisions were based solely 
on financial considerations (interviews 7 and 8). Yet, managers recognise that 
specialist vehicles such as coffin carriers or street cleaners can run very effectively on 
electricity, and are happy to invest in EVs for these purposes. In other words, 
Newcastle Council adopts a pragmatic perspective, in which it will purchase EVs for 
specific tasks but rely on traditional vehicles where they are less suitable. As with the 
other examples discussed in this subsection, such an attitude sits somewhere between 
preferring SOTA and BPM solutions. 
 
In a similar way, Newcastle Council’s corporate climate change strategy emphasised 
both the financial and environmental benefits of investing in high-end technologies. 
For example, it estimated that the authority’s first wave of energy-efficiency 
initiatives would result in financial savings of around £650,000 per annum, in return 
for a one-off investment of £1.28m. The investments in monitoring systems detailed 
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in section 6.3.2.1, including in software that switches off idle electrical equipment 
automatically, monitors vehicle use and integrates different energy and water meters, 
also suggest that that the authority is happy to procure technical solutions that might 
contribute towards its policy objectives. Indeed, the council’s corporate climate 
change strategy also stressed that the cost-effectiveness of projects with a potentially 
longer payback period would be assessed over 25 years (Newcastle City Council, 
2008). In the same way as Gelsenkirchen therefore, senior managers are able to use 
financial rules to encourage investment in energy-saving measures that will reduce 
carbon emissions.  
 
Crucially, however, interviewees at Newcastle did not embrace the idea of lifetime 
costs to the same extent as their counterparts in Gelsenkirchen, partly because there 
was less support for the concept along the vertical sub-dimension. Indeed, external 
funding sources such as SELEC (an organisation funded by central government that 
lends money to public bodies to finance environmental or energy efficiency 
improvements) require projects to deliver a return within only five years. This 
illustrates how other vertical actors do not encourage staff to take a long-term 
perspective on the value of potential solutions, particularly when compared to 
Germany. More specifically, it means that major retrofits for most of Newcastle 
Council’s property portfolio are out of the question – despite the fact that several 
municipal buildings that date from the 1960s and 1970s, including the main Civic 
Centre, have very low ratings for energy performance. Many of these buildings have 
solid walls (rather than cavities that can be filled with insulation), which means that 
any investment to improve their energy efficiency would not be repaid through lower 
heating bills for at least 20 years (interview 4). Since officers were also unsure how 
many buildings the authority would require in two decades’ time, this meant it was 
very difficult to develop a business case for retrofitting (interview 4).  
 
Indeed, staff at Newcastle Council need to demonstrate how costs will be recouped 
over a shorter time-frame than their counterparts in Gelsenkirchen, and overall the 
council still relies more on BPM than its German twin. For example, one procurement 
manager stressed that their team was under significant pressure to reduce spending in 
the short term, and how this tended to be the council’s main priority: 
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There’s a balancing act to be had around everything… We’ve got some big targets to 
hit in terms of savings, I’ve got some big targets to hit in terms of helping SMEs, I’ve 
got some big targets to hit on social equalities, I’ve got big targets to hit in terms of 
environmental –how do we balance all of those off and how do we ensure that that 
pound still is getting the best value for the Council? We have to make that decision at 
some point to say, where does it cut off? To say, well actually, that green energy, 
where does it become cost-effective and where doesn’t it on that lifecycle cost? It is 
important we reduce that, but do we have the money to be able to reduce that if we’ve 
been so drastically cut? (interview 9). 
 
This quote illustrates the contrast between the two municipalities in terms of 
procuring green power. As section 6.3.1.1 mentioned, half of Gelsenkirchen Council’s 
electricity came from renewable sources in 2013, and the authority is committed to 
buying all of its power from modern green stations by 2020. For its part, the 
municipality in Newcastle does ensure that some of its power comes from renewable 
sources, and promotes the procurement of green electricity as a general principle 
(Newcastle City Council, 2008). However, financial pressures mean that it cannot be 
as ambitious as its German counterpart: indeed, it has not set a binding percentage 
target for renewable energy procurement, and the authority is unlikely to come close 
to Gelsenkirchen’s objective of buying 100% green electricity by 2020 (interview 9). 
This places Newcastle much closer to the typical ‘English’ perspective of BPM, 
whereas Gelsenkirchen’s policy means that it has a greater preference for SOTA 
solutions.  
 
Crucially, Gelsenkirchen Council will benefit from significant support from other 
tiers of government in working towards its target, not least the tradition of 
Politikverflechtung and the more recent emergence of the Energiewende agenda – 
both of which lead to greater vertical interdependence. For its part, Newcastle’s more 
independent position along this sub-dimension means that it has less capacity to adopt 
and implement such ambitious policies.  
 
Table 6.3 and figure 6.4 summarise how the overall corporate policies of both 
municipalities differ along each sub-dimension of policy style. Notably, it highlights 
the fact that typically ‘German’ and ‘English’ characteristics do not apply to 
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Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle respectively, although the councils do appear to be 
converging to some extent. In terms of their preferences for hierarchy over 
engagement, both authorities focused initially on trying to persuade staff to change 
their behaviour and act in a more environmentally-friendly manner, and this approach 
did result in some progress. However, managers soon began to realise that relying 
purely on engagement was unlikely to deliver the level of benefit that they desired, 
and a more hierarchical approach would be necessary to achieve the council’s policy 
objectives.  
 
 
‘Typically’ German 
characteristics 
‘Typically’ English 
characteristics 
Hierarchy vs 
engagement 
Preference for engagement 
with both internal and 
external governance actors, 
though elected mayor has 
increased hierarchy slightly 
Increasingly hierarchical with 
internal governance actors; 
engagement with external 
organisations 
Vertical framework for 
industrial relations makes 
hierarchy difficult to 
introduce internally 
Vertical framework for 
industrial relations has enabled 
the introduction of ‘Panoptical’ 
management information 
systems internally 
SOTA vs 
BPM 
SOTA principles still 
dominate, though some shift 
towards BPM in recent years 
due to financial constraints  
Will opt for SOTA solutions 
where applicable, but short-term 
financial considerations remain 
very important 
 
Table 6.3: Changes in the sub-dimensions of policy styles types as applied to 
corporate policies in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
However, factors such as the absence of a centralised energy controlling system and 
staff monitoring mechanisms mean that Gelsenkirchen is struggling to change its 
strategy. As a result, it has only shifted slightly towards greater hierarchy in figure 
6.4, because the introduction of an elected mayor led to corporate activities becoming 
more ‘top-down’ and politically-focused. Aside from this, though, the tradition of 
consensual decision-making in German workplaces, together with the stronger 
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position of trade unions when compared to the UK, has resulted in greater horizontal 
interdependence between municipalities (as employers) and other internal actors 
(their staff). As we saw in the case of Newcastle in chapters 4 and 5, horizontal 
independence tends to result in a municipality that is not able to act hierarchically: 
instead it must rely on engagement with other local actors in order to achieve its 
political objectives. This logic also apples to Gelsenkirchen Council in the context of 
corporate policies. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Changes to policy styles as applied to corporate policies in Gelsenkirchen 
and Newcastle 
 
In contrast, Newcastle Council has been able to introduce sophisticated employee 
monitoring technologies that generate a wealth of management information about 
energy consumption and staff activity and mean that it is operating increasingly 
hierarchically in those areas where it has retained direct control. Since employers in 
the UK take decisions more independently of their staff than their German 
counterparts, authority managers have been able to introduce these mechanisms and 
use their data to inform subsequent performance appraisals that include an assessment 
of employees’ compliance with corporate policies. This ‘Panoptical’ system is much 
more hierarchical than the typical English policy style would suggest, but it is 
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buttressed by the vertical approach to industrial relations that forms a key part of the 
Anglo-American macroeconomic model. 
 
Nonetheless, the increasing fragmentation of the local state in England means that 
Newcastle Council has to engage significantly with external actors in the city that are 
responsible for public services. In particular, recent UK Government policies on 
academy schools have followed on from initiatives such as housing ALMOs and 
meant that municipalities no longer undertake a range of local public functions. These 
reforms mean that Newcastle Council has direct control over a shrinking portfolio of 
services, and it must therefore engage with external actors in order to implement its 
corporate policies across a similar range of services to Gelsenkirchen. As figure 6.4 
shows, therefore, the authority relies on horizontal engagement and compromise when 
working with these other organisations, but hierarchy for those areas still controlled 
by the council. 
 
Interestingly, Newcastle’s greater reliance on ‘management by numbers’ and 
informed decision-making is also characteristic of the dominance of New Public 
Management (NPM) ideas. Chapters 4 and 5 showed how NPM principles have 
weakened Newcastle’s influence over other policy sectors by fragmenting the local 
state. However, the case of corporate policies shows how a preference for more robust 
performance management systems can also strengthen the power of senior decision-
makers and enable them to operate more hierarchically. For its part, Gelsenkirchen 
Council has introduced fewer NPM techniques than Newcastle, partly due to the fact 
that these were not mandated for all local authorities in Germany (see chapter 3), but 
also because they encountered staff opposition in many places. As a result, the 
municipality does not rely on information and performance management systems to 
the same extent as its English counterpart, and its senior staff are less able to exert this 
level of authority as a result. By ensuring that employees are more influential in 
municipal decision-making, and therefore managers have to engage with them in 
order to introduce workplace reforms, the prevailing macroeconomic framework plays 
a key role in determining this policy-making approach. 
 
In terms of the preference for SOTA or BPM solutions, Gelsenkirchen Council’s 
corporate policies demonstrated greater preference for the former than those of 
272 
 
Newcastle. However, the overall picture was more complicated than these two ideal 
types might suggest. For example, although Gelsenkirchen has committed itself to 
much more ambitious targets for purchasing renewable energy than its English 
counterpart, it requires managers to produce business cases for investments that show 
how a particular solution will save money within a decade. This represents a shift 
away from its previous position, which placed less emphasis on the potential for high-
end solutions to deliver a return on investment. For its part, Newcastle Council has 
sought to portray itself as a leader in sustainability in recent years, by adopting the 
national sustainable procurement framework before any other council in the North 
East and promoting corporate electric vehicles and extra low voltage bulbs in traffic 
lights. However, the English municipality is more concerned with shorter-term 
financial concerns than its German counterpart, and is therefore reluctant to buy green 
electricity because of the additional cost. As a result, we can see how Newcastle sits 
in the middle in this sub-dimension, but its more recent decisions mean it has shifted 
away from the typically ‘English’ position of preferring BPM.  
 
6.4  Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined whether corporate policies in the case study municipalities 
reflect the typical ‘German’ and ‘English’ multi-level governance structures and 
policy styles. Overall, it found that the Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle did operate 
within multi-level governance structures that resembled Type I and Type II 
respectively, particularly in terms of their vertical relationships. However, it should be 
noted that they are diverging rather than converging along this sub-dimension – 
because local authorities in England now operate more independently of the centre 
than previously, whereas German municipalities work increasingly closely with other 
tiers of government in order to implement the Energiewende agenda. These findings 
concur with the analyses of climate change strategy and planning in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
Notably, however, the vertical framework for corporate policies does not shape 
horizontal arrangements in the same way as these other sectors. Instead of 
Gelsenkirchen’s greater vertical interdependence leading to more horizontal 
independence, the municipality has begun to work more with other actors in the 
locality in order to achieve its objectives. Indeed, although the Energiewende has 
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enabled German public bodies to coalesce around a single issue and encourage policy 
co-ordination, Gelsenkirchen Council lacks the internal capacity to facilitate 
behavioural change amongst its employees and also has to liaise with external energy 
providers in order to develop and implement council policy. This is primarily due to 
the German model of industrial relations, which encourages consensus-based 
negotiations between staff and their employers and therefore makes it much more 
difficult for municipalities to introduce hierarchical management techniques that may 
be unpopular with employees.  
 
Nonetheless, the local state in Newcastle is fragmented to an even greater extent: the 
municipality can no longer exert much control over an increasing number of schools 
and social housing, as well as utilities. In addition, although the municipality has 
concentrated its procurement activities into a single corporate team (in contrast to 
many English councils), it also operates an internal charging system between 
departments, which can hamper attempts at concerted action across the authority. 
Overall, this means that Newcastle Council works less independently along the 
horizontal dimension than was previously the case. Indeed, it is dependent on the 
actors of many external organisations (such as academy schools), because they have 
little incentive to work collaboratively with the authority yet their activities still 
contribute towards the local state’s overall carbon footprint. 
 
Nonetheless, if we consider municipal employees to be ‘governance actors’ (and this 
description fits with the definition outlined in section 2.2.3 on page 28, because they 
have been approached by the council to get involved in policy-making), Newcastle 
Council operates more independently of them than its counterpart in Gelsenkirchen. 
Crucially, the vertical framework for industrial relations in England means that 
managers are not required to engage with staff to the same extent as their German 
counterparts. This means that Gelsenkirchen Council has to work more 
interdependently with its employees and their representatives in corporate policy-
making.  
 
This contrast has made it easier for the English municipality to introduce hierarchical 
monitoring techniques in the workplace. By way of contrast, German councils operate 
within an industrial relations context that encourages greater consensus between 
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employers and employees, which means it is much more difficult to introduce 
potentially controversial or intrusive management approaches. Indeed, as with climate 
change strategy and planning (see chapters 4 and 5), it highlights how the degree of 
hierarchy or engagement is largely a function of the institutional arrangements within 
which each municipality operates. In particular, the nature of central support and 
vertical interdependence shapes the extent to which councils have the capacity to 
operate independently along the horizontal dimension – and this determines whether 
municipalities need to engage with other local actors or can take a more hierarchical 
approach.  
 
Finally, Gelsenkirchen does still exhibit a greater preference for SOTA technical 
solutions to environmental problems than Newcastle. As with the other sub-
dimensions investigated in this chapter however, the typical characterisations are 
somewhat simplistic and certainly do not apply wholesale to either city. For example, 
although the municipality in Gelsenkirchen has made a very ambitious commitment to 
purchasing renewable energy, investments still have to consider their financial 
implications and deliver a return within a decade. Similarly, Newcastle Council is 
demonstrating greater ambition in its preference for sustainability solutions, such as 
by installing extra low voltage traffic lights and procuring electric vehicles. Such 
actions do not fit with a fixed preference for using BPM to address an environmental 
problem. In spite of this, however, the authority is much more reluctant than 
Gelsenkirchen to purchase renewable electricity, primarily for financial reasons. As 
such, Newcastle Council relies on neither a state of the art solution nor the best 
practicable means – although it is not as close to the former as its German counterpart.  
 
As with climate change strategy and planning, a key factor in these preferences has 
been the level of external capacity that has helped municipalities to adopt more 
ambitious policies. In the case of Gelsenkirchen, the Energy Conservation Act, 
changes to the federal accountancy framework, feed-in-tariffs, the culture of 
Politikverflechtung and the more recent Energiewende agenda have ensured that the 
council has received significant support from other tiers of government. For its part, 
Newcastle does not benefit from as much vertical support and has therefore been 
unable to adopt SOTA solutions to the same extent. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and key findings 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
This project began by attempting to identify the extent to which typically ‘German’ 
and ‘English’ institutional structures and policy styles applied to the governance of 
climate change in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle, and whether they might be 
converging towards some kind of hybrid model. By employing more rigorous 
theoretical perspectives on intergovernmental relations and power dependencies, it 
evolved significantly from this starting point to examine the nature of vertical and 
horizontal relationships involving both municipalities. As such, not only does it 
describe how the policy-making approaches of both councils have developed in recent 
years, but it also explains how these arrangements have been shaped by the 
institutional context.  
 
In particular, the empirical chapters identify the crucial role that vertical relationships 
play in determining municipal capacity, and how greater interdependence along this 
sub-dimension in Germany enables Gelsenkirchen Council to operate relatively 
independently of other horizontal actors. By way of contrast, Newcastle Council is 
more independent of central government (indeed, it has become more so since 2010), 
which means it is increasingly dependent on other organisations in the locality for 
capacity and resources. Crucially, therefore, these vertical power dependencies shape 
the nature of the councils’ horizontal relationships, which then influence whether they 
can rely on hierarchy or engagement within their localities.  
 
In other words, both case study municipalities recognise that they have to work with 
other organisations to have sufficient capacity to achieve their climate change policy 
objectives. Crucially, Gelsenkirchen Council is able draw on Germany’s long legacy 
of constitutionally-embedded local government, more recent trends such as 
Politikverflechtung and contemporary agendas like the Energiewende to collaborate 
with other vertical tiers of government and operate more hierarchically within the 
locality. In contrast, municipalities in England cannot rely on any of these factors to 
support greater vertical co-operation and integration – and therefore Newcastle 
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Council has to engage more with other horizontal actors to try and fill the capacity 
gap.  
 
Notably, these characterisations of hierarchy in Gelsenkirchen and horizontal 
engagement in Newcastle fit with the typically ‘German’ and ‘English’ policy styles 
respectively. Indeed, by showing how institutional factors shape the way in which 
these councils respond to climate change, this thesis actually enhances the arguments 
of policy styles theorists. This is because it goes beyond the descriptive nature of 
much of the policy styles literature by highlighting several factors that nurture and 
reinforce the characteristically ‘German’ and ‘English’ approaches to climate change 
in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle respectively. 
 
The remainder of this concluding chapter draws together the key points from chapters 
2-6 in turn, before providing an overall summary of their findings and how they relate 
to the research questions set out in the introduction. It then highlights how the thesis 
raises a number of normative issues around democratic accountability and suggests 
several other potential lines of empirical enquiry that could build on its findings. 
Finally, it sets out the ways in which the thesis contributes to wider academic debates, 
particularly by combining political science perspectives with urban governance 
approaches to enable a more complete understanding of local policy-making 
processes. 
 
7.2  Key theoretical findings 
 
Chapter 2 analysed various literatures that relate to the governance of climate change 
in German and English cities. In particular, it highlighted the potential relevance of 
multi-level governance and policy styles perspectives, and used these to develop a 
hypothesis that suggested German and English municipalities rely on governance 
approaches that resemble the ‘typical’ characteristics of their respective countries. 
Furthermore, this hypothesis posited that these national approaches are converging 
towards a hybrid model, due to various exogenous and endogenous pressures. These 
pressures included: resource constraints that have been exacerbated by funding cuts 
and austerity; the recognition that climate change is a ‘wicked issue’ that needs to be 
addressed by a variety of stakeholders; the desire of some municipalities to be viewed 
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as sustainability leaders; a need for greater policy co-ordination across organisations; 
and, a drive for greater institutional flexibility. Notably, all of these pressures relate to 
whether a municipality has the capacity to achieve its political objectives without 
changing its existing governance approach. 
 
Since climate change is a ‘wicked issue’ that affects a range of stakeholders in any 
given jurisdiction, local authorities in both Germany and England need to work with 
other organisations to combat it. Therefore, any analysis of policy-making in this 
sector needs to examine the relationships between governing actors in order to 
identify the most influential decision-makers. As chapter 2 highlighted, however, 
Hooghe and Marks’ (2003) typologies of multi-level governance do not provide the 
theoretical basis to support this analysis. They are unclear about exactly which (non-
state) actors should be included in any assessment of governance structures, and also 
do not provide any tools to analyse power dynamics within these arrangements. As a 
result, they do not help to understand which organisations are influencing decision-
making, or indeed the extent to which any actor might shape policy outcomes. 
Instead, although these typologies acknowledge the increasing importance of non-
state actors in horizontal governing arrangements, as well as the important role of sub-
national and supranational bodies along the vertical dimension, they merely describe 
possible patterns of governance.  
 
In addition, as the empirical chapters identified, some of the characteristics attributed 
to Hooghe and Marks’ typology are potentially contradictory. For example, Type I 
jurisdictions are supposed to operate within a rigid, system-wide constitutional 
architecture, whilst also having non-intersecting memberships and a limited co-
ordination between governing actors. In fact, the empirical research found that the 
highly-integrated vertical framework in Germany actually strengthened the pre-
existing institutional architecture, because different tiers of government recognised 
and supported the principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung and therefore helped 
municipalities to pursue their own political objectives. In addition, they highlighted 
how integrative phenomena such as Politikverflechtung mean that actors at all levels 
benefit from the governing arrangements, and therefore they seek to reinforce rather 
than weaken them.  
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In spite of these contradictions, chapter 2 identified two contrasting features from 
Hooghe and Marks’ descriptions of Type I and Type II multi-level governance, and 
they formed two lines of empirical analysis. Firstly, to identify whether ‘German-
style’ Type I characteristics were evident along the vertical sub-dimension, the thesis 
analysed the extent to which different tiers of government co-operate within 
structured and mutually-supportive frameworks. Secondly, it investigated the extent 
to which responsibility for local public functions is concentrated in the municipality – 
a feature that would represent a characteristically Type I organisation along the 
horizontal sub-dimension. 
 
In addition to this assessment of institutional structures, chapter 2 also explained how 
some scholars have found that Germany and England adopt contrasting policy styles, 
particularly in the environmental sector. Indeed, this literature has highlighted a large 
number of differences between the two countries, many of which overlap and/or 
complement one another. For the purposes of simplicity, the thesis selected two of 
these contrasting characteristics as sub-dimensions for the empirical analysis. These 
were the extent to which each municipality relied on hierarchy rather than 
engagement, and their preference for state of the art (SOTA) solutions rather than the 
best practicable means (BPM) to address a policy problem. These characteristics 
formed the horizontal and vertical sub-dimensions for the empirical analysis of policy 
styles in chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
However, as with multi-level governance, ideas of national policy styles do not 
provide many clues as to why municipalities such as Gelsenkirchen or Newcastle 
might address problems in different ways. Indeed, both perspectives lack analytical 
tools to understand the nature of decision-making and power relations. As such, had 
this thesis relied solely on these two perspectives, it would not have addressed the 
fundamental drivers that shape each municipality’s governance arrangements in a 
satisfactory manner. In order to overcome this shortcoming, chapter 2 introduced and 
built upon Rod Rhodes’ (1981) theoretical model of power dependency to develop a 
new framework for analysing policy-making processes. In particular, it highlighted 
the crucial role that an organisation’s capacity to address policy problems plays in 
intergovernmental relations, and how this determines the extent to which governing 
actors are independent of, interdependent with, or dependent on other stakeholders. 
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Notably, this perspective is relevant for both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
governance – and therefore it allows us to analyse how municipalities work with other 
local actors, as well as with central government. In this way, it adopts perspectives 
from both political science (which tend to focus on central-local relations) and urban 
studies (which normally concentrate on local policy drivers). 
 
Indeed, it is only by taking this interdisciplinary approach to power dependency that 
we can identify which actors exert the most influence in local policy-making 
processes. The framework set out in chapter 2 does this by characterising both vertical 
and horizontal relations as being independent from, interdependent with or dependent 
on other governance actors, and thereby enables a more rigorous analysis of climate 
governance arrangements in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. Furthermore, it is worth 
emphasising that this tripolar model could also be applied to other governance 
contexts to examine power relations, particularly in wicked policy sectors and/or 
where the state seeks to collaborate with external actors to achieve its objectives. The 
final subsection of this concluding chapter discusses this in further detail. 
 
7.3   The historical evolution of local governance in Germany and 
England 
 
Chapter 3 set out how power dependency relationships have evolved in both countries 
since the establishment of modern local authorities in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. It highlighted the contrasting constitutional positions of local government in 
Germany and England, which give credence to the view that they have Type I and 
Type II multi-level governance arrangements respectively. By focusing on 
developments in the two countries (rather than the individual case study cities), it 
describes the picture that we might expect to find as a result of empirical research in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. 
 
In particular, the chapter highlighted the increasing importance of Politikverflechtung 
in Germany, and how this trend has led to greater vertical interdependence between 
governing actors. Crucially, this has meant that municipalities receive significant 
support from higher tiers of governance, which has strengthened them vis à vis other 
horizontal actors and given them greater capacity to achieve their objectives. This 
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support has come in the form of providing some of the means to implement policy, 
rather than prescribing the ends that councils are obliged to deliver. As a result, 
German councils operate within a highly-structured vertical context but can 
nonetheless exercise significant autonomy within this framework, which maps closely 
on to the vertical sub-dimension of multi-level governance that was selected for this 
thesis. Furthermore, many German councils still provide public services such as 
utilities and local transport, and therefore resemble the ‘multi-functional authority’ 
that is characteristic of Type I multi-level governance along the horizontal sub-
dimension. However, more recent financial challenges have weakened the position of 
deprived authorities (including Gelsenkirchen), and led to them outsourcing some 
functions to external providers. As such, some areas may be shifting towards Type II 
horizontal arrangements.  
 
Crucially, local government’s embedded position in Germany’s constitutional 
framework, along with a long-standing commitment to lokale Selbstverwaltung, has 
underpinned these developments. For its part, the lack of a codified constitution in the 
UK means that the British Government has not had to operate within these 
institutional constraints. Instead, ministers have made a concerted (and ultimately 
successful) attempt to weaken and fragment the local state in England, particularly 
since the 1970s. This involved removing a host of functions from local authorities and 
introducing stringent restrictions on their ability to raise revenue. Although ministers 
did try to co-ordinate policy implementation through national performance 
frameworks from the late 1990s onwards, this focused on setting out desirable ends 
(policy outcomes) and did not extend to significant support in providing the means to 
achieve them. More recently, the Coalition Government and its Conservative 
successor since 2010 have abandoned this modest attempt at vertical co-ordination, 
and the increasingly detached nature of central-local relations means that councils are 
even more independent of other vertical actors than was previously the case. 
 
Crucially, this vertical independence means that local authorities need to look 
elsewhere for the additional capacity that is necessary to implement policy effectively. 
As a result, they now work much more closely with other horizontal actors than their 
German counterparts – and their weaker position means they are not able to exert the 
same level of influence in local governance arrangements. This is particularly the case 
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in poorer areas such as Newcastle, which have been disproportionately affected by 
cuts in central government grants since 2010. As a result, they have become more 
dependent on other local actors to implement policy. Indeed, in terms of multi-level 
governance, the increasing independence from central government, together with the 
continued outsourcing or privatisation of many local public services, suggests that 
England is shifting closer towards an ideal Type II model along both the vertical and 
horizontal sub-dimensions.  
 
7.4  Climate change strategy in Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen  
 
The trend towards greater Politikverflechtung in intergovernmental relations in 
Germany since World War II, together with the more recent commitment to the 
Energiewende across different tiers, has resulted in Gelsenkirchen developing its 
climate change strategy increasingly interdependently with other vertical actors. This 
relatively rigid and mutually-supportive institutional structure also chimes with the 
sub-dimensions of Type I multi-level governance that were selected as lines of 
enquiry in this thesis. At the same time, however, the authority recognises that other 
local actors need to contribute towards its climate objectives, and therefore it needs to 
work interdependently along the horizontal dimension to a certain extent. 
Nonetheless, the extra support it receives from other vertical actors has enabled the 
council to continue as the dominant actor in horizontal governance arrangements – 
and therefore it has adopted a much more hierarchical position vis à vis other local 
stakeholders than Newcastle.  
 
Furthermore, despite contracting out some local services, Gelsenkirchen Council has 
retained responsibility for a wider range of public functions than its English twin, 
which means that it is still located closer to the ideal Type I position along the 
horizontal sub-dimension of multi-level governance. Notably, this increases its ability 
to exert control over other local actors, and therefore reinforces the municipality’s 
position as the dominant player in the city. In addition, although the authority would 
like to continue investing in SOTA technical solutions, recent financial pressures have 
weakened this to some extent. As a result, it is also shifting slightly towards a 
preference for BPM along this sub-dimension of policy styles. 
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For its part, Newcastle Council has greater freedom to pursue its strategic climate 
change objectives independently of other tiers of government, particularly now that 
ministers have abolished centralised performance frameworks and introduced a power 
of general competence for English local authorities. In fact, the authority did not take 
much account of central government priorities even whilst performance frameworks 
were in place, which illustrates the prevailing dominance of Type II multi-level 
governance along the vertical sub-dimension. Nonetheless, although the council now 
enjoys the same de jure freedom to determine policy goals as its German counterpart, 
it does not receive the same level of support from other tiers of government to help to 
achieve these objectives. This means it is a weaker and more fragmented actor in 
horizontal arrangements, and increasingly dependent on the voluntary sector and other 
members of its broad coalition to implement policy. Moreover, the fragmented, Type 
II nature of the local state means that Newcastle Council has responsibility for fewer 
public functions than its counterpart in Gelsenkirchen, and therefore it cannot exercise 
direct authority over as many local actors. Therefore, it has to rely even more on 
engagement, in line with the ‘English’ policy style. In addition, the authority has 
begun to concentrate more on what it can control and achieve as an organisation, 
rather than investing in state of the art solutions to try and meet highly ambitious 
targets. As a result, it is focusing more on climate adaptation rather than mitigation, 
which illustrates an increasing preference for the best practicable means.  
 
As such, the broad characterisations of ‘German’ and ‘English’ governance 
approaches do tend to apply in this policy sector, although they have begun to change 
in recent years (see table 4.3 on page 158). In fact, the two municipalities are 
diverging along more sub-dimensions than they are converging: Newcastle Council is 
becoming more ‘English’ in all four areas, and the Energiewende agenda has 
strengthened the Type I nature of vertical structures involving Gelsenkirchen. 
Furthermore, although the German city has begun to adopt some ‘English’ 
characteristics (by outsourcing some public functions, lowering its sights on investing 
in SOTA solutions and engaging more with other local actors), these changes have not 
altered the council’s fundamental governance approach. As such, we cannot say that 
the two authorities are converging towards a hybrid model for climate change 
strategy.  
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Nonetheless, it is clear that the vertical institutional structures play a vital role in 
determining the nature of horizontal governance arrangements and policy styles in 
both cities. Gelsenkirchen Council receives much more support from higher tiers of 
government than its counterpart in Newcastle, and operates within a context that 
encourages greater vertical policy co-ordination. This vertical interdependence has 
enabled it to retain responsibility for a wider range of local services, adopt a more 
hierarchical position in local governance arrangements and invest in more ambitious 
policy solutions compared to its English twin.  
 
7.5  Planning policy in Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen 
 
Gelsenkirchen operates within an even more interdependent vertical framework for 
planning policy than in climate change strategy. At the federal level, the Energy 
Conservation Act sets out a robust legal framework and strict standards on energy 
performance for every new building that is constructed (as well as older properties 
that undergo refurbishment). In addition, the Land and Bezirk levels provide advisory 
and financial support to help municipalities take decisions within this overall 
framework. This Type I vertical structure enables the council to use the planning 
system to further its climate objectives and adopt a strong position vis à vis other local 
actors. Indeed, Type I characterisations also apply along the horizontal sub-
dimension, where the council has been able to retain responsibility for a wide range of 
functions. Notably, this included the Ebertstraβe redevelopment, which the authority 
was determined to pursue independently of other local actors after a private firm’s 
attempt to refurbish Hans-Sachs-Haus were aborted prematurely. This institutional 
context means that the municipality is the strongest actor in the locality, which allows 
it to rely predominantly on a hierarchical mode of governance.  
 
Nonetheless, public concern about Hans-Sachs-Haus did mean that the council had to 
liaise more with citizens about the future of this controversial project. In addition, it 
felt unable to compel landlords to undertake sustainability retrofits of their properties 
in return for receiving public funding to replace their façades. As these examples 
illustrate, Gelsenkirchen Council is not in a position to do whatever it wants and does 
need to work interdependently with other horizontal actors to some extent. In other 
words, it cannot always rely on the typically ‘German’ policy style of hierarchy rather 
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than stakeholder engagement. Similarly, although Hans-Sachs-Haus incorporates a lot 
of high-end sustainability features, the council’s preference for SOTA solutions has 
weakened slightly – due to financial constraints and the need to demonstrate that any 
investment will deliver a financial return within ten years. 
 
In contrast, planning policy at Newcastle Council operates within a very loose vertical 
environment, particularly following the abolition of Regional Spatial Strategies in 
2010. As a result, the authority is much more independent of other tiers of 
government than its German twin. Together with the fact that the city has experienced 
economic decline in recent decades, this means the municipality is in a much weaker 
position in horizontal governance arrangements, because developers can threaten not 
to invest in the area if the council insists that new buildings meet stringent 
environmental standards. In addition, because various different task-specific 
organisations have had responsibility for the Science Central development, and 
Newcastle University has assumed the leading role for environmental sustainability 
on this initiative, the English city is also more fragmented along the horizontal sub-
dimension. This situation, which results in increasing dependency on other local 
actors, also fits with Type II multi-level governance arrangements.  
 
Furthermore, the fragmented nature of local governance and Newcastle Council’s 
weaker position in these arrangements means that the authority must rely on 
engagement rather than hierarchy to achieve its objectives. This bears all the 
hallmarks of the ‘English’ policy style. Notably, the municipality’s partnership with 
the university has enabled the city to benefit from SOTA sustainability features on the 
Science Central site, which suggests that Newcastle has adopted the ‘German’ 
position for this sub-dimension of policy style. Nonetheless, it is important to note 
that this is a result of the university’s actions, not those of the local authority acting 
directly – and therefore it should only be characterised as the municipality relying on 
SOTA solutions by proxy. Furthermore, Newcastle Council’s more flexible approach 
to negotiating with building companies about potential developments means that the 
council is much more likely to rely on BPM than SOTA solutions. This is largely 
because the city’s economic decline means the council is very keen to attract firms to 
invest in the area, and more likely to compromise on sustainability standards as a 
result. 
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Therefore, as table 5.2 and figure 5.4 on pages 191 and 192 show, multi-level 
governance structures in the two cities are actually diverging rather than converging 
for planning policy. For example, the cross-tier framework for planning policy in 
Germany is becoming more structured and robust, whereas it is weakening in 
England, meaning that Types I and II vertical multi-level governance arrangements 
are even more applicable in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle respectively. This is also 
the case along the horizontal sub-dimension, because Gelsenkirchen Council took 
back responsibility for redeveloping Hans-Sachs-Haus – whereas various different 
bodies have been involved in the management of Science Central. As with climate 
change strategy, however, there is some convergence in terms of the policy styles 
adopted in planning. Gelsenkirchen Council has begun to adopt some ‘English’ 
characteristics, by engaging more with horizontal actors and lowering its sights on 
ambitious technical solutions. In addition, although Newcastle Council is increasingly 
dependent on other horizontal actors (and therefore has to engage even more with 
them than was previously the case), its partnership with one of the city’s universities 
has meant that Science Central will feature a number of SOTA sustainability features. 
Table 5.3 and figure 5.10 on pages 217 and 218 illustrate how these shifts have 
occurred in recent years. 
 
However, the two municipalities remain some distance away from each other along 
all four sub-dimensions. Indeed, unless the vertical framework for planning policy in 
England becomes more mutually-supportive and robust, and there is some unforeseen 
and remarkable upturn in the economic fortunes of post-industrial cities, it is very 
unlikely that councils such as Newcastle will be able to adopt a hierarchical position 
in horizontal governance arrangements. As far as Gelsenkirchen Council is concerned, 
it has begun to adopt some ‘English’ characteristics around horizontal engagement, 
primarily in order to ensure that developments have popular support. However, 
interviewees at the authority were clear that they saw planning as a key tool for 
achieving the council’s climate change objectives, and were not keen to relinquish 
any control over decision-making in this sector. Moreover, the strong vertical 
framework within which German councils operate actually prevents them from 
agreeing lower sustainability standards with developers. Therefore, Gelsenkirchen 
will continue to rely on a hierarchical approach and insist on ambitious environmental 
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criteria rather than BPM solutions. In other words, it appears very unlikely that 
planning policy in the two municipalities will converge towards some kind of hybrid 
model. 
 
7.6  Corporate policies in Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen 
 
As with the previous two sectors, Gelsenkirchen Council is operating within an 
increasingly interdependent vertical context for its corporate policies. The 
Energiewende provides a ‘glue’ to facilitate policy co-ordination and mutual support 
across tiers of government, and thereby increases the rigidity of Type I vertical 
structures. More recently, however, the council has outsourced some tasks associated 
with implementing these policies (most notably the delivery of workshops to 
encourage staff to change their behaviour), which has resulted in some Type II 
fragmentation and thereby also more interdependence along the horizontal dimension 
(see table 6.2 and figure 6.1 on pages 241 and 243 respectively). Importantly, this 
fragmentation has been in response to a recognition that the council is unable to 
achieve its objectives independently – and it has been unable to source the necessary 
extra capacity from other vertical actors.  
 
Notably, Gelsenkirchen Council has also relied more on ‘English’-style compromise 
and engagement in its implementation of corporate policies. The authority encourages 
employees to change their behaviour through incentives and persuasion – instead of 
sanctions or compulsion – in order to try and reduce the municipality’s energy bills. 
Although interviewees were increasingly aware that these techniques were not 
delivering the desired results, and the introduction of an elected mayor had meant that 
corporate activities were becoming more politically-focused and hierarchical, 
engagement still represented the dominant mode of governing in summer 2013. A 
crucial reason for this is the relatively strong position of staff in horizontal governing 
arrangements, which means that council managers cannot introduce new workplace 
reforms without extensive consultation and consensus. This greater interdependence 
between employer and employees (particularly compared to the Anglo-American 
macroeconomic model, in which managers can operate much more independently of 
their staff), means that Gelsenkirchen Council cannot be as hierarchical with its 
workforce as its counterpart in England. In other words, the vertical context for 
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industrial relations in Germany shapes the governance approaches that municipalities 
are able to adopt for corporate policies, because staff need to be more involved in 
organisational decision-making. 
 
Furthermore, financial constraints have led the municipality to move slightly away 
from SOTA solutions. Corporate purchases of environmental technologies now need 
to demonstrate a return on investment within a decade, whereas previously they were 
assumed to benefit the city and its strategy of regeneration through solar technology. 
Nonetheless, various mechanisms are in place to ensure that managers can build a 
business case for high-tech sustainability features, not least the relatively long 
payback period, a generous (national) system of feed-in-tariffs, and council 
requirements that new or refurbished public buildings must have photovoltaics on the 
roof or a green covering. 
 
For its part, Newcastle Council’s corporate policy-making occurs increasingly 
independently of central government. As such, Type II characteristics predominate 
along the vertical sub-dimension of multi-level governance – and internal municipal 
fragmentation means that the English city also resembles a Type II municipality in 
terms of its horizontal relationships. Indeed, Newcastle Council has lost control of a 
range of its functions in recent decades as a result of central government legislation, 
including social housing provision and an increasing number of local schools. 
Furthermore, endogenous reforms, such as the introduction of internal charging 
mechanisms to account for the use of other departments’ assets, have accelerated this 
trend towards a model Type II arrangement. 
 
This fragmented situation suggests that Newcastle Council will need to rely on 
horizontal engagement with other local actors in order to implement its corporate 
policies effectively. Indeed, the fact that the municipality cannot exert direct control 
over many other public service providers within the locality means that it is not in a 
position to adopt a hierarchical mode of governance in these areas. However, the 
council’s various monitoring systems for vehicle use and energy consumption means 
that it does operate hierarchically in those services that it delivers directly. Since the 
Anglo-American macroeconomic model means that employers can take decisions 
more independently of their staff, this vertical context enabled Newcastle Council to 
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introduce these management information systems relatively easily. As such, 
Newcastle Council relies on both the ‘English’ and ‘German’ policy styles along this 
sub-dimension, depending on whether it has retained direct control over a particular 
public function. 
 
The English case authority has also moved towards a greater preference for SOTA 
solutions in recent years, as part of its strategy to portray the city as a forward-
looking, ambitious location. It has invested in a large number of electric vehicles, 
embraced the national sustainable procurement framework and was a trailblazer in 
installing extra low voltage bulbs in traffic lights. Although financial considerations 
did play a role in each of these investments, they were also heavily influenced by the 
council’s strategic sustainability objectives. However, Newcastle Council is more 
concerned with shorter-term financial concerns than its German counterpart: it is 
much more reluctant to buy green electricity because of the additional cost, and has 
been much slower to install renewable energy generating technologies on and in 
public buildings. In this way, we can see how the English authority has shifted along 
this sub-dimension in figure 6.4 (see page 270), but remains some distance away from 
Gelsenkirchen.  
 
Therefore, as with climate change strategy and policy styles, the case study councils 
are actually diverging in terms of multi-level governance typologies – particularly 
along the vertical sub-dimension. Vertical structures in Germany have become even 
more robust and mutually-supportive, whereas the UK Government’s increasingly 
detached approach to English councils means that Newcastle Council develops and 
implements its corporate policies independently of other vertical actors. Although the 
municipality in Gelsenkirchen has outsourced some service provision to other 
horizontal actors, responsibilities are still far more concentrated in the German 
authority than its English counterpart.  
 
However, the empirical research into policy styles revealed somewhat surprising 
results. If we restrict the scope of analysis to those functions over which 
municipalities have retained direct control, Newcastle Council relies much more on 
‘German-style’ hierarchy than Gelsenkirchen as a way of trying to change staff 
behaviour. Nonetheless, the English authority has to resort to horizontal engagement 
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when dealing with the providers of other public services in the city – whereas its 
German counterpart remains responsible for a much broader range of functions in 
Gelsenkirchen and can therefore adopt a more hierarchical stance in these areas. In 
terms of their preference for SOTA or BPM, Newcastle Council is located mid-way 
between these two points, but has moved away from BPM in recent years, partly due 
to its desire to promote local manufacturing of electric vehicles. At the same time, 
financial constraints have meant Gelsenkirchen has shifted slightly away from SOTA 
and towards BPM, which suggests that the two cities are converging along this sub-
dimension. Nonetheless, high standards on retrofitting public buildings, along with 
ambitious targets for procuring green electricity, mean that Gelsenkirchen still 
exhibits typically ‘German’ characteristics along this sub-dimension, and it remains 
some distance away from the English case study. 
 
7.7  Summary of empirical findings 
 
Overall, the local authority in Gelsenkirchen operates within a much more structured 
vertical framework than its counterpart in Newcastle, and also has direct 
responsibility for a larger number of local public functions. Similarly, Gelsenkirchen 
Council is more likely to rely on hierarchical modes of governance vis à vis other 
horizontal actors than Newcastle, and also prefers state of the art (SOTA) technical 
solutions to the best practicable means (BPM). As such, the type of multi-level 
governance and the country-specific characteristics of policy style in Gelsenkirchen 
and Newcastle do resemble those that are typically associated with Germany and 
England respectively. In spite of this, however, neither municipality fits with the 
‘ideal’ governance arrangements of their particular country, because traits that would 
not normally be associated with their respective countries were apparent in each city. 
Furthermore, the approaches of both councils to all three policy sectors are changing – 
primarily because the authorities are trying to seek out ways to acquire the necessary 
capacity to achieve their political objectives.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that these shifts do not always represent a 
converging trend: indeed, the two authorities are actually diverging in terms of multi-
level governance. For example, although the municipality in Gelsenkirchen has direct 
control over a smaller number of local public functions than previously, it is more 
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interdependent with vertical actors - and therefore increasingly resembles model Type 
I arrangements along this sub-dimension. Similarly, Type II structures are becoming 
more dominant at Newcastle Council along both sub-dimensions, due to a weakening 
of central-local relations and the continued fragmentation of the local state. 
 
However, there is more evidence to suggest some convergence in policy style. This is 
largely due to shifts in approach from Gelsenkirchen Council, which has begun to 
engage more with other local actors in climate change strategy and planning, and is 
also less likely to invest in state of the art solutions that previously. Nonetheless, 
although the council is travelling in an ‘English’ direction along these sub-
dimensions, typically ‘German’ characteristics still dominate. For its part, Newcastle 
is also moving closer to the ideal ‘English’ model through its increasing reliance on 
horizontal engagement in these two sectors. For both councils, the notable exception 
is in corporate policy, where Newcastle has adopted the ‘German’ characteristic of 
greater hierarchy (at least over those functions that it still controls directly) whilst 
Gelsenkirchen has relied more on horizontal engagement (although it is moving away 
from this approach).  
 
Table 7.1 illustrates how multi-level governance structures and policy styles have 
changed more in some sectors than others. In order to relate these results more clearly 
to the original hypothesis, each of the cells relating to the empirical chapters are 
shaded: the darker the colour, the closer the municipality resembles typically 
‘German’  characteristics – and the lighter the shade, the more akin to ‘English’ 
attributes. They also indicate the ‘direction of travel’ for every policy sector along the 
sub-dimensions of multi-level governance and policy styles: in other words, whether 
it is shifting towards the hypothetical ‘mid-point’ between characteristically German 
and English approaches or moving in the opposite direction.  
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Policy 
sector 
Municipality Multi-level governance type Policy style 
Vertical dimension Horizontal dimension Hierarchy vs engagement SOTA vs BPM 
Climate 
strategy 
Gelsenkirchen Diverging: Type I 
becoming very 
dominant 
Converging: Type I 
dominant, but shift 
towards Type II 
Converging: Hierarchy dominant, but 
shift towards engagement 
Converging: SOTA dominant, 
but shift towards BPM  
Newcastle Diverging: Type II 
becoming more 
dominant  
Diverging: Type II 
becoming even more 
dominant 
Diverging: Engagement becoming even 
more dominant 
Diverging: BPM becoming even 
more dominant 
 
Planning Gelsenkirchen Diverging: Type I 
becoming very 
dominant 
Diverging: Type I 
becoming very 
dominant 
Converging: Hierarchy dominant, but 
shift towards engagement 
Converging: SOTA dominant, 
but shift towards BPM  
Newcastle Diverging: Type II 
becoming more 
dominant 
Diverging: Type II 
becoming even more 
dominant 
Diverging: Engagement becoming even 
more dominant 
Diverging/Converging: SOTA 
by proxy through the university, 
otherwise BPM dominant  
Corporate 
policies 
Gelsenkirchen Diverging: Type I 
becoming more 
dominant 
Converging: Type I 
dominant, but shift 
towards Type II 
Diverging: Engagement dominant, but 
shift towards hierarchy 
Converging: SOTA dominant, 
but shift towards BPM 
Newcastle Diverging: Type II 
becoming even more 
dominant 
Diverging: Type II 
becoming even more 
dominant 
Diverging/Converging: Hierarchy 
dominant internally: engagement 
dominant with other local public bodies 
Converging: BPM formerly 
dominant, but shift towards SOTA 
 
 
Table 7.1: Characterisations of multi-level governance and policy styles in the case study municipalities. (Note: the darker the shading, the more 
‘German’ the governance approach – and, by extension, the lighter the shading, the more ‘English’) 
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As the table suggests, most of the cells relating to Gelsenkirchen are dark or very dark 
grey in colour, whereas those associated with Newcastle are much paler. This is 
particularly the case with multi-level governance structures, in that Type I dominates 
along both the vertical and horizontal sub-dimensions for all three policy sectors in 
Gelsenkirchen, whereas Newcastle operates with arrangements that bear a much 
closer resemblance to Type II. Indeed, the two municipalities’ multi-level governance 
arrangements are actually diverging rather than converging in most cases – the only 
exception being some horizontal fragmentation in Gelsenkirchen’s climate change 
strategy and corporate policies.  
 
In terms of policy styles, Gelsenkirchen Council now engages slightly more with 
other horizontal actors in climate change strategy and planning than was previously 
the case, whereas Newcastle has shifted even further away from hierarchy. Therefore 
the authorities remain a significant distance apart along this sub-dimension in both 
sectors, even though they are moving in the same direction. The findings from 
corporate policies are more mixed, since they show that Gelsenkirchen Council has 
relied traditionally on ‘English’-style engagement but has moved towards a greater 
reliance on hierarchy since the introduction of an elected mayor. For its part, 
Newcastle is increasingly hierarchical in those functions that it still controls directly – 
in contrast to what we might expect from the policy styles literature but in line with 
comparative perspectives on macroeconomic policy. However, because these 
represent a low and shrinking set of responsibilities, it needs to engage more and more 
with external horizontal actors (such as academy schools) that can otherwise operate 
autonomously of the municipality.  
 
Therefore, the only sub-dimension along which there appears to be some convergence 
relates to the municipalities’ preference for SOTA or BPM solutions. This is 
particularly the case if we consider Newcastle University’s ambitious investments in 
Science Central to be the council adopting SOTA technologies by proxy. Nonetheless, 
in most cases Gelsenkirchen Council still opts for higher-end solutions than its 
English counterpart, primarily due to the vertical framework that provides more 
support for investing in green technologies. 
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Municipality Multi-level governance type Policy style 
Vertical 
dimension 
Horizontal 
dimension 
Hierarchy vs 
engagement 
State of the art 
vs BPM 
Gelsenkirchen Desire for 
greater 
institutional 
flexibility; 
divergence 
towards more 
structured 
Type I 
arrangements 
Resource 
constraints leading 
to outsourcing or 
privatisation; some 
convergence 
towards more 
fragmented Type 
II arrangements 
Recognition of 
‘wicked’ 
nature of 
climate 
change; some 
convergence 
towards 
‘English’ 
approach of 
engagement 
Financial and 
other resource 
constraints; 
some 
convergence 
towards ideal 
‘English’ 
preference for 
BPM 
Newcastle Desire for 
institutional 
stability; 
divergence 
towards more 
flexible and 
detached Type 
II 
arrangements 
Need for policy co-
ordination and 
integration; 
divergence 
towards more 
fragmented Type 
II arrangements 
Desire for 
more 
ambitious 
policies; 
divergence 
towards 
‘English’ 
approach of 
engagement 
Desire to be 
seen as a 
sustainability 
location; some 
convergence 
towards 
‘German’ 
preference for 
SOTA 
 
Table 7.2: Potential factors that could cause governance approaches to change 
mapped against the empirical findings (adapted from figure 2.3 on page 53) 
 
In summary, the municipalities are travelling away from the hypothetical mid-point 
along some sub-dimensions of multi-level governance and policy styles, but they are 
converging on it in others. This highlights how the hypothesis at the centre of this 
thesis is too simplistic even to describe the changing nature of governance approaches 
in the two cities – never mind identify what factors may be driving the shift to new 
arrangements. As such, figure 2.3 on page 53, which set out the original hypothesis, 
cannot be adapted easily to illustrate whether either municipality is moving in a 
particular direction along either dimension (or indeed sub-dimension). Nonetheless, it 
is worth returning to this diagram to examine the factors that were suggested as 
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potential drivers for change in governance arrangements, in order to identify whether 
they did exert this pressure. As such, they are listed in table 7.2, along with the sub-
dimensions of governance approach that they may have challenged. Furthermore, 
table 7.2 draws on table 7.1 to highlight the extent to which each municipality 
converged towards the hypothetical mid-point of each sub-dimension, in order to help 
identify the most influential of these drivers. 
 
Indeed, as table 7.2 shows, some factors proved much more influential than others. In 
particular, resource constraints and a growing realisation that the authority needed to 
change the behaviour of other horizontal actors led Gelsenkirchen Council to shift 
slightly towards the ‘English’ position, whereas the desire for sustainability-led 
regeneration influenced Newcastle’s approach. In contrast, concerns about the 
potential rigidity or instability of the institutional framework were not really 
addressed in either authority, and this has resulted in the municipalities diverging 
along the vertical dimension for multi-level governance.  
 
Nonetheless, all of these pressures are associated with the key factor that drives 
change in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle’s governance arrangements – the extent to 
which these municipalities have the capacity to achieve their objectives, and how this 
shapes their relationships with other actors. Chapters 1 and 2 highlighted how climate 
change is a ‘wicked issue’, and therefore individual state actors need external support 
to implement policies effectively. Crucially, however, most of this additional capacity 
comes from different sources in the cases of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle – and this 
has profound implications for their governance arrangements.  
 
Indeed, one of the most important findings of this thesis is that the key variable that 
shapes governance structures (and ultimately influences policy styles) in the two cities 
is the source of that additional capacity, particularly the extent to which it is 
available along the vertical dimension (see table 7.3). Notably, the prevailing culture 
of Politikverflechtung and the ‘glue’ of the Energiewende means that Gelsenkirchen 
Council is able to access extensive support from higher tiers of government and 
operate within a robust interdependent vertical framework. Together with the fact that 
it has retained responsibility for a broader range of local public functions (because the 
federal or Land levels did not require municipalities to outsource or privatise their 
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services), this means it is in a strong position to operate relatively independently of 
other horizontal actors and adopt a more hierarchical approach in the locality. 
Similarly, financial support from the Land and Bezirk, along with federal laws to 
introduce feed-in-tariffs and stringent energy performance standards for buildings, 
have enabled the council to continue adopting relatively high-end technical solutions 
instead of relying on the best practicable means to address a problem. 
 
As far as Newcastle is concerned, the much more detached relationship between the 
UK Government and English councils means that the authority is becoming 
increasingly independent of the centre. This means that Newcastle Council has to look 
elsewhere for the additional capacity that it requires to implement its policies 
effectively – and the obvious place to search is along the horizontal dimension. 
However, it is in quite a weak position vis à vis other local actors, due to the centrally-
imposed agenda to contract out local public services and the lack of a strong vertical 
support framework. As a result, it becomes increasingly dependent on external 
organisations and has to try and engage with these horizontal actors rather than adopt 
a more hierarchical approach. Notably, however, because the council has ‘piggy-
backed’ on the capacity of local actors such as the university, the city as a whole is in 
a position to invest in more SOTA solutions than would otherwise be the case. 
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Policy 
sector 
Municipality Power dependence relationship Policy style 
Vertical dimension Horizontal dimension Hierarchy vs engagement SOTA vs BPM 
Climate 
strategy 
Gelsenkirchen Increasingly more 
interdependent  
Largely independent, 
though some 
interdependence  
Hierarchy dominant, but shift 
towards engagement 
SOTA dominant, but shift 
towards BPM  
Newcastle Highly independent  Increasingly dependent Engagement becoming even 
more dominant 
BPM becoming even more 
dominant 
 
Planning Gelsenkirchen Highly interdependent  Largely independent, 
though some 
interdependence 
Hierarchy dominant, but shift 
towards engagement 
SOTA dominant, but shift 
towards BPM  
Newcastle Highly independent  Increasingly dependent Engagement becoming even 
more dominant 
SOTA by proxy through the 
university, otherwise BPM 
dominant  
Corporate 
policies 
Gelsenkirchen Increasingly more 
interdependent 
Largely independent, 
though some 
interdependence 
Engagement dominant, but 
shift towards hierarchy 
SOTA dominant, but shift 
towards BPM 
Newcastle Highly independent  Independent in internal 
activities; dependent in 
other public functions 
Hierarchy dominant internally: 
engagement dominant with 
other local public bodies 
BPM formerly dominant, but 
shift towards SOTA  
 
Table 7.3: Power dependencies and policy styles in the case study municipalities 
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Table 7.3 summarises these findings and highlights the important role that vertical 
power dependencies play in shaping Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle’s horizontal 
relationships and policy styles. In the German case, interdependent vertical 
relationships have helped to support horizontal independence, and are more likely to 
result in the municipality relying on hierarchy and SOTA technologies. In contrast, 
independent vertical relationships in England are causing Newcastle to become 
increasingly dependent along the horizontal dimension, and mean the council has to 
adopt a strategy of engagement with other local actors, as well as demonstrate greater 
preference for BPM solutions. However, as the next subsection will explain in further 
detail, it is important to note that these conclusions are based on the assumption that 
both councils are subject to tight financial constraints. If the municipalities were able 
to access additional resources from elsewhere (for example, by raising significant 
extra revenue through taxation), they may not be as reliant on other sources of 
capacity to achieve their policy objectives and could therefore operate more 
independently of both vertical and horizontal actors. 
 
 
7.8  Implications for future research 
 
7.8.1  Further empirical study 
 
Table 7.3 highlights a number of avenues for further empirical investigation and 
normative consideration. Notably, it highlights how vertical power dependencies 
shape the horizontal governance arrangements and policy styles of Gelsenkirchen and 
Newcastle, two municipalities that operate within constrained financial contexts. 
Figure 7.1 condenses these findings into a hypothesis for further investigation in other 
contexts. Indeed, we might expect authorities in other parts of Germany and England 
that have experienced economic decline to have similar capacity constraints and adopt 
comparable coping strategies in order to achieve policy objectives. Alternatively, the 
hypothesis could be investigated in other countries that have comparable vertical 
structures, in order to identify whether this results in municipalities adopting much 
more similar governance approaches. 
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Figure 7.1: How vertical power dependencies might influence horizontal 
relationships and policy styles: A hypothesis for future investigation 
 
At the same time, other local contexts may well result in different governance 
approaches – and therefore they represent interesting lines for further investigation. 
For example, studies into councils that have greater internal capacity could identify 
whether vertical power relationships are shaping decision-making arrangements in 
similar ways. With this in mind, it may be the case that capital cities (which national 
governments may treat differently due to their status within the country) find it easier 
to pursue their climate change objectives independently of other actors than provincial 
cities like Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. Alternatively, studies of English 
municipalities that do not have research-intensive universities located within their 
boundaries might find them to be even more dependent on other horizontal actors than 
Newcastle. Further studies could also investigate whether vertical power 
dependencies play a similar role in shaping the governance of other ‘wicked’ policy 
issues at the local level.  
 
7.8.2  Normative considerations 
 
As this thesis has suggested at various points, greater interdependence (and 
particularly increasing dependence) has significant normative implications for 
democracy. In line with this viewpoint, Shepsle (1988) has suggested that there is a 
‘trade-off’ between the ‘representativeness’ and ‘influence’ of a legislature, which can 
be re-phrased in the context of this thesis as being between ‘democracy’ and 
‘capacity’. Indeed, as individual public bodies work with other organisations to 
increase their ability to achieve policy objectives, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
identify which actors are influencing the decision-making process. This chimes with 
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the discussion in chapter 2 of this thesis, which highlighted how New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms have reduced democratic accountability.  
 
Crucially, the model of power dependencies set out in chapter 3 does help to pinpoint 
the extent to which organisations are able to shape policy-making, and it can therefore 
act as a starting point for investigating these normative issues. Nonetheless, political 
theorists may still want to consider whether reducing the level of democratic control 
over decision-making processes is a price worth paying for enabling public bodies to 
achieve their political objectives more effectively – or alternatively, where to strike 
the balance between democracy and capacity (see also Bellamy et al., 2011). In 
particular, when state actors become so weak that they are dependent on the private 
sector to provide this additional capacity, there is a significant risk that these 
companies will not act in the public interest. Such a scenario is reminiscent of 
traditional critiques of pluralism and the influence of special interest groups in policy-
making (Schattschneider, 1960, Lehman Schlozman et al., 2012). Yet, it must be 
borne in mind that public bodies do need to work with external actors in order to 
address vital issues such as climate change, since individual organisations cannot 
hope to solve such enormous challenges independently. This suggests that there needs 
to be some trade-off between democracy and capacity – after all, any government that 
is unable to deliver its policy objectives will soon lose legitimacy. Indeed, as some 
have argued, it may just be the case that the idea of ‘output legitimacy’ (the 
effectiveness of the policy-making process) is increasingly more relevant than ‘input’ 
or ‘throughput’ legitimacy (the relationship between citizens and the process of 
decision-making, and the quality of this process respectively) in the era of constrained 
state power (Scharpf, 1999, Risse and Kleine, 2007). As a result, traditional methods 
of holding the powerful to account may have simply evolved in response to global 
developments. 
 
Nonetheless, Gelsenkirchen Council has reaped two notable benefits from its strong 
position in horizontal governance arrangements. Normatively-speaking, the city’s 
voters can have greater confidence that the municipality is the key player in local 
climate governance – and it can therefore be much more accountable to citizens 
through traditional voting mechanisms. Secondly, from a practical perspective, the 
municipality is able to choose whether to adopt a hierarchical approach or to engage 
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horizontally with other actors, depending on which approach decision-makers feel 
would be more effective. In contrast, Newcastle’s weaker position means that it relies 
overwhelmingly on engagement, which could mean that external actors are able to 
‘dilute’ its objectives. As a result, Gelsenkirchen’s interdependent vertical framework 
not only creates the conditions that can protect and enhance local democracy, but it 
also enables public officials to draw on a broader range of tools and approaches to 
address policy problems. In other words, if an interdependent vertical framework does 
help municipalities to operate more independently within their jurisdictions, then it 
has distinct normative and practical advantages over a weaker and less co-ordinated 
arrangement. 
 
7.9   Final conclusions  
 
Overall, this thesis sits within various different academic literatures, particularly those 
associated with multi-level governance, intergovernmental relations, urban studies, 
public policy analysis, and policy styles. This final section will discuss how it has 
contributed to each of these fields, both in terms of the theoretical developments set 
out in chapter 2 and the empirical analysis in chapters 4, 5 and 6. As such, it will 
bring together the key findings from the entire thesis and place them in the context of 
wider debates in political science and urban studies. 
 
Firstly, this thesis did find that the two cities relied on notably different decision-
making processes, many of which fitted descriptions of the ‘typical’ policy style 
associated with their respective countries. This suggests that the idea of policy styles 
has some merit, and different countries do not necessarily adopt similar policy-
making approaches to the same policy sectors. The finding relates to the academic 
debate about whether the nature of a policy problem shapes how the political system 
seeks to address it (‘policy determines politics’, in line with Lowi (1964)), or if the 
institutional context has more influence over governance approaches (‘politics 
determines policy’, see O'Riordan and Jordan, 1996). By highlighting how the vertical 
(and therefore national) institutional context within which each case study 
municipality operates shaped their governance arrangements, this thesis has provided 
useful theoretical support for the idea that different countries adopt specific policy 
styles. Crucially, however, neither Gelsenkirchen nor Newcastle had static policy-
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making processes that fitted completely with the ascribed approach of Germany and 
England respectively. Most notably, Gelsenkirchen had begun to involve societal 
actors more in climate governance arrangements, instead of relying solely on 
traditional state hierarchy to implement policy. In other words, these typical styles are 
too simplistic to adopt as general rules that will apply to every situation, particularly 
in ‘wicked’ policy sectors that – by definition – require decision-makers to take a non-
traditional approach to problem-solving. A more nuanced perspective, which 
recognises that both the policy problem and the prevailing political institutions are 
likely to influence the governance approach (see Stone, 2005), is a far more realistic 
and accurate portrayal – and therefore provides a much better starting point for 
analysing policy-making processes at any level of government.  
 
Moreover, this thesis highlighted one of the key drawbacks of traditional multi-level 
governance perspectives. As the theoretical and empirical chapters of this thesis have 
demonstrated, multi-level governance may be a good analogy to illustrate the fact that 
different actors are involved in decision-making, but it does not help to understand the 
role that they play or which stakeholders are most influential in these arrangements. 
Similarly, the language of contrasting Type I and Type II jurisdictions is useful 
shorthand to describe which actors might be involved in governance and what they 
have responsibility for, but it does not delve deeper to identify how they relate to 
other stakeholders and reveal the processes involved in decision-making. As such, 
scholars should only consult the multi-level governance lexicon to stress that different 
actors are involved in decision-making, and/or to suggest how responsibilities might 
be allocated across jurisdictions. Unlike theories of the policy-making process, it 
cannot help us to understand how actors take decisions, or the extent to which they 
influence governance arrangements.  
 
Instead, any analysis of decision-making requires a theory of power – a concept that 
this thesis characterised in terms of the capacity that a public body has to implement 
policy. Implicitly, this links Rhodes’ (1981) notion of resource dependency with 
Stone’s (1989) concept of municipalities possessing the ‘power to’ achieve political 
objectives (which he distinguishes from exerting ‘power over’ other actors). By 
incorporating ideas from both political science and urban governance in this way, the 
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thesis provides a more comprehensive framework for local policy analysis that 
scholars can apply across a range of sectors.  
 
Indeed, previous studies have failed to appreciate sufficiently the important role of 
both horizontal and vertical factors in local policy-making, yet such an 
interdisciplinary approach is necessary to obtain a fuller understanding of governance 
arrangements. For their part, geographers and urban studies scholars have tended to 
focus on horizontal factors, such as how local resource constraints and/or economic 
problems may be encouraging municipal decision-makers to search for a 
‘sustainability fix’ to industrial decline. On the other hand, political scientists have 
concentrated largely on the vertical dimension, by analysing issues such as the extent 
of municipal autonomy from the centre, the legal/constitutional status of sub-national 
tiers, the distribution of public functions between levels of government and the degree 
of control that local authorities have over their revenue streams. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, however, both dimensions play a crucial part in shaping local 
governance arrangements – and therefore future studies that seek to understand 
subnational policy-making processes should take the role of vertical and horizontal 
actors into account. By assessing the extent to which municipalities are independent, 
interdependent or dependent along both of these dimensions, the power dependency 
framework developed for this thesis provides a useful lens through which scholars 
could examine these governance arrangements.  
 
By extension, (a lack of) internal capacity influences local policy-making more than 
political ideology, public opinion or any evidence-based assessment of what might be 
necessary to address issues at the municipal level. Therefore, it could prevent 
decision-makers from implementing (or even proposing) ambitious policies, 
particularly in wicked sectors where societal actors can exercise significant influence. 
In the specific case of climate change, this could mean that a failure to reduce global 
CO2 emissions might not necessarily be due to a lack of political will, but instead the 
inability of the political-administrative system to implement policy objectives. 
 
Such a scenario is perhaps more likely at the local level, since we might expect cash-
strapped municipalities to have less internal capacity than central governments. This 
highlights the importance of conducting micro-level studies along the lines of this 
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thesis, since all tiers of government have a crucial role to play in wicked policy 
sectors. Even if ambitious policy goals are agreed at the national or global level, such 
as the COP21 agreement on climate change that over 190 countries struck in Paris in 
December 2015, implementing the initiatives that will be necessary to achieve these 
objectives is likely to be a far more difficult task than negotiating the deal in the first 
place (Ferry and Eckersley, 2016). This is particularly the case given the continued 
trend towards state fragmentation in many Western countries, which is likely to 
weaken the influence of public bodies vis à vis societal actors even further. 
 
This brings us to the key finding within this thesis – that the support a municipality 
receives from other vertical actors is the key factor that shapes local governance. 
Notably, this finding conflicts with many critics of centralisation in England, who 
tend to promote the idea of ‘localism’ from a normative perspective and argue that 
greater autonomy for municipalities will enhance democracy and enable citizens to 
take more control over their lives (Jones and Stewart, 1983, Copus, 2010). Such 
perspectives do not take sufficient account of the fact that greater autonomy from 
central government is likely to mean reduced capacity within the municipality, 
particularly in countries like England, where local government has very little freedom 
to raise its own revenue. Perhaps reflecting the fact that they tend to come from a 
political science perspective (and therefore focus more on vertical than horizontal 
relationships), they fail to take sufficient account of how these reforms would affect 
the local context within which municipalities operate. For as this thesis has 
demonstrated, sub-national governments that receive less support from central 
institutions are weaker and less able to operate independently within their localities. 
 
By way of contrast, the highly-integrated nature of vertical relationships in Germany 
means that municipalities are in a much stronger position vis à vis other local actors. 
Indeed, this thesis has found that the phenomenon of Politikverflechtung was an 
inherently positive influence on policy-making in Gelsenkirchen – in contrast to those 
who have argued that it is slow and bureaucratic, and results in sub-optimal policy 
outcomes (Scharpf, 1988). These critics have tended to focus on the federal level 
(where capacity is perhaps less of a concern), rather than municipalities (which often 
need additional support to achieve their objectives, particularly in deprived cities such 
as Newcastle or Gelsenkirchen). Moreover, and in common with the proponents of 
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localism in England, they tend to take a purely political science approach and 
therefore do not focus sufficiently on how Politikverflechtung influences horizontal 
governing arrangements within localities. As we have seen, the strong vertical 
structures enabled Gelsenkirchen Council to punch at a much higher weight in local 
governance arrangements than Newcastle, which meant it could set more ambitious 
policy goals and have much more chance of achieving them. This applied to climate 
change strategy (where the German municipality received significant additional 
financial resources from the Land) and also in planning policy (where a more robust 
framework for sustainable development meant that Gelsenkirchen could not water-
down more rigorous environmental standards for new buildings). 
 
The other main criticism of Politikverflechtung – that it harms democratic 
accountability – dates back to when the term was first coined (Scharpf et al., 1976). 
Indeed, this argument was so persuasive that federal politicians sought to disentangle 
policy-making processes and clarify which government institutions had responsibility 
for specific sectors (Benz, 2008). Notably, however, it was put forward in an era 
before New Public Management (NPM) ideas such as outsourcing and privatisation 
had taken hold in Western democracies (particularly Germany), and therefore the state 
was still directly responsible for a much broader scope of public services. 
Jurisdictions that have embraced NPM in the period since the 1970s have struggled to 
co-ordinate policy-making between those actors that now have responsibility for 
public functions (Dunleavy and Margetts, 2006). Furthermore, this weakening and 
fragmentation of the state has strengthened the position of market actors in 
governance arrangements – particularly in municipalities, which have implemented 
more NPM reforms than central government in both of the countries studied for this 
project. Crucially, the fact public bodies now have less influence over policy-making 
than was previously the case raises even greater concerns about democratic 
accountability than the original critique of Politikverflechtung. This is because the 
more integrated nature of public institutions in Germany results in a stronger state, 
which means political decisions are more likely to reflect the will of elected officials 
and the public, rather than those of market actors and their shareholders. 
 
In spite of these concerns about the potentially negative influence of private 
companies on policy-making processes, this thesis does concur with the academic 
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consensus that decision-makers need to embrace a ‘governance’ approach to wicked 
issues such as climate change (see for example Wurzel et al., 2013). Nonetheless, 
there is a real risk that empowering other societal actors too much in governance 
arrangements can result in policies that favour private over public interests and/or 
initiatives that do not address crucial issues in an effective manner. Furthermore, 
because policy-making processes that involve a range of different stakeholders are 
invariably complex and difficult to analyse, this would raise significant concerns 
about democratic accountability. In other words, governance arrangements need to 
strike the correct balance between state hierarchy and societal engagement. The 
former can ensure that policies are sufficiently ambitious and designed with the public 
interest in mind, whereas the latter should mean they have enough support from other 
actors to be implemented successfully. Indeed, this principle applies not only to 
climate change policy-making in cities, but also to other policy sectors at all levels of 
government. 
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Appendix: Details of fieldwork interviews 
 
 
Date Reference 
number 
Method  Number of 
interviewee(s) 
Organisation 
06/01/2012 1 Face-to-face 2 Newcastle City Council 
16/02/2012 2 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
05/03/2012 3 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
11/06/2012 4 Face-to-face 1 Your Homes Newcastle 
23/07/2012 5 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
15/10/2012 6 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
09/11/2012 7 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
09/11/2012 8 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
16/11/2012 9 Face-to-face 2 Newcastle City Council 
27/02/2013 10 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
28/02/2013 11 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle Science Central 
08/04/2013 12 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
19/06/2013 13 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle University 
27/06/2013 14 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
27/06/2013 15 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
27/06/2013 16 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
09/07/2013 17 Face-to-face 2 Gelsenkirchen Council 
15/07/2013 18 Face-to-face 2 Gelsenkirchen Council 
16/07/2013 19 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
16/07/2013 20 Face-to-face 2 
Gelsenkirchen Council and 
Solarstadt Gelsenkirchen 
18/07/2013 21 Face-to-face 3 Gelsenkirchen Council 
18/07/2013 22 Face-to-face 2 Gelsenkirchen Council 
19/07/2013 23 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
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19/07/2013 24 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
22/07/2013 25 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
25/07/2013 26 Telephone 1 GMP Architects 
25/07/2013 27 Face-to-face 2 Münster Bezirksregierung 
22/09/2013 28 Telephone 1 
North Rhine-Westphalian 
Audit Commission 
28/09/2013 
29 
Email 
1 
SOL Community 
Association 
09/12/2013 30 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
08/05/2014 31 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle Science City 
10/06/2014 32 Face-to-face 1 Climate North East 
29/08/2014 33 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle Science City 
13/05/2015 34 Email 1 Newcastle City Council 
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